By motion dated June 23, 2025, defendant moves to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (1) (a) on the ground that the district attorney failed to comply with automatic discovery (see CPL 245.20). His principal discovery complaint is that the district attorney failed to timely disclose forty-six DD5 complaint follow-up reports prepared by detectives investigating the case. For the reasons explained below, the prosecutor failed to exercise due diligence to comply with automatic discovery, and the motion to dismiss the indictment must be granted.

The charges against defendant arise from a shooting at approximately 2:00 a.m. on March 28, 2024. Within minutes of the shooting, patrol units responded to the location of the shooting. Soon after and throughout the day, numerous detectives followed leads and worked the case. At 8:00 a.m., at the beginning of his day tour, Detective Max Lindon was assigned as lead investigator. By March 29, 2024, defendant was an identified suspect. On April 2, 2024, police apprehended defendant at a traffic stop of the vehicle that he was driving. Police later seized evidence from the vehicle during an alleged inventory search. During this investigation, [*2]Detective Lindon compiled seventy-five complaint follow-up reports in his case file.

On September 18, 2024, the prosecutor filed the initial certificate of discovery compliance (CoC) and statement of readiness for trial. The prosecutor, however, disclosed only twenty-nine of the seventy-five follow-up reports before filing the initial CoC. The inventory of discovery lists disclosure of thirty-six complaint follow-up reports (see EDDS Doc ID: YI3ZS1). In an email to this court and defense counsel on September 23, 2025, the prosecutor explained that the seven other follow-up reports are reports prepared in so-called "companion cases," which are reports prepared by assisting detectives. Under the case management system in effect in September 2024, those reports would not appear in the "primary" case file of the case detective but would appear individually.

On March 24, 2025, this court issued a decision and order invalidating the initial CoC for reasons unrelated to the present motion (see 85 Misc 3d 1238[A]). As part of the motion, defendant raised the possibility that the district attorney did not disclose the names and case materials of the Night Watch and 63rd Precinct detectives who had responded to the scene and to the hospital (see Ryu aff in supp of first mot at ¶ 22). The prosecutor, however, stated that the names of all the Night Watch detectives had been provided and that all of Detective Lindon's follow-up reports and all "companion case" follow-up reports had been provided (see memorandum of law for dist atty on first motion at 18-19). Based on that information, this court found that the material sought by defendant had been disclosed (see 85 Misc 3d 1238[A] at *2 ["By now, the district attorney has disclosed to defendant . . . the names and case materials of the Night Watch and 63rd Precinct detectives involved in this case"]).

On April 24, 2025, the district attorney filed a supplemental CoC and statement of readiness for trial. The district attorney filed additional supplemental CoCs and statements of readiness for trial on June 2, June 18, June 23, July 21, and July 28, 2025.

On June 23, 2025, defendant filed the instant motion (see EDDS Doc ID: EBNGXN). The district attorney filed an affirmation and memorandum of law in opposition, dated July 12, 2025; an amended affirmation and memorandum of law in opposition, dated July 17, 2025; and an amended affirmation and memorandum of law in opposition, dated August 27, 2025 (see EDDS Doc IDs: EIGWA5, OYIJTJ, and KNMCC6). Defendant filed a supplemental affirmation in support of the motion and a memorandum of law, dated September 5, 2025, and a memorandum in further support of the motion, dated September 9, 2025 (see EDDS Doc IDs: UWTAHC and WRELUY).

In the meantime, on June 24, 2025, this court began the pretrial suppression hearing. Two police officers testified about defendant's arrest and the inventory search of his vehicle. This court adjourned to July 17, 2025, to hear testimony from Detective Lindon.

On July 17, 2025, prior to the start of the hearing, the prosecutor provided the defense with discovery that included five additional complaint follow-up reports from Detective Lindon's case file. These were follow-up reports numbered thirty through thirty-four (see EDDS Doc ID: KQQPV8; transcript of discovery conference, dated July 30, 2025, at 6-7).

At the continued hearing, Detective Lindon testified that defense counsel was missing "a lot" of his complaint follow-up reports. This court halted the hearing and adjourned to July 30, 2025, for a discovery conference and for the parties to confer about the missing complaint follow-up reports. On July 28, 2025, the district attorney disclosed to the defense forty-one more complaint follow-up reports.

While this motion was pending, the 2025 amendments to CPL article 245 went into effect (see L 2025, ch 56, part LL, § 8). The district attorney argues for the prosecutor's good faith and due diligence to be assessed under current law (see CPL 245.50 [5]). Defendant argues that the due diligence standard was not met under either the old or the new statute. The motion papers do not specifically address the issue of whether Criminal Procedure Law § 245.50 (5) can be applied to CoCs filed before the effective date of the new statute. This court need not decide that question because the outcome of this motion does not depend on whether due diligence is assessed under prior law or current law. For the sake of clarity, this decision will apply the new statute in assessing the prosecutor's due diligence (see People v Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270[A], *4 [Crim Ct, NY County 2025]).

Under subdivision five of Criminal Procedure Law § 245.50, this court must review "the totality" of the district attorney's effort to comply with automatic discovery and not "assess the [district attorney's] efforts item by item." The "[r]elevant factors for assessing the prosecutor's due diligence include, but are not limited to: [1] the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of this article; [2] the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; [3] the complexity of the case; [4] whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; [5] the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; [6] the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; [7] whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; [8] whether the omission was corrected; [9] whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and [10] whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (CPL 245.50 [5] [a]). Because the assessment of the prosecutor's due diligence is not limited to the statutory factors, this court also considers "how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence" (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 212 [2023]). In the end, this court must consider "all [the] factors . . . and no one factor shall be determinative" (CPL 245.50 [5] [b]). The prosecution bears the burden of establishing due diligence (see People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 213).

The prosecutor's explanation for the belated disclosures betrays a lack of due diligence. At the discovery conference on July 30, 2025, and in papers submitted to this court, the prosecutor explained that she had accepted the repeated assurances of Detective Lindon and others that all the complaint follow-up reports had been shared with the District Attorney's Office (DAO). She also stated that Detective Lindon had mistakenly believed that all his complaint follow-up reports had been shared with the DAO. He reportedly told the prosecutor that he had not submitted all his reports for approval and that he did not realize that unapproved [*3]follow-up reports were not shared with the DAO. However, upon review of the motion papers and the seventy-five complaint follow-up reports submitted for in camera review, this court finds that the prosecutor should have known that some complaint follow-up reports were missing before certifying that discovery was complete and filing a statement of readiness for trial. The prosecutor's failure to discover that some reports were missing amounts to a lack of due diligence.

As every prosecutor should know, detectives are obliged to prepare a follow-up report to document every step they take during the investigation of a case (see People v Lee, 116 AD3d 493, 498 [1st Dept 2014] [detective explained that DD5 complaint follow-up reports are, "in his words, what I would do to outline the steps taken in my investigation . . . basically it is a synopsis of my investigation"] [internal quotation marks omitted]). A review of the content of the first twenty-nine follow-up reports would have put the prosecutor on notice that more reports likely existed but had not been shared with the DAO.

For instance, Follow-Up Nos. 1, 2 and 3, indicate that, beginning at 10:10 p.m., on March 28, 2024, Detective Lindon submitted three facial recognition analysis requests for the shooter and two potential witnesses. A diligent prosecutor should have known to look for complaint-follow up reports that documented the collection of the images that were sent for facial recognition analysis. Follow-Up No. 4 documents that Detective Lindon was assigned to the case at 8:00 a.m. on March 28, 2024. This information should have led the prosecutor to look for follow-up reports that documented detective work between the time of the shooting, at 2:00 a.m., and the time of Detective Lindon's assignment at 8:00 a.m. Follow-Up No. 5 summarizes the actions of several unnamed Night Watch detectives. They interviewed the victim and treating physician at the hospital; they established the crime scene; they searched for and found ballistic evidence; they searched for and found surveillance video depicting events before and after the shooting; and they canvassed for witnesses. The prosecutor should have known that those Night Watch detectives would have written their own follow-up reports to document their work. Indeed, there are numerous follow-up reports that document investigative work done on March 28, 2024, that were not included in the twenty-nine reports initially shared with the DAO (see Follow-Up Report Nos. 35-46, 48-52). It is evident that had the prosecutor been duly attentive to the nature of the investigation and the content of Follow-Up Nos. 1-29, the prosecutor should have looked beyond mere assurances and pressed Detective Lindon to find and share the missing follow-up reports. Under the circumstances, the absence of these reports likely would have been "obvious" to the prosecutor (People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 212).

The prosecutor's reliance on the other statutory factors do not establish due diligence. The belated disclosures were largely not self-reported and were not discovered until Detective Lindon testified at the suppression hearing that the defense was missing "a lot" of his reports. The belated disclosures impeded defendant's ability to prepare for the pretrial suppression hearing, which had to be postponed until the missing reports were provided to the defense. Although the prosecutor had no actual knowledge that follow-up reports were missing, the prosecutor should have known. And while the prosecutor acted in good faith overall to comply with automatic discovery and to provide the missing follow-up reports upon learning that they were missing, those efforts do not outweigh the prosecutor's overreliance on police assurances [*4]and the prosecutor's failure to confirm those assurances. The prosecutor cannot delegate discovery compliance to the police.

This court disagrees with the district attorney's contention that the belatedly disclosed follow-up reports were "substantially duplicative" or "insignificant" (CPL 245.50 [5] [a]). The discovery items cited as duplicative—including grand jury testimony, medical records, surveillance video—do not show what the follow-up reports show: the full scope of the police investigation, from start to finish. The thoroughness of the police investigation can itself provide grounds for a defense (see Alvarez v Ercole, 763 F3d 223 [2d Cir 2014]). For that reason, the missing follow-up reports were not insignificant and the volume of other material that was timely disclosed does not outweigh the high number of complaint follow-up reports belatedly disclosed.

The prosecutor also contends that the complexity of this case supports a finding of due diligence (see People v Odusanya, 235 AD3d 1299, 1301 [4th Dept 2025] [case with "multiple perpetrators and a lengthy investigation" was "somewhat complex"]). But this case was not complex. This case involved one shooter, and police solved the case in six days. This factor does not help the prosecutor establish due diligence.

Upon consideration of the factors specified in Criminal Procedure Law § 245.50 (5) (a) and People v Bay (41 NY3d 200), this court concludes that the district attorney did not exercise due diligence to comply with automatic discovery. Accordingly, this court invalidates all the CoC and supplemental CoCs filed before July 28, 2025, and strikes all accompanying statements of readiness for trial.

Before computing the chargeable speedy trial time, this court addresses the other grounds that defendant raised in his motion dated June 23, 2025. The old procedural rules for filing a motion to challenge a CoC apply to this motion (see People v Grant, 2025 NY Slip Op 25217, *3-*4 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025]; People v Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270[A] at *2). Those rules required defendant to alert the prosecutor of alleged discovery deficiencies "as soon as practicable" and to file a motion to challenge a CoC "as soon as practicable" (CPL 245.50 former [4] [b], [c]). Defendant violated those rules by waiting to raise claims in this second motion that could have been raised in the first one.

The motion claims that the NDF lacked a proper designation of which police officers were potential witnesses and that the so-called Giglio materials for five police officers were belatedly disclosed and that the Giglio materials for eight other officers were incomplete. But defendant should have been aware of these alleged deficiencies at the time of the first motion in February 2025. The NDF was filed on June 5, 2024, and defendant had received, by September 18, 2024, Giglio disclosure letters for twenty-two police officers, a CCRB allegation history for twenty-one officers, and so-called underlying documents for sixteen officers. Upon receipt of this material, defendant had sufficient information to decide whether the NDF complied with automatic discovery and the prosecutor had provided Giglio disclosure letters for all the officers identified in the NDF and whether the Giglio materials for one or more officers were incomplete. The defense offers no legitimate excuse for not raising these complaints in the first motion.

The same is true for the complaints about discovery of FIS and HIDTA material; police communications about the generation of FIS Possible Match Lead Reports; and correspondence and any photo attachments related to an identification made by a Police Officer Rodriguez. The complaints about the FIS and HIDTA discovery appear to have been raised now, rather than at the time of the first motion, only because defense counsel subsequently made a "[c]loser inspection of the discovery" (Ryu aff in supp of mot, dated June 23, 2025, at ¶ 20). But the old procedural rules for challenging a CoC did not allow for motions to challenge a CoC to be filed every time the defense took a "closer" look at the discovery. As for the complaint about the correspondence with Officer Rodriguez, this one appears to be based upon a review of other discovery received before the initial CoC was filed ("the Screening Sheet") and defense counsel's knowledge about how police "[n]ormally" operate when such an identification is made (Ryu aff in supp of mot, dated June 23, 2025, at 19). Defendant could have raised this complaint in the first motion as well.

Although the prosecutor belatedly disclosed three police property invoices on June 18, 2025, that were not disclosed earlier (see Invoices 3001724702; 3001724777; 3001724784; EDDS Doc ID: OBPGSG), the defense should have noticed that these invoices were missing from the discovery received by September 18, 2024. Two of the invoices list the property taken from defendant and held either as arrest evidence or for safekeeping. Defendant presumably had personal knowledge that police seized property from him at arrest, and the defense should have expected to receive the invoices for that property in the discovery.

The defense likewise should have expected that the discovery would include the third invoice. This invoice listed the forty items seized from defendant's vehicle during the alleged inventory search. Although defendant presumably was not present when police seized those items from his vehicle, the defense was aware of the claim that police had seized those items during an alleged inventory search. In such a case, the defense should have expected that the prosecutor would produce that invoice in discovery to support a claim that police conducted a proper inventory search. This invoice was critical evidence to produce at a suppression hearing to show that police had conducted a lawful inventory search (see People v Noble, 211 AD3d 970, 972 [2d Dept 2022] [finding itemized police vouchers, "on their face, fill out the hallmark of an inventory search: a meaningful inventory list"] [cleaned up]). Defense counsel understood this point, explaining at the start of the pretrial suppression hearing that the existence of this invoice "directly bears on the analysis of . . . the Mapp portion of this hearing" (transcript of suppression hearing, dated June 24, 2025, at 29). Under the circumstances, the nondisclosure of this invoice was a "potential defect or deficiency" in the discovery that defense counsel should have raised at the time of the first motion and in the first motion (CPL 245.50 former [4] [b]). Accordingly, the branch of the present motion based on these other grounds is denied as untimely (see People v Seymour, 84 Misc 3d 23, 25 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists], lv denied 42 NY3d 1022 [2024]).

The invalidation of all CoCs and statements of readiness for trial filed before July 28, 2025, requires that the indictment be dismissed. Under New York's speedy trial statute, the district attorney must be ready for trial within six months of when the felony complaint was filed on April 3, 2024 (see CPL 1.20 [8], [16], [17]; 30.30 [1] [a]; 100.05; People v Osgood, 52 NY2d [*5]37, 50 [1980]). The applicable six-month period, as measured by the number of days within the six calendar months after the felony complaint was filed, is 183 days (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 207 n 3 [1992]; People v Bernier, 141 AD2d 750, 754 [2d Dept 1988]).

The delay between the arraignment on the felony complaint on April 3, 2024, and the arraignment on the indictment in Supreme Court on May 20, 2024, is chargeable (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d at 213 & n 5; People v Correa, 77 NY2d 930, 931 [1991]; People v Lisene, 201 AD3d 738, 740 [2d Dept 2022]; People v Owens, 209 AD2d 549, 550 [2d Dept 1994]). (47 days charged.)

At the arraignment in Supreme Court on May 20, 2024, defense counsel did not request inspection of the grand jury minutes. The court adjourned to June 7, 2024, for the district attorney to file a CoC. (18 days charged. 65 total days charged.)

On June 7, 2024, defense counsel again did not request inspection of the grand jury minutes, and the court adjourned to August 6, 2024, for the district attorney to file a CoC. On July 3, 2024, defendant filed an omnibus motion that stopped the speedy trial clock (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). (26 days charged. 91 total days charged.)

On August 6, 2024, the court set a motion schedule for submissions on the defense omnibus motion, and adjourned to September 26, 2024, for the district attorney to file a CoC and a decision on defense motions. This delay is excludable under Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (4) (a). (0 days charged. 91 total days charged.)

On September 26, 2024, the court noted that a decision on the defense omnibus motion had been issued the day before and that the district attorney had filed a CoC and statement of readiness for trial on September 18, 2024. The court adjourned to October 30, 2024, in Part 21, for the defense to file a CoC and a pretrial conference. However, because this court subsequently found the CoC to be invalid, this adjournment is charged to the district attorney (see People v Bautista-Gonzalez, 224 AD3d 845, 846 [2d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1078 [2025]). (34 days charged. 125 total days charged.)

On October 30, 2024, this court adjourned to December 11, 2024, for defendant to file any motion to challenge the initial CoC. This time is excludable under Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (4) (a) (see People v Brown, 99 NY2d 488, 492 [2003]; People v Sai, 223 AD2d 439, 440 [1st Dept 1996]). (0 days charged. 125 total days charged.)

The case was thereafter administratively adjourned to January 8, 2025, after defense counsel requested more time to review discovery, and this court granted that request. This delay is not charged to the district attorney (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a], [b]; People v Jackson, 2025 NY Slip Op 51511[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th, and 13th Jud Dists 2025]). (0 days charged. 125 total days charged.)

On January 8, 2025, defendant requested more time to review discovery, and this court granted that request. This court adjourned to February 19, 2025, for defendant to file any motion to challenge the CoC. This time is excludable (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a], [b]; People v Jackson, [*6]2025 NY Slip Op 51511[U]). (0 days charged. 125 total days charged.)

Off calendar on February 18, 2025, defendant submitted for filing on EDDS a motion to challenge the CoC.

On February 19, 2025, this court set a motion schedule on the defense motion and adjourned for decision to March 26, 2025. This time is excludable (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). (0 days charged. 125 days charged.)

As noted already, on March 25, 2025, this court issued a decision and order that invalidated the CoC filed on September 18, 2024.

On March 26, 2025, this court adjourned to April 23, 2025, for the district attorney to file a CoC. This delay is chargeable. (28 days charged. 153 total days charged.

On April 23, 2025, this court noted that the district attorney had yet to file a CoC. This court adjourned to June 4, 2025, for the district attorney to file a CoC, stating that speedy trial time would be charged until a CoC was filed. Off-calendar on April 24, 2025, the district attorney filed a supplemental CoC. However, this court has found that this CoC and all subsequent supplemental CoCs filed before July 28, 2025, to be invalid and struck all accompanying statements of readiness for trial as illusory. Consequently, this delay is charged to the district attorney. (41 days charged. 194 total days charged.)

On June 4, 2025, this court adjourned to June 24, 2025, for the pretrial suppression hearing on the defense motion to suppress. This time is excludable under Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (4) (a). (0 days charged. 194 total days charged.)

Off calendar on June 23, 2025, defendant filed the instant motion.

On June 24, 2025, this court began the pretrial suppression hearing and adjourned to July 17, 2025, to continue the hearing. As noted previously, this court postponed the hearing and adjourned to July 30, 2025, for an on-the-record discovery conference. At the conclusion of the conference, this court set a date for the parties to file supplemental papers on the pending defense motion and adjourned to October 1, 2025, for decision. This court thereafter adjourned to October 8, 2025, for decision. This delay is excludable. (0 days charged. 194 total days charged.)

For the reasons stated above, this court finds all CoCs and statements of readiness filed before July 28, 2025, to be invalid and charges the district attorney with 194 days of speedy trial time. Because the number of chargeable speedy trial days exceeds the number within the applicable six-month period for trial readiness, the motion to dismiss the indictment is granted, and the indictment is dismissed.

So ordered.