At the most recent appearance in this case, the People asked for the complaint to be deemed converted to an information based on the complaining witness's supporting deposition. The defense objected, because discovery documents revealed that the complaining witness communicates in another language—and the supporting deposition was not accompanied by a certificate of translation, and did not otherwise acknowledge the language difference.

During the appearance, I observed that the defense's argument was likely forestalled by People v. Slade, 37 NY3d 127 (2021), which reaffirmed that hearsay issues outside of the four corners of the accusatory instrument do not impede conversion. But the defendant had been waiting for the case to be called for some time; not wishing to cause further delay, I deferred decision on conversion and adjourned the case to December 19.

Rather than leave the question for the next judge, I have examined the issue further. And, as I initially suspected, Slade bars the defense's argument. Accordingly, the complaint is deemed an information.

Because this decision is primarily for the parties, I will be brief. The defendant is charged with resisting arrest (P.L. § 205.30) and fourth-degree criminal mischief (P.L. § 145.00(1)), the latter because he allegedly kicked an apartment access door off its hinges. The misdemeanor complaint was sworn by a police officer, who relayed information about the alleged criminal mischief from the complaining witness, who was identified as the owner of the building. [*2]Nothing in the complaint itself suggested that the complaining witness communicated in a language other than English.

The People later filed and served off-calendar a supporting deposition, reflecting that the complaining witness had read the complaint and was attesting that the facts furnished were true and correct. Once again, nothing in the supporting deposition itself indicated that the complaining witness communicated in a language other than English, or that any documents had been (or needed to be) translated.

At the following appearance, defense counsel ^[FN2] objected to conversion based on a lack of a certificate of translation. Discovery documents had apparently revealed that the complaining witness communicates in Mandarin, which the People confirmed by reference to their status sheet for the case. In the defense's view, this inconsistency, and the lack of a certificate of translation, prevented the supporting deposition from converting the complaint into an information.

But Slade forestalls this objection on all fronts, having held in the specific context of certificates of translation that latent hearsay defects—meaning those that do not appear on the face of an accusatory instrument—do not prevent conversion. Slade, 37 NY3d at 137. In Slade itself, a facially adequate first-party complaint was not undermined, either for conversion or on sufficiency grounds, by the revelation that a certificate of translation had been prepared but not filed. See id. at 138. And in one of the companion cases, where neither "the face of the complaint" nor the supporting deposition indicated that the English-language documents were "translated for the witness" or otherwise that "he failed to read, have read to him, or understand" them, Slade concluded that there was no impediment to conversion because "the four corners of the complaint, including the witness's accompanying supporting deposition, contain[ed] no indication of any translation or other potential hearsay defect." Slade also held both that the C.P.L. does not require a certificate of translation and that the use of a translator does not create an additional layer of hearsay, so a certificate of translation is not generally required for conversion. Id. at 139—41, 143.

Here, the alleged defect is precisely the kind of latent deficiency contemplated by Slade: a purported translation inconsistency that appears nowhere in the complaint or supporting deposition, but instead was revealed by reference to discovery documents, and also confirmed by the People's status sheet. This revelation—one outside of the four corners of the complaint itself—cannot prevent conversion on the grounds that some kind of acknowledgment of translation should have been provided but was not, as decisions applying Slade have confirmed. See People v. Vaquero, 74 Misc 3d 25, 26 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2022) (applying Slade to conclude that "[t]he accusatory instrument needed no certificate of translation for conversion to an information" when the complaint "gave no indication that this document was translated for the complainant, or that he failed to read, have read to him, or understand the English-language document"); People v. Rodriguez-Alas, 74 Misc 3d 22, 23—24 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2021) (similar); see also People v. McNeil, 85 Misc 3d 139(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50553(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2025) (revelation that the complaining witness was blind "cannot be used to create a facial defect otherwise undetectable on the face of the accusatory instrument" [*3](internal quotations and citation omitted)).

During the on-the-record discussion, defense counsel emphasized that permitting conversion in this case would endorse an alleged lack of candor by the People. Perhaps, but also perhaps not. It may be that the complaining witness communicates only in Mandarin, and that this language barrier was not disclosed. It may also be the case that the complaining witness prefers to communicate in Mandarin for lengthier or official proceedings, but was sufficiently comfortable with English to both communicate and understand "that guy kicked down the door in my building." The record does not reveal which of these scenarios is true, or whether the truth is something else entirely. As Slade makes clear, though, this kind of outside-of-the-four-corners ambiguity has no bearing on conversion.

Regardless, it bears emphasizing that while the lack of a certificate of translation does not prevent conversion in this case, Slade left open the possibility that "a defendant who discovers such a specific translation-related latent hearsay defect in the accusatory instrument before trial" might be able to "us[e] other options available under the CPL, if the circumstances warrant, to ensure that the supporting deposition meets statutory requirements." Id. at 144. Slade did not specify what these other options were or are, although Slade cited the general statute for a motion to dismiss in a misdemeanor case, C.P.L. § 170.30. To be clear, this decision on conversion should not be understood to reach or resolve any other issue in this pending case, such as facial sufficiency.

For the above reasons, the complaint is deemed an information. The defendant should be arraigned on the information at the next court appearance when he is personally present.