| Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Sposato |
| 2025 NY Slip Op 51700(U) [87 Misc 3d 1226(A)] |
| Decided on October 22, 2025 |
| Supreme Court, Westchester County |
| Jamieson, J. |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB, D/B/A CHRISTIANA TRUST, NOT INDIVIDUALLY
BUT AS TRUSTEE FOR PREMIUM MORTGAGE ACQUISITION TRUST, Plaintiff,
against Robert Sposato, LINDA SPOSATO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O/B/O INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DCFS TRUST MERCEDES BENZ FINANCIAL, CITIBANK, N.A. and ALBERT SORANO, Defendants. |
The following papers numbered 1 to 4 were read on these motions:
Paper &n bsp; NumberThere two open and largely duplicative motions before the Court filed by pro se defendant Linda Sposato. The first motion seeks (1) to vacate all Decisions and Orders issued in this matter in plaintiff's name, for lack of standing; (2) to dismiss the action based on the statute of limitations; and (3) to strike all filings by unauthorized counsel. The second motion seeks (1) to vacate Orders because of fraud on the Court; (2) to vacate the last Decision and Order because the Court purportedly "overruled" the Appellate Division; and (3) to void a Judgment based on a Federal statute for lack of standing.
These motions are the 17th and 18th motions in a foreclosure action that has lasted more than ten years. Without belaboring this lengthy history, the Court notes that in February 2023, the Court issued a Decision and Order declining to vacate the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. In a September 2025 Decision and Order (the "September Decision"), the Court held that "again Ms. Sposato has presented the Court with no new legally-cognizable evidence or law to substantiate her claims of fraud, or otherwise give the Court any legal basis for the relief she seeks." The Court, citing caselaw that a "'judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all questions at issue between the parties, and all matters of defense which were or which might have been litigated in the foreclosure action are concluded. Defenses which should have been raised before the entry of a judgment of foreclosure, but were not, should not be entertained by the court after the fact,'" held that there were several issues that movant had raised that she had not raised prior to the issuance of the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale and that were thus barred.
Ms. Sposato raises certain of these issues again on this motion. The Court has already addressed them and need not repeat itself. With respect to the new issues, such as Ms. Sposato's assertion that the Court "overruled" the Appellate Division, a review of the September Decision shows that the Court did no such thing. The Court held that "Even if movant were entitled to raise this issue nearly 17 years after the fact (and more than five years after the Court granted the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale), which she may not as a matter of law, the evidence demonstrates that despite having been disbarred, this man's notary license was and remains valid to date, according to the New York State Department of State website, of which this Court may take judicial notice." The Court not only acknowledged the disbarment, but also addressed the independent issue of the validity of the notary license.
Next, the Court briefly addresses the argument that an assignment that occurred during a bankruptcy violated the automatic stay. This contention is meritless. While proceedings in an underlying litigation are stayed, corporate transactions involving the subject matter of any litigations are not stayed. 11 USC § 362.
Nor is there any merit to Ms. Sposato's claim that by plaintiff having assigned the note and mortgage to another bank in April 2025, this action becomes void for lack of standing. [*2]CPLR § 1018 is designed for exactly this scenario. It provides, in relevant part, that "Upon any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by . . . the original parties. . . ." Similarly, as counsel for plaintiff remains counsel for plaintiff, any filings by counsel are not filed by "unauthorized counsel."
As for the typo in the caption, in which plaintiff is referred to as "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, d/b/a Christiana Trust, Not Individually But As Trustee For Premium Mortgage Acquisition Trust," instead of "Pretium," this is a mere typo that affects nothing. CPLR § 2001.[FN2]
None of the other issues have any legal merit. The Court thus denies both motions in their entirety.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: October 22, 2025