I. Statement Pursuant to § CPLR 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 004) numbered 63-76, 115-117, 212; (Motion No. 005) numbered 77-85, 97-106, 109-112, 121; and (Motion No. 006) numbered 83-96, 107-108, 113-114 were read on this motion. The Court has considered the following papers: the Notice of Motion, Affirmation, Exhibits, Rule 202.8-g Statement, and Memorandum of Law submitted by Defendants Elton and Erjona Frasheri (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos 63—65, 76); the Notice of Motion of Plaintiff Robert Sanchez with Affirmation in Support and Exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 77—78); Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition to the Frasheri Defendants' motion and Plaintiff's Response to the Rule 202.8-g Statement (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 115—116); and the Reply Affirmation submitted on behalf of Defendants Elton and Erjona Frasheri (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 121).

II. Facts

On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff Robert Sanchez, a plumber employed by KCM Plumbing, was engaged in performing plumbing work at the premises located at 298 Nicholas Avenue, Staten Island, New York. The property was then undergoing construction as a two-story residence. Plaintiff, together with coworkers, was running drainpipes throughout the building. It is undisputed that no trade other than KCM Plumbing was present on the site that day.

At the conclusion of his work, Plaintiff attempted to leave the premises. A wooden ramp, fashioned from planks, had been set in place to bridge the gap between the elevated doorway threshold and the exterior ground. This makeshift device, utilized for ingress and egress, collapsed beneath Plaintiff, causing him to fall and sustain injury. Plaintiff testified that he did not know who constructed the ramp, though it had been regularly employed by workers on the site.

The property was owned by Defendant 298 Nicholas LLC. Defendant Elton Frasheri was the president of that entity. Defendant Erjona Frasheri, his spouse, had no ownership interest, never visited the site, never retained contractors, and exercised no involvement in the project.

The nature of Elton Frasheri's role is central. His deposition testimony reveals that he purchased the property as an investment, did not retain a general contractor, and instead personally engaged the subcontractors, including Plaintiff's employer KCM Plumbing. He admitted that he was present on the site daily, observed progress, cleaned, and, on at least one occasion, directed that plumbing work be redone when it did not comport with his standards. Plaintiff emphasizes these admissions to argue that Elton acted as de facto general contractor.

As to the ramp itself, testimony diverges. Plaintiff maintains that Elton acknowledged both knowledge of the ramp and participation in its construction. Elton insists that he did not build the ramp and that it was erected by KCM's foreman and crew, allegedly to comply with a directive of the Department of Buildings. The Court is thus confronted with conflicting testimony bearing directly on Elton's potential status under the Labor Law.

Plaintiff commenced this action alleging violations of Labor Law §§240 [1], 241 [6], and 200, as well as common-law negligence. Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment under §240 [1]. The Frasheri Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against them, contending that they are neither owners nor contractors and bore no duty to Plaintiff.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Summary Judgment Standards

The well-settled principles governing summary judgment are familiar. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, through competent proof sufficient to eliminate any triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). The movant's burden does not extend to disproving every remotely conceivable factual theory advanced by the opponent (see Ferluckaj v Goldman Sachs & Co., 12 NY3d 316 [2009]); rather, it suffices to demonstrate the absence of genuine issues. Once this burden is met, the onus shifts to the opponent to adduce admissible evidence establishing the existence of material questions requiring trial (see Zuckerman v New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]).

These standards guide the Court's analysis of the parties' cross-applications.

B. Labor Law § 240 ]1]

Labor Law § 240 [1], the "Scaffold Law," imposes absolute and non-delegable liability upon owners, general contractors, and their statutory agents for failing to furnish or erect safety devices adequate to protect workers from elevation-related hazards. The statute was enacted to protect workers against the special perils arising from gravity-related accidents and places the duty squarely on those best situated to enforce safe practices.

Here, Plaintiff's injury indisputably resulted from the collapse of a ramp that served as an access device. The collapse of such a device falls squarely within the hazards contemplated by § 240 [1]. Thus, Plaintiff has established the occurrence of a statutory violation and proximate causation.

The question is whether Elton or Erjona Frasheri are proper statutory defendants. The deed establishes that 298 Nicholas LLC was the record owner. Individual officers and members of an LLC are not personally liable under the Labor Law absent veil piercing, which has neither been pleaded nor established. Authority is clear that liability attaches only to owners, contractors, and statutory agents (see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]). Courts have repeatedly held that where a party is neither owner nor contractor, liability may not be imposed (see Wong v City of New York, 65 AD3d 1000 [2d Dept 2009]); Acevedo v Mehlman, 743 NYS.2d 726 [2d Dept 2002]).

Plaintiff nonetheless contends that Elton functioned as a general contractor or statutory agent. It is well established that nomenclature is not determinative. As the Second Department observed, "[t]he title by which a party is known is not determinative . . . a party with essentially the same duties as a contractor or as an agent of the owner will be held to have the responsibilities of a contractor or owner under the Labor Law" (see Aranda v Park E. Constr., 4 AD3d 315 [2d Dept 2004]). Indeed, where a defendant hires subcontractors, oversees the project, and instructs how work is to be performed, he may be deemed a general contractor (see Seales v Trident Structural Corp., 142 AD3d 1153 [2d Dept 2016]).

The record presents evidence that Elton hired all subcontractors, was at the site daily, directed remedial work, and acknowledged knowledge of the ramp. If these facts are credited, he could indeed be deemed a general contractor. Conversely, Elton asserts that he merely acted as president of the LLC, that he never directed the means and methods of Plaintiff's work, and that KCM itself built the ramp. Where such conflicting testimony exists, summary judgment must be denied (see Carrasco v Weissman, 120 AD3d 531 [2d Dept 2014]).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion under Labor Law § 240 [1] must be DENIED, as material questions remain as to Elton's role. Elton's own motion for dismissal is likewise denied for the same reason.

C. Labor Law § 241 [6]

Labor Law § 241 [6] imposes a non-delegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to workers by complying with specific provisions of the Industrial Code. Liability cannot be imposed in the absence of qualifying status as an owner, contractor, or agent.

Here, the record again confirms that 298 Nicholas LLC was the deeded owner. Whether Elton assumed the role of contractor or agent is contested. The evidence that he retained subcontractors directly, visited the site daily, and directed corrective work could, if credited, support the conclusion that he bore contractor responsibilities. The competing evidence, including Plaintiff's testimony that he took orders solely from KCM and Elton's own insistence that he did not supervise the means or methods, supports the contrary conclusion. These are quintessential factual disputes inappropriate for summary resolution.

D. Labor Law § 200

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of owners and contractors to provide workers with a safe place to work. Liability may arise under two distinct lines of cases: where the accident arises from the manner and method of the work, in which case liability attaches only if the defendant supervised or controlled the work; and where the accident arises from a dangerous premises condition, in which case liability attaches if the defendant created the condition or had notice of it.

Plaintiff argues that Elton both supervised the plumbing work and participated in constructing or approving the ramp. If so, liability under Labor Law § 200 could attach. Elton disputes this, testifying that KCM alone constructed the ramp and that he never directed Plaintiff's work. The case law makes plain that liability is not imposed absent supervisory control or notice (see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]). Given the conflicting evidence, triable issues preclude summary resolution.

E. Common-Law Negligence

Common-law negligence principles mirror those of Labor Law § 200. Liability arises where a defendant owned, controlled, or specially used the premises, or where he affirmatively created the hazard. Plaintiff contends that Elton, by retaining subcontractors and overseeing the project, controlled the premises and contributed to the creation of the ramp. Elton insists otherwise. The competing accounts render summary judgment inappropriate.

F. Claims Against Erjona Frasheri

By contrast, the record as to Defendant Erjona Frasheri is unambiguous. She held no ownership interest, never visited the premises, never retained contractors, and played no role in the project. Absent ownership, control, or affirmative conduct, liability under Labor Law or common-law negligence cannot be imposed. Accordingly, her motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety.

IV.Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion of Defendant Erjona Frasheri for summary judgment is granted, and the Complaint and all cross-claims against her are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion of Defendant Elton Frasheri for summary judgment is denied, as triable issues of fact exist regarding his role as a potential contractor or statutory agent and his possible involvement in the ramp's construction; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion of Plaintiff Robert Sanchez for summary judgment under Labor Law §240 [1] is DENIED, as material questions of fact preclude judgment as a matter of law; and it is further

ORDERED that the action shall proceed against Defendants Elton Frasheri, 298 Nicholas LLC, 130 Arnold Street Venture LLC, and Maximum Contracting Inc.