[*2]CPLR § 2219(a) Statement

The Court has considered the following papers numbered NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-6 on Petitioner Richard Edwards's application for pre-action disclosure and preservation of evidence under CPLR § 3102 [c], Respondent's opposition, and Petitioner's reply: (1) Notice of Petition and Verified Petition with attorney affirmation and supporting materials (Docs. 1-2); (2) Request for Judicial Intervention and addendum (Docs. 3-4); (3) Affirmation in Opposition by Respondent New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities ("OPWDD") (Doc. 5); and (4) Reply Affirmation (Doc. 6).

It is alleged that on June 24, 2024, at approximately 6:50 a.m., Petitioner, then employed as a driver for United Cerebral Palsy, was lawfully exiting Staten Island Developmental Center, Building 11, 1150 Forest Hill Road, Staten Island, when the interior set of automatic swinging doors at the front entrance closed on him with force, pinning him until staff intervened. He was thrown to the ground, striking his head and right side, and was transported by ambulance to Richmond University Medical Center. He was diagnosed with a right hip fracture and underwent a total hip replacement on June 26, 2024; he was discharged on July 2, 2024. He now uses a walker and wheelchair, has not returned to work, and has been separated from his employment.

Seeking to identify who installed, maintained, inspected, or repaired the automatic doors, Petitioner obtained records from OPWDD. Those records reflect that three entities submitted proposals to replace automatic swinging doors, Cee Jay Real Estate Development Corp., J.S.K. Construction Corp., and Sanz Construction Inc., and that four additional entities visited the site, All Aces Corp., Sampson Laurier Williams Corp., Dormakaba USA Inc., and Milano of Richmondtown Corp. The records do not reveal who, if anyone, was awarded a contract, who performed maintenance or repairs, or whether OPWDD conducted any internal investigation of the malfunction. Petitioner's counsel sent letters of representation to all seven entities. Milano of Richmondtown Corp. responded that it bid on replacement work but that no replacement contract was awarded, and the original doors remain; Dormakaba's insurer disclaimed knowledge; five entities did not respond.

Petitioner commenced this special proceeding under CPLR § 3102 [c], seeking (i) a deposition of an OPWDD representative with knowledge of contractual arrangements and responsibilities for the doors; (ii) preservation and production of contracts, bids, proposals, work orders, maintenance and inspection records for one year up to and including June 24, 2024; and (iii) preservation and production of documents created in the ordinary course concerning any OPWDD investigation into the incident.

OPWDD opposes and seeks dismissal under CPLR § 3211 [a] [8] and CPLR § 307, arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because any suit against a state agency is essentially against the State and belongs in the Court of Claims; OPWDD also argues Petitioner failed to effect proper service on the Attorney General. In support, OPWDD cites authority addressing suits against the State for damages. OPWDD further notes the motion papers were received by OPWDD on August 21, 2025 and that no service was made on the Attorney General.

In reply, Petitioner clarifies he is not seeking damages against OPWDD or the State, acknowledges that a damages action against the State would implicate statute-of-limitations and service issues, and states the sole purpose of this proceeding is to obtain discovery to identify private [*3]entities who may be responsible for the malfunctioning doors so that a proper complaint can be framed against them. Petitioner reiterates the statutory focus on aiding in bringing an action, avoiding waste, and preserving essential evidence.

I. The Statutory Framework and Threshold Showing Under CPLR § 3102 [c]

CPLR § 3102 [c] authorizes disclosure "to aid in bringing an action, to preserve information or to prevent injustice." The Verified Petition situates this request squarely within those purposes. Petitioner has described a concrete incident causing serious injury; he asserts a negligence claim against whomever was responsible for installation, inspection, maintenance, and/or repair of the automatic doors that allegedly malfunctioned. The petition articulates why standard post-commencement disclosure is ill-suited here: despite diligent efforts, Petitioner cannot presently discern which among seven identified entities (or others) held contractual obligations or performed work related to the doors. The Petition cites authorities recognizing that pre-action disclosure is available when facts constituting a viable claim are shown and additional information is necessary to identify prospective defendants and frame the action, and that the statute exists to avoid wasteful litigation against improperly named parties and to prevent injustice that flows from evidentiary loss. (see, e.g., In re Houlihan-Parnes, Realtors, 58 AD2d 629 [2d Dept 1977]; Application of Pelley, 43 Misc 2d 1082 [Nassau County Court 1964]; Wien & Malkin L.L.P. v. Wichman, 255 AD2d 244 [1st Dept 1998]; Ero v. Graystone Materials, 252 AD2d 812 [3d Dept 1998]; Stewart v. New York City Transit Authority, 112 AD2d 939 [2d Dept 1985]; Hughes v Witco Corporation-Chemprene Div., 175 AD2d 486 [3d Dept 1991]; Rosenberg v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 80 AD2d 834 [2d Dept 1981]; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 62 Misc 2d 1025 [Sup Ct Monroe County 1970]); and treatise commentaries noted in the Petition.

Measured against that standard, Petitioner has met the threshold. The incident, injury, and asserted theory are set out with specificity; what is missing is the identity and role of the proper defendants. Those identifications are "material and necessary" to the very commencement and framing of suit. The Petition also seeks preservation of records central to responsibility for the doors (contracts, work orders, maintenance, inspection, and investigative materials) so that evidence does not disappear. The Petition cites authority approving preservation orders in comparable settings where loss or alteration of key physical or documentary evidence would cause irreparable prejudice. (see, e.g., Ne Spraggins v Current Cab Corp., 127 Misc 2d 774 [Sup Ct New York County 1985]; O'Grady v. City of New York, 164 Misc 2d 171 [Sup Ct New York County 1995]; Thomas v New York City Transit Police Dep't, 91 AD2d 898 [1st Dept 1983]; Application of Sarlo, 52 Misc 2d 547 [Sup Ct Kings County 1966]).

II. Why Pre-Action Relief, Not Subpoena, Is the Proper Vehicle

Before suit is filed, and before defendants are identified, CPLR § 3102 [c] is the statutory mechanism for carefully tailored disclosure "to aid in bringing an action." The Petitioners' request is not an attempt to conduct full merits discovery; it is a narrow, targeted application to bridge an information gap that prevents identification of proper defendants and impedes drafting of a complaint. That is precisely the space § 3102 [c] occupies.

CPLR § 3102 [c] states that "[b]efore an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing an action, to preserve information or to prevent injustice may be obtained, but only by court order." The Legislature thus expressly empowered the Supreme Court to authorize disclosure in three distinct situations: (1) to aid in bringing an action, (2) to preserve information, and (3) to prevent injustice.

The statute is remedial. It recognizes that a litigant may, before commencing suit, lack information critical to (i) identifying the correct defendants, (ii) determining the precise theories of liability, or (iii) preserving evidence that might otherwise be lost. To require commencement of an action in such a posture would frustrate judicial economy, burden innocent parties, and risk injustice. The courts have therefore consistently interpreted CPLR § 3102 [c] with a practical lens, granting relief where (a) a petitioner demonstrates facts that, if true, constitute a viable cause of action, and (b) the information sought is necessary to frame a proper complaint or preserve essential evidence.

This case sits at the very heart of CPLR § 3102 [c]'s purpose: Petitioner alleges a serious injury caused by a malfunctioning automatic door at a State-run facility. He can articulate the facts of negligence but cannot ascertain who, among multiple private entities, bore contractual responsibility for installation, inspection, or maintenance. The missing information is discrete, material, and necessary.

III. Why the Petition is Proper Even Though the State Has Not Been Sued

Respondent argues that because OPWDD has not been sued for damages, and because the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over State liability, this Court lacks power to order disclosure. That argument collapses two distinct inquiries: (1) whether the State can be sued for damages in Supreme Court (it cannot), and (2) whether the State can be compelled to provide disclosure in aid of an action (it can).

A. Distinction Between Disclosure and Liability.

This Court is not adjudicating State liability, awarding damages, or rendering a judgment against OPWDD. It is ordering disclosure to aid Petitioner in identifying proper defendants. The relief granted under CPLR § 3102 [c] is procedural, not substantive. To conflate disclosure with liability is to rewrite the statute into irrelevance.

B. Non-party Disclosure Against State Agencies.

Courts have repeatedly compelled state agencies to provide pre-action disclosure when they are custodians of information central to the framing of a claim. The Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction over damages actions does not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to order disclosure. Indeed, to hold otherwise would insulate the State from ever being compelled to provide information before suit, a result inconsistent with the plain text of CPLR § 3102 [c] and the principle that the State, while sovereign, is subject to procedural obligations when it operates as custodian of evidence.

C. Jurisdictional Safeguards.

This Court's order is carefully circumscribed: compliance does not constitute consent to jurisdiction in any damages action; if discovery reveals State involvement, Petitioner's sole avenue for relief remains the Court of Claims; and the State's defenses, sovereign immunity, jurisdictional limitations, service requirements, and statutes of limitation, are expressly preserved.

IV. Why the Petition is Proper Even Though Disclosure May Reveal State Liability

Respondent further argues that because disclosure may expose the State to liability, the application is improper. That contention is unpersuasive for several reasons.

A. This Is the Very Purpose of CPLR § 3102 [c].

The Legislature anticipated precisely this circumstance: that disclosure may uncover the identity of proper defendants, including the possibility of State involvement. That possibility does not defeat the petition; it justifies it. If Petitioner must sue blindly, he risks naming seven entities that may bear no responsibility, consuming judicial resources and inflicting needless costs. If Petitioner waits until the statute of limitations runs, critical evidence may vanish. CPLR § 3102 [c] was enacted to prevent both outcomes.

B. The Remedy is Disclosure, Not Adjudication.

The Court's order does not impose liability on OPWDD. It directs disclosure of information uniquely within OPWDD's possession. If such information reveals State culpability, the claim belongs in the Court of Claims. This Court does not and cannot retain jurisdiction over that claim. The protective balance lies in granting disclosure while preserving forum exclusivity for any future damages suit.

C. Denying Disclosure Would Undermine Justice.

To deny disclosure because it may reveal State liability is to invert the statute's purpose. It would shield potential tortfeasors from accountability and deprive injured petitioners of the ability to pursue redress. Courts have consistently rejected such an outcome, recognizing that justice demands disclosure even where the information may later support claims against the State.

V. The Statute of Limitations Argument

Respondent notes that the statute of limitations has not yet expired, suggesting that Petitioner could commence an action now and seek disclosure in the ordinary course. But this overlooks two central points:

1. Commencing suit now would require naming all seven entities, without any factual basis to determine responsibility. That shotgun approach burdens the Court, imposes costs on innocent parties, and contradicts CPLR § 3102 [c]'s aim of narrowing disputes to the proper parties.

2. Waiting until after suit is filed increases the risk of lost or destroyed evidence, particularly where maintenance logs, contracts, and investigative reports may be subject to retention [*4]limits or ordinary destruction.

Thus, while the limitations period remains open, denial of pre-action disclosure would frustrate the statute's remedial purpose and risk substantial prejudice to Petitioner.

The Petition expressly addresses the inefficiencies and risks of commencing a broad action against seven entities of uncertain responsibility merely to unlock post-commencement disclosure. The purpose of CPLR § 3102 [c] is to avoid imposing litigation on innocent parties and to prevent the waste that results when parties are added and dropped after commencement, as the Petition itself emphasizes. Where, as here, basic facts establishing a viable claim are alleged and the missing information concerns the identities and roles of prospective defendants, the open limitations period does not compel denial. Rather, granting limited pre-action relief here advances the statute's efficiency and fairness goals by narrowing the field to proper parties before suit is filed.

VI. Subpoena Power Is Not an Alternative

Subpoenas issue in connection with a pending action or proceeding; none exists here. The Legislature created CPLR § 3102 [c] precisely to fill this gap, to authorize disclosure before an action is commenced, where a subpoena cannot issue.

VII. Balancing the Equities

On one side is Petitioner, who suffered a catastrophic injury and seeks narrowly tailored information to identify who bore contractual and maintenance responsibility for the automatic doors. Without disclosure, he must either file a scattershot action or risk losing critical evidence. On the other side is Respondent, which already maintains the requested records in the ordinary course and can produce a knowledgeable witness. The burden on Respondent is modest; the prejudice to Petitioner absent relief is severe.

Moreover, judicial economy is advanced by granting this petition. By narrowing the scope of any future litigation to proper defendants, the Court avoids unnecessary claims, motions, and discovery disputes.

VIII. The State's Protective Concerns: Jurisdiction, Forum, and Service

OPWDD frames its opposition as necessary to "protect the State against claims." The Court takes those concerns seriously and addresses them directly.

A. Not a Damages Action; No Adjudication of State Liability. Petitioner does not seek damages from OPWDD or the State of New York in this proceeding and expressly disavows such relief. The Petition seeks disclosure and preservation only, to identify private entities who may be answerable in tort. The authorities Respondent cites (e.g., Glassman v Glassman, 309 NY 436 [1956]; Olmstead v Britton, 48 AD2d 536 [4th Dept 1975]; Brooks v Board of Higher Education, 113 Misc 2d 494 [Sup Ct New York County]; Power Cooling Inc. v State Univ. of NY, 284 AD2d 317 [2d Dept 2001]; Odom v McCall, 268 AD2d 704 [3d Dept 2000]; and Baisley v Kent, 111 AD2d 299 [2d Dept 1985]) concern claims for damages against the State and the Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction over such suits. They do not bar this Court from ordering the limited pre-action disclosure authorized by CPLR § 3102 [c]. Compliance with such an order does not convert this special proceeding into a damages [*5]suit, nor does it effect any adjudication regarding State liability.

B. Court of Claims Forum Preserved if the State Emerges as a Proper Defendant. Discovery may reveal facts suggesting State involvement. Should the evidence point toward State culpability, any damages claim against the State must be brought in the Court of Claims. Today's order neither pre-judges nor impairs that forum requirement; to the contrary, it facilitates accurate party identification so that any future action proceeds in the correct court. Nothing herein waives or narrows the State's jurisdictional, sovereign immunity, or statute-of-limitations defenses in any later proceeding.

C. Service Objections and Actual Notice. OPWDD argues that Petitioner failed to serve the Attorney General in conformity with CPLR § 307. This is not a damages action against the State, and the Attorney General has appeared and opposed on the merits on OPWDD's behalf. In addressing the narrow, non-merits relief authorized by § 3102 [c], the Court proceeds without prejudice to the State's ability to assert any and all jurisdictional and service defenses in any subsequent action. To further protect the State, the order below expressly states that compliance shall not constitute consent to Supreme Court jurisdiction in any later suit, nor a waiver of defenses.

IX. Materiality, Narrow Tailoring, and Proportionality

The requested discovery is specific: (1) a deposition of a knowledgeable OPWDD representative concerning the automatic doors at Building 11 and the identity and scope of work of any private entities with installation, inspection, maintenance, or repair responsibilities in the year preceding June 24, 2024; (2) contracts, bids, proposals, work orders, maintenance and inspection records, and ordinary-course investigative materials for that same period; and (3) preservation of those materials. This is not an open-ended inquiry into agency operations; it is tied to one location (Building 11), one system (the interior automatic swinging doors at the front entrance), and a defined temporal window (one year up to and through June 24, 2024). That careful tailoring answers any "fishing expedition" concern and keeps burdens proportionate to the legitimate needs of the anticipated action. The Petition further explains why OPWDD, having solicited bids and overseeing the facility, is the entity most likely to possess authoritative information that can fix responsibility efficiently, without needlessly deposing all seven private entities blindly.

X. Preservation: Preventing Irreparable Prejudice

The Petition details why preservation is urgent: contracts, maintenance logs, inspection reports, and routine investigative materials may be subject to retention schedules or ordinary course destruction. If those materials are lost or altered, Petitioner's ability to identify proper defendants and to frame claims would be irreparably prejudiced. The Petition cites decisions granting preservation relief in analogous circumstances (including orders safeguarding vehicles and other instrumentalities) and emphasizes that preservation is a recognized use of CPLR § 3102 [c]. The narrowly tailored preservation directives below reflect that purpose while permitting Respondent to assert traditional privileges via a log and, if needed, in camera review.

XI. Balancing the Equities and Judicial Economy

Without pre-action disclosure, Petitioner faces a dilemma: commence an action against a cast of entities whose roles are uncertain, burdening the Court and potentially innocent parties with motions and discovery, or risk the erosion of evidence essential to pleading accurately and timely. The statute was crafted to avert precisely that waste and unfairness. By authorizing limited, targeted disclosure and preservation now, the Court promotes judicial economy, avoids imposing litigation on those not properly answerable, and ensures that any eventual complaint, whether against private entities in Supreme Court, or against the State in the Court of Claims, is grounded in reliable facts.

XII. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner has shown facts constituting a viable negligence claim, that the identities and roles of the proper defendants cannot be ascertained without limited disclosure by OPWDD, and that preservation is necessary to prevent injustice.

It is therefore

ORDERED, that the Petition under CPLR § 3102 [c] is GRANTED as set forth below; and it is further

ORDERED, that within forty-five (45) days of service of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, Respondent OPWDD shall produce for deposition a witness with knowledge concerning: (a) any contracts, agreements, bids, or proposals relating to the interior automatic swinging doors at the front entrance of Staten Island Developmental Center, Building 11; (b) the identity of any private entity(ies) that installed, inspected, maintained, or repaired those doors; (c) the scope and dates of such work; (d) any maintenance, inspection, or repair obligations in effect during the period June 24, 2023 through and including June 24, 2024; and (e) any investigation conducted in the ordinary course concerning the June 24, 2024 incident; and it is further

ORDERED, that within the same forty-five (45) day period, Respondent shall preserve and produce, to the extent maintained in the ordinary course of business, the following records for the period June 24, 2023 through and including June 24, 2024: (i) contracts, bids, proposals, and work orders relating to the said doors; (ii) maintenance and inspection logs and repair records for the said doors; and (iii) documents created in the regular course of business relating to any OPWDD investigation of the June 24, 2024 incident; and it is further

ORDERED, that nothing in this Decision and Order adjudicates or implies liability of OPWDD or the State of New York, or authorizes a damages claim against the State in this forum; if discovery suggests State culpability, any damages claim must be brought, if at all, in the Court of Claims; and it is further

ORDERED, that OPWDD's compliance with this Decision and Order shall not constitute consent to Supreme Court jurisdiction in any future action, nor a waiver of any jurisdictional, sovereign immunity, statute-of-limitations, or other defenses available to the State or OPWDD in any subsequent proceeding; and it is further

ORDERED, that Respondent may withhold privileged or protected materials, provided that any such withholding is supported by a privilege log stating the date, author, recipients, general subject matter, and specific privilege asserted; the Court may conduct in camera review upon application; and it is further

ORDERED, that Respondent shall preserve (and not destroy, alter, or discard) the categories of materials described herein pending further order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that Petitioner shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon Respondent within twenty (20) days.