Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 001) numbered 12-29 were considered on this motion for partial summary judgment on liability: Notice of Motion, [*2]Affirmation in Support with exhibits (including affidavit of Alexandra DeJesus, certified police report, pleadings), Affirmation in Opposition, and Reply Affirmation.

II. Facts

This personal injury action arises out of a rear-end motor vehicle collision that occurred on October 3, 2024, upon the Staten Island Expressway at or near the Targee Street/Richmond Road exit ramp in Richmond County. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 15 at ¶4; 16).

Plaintiff Alexandra DeJesus avers that she was operating her motor vehicle in a lawful manner, and that her vehicle had been brought to a full stop on the exit ramp for approximately one minute, due to traffic conditions ahead, when it was suddenly and violently struck in the rear. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 15 at ¶7-9). The striking vehicle, a 2014 Audi sedan bearing New York license plate T86ULH, was operated by Melissa Parker and owned jointly by Melissa Parker, Michael Parker, and Maria Parker.

A certified police accident report, annexed to the motion, memorializes the collision as a rear-end impact and attributes operation of the Audi to Melissa Parker. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16). The report recites that the Parker vehicle, while coming off the ramp, rear-ended the stopped vehicle operated by Plaintiff. (see id).

Plaintiff commenced this action by summons and complaint on March 7, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 1; 2). Defendants interposed their answer on or about March 28, 2025, asserting, inter alia, an affirmative defense of comparative negligence. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 10). Plaintiff now moves pursuant to CPLR § 3212 for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, and for dismissal of Defendants' comparative negligence defense.

Defendants oppose the motion, contending that summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be sparingly employed in automobile negligence cases, that questions of fact remain as to liability and potential comparative negligence, and that discovery, including depositions, has not yet been completed. Defendants filed solely an attorney affirmation in opposition, without sworn statements from any party or witnesses.

Plaintiff replies that Defendants have offered no admissible evidence in opposition, relying exclusively on attorney argument, which is without probative value. Plaintiff emphasizes that both her sworn affidavit and the certified police report suffice to establish a prima facie case of liability under longstanding Second Department precedent.

III. Conclusions of Law

Under CPLR § 3212 [b], summary judgment is appropriate where the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering evidence sufficient to eliminate material issues of fact. Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the opponent to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material issues.

It is axiomatic in New York jurisprudence that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby imposing upon that operator a duty to come forward with a non-negligent [*3]explanation for the occurrence. Where no such explanation is proffered in admissible form, summary judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The Second Department has reiterated this principle in numerous decisions (see Bustillo v Matturro, 292 AD2d 554 [2d Dept 2002]; Barba v Best Sec. Corp., 235 AD2d 381 [2d Dept 1997]; Gutierrez v Trillium USA, LLC, 111 AD3d 669 [2d Dept 2013]).

Here, Plaintiff has produced both her own sworn affidavit (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 15) and the certified police accident report (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 16), each of which corroborates that her vehicle was lawfully stopped when struck in the rear by Defendants' vehicle. This evidence establishes a prima facie case of negligence against Defendant operator Melissa Parker, as well as vicarious liability against the co-owner Defendants.

Defendants, by contrast, have submitted only an attorney affirmation. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 24). It is well settled that an attorney affirmation, absent personal knowledge of the operative facts, has no probative value and cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Defendants have thus failed to raise any material issue of fact or to articulate any non-negligent explanation for the collision.

As to Defendants' plea that summary judgment is premature pending depositions, the Court notes that CPLR § 3212 [f] does not sanction denial of summary judgment where the opposition rests solely upon speculation that discovery may yield helpful evidence. The Appellate Division has consistently rejected such arguments, holding that "the belief that additional discovery might reveal something helpful does not provide a basis for postponing determination of summary judgment." (see Morissaint v Raemar Corp., 271 AD2d 586 [2d Dept 2000]).

With respect to comparative negligence, Defendants urge that dismissal of their affirmative defense is unwarranted. They rely upon Carlos Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 [2018]. wherein the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff need not establish freedom from comparative negligence to obtain summary judgment on liability, but that comparative negligence may remain an issue for the jury. However, unlike in Rodriguez, the record here contains no evidence of any conduct by Plaintiff contributing to the accident. Plaintiff was fully stopped for nearly one minute before the impact. Defendants had the burden to adduce some admissible evidence suggesting Plaintiff's negligence in order to preserve the defense. Having failed to do so, the affirmative defense must be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Upon all the papers submitted, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established her prima facie entitlement to judgment on the issue of liability, and that Defendants have failed to raise any triable issue of fact or proffer any admissible non-negligent explanation. Moreover, as there exists no evidence supporting the claim of comparative negligence, the affirmative defense asserting same is without merit.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability [*4]is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendants' first affirmative defense of comparative negligence is DISMISSED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the matter shall proceed solely on the issue of damages; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the matter is scheduled for a compliance conference on the next adjourn date, October 15, 2025, at 10:30 AM at the Courthouse located at 26 Central Avenue, Courtroom 330, Staten Island, NY; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

The foregoing shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.