The following numbered papers were used on this motion: NYSCEF Document Numbers 2-34.

Upon the foregoing papers, the Court having elected to determine the within motion on submission pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-f and IAS Part 2 Rules, Part II (Motions & Special Proceedings), Subpart C (Appearances & Post-Order Matters), Section 6 (Personal Appearances) ("All motions presumptively are to be argued in person unless the Court informs the parties at least two days in advance that it has made a sua sponte determination that a motion will be determined on submission."), and due deliberation having been had thereon,

It is hereby ORDERED as follows:

Defendants T.D. Wilson-Phillip (moving under the name Theresa D. Wilson-Phillips) and Ivor Stewart have moved in this 2009 action for personal injuries resulting from a March 7, 2007 motor vehicle accident, by order to show cause seeking the following relief:

1. Reinstating the action;

2. Vacating the default judgment and monetary judgment against Defendants WILSON-PHILLIPS and STEWART;

3. Lifting the restraint on bank account owned by non-debtor OSWIN GLENRICK WILSON's and Defendant WILSON-PHILLIPS restrained account and restoring the funds that were improperly removed; and

4. Granting Defendant such other and further relief as the Court may deem just, proper, and equitable (NYSCEF Doc No. 12 at 1-2 [quoted without correction of errors]).

Defendants claim that the default judgment entered against them ^[FN2] must be vacated due to lack of personal jurisdiction, as per CPLR 5015 (a) (3) and (4) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6 5), which provide:

(a) On motion. The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of:

. . .

3. fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; or

4. lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order[.]

Defendants also rely upon CPLR 317 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6 34), which provides in pertinent part:

A person served with a summons other than by personal delivery to him or to his agent for service designated under rule 318, within or without the state, who does not appear may be allowed to defend the action within one year after he obtains knowledge of entry of the judgment, but in no event more than five years after such entry, upon a finding of the court that he did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense.

In claiming lack of personal jurisdiction, Defendants maintain that they were not served pursuant to CPLR 308, which contains the provisions for personal service upon a natural person (see NYSCEF Doc No. 620-22).

Included as an exhibit by Defendants are the affidavits of service attesting to them being served with the summons and complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 7). Process server Linden Blackman swore on October 30, 2009, that on October 23, 2009, at 130-26 126th Street, So. Ozone Park, NY 11420, he served Defendant T.D. Wilson-Phillip by delivering a copy to Marjorie (Smith), co-tenant who refused a last name, and by mailing a copy to said Defendant at said address, it being her last known residence and usual place of abode. Process server Curtis Warren swore on October 15, 2009, that on October 10, 2009, at 969 E. 78 St. 2nd floor, Brooklyn, NY 11236, he served Defendant Ivor Stewart by delivering a copy to Tricia Graham, co-tenant, and by mailing a copy to said Defendant at said address, it being his last known residence and usual place of abode. Each process server provided a physical description of the respective person to whom a copy was delivered.

Defendants submitted a joint affidavit, asserting, inter alia, that (1) They had been domestic partners for several years before the subject motor vehicle accident; (2) At the time of [*2]the 2007 accident, they had resided at 130-26 126th Street, So. Ozone Park, NY11420, but sometime in Summer 2009, they relocated and moved to 181 Holland Avenue, Elmont, NY 11003; (3) They did not reside in Brooklyn, New York, in 2009; (4) They were never served with the summons and complaint or any other legal documents in this action, including the judgment; (5) Defendant Stewart did not know a Tricia Graham; (6) Defendant Wilson-Phillips did not know a Marjorie; (7) They did not receive a copy of the motion for a default judgment; and (8) A garnishment was placed on a bank account of non-party Oswin Glenrick Wilson where Defendant Wilson-Phillips, his sister, is an owner by convenience (see NYSCEF Doc No. 9). Additionally, Defendants asserted that their car was one of several involved in the subject motor vehicle accident, that they had insurance, that insurance covered repair of their car, and that they had no knowledge of anyone suffering personal injuries.

Among the arguments made by Plaintiff are that Defendants submitted a mere denial of receipt of service, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service created by a properly executed affidavit of service and that a traverse hearing (sought by Defendants) is not necessary where, as here, Defendants did not submit any documentary evidence to rebut the process servers' affidavits (see NYSCEF Doc No. 15).

The Appellate Division, Second Department, has stated:

To vacate a default pursuant to CPLR 317, a defendant who has not been served pursuant to CPLR 308 (1) does not have to establish a reasonable excuse for his or her default, but must show that he or she did not actually receive notice of the action in time to defend it, and must further show that he or she has a potentially meritorious defense (see Wassertheil v Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d 753, 753 [2012]; Matter of Rockland Bakery, Inc. v B.M. Baking Co., Inc., 83 AD3d 1080, 1081 [2011]). The mere denial of the receipt of the summons and complaint is insufficient to rebut the presumption of service established by a process server's affidavit (see Wassertheil v Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d at 753; Rockland Bakery, Inc. v B.M. Baking Co., Inc., 83 AD3d at 1081-1082; Irwin Mtge. Corp. v Devis, 72 AD3d 743 [2010]; Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v Girault, 60 AD3d 984, 984 [2009]; Hamlet on Olde Oyster Bay Homeowners Assn., Inc. v Ellner, 57 AD3d 732, 732 [2008]; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Schotter, 50 AD3d 983 [2008]). However, a sworn denial of service containing specific facts generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by the process server's affidavit, and necessitates an evidentiary hearing (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Christie, 83 AD3d 824, 825 [2011]). (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v DaCosta, 97 AD3d 630, 631 [2d Dept 2012].)

In DaCosta, the Appellate Division found that the factual recitation in the defendants' sworn denial of service sufficed to warrant a traverse hearing. However, a "defendant's conclusory and unsubstantiated denial of service [is] insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service established by the duly executed affidavit of service" (U.S. Bank N.A. v Hasan, 126 AD3d 683, 684 [2d Dept 2015]). "In order to warrant a hearing to determine the validity of service of process, the denial of service must be substantiated by specific, detailed facts that contradict the affidavit of service" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Benitez, 179 AD3d 891, 892 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

A similar standard is applied to a motion to vacate a default pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Simpson, 208 AD3d 1305 [2d Dept 2022]; Ross v Sunrise Home Improvement, 186 AD3d 633 [2d Dept 2020]).

This Court finds that Defendants failed to submit specific, detailed facts contradicting the affidavits of service, which are imbued with the presumption of regularity. Defendants' assertions consist of nothing more than an unsubstantiated claim that they moved in the summer of 2009 from the South Ozone Park address listed in one of the affidavits of service to an address in Elmont. They do not deny that they had resided at the addresses listed in the affidavits of service. Indeed, they have not detailed what their connections were to the addresses at which service was effectuated. They have submitted no documentation as to their usual place of abode on the dates of service of the summons and complaint, such as a lease, deed, mortgage, utility bill, or redacted tax return. They have not submitted any government-issued indicia of residence, such as a driver license, vehicle registration, or voter registration card.

A defendant's claim that she moved to another location amounts to nothing more than a mere denial of receipt (see Xiao Lou Li v China Cheung Gee Realty, LLC, 139 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2016]). Here, the Defendants' proffer amounts to nothing more than a mere denial of receipt which is unaccompanied by supporting documentation. As such, they have failed to make out a prima facie case warranting a traverse hearing.

A CPLR 317 motion to vacate a judgment entered upon default requires a showing of a potentially meritorious defense, but Defendants offered no specific details of the motor vehicle accident which might have shown one. Therefore, in addition to not making a sufficient showing to contradict the process servers' affidavit, their efforts to rely on CPLR 317 to vacate the judgment are to no avail (see Professional Offshore Opportunity Fund, Ltd. v Braider, 121 AD3d 766, 769 [2d Dept 2014]). Also, this motion was made more than five years after entry of judgment (see CPLR 317).

Not having made a sufficient showing to rebut the process servers' affidavit, reliance on CPLR 5015 (a) (4) is unavailing (see Simpson, 208 AD3d 1305; 186 AD3d 633). The Court did possess jurisdiction to enter judgment.

With respect to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), Defendants "failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff engaged in any fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct which would warrant vacating [their] default in appearing or answering the complaint (see Professional Offshore Opportunity Fund, Ltd. v Braider, 121 AD3d 766 [2014]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Hampton, 119 AD3d 856 [2014]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Allen, 102 AD3d 955 [2013])" (Hasan, 126 AD3d at 684).

It is true that the resolution of cases on the merits is favored (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Persaud, 234 AD3d 982 [2d Dept 2025]; Bardes v Pintado, 115 AD3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2014]; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56 [2d Dept 2013]). It is also true that the law reflects society's interest in giving repose to human affairs, and this is furthered by deadlines which lead to stability and predictability when enforced (see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel, 37 NY3d 1, 20 [2021]). Judicial economy is also enhanced through the enforcement of deadlines (see Blanco v American Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 NY2d at 773-774 [1997]). Repose to judicial proceedings and the preservation of judicial resources is favored (see U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v Rahman, 218 AD3d 626, 628 [2d Dept 2023]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Quinn, 186 AD3d 561, 563 [2d Dept 2020]; Campbell v Campbell, 107 AD3d 929, 930 [2d Dept 2013]; Sanchez v Sanchez, 79 AD2d 651, 653 [2d Dept 1980, Cohalan, J., concurring] ["to hold a hearing now on the traverse, almost two decades after service was effected in the declaratory judgment action . . . is unfair. There should be a statute of repose on such a matter. . . ."]; Sieger v Sieger, 17 Misc 3d 1101[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51787[U], *7 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2007]; cf. Yarbough v Franco, 95 NY2d 342 [2000] [half-year delay]).

The subject judgment was docketed in 2014. It was a matter of record. Moving defendants are charged with at least constructive notice of it (cf. Charles v Berman, 191 AD3d 632 [2d Dept 2021] [judgment not docketed properly]). A 10-year-plus delay in moving pursuant to CPLR 505 (a) (4) was factored into account by the court in North Side Sav. Bank v Rosati (32 AD3d 921 [2d Dept 2006]), in denying the defendant vacatur of a judgment on the asserted grounds of lack of proper service of process. The equities do not lie with moving defendants herein who moved to vacate the judgment so long after its entry. Therefore, the Court finds that interests of justice do not support vacatur of the judgment (see Wilson v Saini, 221 AD3d 847, 849 [2d Dept 2023] [failure to rebut presumption of proper service created by the affidavit]; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Dev, 176 AD3d 691, 693 [2d Dept 2019] [failure to provide any evidence of fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect]; Cox v Marshall, 161 AD3d 1140, 1142 [2d Dept 2018] [discretion reserved for unique or unusual circumstances]; Kleynerman v MJGC Home Care, 153 AD3d 1246 [2d Dept 2017] [failure to establish CPLR 5015 (a) grounds to vacate]; Katz v Marra, 74 AD3d 888 [2d Dept 2010] [claims of financial distress not sufficient to justify exercise of court's inherent discretionary power to vacate judgment in interests of substantial justice]; NYCTL 2005-A Trust v 2137-2153 Nostrand Ave. Assoc., L.P., 69 AD3d 697 [2d Dept 2010] [equities did not favor movant]).

All other arguments of movants are rejected. This includes the claim that the judgment is no longer enforceable due to its expiration. "Although a New York money judgment is enforceable for 20 years (see CPLR 211[b], a real property lien resulting from the judgment is viable for only 10 years (see CPLR 5203[a])" (Premier Capital, LLC v Best Traders, Inc., 88 AD3d 677, 677 [2d Dept 2011]). The minor errors in the judgment are insignificant (see Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v American Express Co., 74 NY2d 153 [1989]; First Manufactured Hous. Credit Corp. v Clarkson Mobile Home Park, 148 AD2d 901 [3d Dept 1989]). If Plaintiff runs into difficulties in enforcing the judgment, leave is granted to file an amended one.

It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion to vacate the judgment and seeking other relief is DENIED in its entirety.