I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 001) numbered 39-62, were read on this motion. The Court has considered the following papers on Defendant's Motion Sequence 001: the Notice of Motion dated September 25, 2025; the Affidavit of AO, sworn September 25, 2025, with Exhibits A (Allstate [automobile insurance] policy) and B (EmblemHealth [medical insurance] statement); the Affirmation of Defendant's counsel, Erin K. Colgan, Esq., dated September 25, 2025; the Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition, sworn October 15, 2025; and the Affirmation in Opposition of Plaintiff's counsel, Michael A. Coscia, Esq., Abrams Fensterman LLP, dated October 15, 2025, with annexed materials, together with all prior proceedings in this action.

This matrimonial matter presents a motion to modify the automatic orders imposed by Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") § 236 [B] [2] [b]. Defendant seeks leave to remove Plaintiff and the parties' adult twin daughters, SO and OO, from his existing medical and automobile insurance policies and to discontinue payment of the associated premiums during the pendency of this action. Plaintiff opposes, invoking the protective purpose of the automatic orders and disputing both the factual predicates and the equitable grounds advanced. The question is not whether Defendant's long-term support obligations extend past the age of twenty-one, but whether he has shown "good cause" to interrupt the statutory status quo now, pendente lite.

A. Procedural Posture and Parties

Plaintiff commenced the action by filing a Summons and Complaint on November 22, 2024 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 1), thereby triggering the automatic orders. The parties were married on XX XX, 2003, and have twin daughters, SO and OO, born XX XX, 2003; they are now twenty-one.

B. The Insurance Coverages in Dispute

Defendant avers he is the policyholder of an Allstate automobile policy effective August 21, 2025 through February 21, 2026; the declarations identify listed drivers including the daughters, with high liability limits and comprehensive collision coverage. He further proffers an Emblem Health commercial statement reflecting a monthly premium obligation of $2,246.48.

C. Defendant's Factual Showing

Defendant asserts "urgent and necessary circumstances." He states each daughter has a history of accidents and moving violations, that multiple vehicles have been totaled, and that one severe collision produced bodily injury to a third party and spawned litigation in which he remains involved. He attests that maintaining the daughters on his auto policy inflates premiums and exposes him to continuing liability. He also represents that each daughter holds a Morgan Stanley account exceeding $550,000, funded solely by him, and that both are now part-time students at the College of Staten Island. He maintains Plaintiff, a physician, can secure her own coverage; he additionally contends that because he resides in New Jersey, the policy structure prevents removing the children without also removing Plaintiff.

D. Plaintiff's Opposition

Plaintiff opposes in a sworn submission, asserting that the daughters, although twenty-one, are full-time college students without employment and remain financially dependent; that Defendant has always maintained family coverage and offers no more than a preference to stop paying; and that granting the motion would defeat the automatic orders' stabilizing purpose. She acknowledges new W-2 employment as a physician at Essen Medical Associates with 2024 wages of $123,475.68, but avers she expressly opted out of employer health benefits based on a mutual understanding that the existing family coverage would remain intact during the case, an understanding Defendant well knew.

Of particular note, Plaintiff asserts the Morgan Stanley accounts on which Defendant now relies were concealed by him during discovery and omitted from his Statement of Net Worth; she contends she learned of them only after subpoena responses, and characterizes Defendant's application as retaliatory once the daughters curtailed his access. Plaintiff's counsel amplifies the statutory purpose of the automatic orders, citing Davidoff v Davidoff, 209 AD3d 833 [2d Dept 2022], and Spencer v Spencer, 159 AD3d 174 [2d Dept 2018], for the proposition that those orders preserve the status quo and are not to be modified absent a particularized showing beyond mere convenience.

E. Legal Authority Relied Upon by Counsel

The motion papers collectively reference the following authorities. Defendant cites that a parent's legal obligation to support generally terminates at twenty-one: Family Court Act ("FCA") § 413 [1]; Bani-Esraili v Lerman, 69 NY2d 807 [1987]; Matter of Roe v Doe, 29 NY2d 188 [1971]; Bailey v Bailey, 15 AD3d 577 [2d Dept 2005] and Carr-Harris v Carr-Harris, 98 AD3d 548 [2d Dept 2012]. He also invokes the notion that any obligation beyond that age is moral rather than legal, referencing Parker v Parker, 189 AD 603 [1st Dept 1919]. He notes there is no stipulation requiring post-21 coverage and distinguishes situations like B.D. v E.D., 218 AD3d 9 [1st Dept 2023], where a so-ordered agreement existed. He further references DRL § 240-d and Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03 for the separate framework governing support for developmentally disabled adult children, which he argues is inapplicable here.

Plaintiff, in turn, cites Davidoff and Spencer for the express purpose of automatic orders, to preserve the status quo of benefits and prevent unilateral changes pending adjudication.

A. The Nature and Function of the Automatic Orders

Upon service of the Summons and Complaint in a matrimonial action, DRL § 236 [B] [2] [b] imposes automatic restraints prohibiting, inter alia, removal of a spouse or "children of the marriage" from existing medical insurance coverage and changes to insurance benefits, absent written consent or further court order. The automatic orders are injunctive in character; they exist to preserve the pre-litigation status quo pending the Court's equitable determinations. The record correctly recites that they remain "in full force and effect" unless modified by the Court for good cause. Defendant's counsel acknowledges as much, noting the statute's text and the Court's continuing discretion.

The legal frame, as articulated in Plaintiff's papers and consistent with cited authority, is that modification is not a matter of ordinary discretion but of demonstrated necessity or equity, something more than a party's preference to stop paying ongoing obligations during the case. Davidoff and Spencer (as invoked by Plaintiff) are instructive in delineating the status-quo, preserving purpose of the automatic orders during the pendency of suit.

B. Emancipation, Support, and Insurance During Pendency

Defendant's reliance on the age of twenty-one is legally well-taken in the context of substantive support, FCA § 413 [1] and decisions such as Bani-Esraili and Roe v. Doe establish that the general legal obligation of parental support ends at that age. The moving papers also invoke Carr-Harris, Bailey, and Parker to similar effect. But those authorities do not themselves dissolve the automatic orders. The dispositive question here is procedural and equitable: whether "good cause" exists now to lift the restraints and allow unilateral termination of existing coverage pending final adjudication. The mere fact of emancipation does not compel interim modification. Rather, emancipation is one factor in the good-cause calculus, to be weighed against countervailing risks, reliance interests, and the statute's stabilizing goals.

C. Defendant's Claimed Burdens: Financial Cost and Liability Exposure

Defendant's affidavit details significant premium costs and an enhanced exposure environment attributable to the daughters' driving histories, including a catastrophic loss with bodily injury and ongoing litigation. The Court does not trivialize those concerns. However, the motion papers do not demonstrate that continued maintenance of the existing coverages threatens insolvency or constitutes an unmanageable hardship during the pendency of the action. The EmblemHealth invoice shows an identified monthly premium, but no balance sheet, cash-flow constraint, or comparable financial showing accompanies the request. Absent a particularized demonstration of necessity, as opposed to preference, the statutory presumption favoring preservation of the status quo controls.

On the automobile side, Defendant highlights that his New Jersey residence and policy structure purportedly prevent removal of the daughters without removing Plaintiff. That constraint is contractual and of Defendant's own selection; it does not itself establish good cause to strip a spouse of coverage protected by New York's automatic orders. The risk of adverse driving does exist, but there is no showing that alternative interim risk-management tools (e.g., usage restrictions, driver exclusions as permitted by the carrier, or increased deductibles) were pursued or exhausted. [*2]On this record, the increased cost and generalized exposure are insufficient to carry the movant's burden of "good cause" to modify a standing injunction.

D. Plaintiff's Reliance and the Equity of Concealment

Plaintiff's sworn assertion that she deliberately opted out of employer coverage in reliance on a mutual understanding that the extant family policy would continue is unrebutted on this motion and weighs heavily in equity. To terminate coverage mid-litigation would defeat the protective aim of the automatic orders and could occasion irreparable harm if comparable coverage cannot be immediately secured on like terms.

Even more consequential is Plaintiff's assertion, supported by procedural context, that the Morgan Stanley accounts now cited by Defendant as proof of the daughters' financial independence were not disclosed by him during discovery and were omitted from his Statement of Net Worth, becoming known only after subpoenaed records issued. A party asking a court of equity to relieve him from injunction-like restraints cannot predicate relief on facts he is alleged to have withheld from the adversary and the Court. The "clean hands" dimension is not a new legal rule introduced by this Court; it is an equitable lens compelled by the record Plaintiff presents. On the present papers, the Court will not grant discretionary modification grounded in assets that, if Plaintiff's showing is credited, were previously and wrongfully concealed.

E. Statutory Exceptions and the Absence of a Stipulation

Defendant correctly notes there is no stipulation or court order obligating him to maintain health or auto insurance beyond age twenty-one, distinguishing circumstances like B.D. v. E.D., where a so-ordered stipulation controlled, and averring that DRL § 240-d and Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03 are inapplicable because no developmental disability is alleged. Those points narrow the field but do not end the inquiry; they simply confirm that any continuation of coverage is a matter of interim restraint, not a continuing statutory duty. The absence of a stipulation removes one potential basis to compel coverage; it does not supply "good cause" to lift the automatic orders pending trial.

F. Risk of Irreparable Harm vs. Compensable Expense

If coverage is canceled and later determined to have been wrongfully terminated, reinstatement may be unavailable or cost-prohibitive; gaps in medical coverage, in particular, can have non-compensable consequences. By contrast, premiums paid under the protection of the automatic orders are dollars, and dollars are compensable in the final accounting. The equities therefore favor preserving the status quo absent a clear showing of necessity. That weighing accords with the purpose of DRL § 236 [B] [2] [b] as described in the opposition papers and authorities they cite.

The Court concludes that Defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate "good cause" to modify the automatic orders at this juncture. While emancipation at twenty-one is legally relevant [*3]to the ultimate support analysis (FCA § 413 [1]; Bani-Esraili; Roe v Doe; Bailey; Carr-Harris), the present question is interim and equitable. On this record, the balance of equities, Plaintiff's reliance, the serious allegation of nondisclosure of the very assets invoked by Defendant, the absence of proved hardship, and the risk of irreparable prejudice, compels preservation of the status quo contemplated by DRL § 236 [B] [2] [b], consistent with the function articulated in Davidoff and Spencer as cited in the opposition.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Defendant's motion to modify the automatic orders pursuant to DRL § 236 [B] [2] [b] to remove Plaintiff and the parties' adult daughters from Defendant's existing medical and automobile insurance coverages and to discontinue payment of premiums is DENIED; and it is further;

ORDERED that the automatic orders shall remain in full force and effect pending further order or judgment; and it is further;

ORDERED that Defendant may renew upon a proper evidentiary showing of bona fide financial hardship or upon competent proof that the daughters have secured and are maintaining independent, adequate insurance coverage without prejudice to Plaintiff; and it is further;

ORDERED that all other relief not expressly addressed is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.