The following numbered papers were used on this motion: NYSCEF Document Numbers 21-29, 36-38, 42-60.

Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument, and due deliberation having been had, the within matter is determined as follows.^[FN1]

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a January 16, 2023 motor vehicle accident. Per Plaintiff's bill of particulars, he sustained injuries to the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine areas as well as to the left shoulder, right shoulder, and left knee. The left knee underwent surgery on May 17, 2023. (See NYSCEF Doc No. 26 ¶ 4, 10.)

As per Insurance Law § 5104 [a]), "Notwithstanding any other law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state, there shall be no right of recovery for non-economic loss, except in the case of a serious injury, or for basic economic loss."

Serious injury is defined though nine statutory categories:

a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment [last category known as "90/180"] (Insurance Law § 5102 [d]).

Plaintiff's bill of particulars alleged that he sustained serious injury in the form of "permanent injury," significant disfigurement, permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member, significant limitation of use of a body function or system, and 90/180 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 26 ¶ 20).

Defendant Peak Limo Inc. ("Defendant") seeks summary judgment under CPLR 3212 dismissing the complaint, asserting Plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury — that Plaintiff's claimed injuries did not proximately result from the subject motor vehicle accident and that they did not meet the threshold of serious injury as defined in the statutory categories.

Summary judgment, including in a motor vehicle accident case, is a drastic remedy that should be granted only if no triable issues of fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]).

The issue of whether a claimed injury falls within the statutory definition of "serious injury" is a question of law for the Court, which may be decided on a motion for summary judgment (see Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230 [1982]). A moving defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, by the submission of evidentiary proof in admissible form, a prima facie case that the plaintiff has not suffered a serious injury proximately resulting from the subject motor vehicle accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). A failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Curiale v Delfavero, 211 AD3d 905 [2d Dept 2022]).

In order to make out a prima facie case that a plaintiff has failed to achieve serious injury as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d), a defendant must rule out all categories claimed in the bill of particulars (see Diaz v Nightingale Bakery & Beverage Distrib., Inc., — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04630 [2d Dept 2025]; Santos v Fiktus, 232 AD3d 698 [2d Dept 2024]; Curiale v [*2]Delfavero, 211 AD3d 905)^[FN2] , and/or must establish that whatever injuries are claimed by the plaintiff did not proximately result from the subject motor vehicle accident (see Lemieux v Horn, 39 NY3d 1108 [2023], affg 209 AD3d 1100 [3d Dept 2022]; Franklin v Gareyua, 29 NY3d 925 [2017], affg 136 AD3d 464 [1st Dept 2016]; Rivera v Fernandez & Ulloa Auto Group, 25 NY3d 1222 [2015], affg 123 AD3d 509 [1st Dept 2014]).

If the defendant has made such a showing that the plaintiff has not suffered a serious injury from the subject motor vehicle accident as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to submit evidence in admissible form to establish that indeed there are material issues of fact regarding serious injury (see Franchini v Palmieri, 1 NY3d 536 [2003]; Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 [1991]).

Defendant relies on its medical experts, Dr. Joseph Mazzie, D.O. and Dr. Ken Hansraj, M.D., for its contentions that Plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury proximately resulting from the subject January 16, 2023 motor vehicle accident.

In affirmed reports dated March 8, 2025, Dr. Mazzie discussed his findings upon reviewing MRIs of three of Plaintiff's body parts. He described conditions revealed in the left knee on April 20, 2023 imaging as "degenerative changes" (NYSCEF Doc No. 28 at PDF 3), opining, "No posttraumatic changes [were] causally related to the 1/16/2023 incident" (id. at PDF 4). May 4, 2023 imaging of the right shoulder revealed conditions but there were "[n]o posttraumatic changes causally related to the 1/16/2023 incident" (id. at PDF 6). Finally, an April 20, 2023 MRI of the left shoulder resulted in mostly normal findings but whatever changes existed were not "causally related to the 1/16/2023 incident" (id. at PDF 8).

The Court finds Dr. Mazzie's opinions regarding proximate causation to be conclusory inasmuch as he did not identify any pre-existing or degenerative conditions with particularity (see Landman v Sarcona, 63 AD3d 690 [2d Dept 2009]). Dr. Mazzie did not examine Plaintiff so his reports cannot be utilized in Defendant's attempt to establish that Plaintiff did not achieve any category of serious injury (see Smith v Quicci, 62 AD3d 858 [2d Dept 2009]). Therefore, Dr. Mazzie's reports do not establish for Defendant a prima facie case that Plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury proximately resulting from the subject motor vehicle accident.

Defendant also offered the affirmed independent medical examination (IME) report of Dr. Kenneth Hansraj, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Hansraj examined Plaintiff on September 25, 2024. His report documented taking a history and orthopedic and neurological testing. Range of motion testing of the cervical spine, thoracic spine, lumbar spine, bilateral shoulders, and bilateral knees revealed no deficits, and conditions had "resolved" (NYSCEF Doc No. 27 at 7). [*3]Additionally, a healed surgical scar on the left knee was noted (see id.). Dr. Hansraj opined, "The claimant did not sustain any significant or permanent injury as a result of the motor vehicle accident on 01/16/2023" (id.).

The Court finds that Dr. Hansraj's IME report did not establish a prima facie case in support of Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's asserted injuries were not proximately caused by the subject motor vehicle accident; he did not opine on whether the claimed injuries themselves proximately resulted from the accident; Plaintiff bears no burden here of showing an issue of fact as to proximate causation.

However, Dr. Hansraj's report did establish a prima facie case in support of Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's injuries did not rise to serious injury defined as a "permanent injury" (terminology in bill of particulars) which presumably is a shortened version for the category set forth in Insurance Law Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as "permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system." A permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system must be total (see Oberly v Bangs Ambulance, 96 NY2d 295 [2001]). No body part examined by Dr. Hansraj was totally out of use.

Dr. Hansraj's IME report also made out a prima facie case that Plaintiff did not sustain significant disfigurement inasmuch as the left knee surgical scar healed. At oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel stated that it was the left knee that displayed disfigurement.

There being no deficits in range of motion testing, the IME report further made out a prima facie case that Plaintiff did not sustain a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member or a significant limitation of use of a body function or system (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955). Counsel's argument before the Court that a conflict on proximate causation between the reports of Dr. Mazzie and the IME report of Dr. Hansraj denuded Defendant of a prima facie case lacks merit. In fact, there is no conflict. Describing conditions as "resolved" (NYSCEF Doc No. 27 at 7) does not equate to a concession that the conditions were proximately caused by the subject accident. "Resolved" means that whatever conditions were claimed — regardless of their etiology — are no longer present.

Besides the four "medical" categories of serious injury concerning which Defendant already made out a prima facie case, there remains 90/180. Defendant adverted to testimony on page 37 of Plaintiff's deposition transcript (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6 ¶ 15). The testimony was as follows:

Q. Are there any activities that you can no longer do at all because of the injuries you are alleging from this accident?

A. At all?

Q. Yes, at all.

A. No, it just makes things harder. (NYSCEF Doc No. 29 at 37, lines 13-18.)

Plaintiff's counsel argued to the Court that since the questions posed were not limited to the 180-day post-accident period, this testimony did not rule out 90/180 for Plaintiff. The Court [*4]disagrees. Since Plaintiff answered that there was nothing he could not do due to his injuries alleged from the accident, the "No" answer encompasses a continuous period of time from the accident until the deposition date, which would include the 180 days following the accident; Defendant established its prima facie case regarding 90/180. Curtailment of recreational and household activities does not meet 90/180 (see Lauretta v County of Suffolk, 273 AD2d 204 [2d Dept 2000]. A plaintiff's inability to perform tasks as easily or without pain in doing so does not meet 90/180 (see Lanzarone v Goldman, 80 AD3d 667 [2d Dept 2011].

In any event, as pointed out by Defendant, Plaintiff missed only a week from work. His bill of particulars stated that he was in bed at home for one week. These brief periods of incapacitation and loss of work equate to a prima facie case by Defendant that Plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury as defined by the 90/180 category (see Amato v Gorecik, 167 AD3d 557 [2d Dept 2018]; Anderson v Foley, 162 AD3d 965 [2d Dept 2018]; Marin v Ieni, 108 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2013]; Sanchez v Williamsburg Volunteer of Hatzolah, Inc., 48 AD3d 664 [2d Dept 2008]).

90/180 being the fifth category of serious injury ruled out by Defendant, there is a prima facie case in support of summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.

The Court rejects Plaintiff's contention that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that Plaintiff did not meet any serious injury definitions (categories). However, in the event Defendant met its burden, Plaintiff relied on his submitted medical records and Dr. Hank Ross' affirmation. Dr. Ross, an orthopedic surgeon, related findings from his June 26, 2025 examination of Plaintiff. Indeed the findings reflect reduced ranges of motion of significance (at least 20%) in certain movements in the cervical spine, lumbar spine, left shoulder, and right shoulder (see Dufel v Green, 84 NY2d 795 [1995]).

Plaintiff's counsel argued that one examination report from around the time of a defendant's summary judgment motion suffices to rebut a defendant's prima facie case and show that there is an issue of fact as to serious injury. The Court finds this not to be the law (see Sukalic v Ozone, 136 AD3d 1018 [2d Dept 2016]; Lea v Cucuzza, 43 AD3d 882 [2d Dept 2007]). To show that there is an issue of fact concerning a permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member or a significant limitation of use of a body function or system, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a serious injury existed for a certain period of time; there must be evidence of duration of a serious injury (see Letellier v Walker, 222 AD2d 658 [2d Dept 1995]; Beckett v Conte, 176 AD2d 774 [2d Dept 1991]; Partlow v Meehan, 155 AD2d 647 [2d Dept 1989]).

That means that Plaintiff needed to show that a serious injury existed not just on June 26, 2025, when examined by Dr. Ross, but for a period of time commencing around the occurrence of the accident (see Sukalic v Ozone, 136 AD3d 1018 [2d Dept 2016]). Asked what would confirm the beginning of such a period of time, Plaintiff answered by referring the Court to a February 8, 2023 chiropractic exam report included at the end of the medical records submitted as NYSCEF Doc No. 50 at PDF 58-63. However, this report bears an illegible signature which is not identified. Also, range of motion findings were not objectively measured through a goniometer or inclinometer, which precludes their consideration (see Gersbeck v Cheema, 176 [*5]AD3d 684 [2d Dept 2019]).

Additionally, as noted by Defendant in its reply affirmation — "Plaintiff has failed to submit satisfactory evidentiary proof in admissible form" (NYSCEF Doc No. 58 at 5) — and by Defendant at oral argument, the unknown chiropractor's report is neither sworn to nor affirmed. Defendant is correct that a plaintiff's unsworn medical records not relied on by the defendant cannot be considered in opposition to the latter's summary judgment motion (see Cebron v Tuncoglu, 109 AD3d 631 [2d Dept 2013]). While Plaintiff countered that all of the treating facility records were certified ^[FN3] , this does not cure the absence of an oath or affirmation (see Irizarry v Lindor, 110 AD3d 846 [2d Dept 2013]). Further, the certification applied to the records of East New York Medical Healthcare, yet the unknown chiropractor's report is on the letterhead of Baldwin Injury Chiropractic, PC. If "Baldwin" refers to the Long Island locality by that name, it is not located in East New York, a neighborhood in Brooklyn. Glaringly, none of the records in NYSCEF Doc No. 50 are sworn to or affirmed. None of them are admissible; they cannot be considered in determining whether Plaintiff showed an issue of fact.

Plaintiff did advert to Dr. Frances Rispoli's report dated July 23, 2025. Dr. Rispoli stated that Plaintiff required left knee surgery. However, he did not attest to any quantitative findings and, as such, his report does not rebut Defendant's prima facie case regarding the two serious injury limitation categories (see Terranova v Acosta, 136 AD3d 710 [2d Dept 2016]; Heumann v JACO Transp., Inc., 82 AD3d 1046 [2d Dept 2011]). Plaintiff submitted MRI reports from Dr. John T. Rigney but they too do not reflect quantitative findings.

In sum, the only admissible and probative evidence from Plaintiff which may be considered in opposition to Dr. Hansraj's report is Dr. Ross' report. One report years after the accident does not constitute a showing that there exists an issue of fact as to medical categories ^[FN4] (see Sukalic v Ozone, 136 AD3d 1018; Lea v Cucuzza, 43 AD3d 882; Letellier v Walker, 222 AD2d 658; Beckett v Conte, 176 AD2d 774 [2d Dept 1991]; cf. Estrella v GEICO Ins. Co., 102 AD3d 730 [2d Dept 2013]).

It is worth noting that Dr. Ross confirmed that the body parts examined by him were movable, so that would negate a claim predicated upon the "permanent loss" category. Also, he corroborated that Plaintiff's left knee wounds were "well healed" (NYSCEF Doc No. 49 at 2), so there was no significant disfigurement.

Plaintiff's own affirmation does not rebut Defendant's prima facie case with respect to the 90/180 category. He stated, "The pain still interferes with my life on a daily basis. For instance, [*6]I have difficulty walking long distances, running, lifting heavy things, bending, going up and down stairs, getting up in the morning, showering, getting dressed, doing chores around the house, going grocery shopping and engaging in sexual relations." While describing his present difficulties, this does not describe his condition during the 180-day post-accident period. The fact remains he testified that he was not completely prevented from engaging in any activities. There is no issue of fact regarding 90/180 (see Lanzarone v Goldman, 80 AD3d 667; Keena v Trappen, 294 AD2d 405 [2d Dept 2002]).

Plaintiff having failed to rebut Defendant's evidence sufficiently to bear out that there is an issue of fact to place before a jury concerning serious injury, Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint must be granted.

Granting Defendant summary judgment deprives Plaintiff of an opportunity to present his case to a jury. No doubt he will be disappointed from the within decision. Therefore, the Court deems it important to explain that this outcome should be understood within the wider context of legislative intent. In the 1960s New York was faced with a crisis whereby motor vehicle accident victims waited an extraordinarily long time to be compensated for their economic loss (medical expenses and lost earnings) and non-economic loss (pain and suffering), as it took years for litigation to wend its way through the courts — and compensation could be obtained only if the defendant was found to be the tortfeasor.

After years of proposed solutions, New York adopted a no-fault system whereby persons injured in motor vehicles would be compensated for their economic loss without regard to fault. At the same time, in order to balance out the obvious increase in economic loss payouts by insurers, a means was needed to limit financial compensation for non-economic loss, meaning pain and suffering. The scale needed to be balanced so that an insurance-based compensation system could still exist and premiums could remain affordable for consumers. To accomplish this, damages for pain and suffering had to be limited. The legislation enacted as chapter 13 of the Laws of 1973 "Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act") attempted to do this by requiring that motor vehicle accident victims be compensated for pain and suffering only if they were found to have sustained a serious injury as defined in a few categories; the legislation took effect in 1974.^[FN5] These categories did not prove workable, so the Legislature enacted a new set of definitions for serious injury in chapter 892 of the Laws of 1977. With the addition of loss of a fetus in chapter 143 of the Laws of 1984, there are now nine definitions of serious injury — nine categories. (See generally John R. Dunne, New York's No-Fault Automobile Insurance Law—A Glimpse of the Past and a Glance at the Future, 50 NY St BJ 284 [June 1978]; David Herbert Schwartz, No-Fault Insurance: Litigation of Threshold Questions under the New York [*7]Statute—The Neglected Procedural Dimension, 41 Brook L Rev 37 [Summer 1974]; David Aronson et ano., No-Fault Insurance in New York: Another Hazard for the Innocent Driver [Winter 1974]; James N. Benedict, New York Adopts No-Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 Albany L Rev 662 [1973].)

This system which New York maintains, know as the "No-Fault Law," is a trade-off. It balances the public interest in maintaining a viable system for treating accident victims so they can recover as best as possible while weeding out claims for pain and suffering which do not rise to what is described as "serious injury." No doubt everyone injured in an accident with resulting pain deems their condition serious. Notwithstanding that, the public policy of this State, as codified in statutory law, is that those who cannot establish "serious injury" as a matter of law are relegated to not being compensated for pain and suffering (non-economic loss). While this may not console those whose lawsuits seeking compensation for pain and suffering resulting from the negligence of others in the course of operating a motor vehicle are dismissed for lack of serious injury — either through summary judgment or at trial — at least it is important to point out that payment for medical expenses and lost earnings regardless of fault is complementary to the requirement that compensable pain and suffering be limited to a higher gradation of injuries. Unless compensation is limited for pain and suffering, there can be no mandatory payment for necessary medical expenses and incurred lost earnings.

With the foregoing discourse, this Court has sought to explain the intent behind the No-Fault system. The first instance of doing so by the highest level of the judiciary was when the constitutionality of the No-Fault system was sustained in Montgomery v Daniels (38 NY2d 41, 49-53 [1975] [footnotes omitted]):

Before turning to an analysis of the constitutional claims advanced, it will be helpful to review some of the studies and proceedings which preceded enactment of article 18.

Debate over the efficacy of the tort system of compensating automobile accident victims has raged for over 40 years. Our Legislature in 1973 thus had available to it a staggering number of reports and studies which provided analysis of the concept of a no-fault system of reparations and to which our attention is now drawn by both plaintiffs and defendants on this appeal. These studies identify at least four basic infirmities or defects in the common-law fault system of automobile accident reparation for personal injuries. For the purposes of this appeal, we recognize these four infirmities or defects as predicates for the Legislature's enactment of article 18.

The first infirmity was the acknowledged fact that exposure to the risk of tort liability did not function as a significant factor in motivating drivers to operate their vehicles carefully or prudently. (DOT Report, at pp 53-57; Insurance Department Report, at pp 12-13; Keeton and O'Connell, at pp 247-249.) Nothing in the new no-fault act seeks to remedy this infirmity; indeed the new law apparently proceeds on the assumption that threat of economic disadvantage, by way either of increased insurance premiums or of excess recoveries, is no effective deterrent to bad driving.

Secondly it was urged that the tort system was excessively and needlessly expensive and inefficient. Keeton and O'Connell (at p 70, n 190) and the DOT Report (at p 51) both concluded that half or perhaps less than half of the automobile liability insurance [*8]premium dollar was paid in actual compensation to accident victims. The Insurance Department Report stated (at p 35) that only 44 cents of the premium dollar reached the injured claimants.

Thirdly it was urged that the distribution of compensation among accident victims under the tort system of reparation was unfair and inequitable for a number of reasons. The most revealing statistic reported was that one quarter of the persons who sustained bodily injury in auto accidents in New York received no compensation whatsoever (Insurance Department Report, at p 18). Where the tort system did provide recompense, the statistics further revealed that minor injuries were often overcompensated (at least in terms of readily ascertainable medical expenses) while those suffering serious injuries were being underpaid. Moreover it was concluded in all reports that the tort system was plagued by long delays in claim payment.

As a fourth major inadequacy of the fault system of reparation, it was argued that the system placed an inordinate strain on the State's court systems and judicial resources. (See, generally, Insurance Department Report, at pp 19-24; DOT Report, at pp 70-79; and Keeton and O'Connell, at pp 13-15.)

In March, 1970 the Governor sent the first proposed legislation for implementing no-fault concepts in this State to the Legislature accompanied by a special message (reprinted in 111th Annual Report of the Superintendent of Insurance to the Legislature for 1969 [1970], at pp 329-331). Public hearings were held on the proposed bill, but no action was taken that year. In 1971 the Governor followed a similar procedure (see 112th Annual Report of the Superintendent of Insurance to the Legislature for 1970 [1971], at pp 155-157) and more hearings were held, but again no action was taken on any of the at least five bills before the Legislature. In 1972 even more extensive hearings were held at which some 90 witnesses testified including the Governor, Superintendent of Insurance and Federal Insurance Administrator, but again no legislative action was taken. In 1973, however, the act which is here under scrutiny was passed and signed into law as chapter 13. This synopsis of article 18's legislative history is presented to demonstrate that the Legislature acted only after unusually extensive study and investigation and on what must be accepted for purposes of judicial review as an uncommonly sturdy legislative basis.

It is additionally worth noting that prior to February 1, 1974, the effective date of article 18, 13 other jurisdictions had enacted various forms of no-fault insurance laws. In those jurisdictions where the courts of last resort have passed on the constitutionality of the no-fault plans enacted by their respective Legislatures, all but one have sustained the legislation.

It remains here only to add that we recognize that other studies and data can be cited which tend to refute the conclusions on which our Legislature predicated its enactment of article 18. The judiciary, however, is not called on to weigh the relative worth of data or arguments which may be marshaled on either side as to the wisdom of determinations made by the Legislature in the realm of policy. "Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring [*9]them within the range of judicial cognizance." (Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v McGuire, 219 US 549, 569; see, also, infra., pp 54- 55, 56, 64.)

In this instance, perhaps more than in most, in the light of the exhaustive and vigorous public discussion of no-fault insurance in this State and elsewhere and the extended legislative consideration which preceded adoption of article 18, it would be a demonstration of judicial arrogation and highly inept and inapt to express any opinion as to the factual predicate for this legislation, its philosophical justification or the ultimate wisdom of its enactment. It is not our office to rejoice or to lament. A fair regard for the basic polity of separation of powers dictates judicial respect for the proper role of the legislative branch, and pride in the uniquely and essentially neutral role of the judicial branch. That judicial role is both a privilege and a limitation.

Other appellate decisions likewise have sought to provide background for the enactment of the No-Fault system:

In 1973 the Legislature enacted the "Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act" (see L 1973, ch 13)—commonly known as the No-Fault Law—with the objective of promoting prompt resolution of injury claims, limiting cost to consumers and alleviating unnecessary burdens on the courts (see Governor's Mem Approving L 1973, ch 13, 1973 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2335). Every car owner must carry automobile insurance, which will compensate injured parties for "basic economic loss" occasioned by the use or operation of that vehicle in New York State, irrespective of fault (Insurance Law §§ 5102[a], 5103). Only in the event of "serious injury" as defined in the statute, can a person initiate suit against the car owner or driver for damages caused by the accident (Insurance Law § 5104 [a]).

No-Fault thus provides a compromise: prompt payment for basic economic loss to injured persons regardless of fault, in exchange for a limitation on litigation to cases involving serious injury (see Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 50-51 [1975]). Abuse nonetheless abounds. From 1992 to 2000, reports of No-Fault fraud rose more than 1,700% and constituted 75% of all automobile fraud reports received by the Insurance Department in 2000 (see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of NY v Serio, 100 NY2d 854 [2003]; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 [2005]). There is, similarly, abuse of the No-Fault Law in failing to separate "serious injury" cases, which may proceed in court, from the mountains of other auto accident claims, which may not. That "basic economic loss" has remained capped at $50,000 since 1973 provides incentive to litigate.

In the context of soft-tissue injuries involving complaints of pain that may be difficult to observe or quantify, deciding what is a "serious injury" can be particularly vexing. Additionally, whether there has been a "significant" limitation of use of a body function or system (the threshold statutory subcategory into which soft-tissue injury claims commonly fall) can itself be a complex, fact-laden determination. Many courts have approached injuries of this sort with a well-deserved skepticism. Indeed, failure to grant summary judgment even where the evidence justifies dismissal, burdens court dockets and impedes the resolution of legitimate claims. As a hint of the dimension of the [*10]situation, in less than three years, Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys. (98 NY2d 345 [2002])—addressing similar issues—already has been cited more than 500 times in published decisions of our trial and appellate courts (representing only a small portion of the trial court activity). (Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 570-572 [2005].)

Enactment of the Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act (L 1973, ch 13 [eff Feb. 1, 1974]), served the dual purpose of assuring that accident victims received compensation for their economic loss and of restricting the cost of rising automobile insurance policy premiums (Zoldas v Louise Cab Corp., 108 AD2d 378, 380). However, limitations were placed on the right to sue, namely, that only those who suffered a serious injury were entitled to sue to recover their damages. In 1977, "serious injury" was redefined by the Legislature to counter the fact that so many individuals were able to meet the original statutory definition and the purpose of the legislation, i.e., reducing automobile accident litigation, was being subverted (L 1977, ch 892; see, mem of State Executive Dept, 1977 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2450). (Sanpietro v McCoy, 130 AD2d 648, 649 [2d Dept 1987].)

In 1973, the Legislature enacted the Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Automobile Insurance Reparations Act (see L 1973, ch 13), which supplanted common law tort actions for most victims of automobile accidents with a system of no-fault insurance. Under the no-fault system, payments of benefits 'shall be made as the loss is incurred' (Insurance Law § 5106[a]). The primary aims of this new system were to ensure prompt compensation for losses incurred by accident victims without regard to fault or negligence, to reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists (see Governor's Mem approving L 1973, ch 13, 1973 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2335). (Matter of Medical Socy. of State of NY v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 860 [2003].)

A legislative objective in enacting the No-Fault Law was to reduce significantly the burden of automobile personal injury litigation on the courts (Memorandum of State Executive Department, 1977 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2445, 2448; Governor's Message of Approval of L. 1977, ch 892, id., at 2534, 2535). (Roggio v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 66 NY2d 260, 264 [1985].)

[T]he very purpose of the no-fault law was to ensure the " 'swift reimbursement of accident victims ... who had serious injuries' " (Pavone v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 Misc 2d 658, 663), with "as little litigation as possible" (Matter of Furstenberg [Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.], 67 AD2d 580, 583, revd on other grounds 49 NY2d 757) (Presbyterian Hosp. in City of NY v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 233 AD2d 431, 432 [2d Dept 1996]).

This historical background for the No-Fault system may be of slight comfort for Plaintiff, but he did receive No-Fault benefits following the accident in accordance with the No-Fault Law: "[M]y medical bills for the treatment I received were paid by what [I] had been informed are commonly referred to as "no fault" benefits" (NYSCEF Doc No. 46 & 8). Medical treatment which Plaintiff received, per his motion submission, included the following:

• Emergency hospital

• Evaluations — orthopedic, surgical, neurological

• Physical therapy — ultrasound, gait training, heat/cold packs, strengthening, massage, [*11]stretching, therapeutic exercises, electric stimulation

• Chiropractic

• Surgery — left knee

• MRIs — right shoulder, left shoulder, left knee

• Outcome assessment testing

• Pharmaceuticals — Lidocaine ointment, Cyclobenzaprine tablets

• Medical supplies and durable medical equipment — infrared lamp with stand, deep tissue massager, whirlpool, TENS unit with belt, cervical collar, position pillow, general use cushion, lumbosacral back support, bed board/egg crate mattress, water circulation unit (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 47-50).

In that respect the purpose underlying the No-Fault Law was fulfilled for Plaintiff's benefit. For those who decry the No-Fault system as being too limiting in terms of facilitating compensation for pain and suffering to those injured by the negligence of tortfeasor drivers, the remedy is to advocate to the Legislature to undertake a re-examination of the entire motor vehicle accident reparations system. Meanwhile, the judicial branch of our government — especially trial courts — is bound to apply the case law concerning serious injury as it has developed over the decades since 1974, when the No-Fault system became effective in New York.

Defendant Peak Limo Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED. The complaint is hereby dismissed, and the Clerk shall enter judgment to that effect.^[FN6]