| Doe v BBH LLC |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51661(U) [87 Misc 3d 1222(A)] |
| Decided on October 1, 2025 |
| Supreme Court, Richmond County |
| Castorina, Jr., J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| As corrected in part through October 27, 2025; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Jane Doe,
Plaintiff,
against BBH LLC, RPP LLC, PB, PF, AM, and AR, Defendants. |
I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]
The Court has considered the following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 001) numbered 7-14, 17 were read in connection with plaintiff's application for leave to proceed under a pseudonym:
1. Plaintiff's Affirmation in Support with Exhibits;
2. Defendants' Affirmation in Opposition.
II. Facts
The instant matter arises from allegations of persistent sexual harassment directed at the plaintiff, a former employee of defendants BBH LLC and RPP LLC. Plaintiff, who was hired at the age of sixteen in or about June 2021, avers that during her employment extending until November 2024, she was subjected to a sustained course of verbal, physical, and electronic harassment at the hands of her co-workers and supervisors, specifically defendant AR and defendant AM, with the knowledge, acquiescence, and tacit approval of the entity defendants and their individual principals, PB and PF.
The complaint alleges that AR perpetrated repeated sexualized battery, verbal harassment, and unwanted contact, while AM, in both a supervisory capacity and as a participant, not only tolerated but allegedly condoned the conduct. Plaintiff further asserts that PB and PF, as owners, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of these improprieties, yet failed to take corrective measures. Despite repeated complaints lodged directly with management, including AM and assistant manager DA, the hostile environment persisted until plaintiff was constructively discharged in November 2024.
Plaintiff now seeks to prosecute her civil claims, including violations under the New York City Human Rights Law, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, negligent training, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, under the pseudonym "Jane Doe," citing the intensely personal, sensitive, and stigmatizing nature of the allegations.
Defendants oppose, contending that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any extraordinary privacy right sufficient to overcome the constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. They emphasize that the allegations, while serious, do not rise to the level of criminal sexual assault or rape, distinguishing the instant matter from cases in which pseudonymous filings were permitted. Defendants argue further that embarrassment and reputational concern are insufficient grounds, absent corroborating evidence of real and present harm, to justify anonymity.
III. Conclusions of Law
The presumption of openness in judicial proceedings is a foundational principle, ensuring transparency and accountability. However, this presumption is not absolute. Courts retain [*2]discretion to permit litigants to proceed pseudonymously when substantial privacy rights outweigh the public interest in disclosure. The inquiry, as articulated in Doe v New York Univ., (6 Misc 3d 866 [Sup Ct New York County 2004]), centers upon whether disclosure would subject the party to stigma, harassment, or harm of such magnitude as to warrant judicial protection.
Plaintiff asserts that public exposure of her identity would inflict severe embarrassment, humiliation, and social stigmatization, consequences historically associated with victims of workplace sexual harassment. The sensitive nature of the allegations, committed while plaintiff was a minor and under the authority of her supervisors, clearly implicates "matters of the utmost intimacy." This Court is persuaded that the allegations, including repeated sexualized battery and harassment endured from adolescence into adulthood, present circumstances where the plaintiff's privacy interests are substantial.
Defendants rely upon Doe v Kidd, (19 Misc 3d 782 [Sup Ct New York County 2008]), to argue that embarrassment alone is insufficient. Yet that case involved allegations of inappropriate contact by a celebrity in a civil context, without the element of protracted workplace harassment of a vulnerable minor employee. Here, the risk of enduring stigma is exacerbated by the plaintiff's young age at the inception of the misconduct and the imbalance of power inherent in the employer/employee relationship.
Moreover, plaintiff's request does not unduly impair the public's right to access judicial records. The substance of the allegations, the identities of defendants, and the claims asserted remain in full public view. Only plaintiff's true name would be shielded, a measure far less restrictive than sealing proceedings or closing the courtroom. As noted in Anonymous v Anonymous, (744 NYS2d 659 [Sup Ct New York County 2002]), pseudonymity preserves the equilibrium between transparency and protection of vulnerable parties.
Defendants suffer no cognizable prejudice, as plaintiff's identity has been disclosed to their counsel. They remain fully capable of investigating and defending against the claims through ordinary discovery channels. Indeed, as recognized in E.K. v New York Hosp. Cornell Med. Ctr., (600 NYS2d 993 [Sup Ct Orange County 1992]), when identity is known to adversaries, pseudonymity merely guards against unnecessary public dissemination.
Defendants also contend that plaintiff has proffered no corroborating evidence to substantiate her fears. Yet corroboration is not an absolute prerequisite. The record itself, which details a years-long pattern of sexual harassment beginning when plaintiff was a minor, suffices to demonstrate the heightened risk of stigmatization and emotional injury attendant upon public disclosure of identity.
Accordingly, upon balancing the competing interests, this Court finds that plaintiff's substantial privacy interests outweigh the presumption of openness.
IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion is granted; and it is further,
ORDERED, that plaintiff shall proceed in this action under the pseudonym "Jane Doe," and the caption shall read: Jane Doe v. BBH LLC, RPP LLC, PB, PF, AM, and AR; and it is further,
ORDERED, that all papers, judgments, orders, decisions, and notices filed in this action shall refer to plaintiff solely as "Jane Doe"; and it is further,
ORDERED, that the County Clerk shall record and maintain the action under said pseudonymous caption; and it is further,
ORDERED, that counsel for all parties shall refrain from disclosing plaintiff's true identity in any public filing or communication concerning this action.
Dated: October 1, 2025