Plaintiff, Anticia Macalou, brings this action against defendants McKinsey & Company, Inc., Republic Services, Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), Equitable Financial Life Insurance Company, and Teck Resources Limited. In April 2019, McKinsey hired plaintiff as an expert associate partner in digital and analytics. (NYSCEF No. 41.) Plaintiff worked for McKinsey until June 17, 2022, when she resigned. (NYSCEF No. 42 at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that her resignation was a constructive discharge due to a hostile work environment.

On September 10, 2024, plaintiff filed a summons and complaint to begin this action. The clerk's office rejected the complaint on September 12, 2024, due to a curable defect in the summons. On November 30, 2024, plaintiff filed a corrected version of the summons and refiled the complaint. The clerk's office accepted the new summons and issued plaintiff an index number for this action on December 2, 2024.

On January 10, 2025, two days after the initial summons and complaint's service deadline—January 8, 2025—plaintiff sent a letter to the County Clerk requesting a 90-day extension of time to serve defendants. (NYSCEF No. 3.) Plaintiff received no response.

On March 11, 2025, plaintiff filed an amended complaint with 19 causes of action against defendants and some of their employees (John and Jane Does 1-10). Plaintiff asserts claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), and the Labor Law.

On motion sequences 003, 004, 005, 006, and 007, defendants separately move to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (8). Alternatively, they seek to dismiss some of plaintiff's claims under CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (2), (5), and (7).^[FN1] Plaintiff opposes the motion and seeks leave to file a second amended complaint should this court find her pleadings insufficient.

Defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (8) are granted. Plaintiff's request for leave to amend is denied.

A. Whether Plaintiff Served Defendants Within 120 Days of Commencing This Action

Defendants argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. According to defendants, plaintiff filed this action on September 10, 2024, which, in turn, made January 8, [*2]2025, the service deadline. (See CPLR 306-b [providing for 120-day service deadline after commencement of an action].) Plaintiff served McKinsey on February 7, 2025 (NYSCEF No. 20), Republic Services on February 6, 2025 (NYSCEF No. 16), and Equitable on February 10, 2025. (NYSCEF No. 25.) And plaintiff purportedly served BDC on February 10, 2025 (NYSCEF No. 26), and Teck on February 3, 2025.^[FN2] (NYSCEF No. 17.) Defendants argue that plaintiff did not meet the service deadline and therefore that this court lacks jurisdiction over them.^[FN3]

Plaintiff argues that the action did not commence until December 2, 2024. Plaintiff points out that two days after she filed her initial summons—September 10, 2024— "the Clerk of the Court rejected that filing on September 12, 2024, due to a curable defect in the Summons." (NYSCEF No. 105 at 4.) She contends that the action had not commenced until the clerk accepted the corrected version and issued an index number on December 2, 2024 (see CPLR 304), and that the service deadline was therefore March 31, 2025.

In Supreme Court "practice, the Legislature made the payment of a filing fee and the filing of initiatory papers the acts that commence an action or a special proceeding." (Matter of Gershel v Porr, 89 NY2d 327, 330 [1996].) Here, plaintiff filed the complaint and paid the filing fee on September 10, 2024. (NYSCEF No. 137.) The court concludes that those actions were sufficient to commence the action.^[FN4] (See MacLeod v County of Nassau, 75 AD3d 57, 65 [2d Dept 2010] [holding that filing a summons and complaint in the wrong proceeding is a technical, non-prejudicial mistake that does not change the commencement date from the initial filing date].)

Additionally, under CPLR 2001, "the court may permit a mistake, omission, defect or irregularity, including the failure to purchase or acquire an index number or other mistake in the filing process, to be corrected," or even disregarded, if no party is prejudiced and applicable fees are paid. Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk's office returned the summons due to a curable defect. (NYSCEF No. 105 at 4.) Plaintiff does not explain the nature of that defect. But the record reflects that the Clerk's office permitted plaintiff to cure it. This court therefore has no reason to believe that the initial summons was ineffective.

On these facts, plaintiff commenced this action on September 10, 2024. Plaintiff did not serve defendants within the required 120 days from commencement.

B. Whether Plaintiff is Entitled to an Extension of Time to Serve Defendants

Plaintiff requests a nunc pro tunc extension of time to serve defendants under CPLR 306-b, and an order deeming the action to have been commenced on September 10, 2024. Defendants argue that plaintiff did not file a motion for an extension of time to serve, as required [*3]by CPLR 2214, and therefore that she has not shown she is entitled to an extension.^[FN5]

A court may extend a plaintiff's deadline to serve a defendant under CPLR 306-b, "upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice." Plaintiff represents that she tried to serve defendants in good faith; that defendants will suffer no prejudice should this court award her an extension; and that the Clerk's rejection of plaintiff's summons caused plaintiff's service delay.

1. Good Cause

Plaintiff argues that the Clerk's rejection of plaintiff's summons resulted in the service delay. The Clerk did not err, however. Plaintiff filed the defective summons that triggered the delay.

Plaintiff also contends that, during a meet-and-confer, McKinsey's counsel at BakerHostetler LLP misled her attorney, representing that she was counsel for all the defendants and authorized to discuss service and dismissal with plaintiff's counsel on their behalf. According to plaintiff, service was delayed because plaintiff was waiting for defendants' counsel to send a waiver-of-service form. (NYSCEF No. 105 at 17 [plaintiff's memorandum of law].)

Neither plaintiff nor her attorney makes those representations in the form of a sworn affidavit or affirmation on personal knowledge, however. (See id.) And defendants' counsel avers in an affirmation that at that point, only McKinsey had retained her firm. (NYSCEF No. 37 at ¶ 4; NYSCEF No. 39 at 1 [representation letter].) Defendants' counsel also states that during the meet-and-confer, she did not ask whether McKinsey's counsel would accept service on behalf of McKinsey or any other defendant; and did not suggest that plaintiff might require an extension on the service deadline. (NYSCEF No. 37 at ¶ 6.) Defendants' counsel also represented that she raised the possibility for a waiver of service but was ultimately ignored by plaintiff's counsel. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.)

Additionally, Republic Services, BDC, Equitable, and Teck each submit an affidavit from personnel in their respective legal departments confirming that they retained BakerHostetler in February 2025. The affidavits represent that none of these defendants had authorized BakerHostetler to discuss settlement, service of process, or any other matter pertaining to this case on their behalf before they retained the firm. (NYSCEF No. 54 at ¶¶ 6, 7; NYSCEF No. 62 at ¶¶ 8, 9; NYSCEF No. 69 at ¶¶ 5, 6, 7; NYSCEF No. 76 at ¶¶ 24, 25.)

Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause warranting an extension of time to serve defendants.

2. Interest of Justice

Plaintiff claims that she deserves an extension of time to serve defendants in the interest of justice. She argues that, absent an extension, her NYSHRL and NYCHRL civil-rights claims [*4]are time-barred. According to defendants, the statute of limitations already expired when plaintiff filed the complaint on September 10, 2024.

NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under Executive Law § 297 (5) and New York City Administrative Code § 8-502 (d), respectively. But the continuing-violation doctrine, which resets the clock after each new instance of violation, may toll the limitation period to the date the last act is committed. (See Baez v State of New York, 2010 NY Slip Op 33177(U), *10 [Sup Ct, NY County 2010].) To invoke this doctrine, plaintiff must allege that she continued to face discriminatory conduct (reflecting a discriminatory policy or practice) within the limitations period. (See Newman v HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2019 NY Slip Op 32398(U), *3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2019].)

Plaintiff filed her complaint in September 2024. Thus, to the extent plaintiff's civil-rights claims accrued before September 2021, they are time-barred. It is undisputed that plaintiff last worked on projects for Republic Services, BDC, Equitable, and Teck in May 2020, June 2019, September 2019, and September 2020, respectively.^[FN6] Accordingly, plaintiff's civil-rights claims against these defendants are time-barred. Nor has plaintiff tied those claims to conduct that occurred within the limitations period. (See Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 80-81 [1st Dept 2009].) Plaintiff thus has not shown that a service extension is needed (or warranted) to save what would otherwise be timely claims against these defendants.

With respect to defendant McKinsey, plaintiff alleges that McKinsey personnel violated her civil rights. But she does not allege when the violations occurred. Indeed, plaintiff offers nothing beyond an unsigned affidavit to support her assertion that denying a service extension would bar her claims against McKinsey. (See NYSCEF No. 129.) Therefore, plaintiff has not shown that the limitations period on her civil-rights claims against McKinsey has expired. The remainder of plaintiff's claims against McKinsey are not in danger of expiration. Plaintiff has not shown that an extension of time to serve McKinsey with process in this action is in the interest of justice.

Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff's request for an extension of time to serve defendants. Defendants' motions to dismiss this action under CPLR 3211 (a) (8) are granted. The court therefore does not reach defendants' additional asserted grounds for dismissal.

II. Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend Her Complaint

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint under CPLR 3025 (b) to remedy any pleading deficiencies. But plaintiff has neither submitted a proposed amended pleading nor detailed the nature of those amendments. Plaintiff's request is therefore denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendants' motions to dismiss (mot seqs 003, 004, 005, 006, and 007) are granted, and this action is dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's request for leave to amend her complaint is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on defendant and on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), which shall enter judgment accordingly.