This is an action to recover compensation for work performed on a construction project. The project is located in Hudson County, New Jersey. Plaintiff's principal place of business is located in Nassau County, New York. Defendants' respective principal places of business are in New Jersey. Defendants each move to transfer venue to the appropriate court in Hudson County. The motions are granted.

Plaintiff does not dispute that neither the locations of the parties nor the location of the underlying project support laying venue in New York County. And a partner of defendant Linde-Griffith Construction Co. represents in an affidavit that plaintiff and Linde-Griffith did not sign a "contract . . . as to work performed by Plaintiff at the Jersey City project," and that "[n]o [*2]negotiations or meetings regarding Plaintiff's work on the project took place in New York County."^[FN1] (NYSCEF No. 15 at ¶¶ 7, 11.) Defendants have thus submitted evidence that CPLR 503's bases for venue do not support laying venue in New York County.

Plaintiff does not identify any other provision that might support venue in New York County. Nor does plaintiff provide countervailing evidence that might support venue in this county under CPLR 503. At most, plaintiff's counsel represents in an affirmation that plaintiff agreed to perform work on the project after "multiple negotiations and discussions, which took place, inter alia, in New York County"; and that the parties' "negotiations took place, at least in part, via email, and through communications exchanged in New York County." (NYSCEF No. 27 at ¶¶ 18, 30.) The affirmation does not, however, identify the basis of counsel's knowledge underlying this representation. Nor does plaintiff provide the referenced emails (or other supporting documentation). Indeed, the only document cited as support for counsel's representations is a paragraph from the (unverified) complaint; but that paragraph merely states, in general terms, that the "negotiations, communications, and execution of the contract giving rise to this action occurred within the State of New York." (NYSCEF No. 1 at ¶ 8 [emphasis added].)

Taking into account defendants' evidence that venue in New York County is improper, and that plaintiff has not provided an affidavit or other admissible evidence rebutting defendants' showing, the motions to change venue are granted. (See Jones v Workmen's Circle Multicare Ctr., 236 AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2025].) In light of the transfer of venue, A.J.D. Construction's request for an extension of time to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint is granted, and A.J.D. Construction may respond to the complaint within 45 days of entry of this order (or within 20 days of the completion of transfer of this action to New Jersey court, whichever comes first).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motions to transfer venue of Linde-Griffith Construction Co. (mot seq 001) and A.J.D. Construction Co. (mot seq 002) are granted;

ORDERED that this action is hereby transferred to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants shall serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on plaintiff; on the Clerk of this Court (by using the NYSCEF document type "Service on Supreme Court Clerk (Genl. Clerk) w/Copy of Order"), who is directed to transfer this action to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, and to update its records accordingly; and on the office of the General Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), which is directed to update its records accordingly; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants shall also serve notice of entry on the office of the Clerk of Superior Court, Hudson County, who is directed to update its records accordingly; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants shall pay the appropriate transfer fee, if any, and shall contact the staff of the Clerk of this Court and cooperate in effectuating the transfer; and it is [*3]further

ORDERED that A.J.D. Construction's time to answer or respond to plaintiff's complaint is extended as set forth above.