The following numbered papers were used on this motion: NYSCEF Document Numbers 1, 255-260, 263-264, 270.

Upon the foregoing papers and having heard oral argument on the record, the within motion, concerning which a short-form order has been entered, is determined as follows.

Plaintiff Chantel McLaurin commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries and medical expenses she allegedly sustained as a result of a trip and fall that occurred on May 6, 2018, between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., on a sidewalk adjacent to 296 New Lots Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, the premises being owned by Defendant Andrew Walcott (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1).

Plaintiff subsequently underwent left knee arthroscopic surgery on May 2, 2019, performed by Dr. Kenneth McCulloch, and left ankle debridement on July 24, 2020, performed by Siddhartha Sharma, DPM (see NYSCEF Doc No. 257 at 2). Both medical providers, who are associated with NY Sports & Joints, had Plaintiff undergo radiological imaging by Dr. Thomas Kolb of Kolb Radiology and Lenox Hill Radiology (see id. at 3).

The issue of liability was resolved on October 9, 2025, when the jury found against [*2]Defendant Andrew Walcott ("Defendant").^[FN1] Accordingly, the sole issue remaining for trial is the determination of damages.

Before the Court was Defendant's motion in limine, dated September 19, 2025, seeking (1) to strike Plaintiff's expert witness disclosures pursuant to CPLR § 3101(d) of Siddhartha Sharma, DPM, dated August 28, 2025, and of Vincent Pici, P.E., dated September 18, 2025; (2) to preclude the testimony of said experts at trial; and (3) granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's expert disclosure of Dr. Sharma from August 28, 2025 was untimely, as it was filed seven calendar days prior to a scheduled JCP appearance on September 4, 2025, and twenty days prior to the adjourned jury selection date of September 18, 2025 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 256 ¶ 5). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's expert disclosure improperly elevates Dr. Sharma, Plaintiff's treating podiatrist, to an expert qualified to opine on the knee surgery performed by Dr. McCulloch (see NYSCEF Doc No. 257 at 6-8). Defendant asserts that such testimony is beyond Dr. Sharma's scope of expertise and would prejudice Defendant by denying him the opportunity to cross-examine Plaintiff's treating physicians on the credibility of their findings (NYSCEF Doc No. 256 ¶¶ 9—11).^[FN2]

Although Defendant concedes that CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) contains no fixed deadline for expert disclosure, Defendant argues that the statute leaves timeliness to the discretion of the Court, which must consider factors including whether there was good cause of a delayed disclosure, prejudice to one's adversary, and what relief is appropriate on a case-by-case basis (see NYSCEF Doc No. 257 at 4, citing Vigilant Ins. Co. v Barnes, 199 AD2d 257 [2d Dept 1993]; Lillis v D'Souza, 174 AD2d 976 [4th Dept 1991]; and Krajewski v Rosinski, 212 AD2d 886 [3d Dept 1995]). Defendant further relies on Tsatsakis v Booth Mem. Med. Ctr., 27 AD3d 591 [2d Dept 2007]; Meyer v Zeichner, 263 AD2d 597 [3d Dept 1999]; and Nigro v Moore, 277 AD2d 632 [3d Dept 2000] (see NYSCEF Doc No. 257 at 4-5), to argue that the burden shifts to the disclosing party to demonstrate good cause for delay.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that since the trial commenced on September 29, 2025 ^[FN3] , the disclosures dated August 28, 2025 provided Defendant ample opportunity to prepare as he had one month. Plaintiff relies on Rowan v Cross County Ski & Skate, Inc., 42 AD3d 563 [2d [*3]Dept 2007]; Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580 [2d Dept 1993]; and Martin v Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 73 AD3d 481 [1st Dept 2010], in support of the proposition that CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) does not prescribe a specific time for expert disclosure, and that preclusion is unwarranted absent willful noncompliance or demonstrable prejudice (see NYSCEF Doc No. 263 at 3-4)..

Plaintiff further argues that since Plaintiff's treating podiatrist, Dr. Sharma, is qualified to testify regarding Plaintiff's ankle and knee, any challenges to his qualifications go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. Plaintiff relies on Vallone v Vulcano, 220 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2003]; Badke v Barnett, 35 AD2d 347 [2d Dept 1970]; and Bodensiek v Schwartz, 292 AD2d 411 [2d Dept 2002], among others, to assert that lack of specialized expertise affects the credibility of the expert witness, not the admissibility of his testimony (see NYSCEF Doc No. 263 at 5-6). Plaintiff also contends that as Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Sharma was not required to be disclosed under CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), citing Mantuano v Mehale, 258 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 1999] and Hunt v Ryzman, 292 AD2d 345 [2d Dept 2002] (see NYSCEF Doc No. 263 at 7-8). Plaintiff nevertheless disclosed Dr. Sharma "out of an abundance of caution" (Id. at 8).

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) requires each party, upon demand, to identify each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial and to "disclose in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify, the qualifications of each expert witness and a summary of the grounds for each expert's opinion. However, where a party for good cause shown retains an expert an insufficient period of time before the commencement of trial to give appropriate notice thereof, the party shall not thereupon be precluded from introducing the expert's testimony at the trial solely on grounds of noncompliance. . . . In that instance, upon motion of any trial, made before or at trial, or on its own initiative, the court may make whatever order may be just." Therefore, the statute imposes no fixed time frame for disclosure, and preclusion is appropriate only where the delay was willful and resulted in prejudice (see Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d 580).

The branch of Defendant's motion concerning Vincent Pici's expert testimony is moot as Plaintiff did not call Mr. Pici as a witness at trial, a matter which was previously discussed during oral arguments of this motion on October 9, 2025.

Regarding Dr. Sharma, Plaintiff served the expert disclosure on August 28, 2025. Defendant's counsel received the disclosure on September 2, 2025, more than thirty days before the commencement of jury picking. It is well established that CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) "does not require a party to respond to a demand for expert witness information 'at any specific time nor does it mandate preclusion merely because of noncompliance with the statute', unless there is evidence of intentional or willful failure to disclose and a showing of prejudice" (Aversa v Taubes, 194 AD2d at 582, citing Lillis v D'Souza, 174 AD2d 976; see Rowan v Cross County Ski & Skate, Inc., 42 AD3d at 564). Defendant has made no showing that Plaintiff's disclosure was either willful or prejudicial, and the thirty-day period provided ample time for Defendant to prepare for cross-examination. There was sufficient time for Defendant to perform research on Dr. Sharma.

Further, Plaintiff established that Dr. Sharma was Plaintiff's treating podiatrist and performed left ankle surgery in July 2020. Challenges to a medical expert's qualifications go to weight and not the admissibility of the expert's testimony. For example, in Bodensiek v Schwartz (292 AD2d at 411), the Court held, "The Supreme Court erred in precluding the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, a medical oncologist, in this action against, among others, the defendant Robert S. Schwartz, a gynecological surgeon. The law is settled that a physician need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to qualify as a medical expert [citations omitted]." "Defendants' argument that plaintiff's expert, a neurologist, was unqualified to opine on the circumstances of the procedure performed by Dr. Carasca is unavailing. Their claim of a lack of experience on plaintiff's expert's part is relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, of the expert's opinion [citation omitted]." (Pira v Carasca, 177 AD3d 559, 560 [1st Dept 2019].) Further, as the Appellate Division, Second Department found in Julien v Physician's Hosp. (231 AD2d 678, 680 [2d Dept 1996]) that a physician does not need to be specialist in a particular field in order to be considered a medical expert. There, the Court went on, citing Ariola v Long (197 AD2d 605 [2d Dept 1993]), in support of the proposition that any lack of experience of the expert is a factor to be evaluated by the jury and only goes to the weight given by his testimony, not the admissibility.

"The expert must possess the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the information imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable" (Ghazala v Shore Haven Apt. DEL, LLC, 229 AD3d 447, 448 [2d Dept 2024 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Provided that Plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that Dr. Sharma is qualified to opine regarding Plaintiff's injuries above the ankle, he will be permitted to testify.

In Hunt v Ryzman (292 AD2d 345, 346 [2d Dept2002]), the Appellate Division, First Department held that the disclosure requirements of CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) do not apply to treating physicians. Accordingly, the extent of Dr. Sharma's expertise, including the scope of his opinions regarding the relationship between Plaintiff's ankle and knee injuries, may properly be explored at trial and left for the trier of fact to evaluate, assuming that the Court rules he is qualified to testify based on his credentials presented to the jury.

Accordingly, Defendant's application to strike Plaintiff's expert disclosure or preclude Dr. Sharma's testimony is unwarranted.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) That branch of Defendant's motion seeking to strike the expert disclosure and preclude the testimony of Vincent Pici, P.E., is DENIED as moot, as Plaintiff decided not to call Mr. Pici as a witness at trial; and

(2) That branch of Defendant's motion seeking to strike the expert disclosure and preclude the testimony of Siddhartha Sharma, DPM, is DENIED. Resolution of any objection to Dr. Sharma's qualifications to opine about injuries above the ankle will await testimony at trial.