Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

Upon the reading of the foregoing cited papers and following oral arguments held August 20, 2025 on plaintiffs' Order to Show Cause seeking an Order for Consent to Change attorney of record pursuant to CPLR 321(b)(2) and declaring that the attorney of record does not have a charging lien against the settlement moneys pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475, and upon the filing of an affidavit of service, and upon no opposition filed by defendant, Mr. Arkady Smikun, or by the attorney of record Mr. Daniel E. Rausher, Esq. and upon no appearance by Mr. Daniel E. [*2]Rausher, Esq. and upon appearance of movant counsel, on this day, the Order to Show Cause is resolved as follows:

The attorney of record, Mr. Daniel E. Rausher, Esq., is believed to be undergoing a health-related procedure that requires long term recovery. Moreover, plaintiff Agovic submitted exhibits in support of the motion which included a letter dated February 13, 2020, stating that Mr. Rausher was suffering from a prolonged illness. The letter also set forth the extensive legal services which were rendered and expenses incurred in order to reach a $100,000.00 settlement on behalf of plaintiff Agovic. Also included as an exhibit was a Release and Settlement dated December 9, 2023 for $100,000.00 signed by Sadat Agovic and an email dated July 17, 2024 from Hereford Insurance Company acknowledging that the matter was settled as of October 3, 2023. However, the Hereford Insurance representative noted that the closing papers "had not yet been received" (emphasis added) from Mr. Rausher.

Judiciary Law § 475 specifically states that the lien is conferred upon "the attorney who appears for a party." It is undisputed that Mr. Rausher appeared as "attorney of record" for plaintiff and his legal expertise led to a $100,000.00 settlement. Therefore, Mr. Rausher is entitled to a charging lien (Rodriguez v. City of New York, 66 NY2d 825, 827 [1985]).

Judiciary Law § 475, which codifies the common law charging lien, states as follows:

"From the commencement of an action...the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, judgment or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or determination. The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce the lien" (Judiciary Law § 475).

It is immutable that the legislature's objective was to provide security to attorneys by giving them a lien upon an action in which an attorney provided professional services (Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 173 NY 492, 499 [1903]) ["lien upon a judgment was not created by statute, but was 'a device invented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients by disabling their clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained.' "] [citations omitted]; Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F3d 442, 449 [2d Cir. 1998] ["Lord Kenyon observed that it had been 'settled long ago, that a party should not run away with the fruits of the cause without satisfying the legal demands of his attorney, by whose industry, and in many instances at whose expense, those fruits are obtained' " (quoting Read v. Dupper, 101 Eng. Rep. 595, 596 [1795])].

However, a client has a right to discharge his attorney at any time (Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, 64 NY2d 977, 979 [1985]). When an attorney is discharged by a client for cause before the completion of the of services the attorney has no right to compensation or to a retaining lien (In re Weitling, 266 NY 184, 187 [1935]). Here, Mr. Rausher settled the matter before he was discharged as counsel.

Accordingly, as Mr. Rausher settled the matter while he was the attorney of record, he is entitled to maintain his charging lien to recover attorney fees and disbursements relative to this action.

ORDERED that the portion of plaintiff's Order to Show Cause requesting to change of counsel is granted. The attorney Daniel E. Rausher, Esq. shall be relieved as counsel of record [*3]for plaintiffs Ermina Balic and Sadat Agovic. Mr. Richard A. Klass, Esq. shall be substituted as attorney of record upon the filing of a Notice of Appearance; and it is further

ORDERED that the charging lien of Daniel E. Rausher, Esq., remains in place pursuant to the retainer agreement between attorney Daniel E. Rausher, Esq., and plaintiffs, Sadat Agovic and, if applicable, Ermina Balic, and same branch of plaintiffs' order to show cause is denied.

ORDERED that Mr. Richard A. Klass shall serve Mr. Daniel E. Rausher, Esq. with this Order with a Notice of Entry by overnight mail and electronic mail delivery within fifteen days of the filing date of this Order.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.