The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 were read on this motion to/for DISMISS.

Upon the foregoing documents, defendants PV Holding Corporation ("PV Holding") and Zipcar Inc. ("Zipcar") (together, "corporate defendants") move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them (Motion Seq. 001). Plaintiff Chrysanthius Spann-Williams ("Plaintiff") opposes and cross-moves for summary judgment on liability as against all defendants. Defendant the City of New York (the "City") separately moves to dismiss the complaint as against it (Motion Seq. 002). For the reasons set forth herein, the corporate defendants' motion is granted, the cross-motion is denied, and the City's motion is granted.

In this action, Plaintiff seeks damages arising from a motor vehicle collision that allegedly occurred on June 29, 2023, at approximately 1:00 p.m. at the intersection of Willims [*2]and Liberty Avenues, in the County of Kings, New York (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, complaint). As alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle bearing Florida license plate number 26BYQM, and Santiago was driving a vehicle bearing New York license plate number LFC4095 (id. ¶ 10, 13). Plaintiff alleges that the collision occurred when she was proceeding lawfully on Liberty Avenue approaching the intersection of Williams Avenue, in Kings County, New York, when Santiago disregarded a stop sign causing the collision (NYSCEF Doc No. 66, Gross aff ¶ 17).

On February 15, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint in Kings County Supreme Court (NYSCEF Doc No. 1). Defendants Shaheeda Helanee Santiago ("Santiago") and the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") filed their answer on March 11, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc No. 8). The City filed an answer on March 14, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc No. 18). The corporate defendants filed their answer on April 23, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc No. 35). On September 13, 2024, the matter was transferred to this court following a motion to change venue (NYSCEF Doc No. 41).

In motion sequence 001, the corporate defendants move pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint and any cross-claims against them on the grounds that the corporate defendants are engaged in renting and leasing motor vehicles and are therefore immune to claims of vicarious liability pursuant to 49 USC § 30106. In support of their motion, the corporate defendants submit an affirmation of Jeanne Motosko ("Motosko"), the Regional Insurance Risk Manager for Avis Budget Car Rental LLC, who attests that the vehicle bearing license plate number LCF4095 is owned by defendant PV Holding, the title-holding corporation for Avis Budget Rental Car LLC and its subsidiaries (NYSCEF Doc No. 52, Teles aff in support, exhibit G). The corporate defendants also submit copies of the title and registration for the vehicle to demonstrate ownership (id., exhibits H, I). Motosko also attests that the corporate defendants are in the business of renting vehicles in the short term to the general public pursuant to membership agreements, and, at the time of the collision, a partnership agreement existed between Zipcar and NYCHA (id. ¶¶ 12-13, exhibit J). Finally, Motosko attests that between the date the vehicle was placed into service and the date of the collision, there were no mechanical complaints regarding the vehicle and the vehicle received normal routine maintenance (id. ¶ 14). The corporate defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claims against them because federal law 49 USC § 30106 (the "Graves Amendment") expressly prohibits states from imposing vicarious liability on vehicle owners (or an affiliate of the owner) engaged in the business of renting or leasing vehicles where the accident did not occur due to any fault of the owner (or its affiliates).

Plaintiff opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment on liability as against all defendants. Plaintiff argues that the corporate defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because the Graves Amendment does not apply to actions where claims for actual negligence are asserted against the vehicle owner, and the complaint alleges that she was injured as a result of the corporate defendants' management, maintenance, control, repair, and inspection of the vehicle. She contends that summary judgement should be denied because the corporate defendants have not provided proof that the vehicle was in good working condition. She also asserts that her complaint articulates a viable claim for negligent entrustment against the corporate defendants. In support of Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on liability, she argues that she has established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating that the collision was caused by Santiago's failure to yield at a stop sign in [*3]violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1172, 1142, and 1110 (a). In support of the motion, Plaintiff submits an affidavit in which she attests that the failure to yield was the cause of the collision (NYSCEF Doc No. 67, Spann-Williams aff ¶¶ 3-5).

Santiago and NYCHA (together, the "NYCHA defendants") oppose the cross-motion for summary judgment. They argue that Plaintiff's motion is premature because there are outstanding questions of material of fact regarding the cause of the collision, as demonstrated by affidavits Santiago and non-party Paul Hamilton, who was a passenger in the vehicle driven by Santiago at the time of the collision.

The City also opposes the motion and separately moves to dismiss the complaint as against it (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 86, 70, opposition and notice of motion). The City argues that the complaint should be dismissed as against it because it does not own, operate, manage, maintain, or control the subject vehicle, does not employ Santiago, and that Santiago is employed by NYCHA, which is a separate legal entity from the City. The City's motion is unopposed.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to CPLR § 3212 (b), a motion for summary judgment "shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proofs submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the [c]ourt as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party" (CPLR § 3212[b]). "The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact in dispute, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (Dallas-Stephenson v Waisman, 39 AD3d 303, 306 [1st Dept 2007]). The movant's burden is "heavy," and "on a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" (William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers and Auctioneers, Inc. v Rabizadeh, 22 NY3d 470, 475 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Upon a proffer of evidence establishing a prima facie case by the movant, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of producing evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to necessitate a trial of material questions of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). For an issue of fact to be considered "material," it must be genuine, bona fide, and substantial enough to require a trial (Leumi Financial Corp. v Richter, 24 AD2d 855 [1st Dept 1965]). A motion for summary judgment should not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where issues of credibility exist (Ruiz v Griffin, 71 AD3d 1112, 1115 [2d Dept 2010]). However, "mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to overcome a motion for summary judgment (Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562, supra).

The corporate defendants move for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint as against them on the grounds that the Graves Amendment precludes liability against the leasing company in a motor vehicle accident. "Under the Graves Amendment, the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle cannot be held vicariously liable for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)" (Villa-Capellan v Mendoza, 135 AD3d 555, 556 [1st Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The Graves Amendment supersedes VTL § 388, which otherwise imputes liability to the vehicle's registered owner. To establish their entitlement to summary judgment under the Graves Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate, [*4]by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form, that (1) they are engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, (2) they leased the vehicle involved in the accident, (3) the subject accident occurred during the period of the lease or rental and (4) there is no triable issue of fact as to the plaintiff's allegation of negligent maintenance contributing to the accident (Muslar v Hall, 214 AD3d 77, 81 [1st Dept 2023]).

The corporate defendants have met their burden on this motion by submitting the Motosko affirmation and exhibits thereto. In the affirmation, Motosko attests that she is a Regional Insurance Risk Manager for Avis Budget Car Rental LLC ("Avis"), an affiliated company and parent company of Zipcar, and that she is personally familiar with the record keeping practice and procedures of Avis and the corporate defendants, and she personally reviewed the books and records maintained in the ordinary course of business (NYSCEF Doc No. 59, Motosko aff ¶¶ 1-2). Motosko further attests that PV Holding is the registered owner of the vehicle driven by Santiago on the date in question, which was driven by Santiago pursuant to a membership account and partnership agreement between Zipcar and NYCHA (id. ¶¶ 7-9). Finally, she attests that her personal review of the maintenance reports kept in the ordinary course of business by the corporate defendants demonstrates that an inspection was performed on the vehicle on May 14, 2023, and the vehicle was found to be in proper order, and a state inspection was performed on the vehicle on May 23, 2023, which the vehicle passed, and between these dates and the date of the collision, there were no complaints of mechanical issues, no repairs made on the vehicle, and the vehicle received normal maintenance (id. ¶¶ 11-12). Copies of the title and registration for the vehicle are annexed to the affirmation. This is sufficient to satisfy the corporate defendant's prima facie burden entitlement to summary judgment under the Graves Amendment (see e.g., Harewood v Zip Car, 189 AD3d 1192, 1193 [2d Dept 2020]).

Plaintiff's argument that the Graves Amendment is inapplicable because the complaint alleges that she was injured as a result of the corporate defendants' management, maintenance, control, repair, and inspection of the vehicle is unpersuasive because the complaint does not contain any factual allegations regarding any manner in which the condition of the vehicle contributed to the attributed to the collision. Additionally, Plaintiff attests in an affidavit submitted in support of her cross-motion that "[t]he accident occurred as a result of the defendant driver disregarding a stop sign at the intersection of Liberty Avenue and Williams Avenue" (NYSCEF Doc No. 67, Spann-Williams aff ¶ 8). Plaintiff's affidavit contains no allegations regarding the condition of the vehicle. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed as against the corporate defendants.

Plaintiff also cross-moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability. A plaintiff in a negligence action moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability must establish, prima facie, that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injuries (Fernandez v Ortiz, 183 AD3d 443, 443-444 [1st Dept 2020]). A party's violation of the VTL constitutes negligence per se [Davis v Turner, 132 AD3d 603, 603 [1st Dept 2015]). Plaintiff argues she is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability because Santiago violated VTL §§ 1172, 1142, and 1110 (a), causing the collision. Section 1172 (a) of the VTL provides, in relevant part, that "every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or in the event there is no crosswalk, at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of the [*5]approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection and the right to proceed shall be subject to the provisions of section eleven hundred forty-two." Pursuant to VTL § 1142 (a) "every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop . . . and after having stopped shall yield the right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection." Finally, VTL § 1110 (a) provides that "[e]very person shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable to him."

In support of the cross-motion, Plaintiff submits an affidavit in which she attests that the collision occurred as follows:

I was proceeding Westbound on Liberty Avenue approaching the intersection of Williams Avenue, in the county of Kings, State of New York. Liberty Avenue is a two-way road with one lane of travel in each direction as well as a parking lane in each direction. There is a double solid yellow line separating the directions of travel. At the intersection of Liberty Avenue and Williams Avenue, there is a stop sign controlling the vehicles traveling on Williams Avenue only. As I was proceeding on Liberty Avenue, a motor vehicle bearing New York State license plate number LCF4095 traveling on Williams Avenue disobeyed the stop sign causing a collision with the motor vehicle I was operating.

The NYCHA defendants oppose the motion and argue that questions of fact exist regarding liability. In opposition, they submit affidavits from Santiago and from Paul Hamilton, who was a passenger in the vehicle driven by Santiago at the time of the collision. In her affidavit, Santiago confirms that Williams Avenue is a one-way street with one lane for moving traffic with parking on both sides of the road, that Liberty Avenue is a two-way road with one lane for moving traffic in each direction and parking on both sides of the road, and that there is a stop sign at the intersection for Williams Avenue only (NYSCEF Doc No. 91, Santiago aff ¶ 3). She attests that, as she travelled on Willimas Avenue, she "came to a full stop at the stop sign," where she "looked both to [her] left and right and did not see any oncoming traffic" (id. ¶ 4). She continues that her vision was impeded at the stop because "the stop sign was set back a bit," so she "inched up to the intersection and once again came to a full stop" (id. ¶¶ 4-5). She continues that "while stopped, I again looked to my left and did not see any oncoming traffic, [] then looked to my right and observed a vehicle approximately two blocks away" (id. ¶ 5). Seeing that the vehicle was two blocks away, Santigo states she began to proceed forward, but as she did so, she "observed the vehicle was travelling at an excessive speed and was fast approaching . . . [s]ince the vehicle was fast approaching and not slowing down, [I] once again applied my brakes coming to a full stop" (id. ¶ 6). Finally, Santiago avers that she "stopped with plenty of room for the oncoming vehicle to pass and nothing blocking the vision between our vehicles," but "the other vehicle did not pass," and instead "struck the front passenger side of my stopped vehicle" (id. ¶ 6).

In his affidavit, Hamilton attests that he observed the events as Santiago recited them, adding that he observed her repeatedly look both directions before proceeding through the intersection, that the other vehicle was moving at "an excessive speed," and that "[i]t seemed apparent that the other vehicle did not observe us, even though Liberty Avenue was a flat straight road and there was nothing blocking the vision between our vehicles" (id. ¶ 6). He also [*6]attests that "the oncoming vehicle had plenty of room to pass," but did not and instead "the front driver side of the other vehicle struck the front passenger side of the stopped vehicle I was in" (id.). Finally, he asserts that, "[t]he accident would not have occurred had plaintiff not been traveling at an excessive rate of speed and/or had been paying attention to her surroundings" (id. ¶ 7).

The Appellate Division, First Department, "has repeatedly held that it cannot be said as a matter of law that one driver's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident simply because his approach into the intersection was regulated by a stop sign whereas no traffic control devices regulated the other driver's approach" (Nevarez v S.R.M. Mgmt. Corp., 58 AD3d 295, 297 [1st Dept 2008]). Here, the conflicting testimony offered on the motion raises an issue of fact regarding which party had the right-of-way. Both Santiago and Hamilton attest that Santiago came to a complete stop at the stop sign—first upon reaching it, and again after inching forward to obtain a clearer view of the intersecting roadway before proceeding into the intersection. They both also aver that Plaintiff's vehicle was two blocks away when Santiago entered the intersection. Accordingly, material questions of fact remain as to which vehicle entered the intersection first, and whether Plaintiff's vehicle was approaching with such proximity as to constitute an immediate hazard at the time Santiago proceeded into the intersection. Moreover, Santiago and Hamilton's testimony that Plaintiff's vehicle collided with the passenger side of the vehicle driven by Santiago creates a reasonable probability that the vehicle driven by Santiago crossed the intersection first (see id. at 298 ["Indeed, it is undisputed that Rodriguez's vehicle broadsided plaintiff's vehicle, which creates a reasonable probability that plaintiff's car had crossed the intersection first."]).

A motorist always has a duty to operate their vehicle with reasonable care, which encompasses the duty to see what there is to be seen with the proper use of one's senses (Ohlhausen v City of New York, 73 AD3d 89, 92 [1st Dept 2010], citing PJI 2:77, 2:77.1; Gutierrez v Hoyt Transp. Corp., 117 AD3d 420, 420 [1st Dept 2014]). This duty is necessarily owed to everyone else on the roads (Ohlhausen, 73 AD3d at 93, supra). Santiago and Hamilton's testimony—that Plaintiff was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and had sufficient space to pass but failed to do so—further raises issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff exercised reasonable care to avoid the collision and whether her speed contributed to its occurrence (see Nevarez, 58 AD at 298). In light of these outstanding questions of fact, the motion is denied as to the NYCHA defendants.

The motion is also denied as to the remaining defendants, who are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as otherwise provided herein.

B. The City's Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss brought under CPLR § 3211, the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [citations omitted]). Ambiguous allegations must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor (see JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 NY3d 759, 764 [2015]). The court must be liberally construe the complaint and "accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and any submissions in opposition to the dismissal motion" (511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002] [internal citations omitted]). However, a pleading consisting of "bare legal conclusions" is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss (Leder v Spiegel, 31 AD3d 266, 267 [1st Dept 2006], affd 9 NY3d [*7]836 [2007], cert denied 552 US 1257 [2008]) and "the court is not required to accept factual allegations that are plainly contradicted by the documentary evidence or legal conclusions that are unsupportable based upon the undisputed facts" (Robinson v Robinson, 303 AD2d 234, 235 [1st Dept 2003]).

The City has met its burden on this unopposed motion by demonstrating that it does not own, operate, manage, maintain, or control the subject vehicle, does not employ Santiago, and that Santiago is employed by NYCHA, which is a separate legal entity from the City. The party submissions on the cross-motions for summary judgment further demonstrate that PV Holding is the registered owner of the vehicle driven by Santiago on the date in question and that Santiago is employed by NYCHA, which is a separate entity from the City. Therefore, the motion is granted, and the complaint and all cross-claims are dismissed as against the City.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants PV Holding Corporation and Zipcar Inc. (Motion Seq. 001) is granted, and the complaint and all crossclaims or counterclaims are dismissed against them; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of defendants PV Holding Corporation and Zipcar Inc. dismissing the claims and cross-claims made against them in this action, together with costs and disbursements to be taxed by the Clerk upon submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by the City of New York is granted and the complaint and all cross-claims and counterclaims against the City are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the balance of the action is severed and shall continue; and it is further

ORDERED that this matter is referred to the General Clerk of the Court for reassignment to a General IAS Part.

This constitutes the order and decision of the court.