Appellate Advocates (Russ Altman-Merino of counsel), for appellant. Kings County District Attorney (Leonard Joblove, Ann Bordley and Michael Bierce of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Quynda L. Santacroce, J.), rendered April 4, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of attempted assault in the third degree, and imposed sentence. The appeal brings up for review an order of that court (Elizabeth N. Warin, J.) dated December 17, 2021 denying defendant's motion to strike the certificate of compliance as improper and to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

On February 28, 2021, an accusatory instrument was filed charging defendant with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). On May 28, 2021, the prosecutor informed the Criminal Court that the People were going to file an off-calendar certificate of compliance (COC), which included discovery material, and a statement of readiness (SOR), which included a CPL 30.30 (5-a) statement, later that day, which they did. Defense counsel stated that she had not yet received the COC and requested an adjournment to September 13, 2021 so that she could review the discovery material. The court adjourned the case to September 13th, on which date defense counsel informed the court that, on September 1, 2021, she had filed a CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument.

Defendant's motion sought to strike the COC filed on May 28, 2021 as improper, because [*2]the People had failed to provide delineated items which were allegedly automatically discoverable pursuant to CPL 245.20 (1), and to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds, as, upon the COC being stricken, the People would be chargeable with 185 days of delay from February 28, 2021 to September 1, 2021. The People opposed the motion arguing that they had satisfied their CPL 245.20 (1) discovery obligations. By order dated December 17, 2021, the Criminal Court (Elizabeth N. Warin, J.) denied defendant's motion, finding that the COC was proper and that the People were only chargeable with the 89-day period from February 28, 2021 to May 28, 2021. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty (Quynda L. Santacroce, J.) to attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]) in satisfaction of the accusatory instrument, and was sentenced as promised.

On appeal, defendant contends that the COC was improper, as the Criminal Court erroneously determined that the People had satisfied their CPL 245.20 (1) discovery obligations and, therefore, 185 days of delay were chargeable to the People for the period from February 28, 2021 to September 1, 2021. The People respond that the COC was not improper and, for the first time, argue that the 96-day period from May 28, 2021 (when the People filed their COC) to September 1, 2021 (when defendant filed his CPL 30.30 motion) was excludable.

Pursuant to CPL 30.30 (6), effective January 1, 2020, an "order finally denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to subdivision one of this section shall be reviewable upon an appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty." Here, the People had 90 days from the filing of the accusatory instrument on February 28, 2021 to announce their readiness for trial, as the most serious offense charged was a class A misdemeanor (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 356 [1980]). It is undisputed that 89 days of delay were chargeable to the People when they filed their off-calendar COC and SOR on May 28, 2021.

We note that this court has previously determined that review of legal questions as to the chargeability of speedy trial time that are clear on the record is not precluded by People v LaFontaine (92 NY2d 470 [1998]), regardless of whether the issue was addressed by the motion court (see People v Jacob, 83 Misc 3d 134[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51182[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]).TheCourt of Appeals stated in People v Garrett (23 NY3d 878, 885 n 2 [2014]) that LaFontaine does not prevent the review of all aspects of a single multipronged issue simply because the lower court neglected to mention one of those prongs (see generally People v Butler, 41 NY3d 186, 199 [2023]), and this analysis has been applied to the calculation of speedy trial time (see People v Mena, 29 AD3d 349, 350 [2006]; People v Salgado, 27 AD3d 71, 72 [2006]; Jacob, 2024 NY Slip Op 51182[U]; People v Pagan, 82 Misc 3d 1[App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023]; People v Larkins, 62 Misc 3d 147[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50218[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]).

A review of the record indicates that, on May 28, 2021, defense counsel requested an adjournment to September 13, 2021 so that she could review discovery material and, therefore, the 96-day period from May 28, 2021 to September 1, 2021, when defendant filed his 30.30 motion, is excludable. In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the issue of whether the COC filed on May 28, 2021 was improper, as statutory speedy trial time had, in any event, stopped running on May 28, when only 89 days of delay were chargeable to the People. Consequently, defendant's statutory speedy trial motion was properly denied.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.