Defendant Eric Emmanuel, charged with assault in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 120.10 [3] and [4]), and other related charges, moves to challenge his arrest, his post-arrest identification, and to suppress both pre- and post-arrest statements attributed to him. Defendant alleges that since the police lacked probable cause for his arrest, both his subsequent identification and any statements made by him are the fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible at trial. The People oppose the motion, asserting that the police had probable cause to arrest him and that any prearrest detention was temporary and appropriate under the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the out-of-court identification and the Defendant's statements are admissible at trial.

This court conducted a Huntley/Wade/Dunaway hearing that began on December 12, continued to December 13, 2024, and concluded on January 2, 2025 (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]; United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). At the hearing, the People called two police officers as witnesses and withdrew their intent to introduce identification evidence on January 2, 2025. After the hearing, the parties submitted papers in support of their respective positions for the remaining portions of this motion. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence is DENIED.

Based on the evidence and having assessed the witnesses' credibility, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusion of law.

On November 17, 2022, at approximately 2:50 p.m., Defendant and two passengers were in a white Mercedes-Benz in the vicinity of West Kingsbridge Road and Heath Avenue, Bronx, New York, when the vehicle collided with a New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) bus. Defendant was fleeing from a black BMW whose occupants were [*2]shooting at his vehicle. After the crash, Defendant and his passengers abandoned the Mercedes, with Defendant running southbound on Health Avenue. The two passengers ran in separate directions. The BMW circles the Mercedes and proceeds down Heath Avenue, in the same direction as the Defendant. The driver of a gray Honda Accord is parked facing southbound on Heath Avenue outside of Primary School 310 (P.S. 310). As he exits his car, he is forced to climb over the roof of the vehicle to avoid being struck by a dark-colored sedan. Meanwhile, the Defendant, running down the sidewalk, enters the passenger side of the Honda (People's Ex. 1 at 14:50:33 p.m.). The Honda's owner grabs his grandchildren and runs off.

Video footage obtained from a building across the street from the school shows a dark colored vehicle heading southbound on Health before the Defendant drives away in the Honda. In fact, the BMW veers to the left to avoid being hit by the Honda driven by the Defendant, as the Honda pulls away from the curb (People's Ex. 1 at 2:50:39 p.m.). The people in the black BMW pursue Defendant's car and continue shooting at him.^[FN1]

Traveling southbound on Heath Avenue, the street terminates as it intersects Bailey Avenue at Heath Triangle. Where Health and Bailey Avenues converge at the southern tip of Heath Triangle, the street becomes Bailey Avenue. Continuing south on Bailey Avenue, the road intersects Sedgwick Avenue, a major thoroughfare. From that point south, the street remains Sedgwick Avenue. As Sedgwick approaches West Fordham Road, the street narrows from a four-lane to a two-lane road. As defendant traveled down Bailey Avenue, he struck a cyclist but did not stop. Somewhere on Sedgwick Avenue defendant abandons the Honda, allowing the vehicle to continue rolling down the street. The car eventually comes to rest at a traffic triangle at West Fordham Road and Sedwick Avenue at about 2:51:24 p.m. (People's Ex. 4a, 4b). After exiting the car, defendant walks into a parking garage located at Sedwick and Bailey Avenues.

At approximately 2:56 p.m., Police Officer Jose Ortiz (Officer Ortiz), assigned to the 52nd Precinct, received a 911 call to investigate an accident scene and a shooting. Officer Ortiz and his partner, Police Officer Strachan, go to the intersection of West Kingsbridge Road and Heath Avenue, where they observe an abandoned white Mercedes-Benz in the middle of West Kingsbridge with damage to its left front bumper (hearing tr at 43, line 18). The officers also speak with a civilian who told them that after hearing the crash, he saw a male run towards him, enter his vehicle, and "take off" (hearing tr at 44, lines 10 — 15). The civilian also said another car was chasing the man and that someone fired several rounds towards the man who was running (hearing tr at 44, lines 18 — 20). Officer Ortiz confirmed that a weapon was fired as he found shell casings at the scene (hearing tr at 44, line 23). Another driver told Officer Ortiz that the other occupants of the Mercedes ran off in a different direction. Minutes later, Officer Ortiz received a radio call of a male in a parking garage located at Sedgwick and Bailey Avenues (hearing tr at 45, lines 10 — 11).

Arriving at the parking garage at 3:08 p.m., Officer Ortiz canvassed the low-rise building with other officers. Officer Ortiz had his gun drawn as he walked through the main floor of the [*3]parking garage. About thirty seconds after entering the garage, Officer Ortiz saw defendant walking up a slope from a lower level and ordered him to raise his hands and get on the floor. After defendant complied with these orders, Officer Ortiz approached and handcuffed him. As Officer Ortiz was handcuffing him, defendant made several statements, inter alia, "They were trying to kill me," "They put me with a gun," "I crashed over there and then I took off running," (hearing tr at 50, lines 12 — 23). Defendant denied having a weapon (hearing tr at 51, lines 3 — 6) and told the officers that he was driving the "Benz," not the BMW (People's ex. 5 at 15:09). After cuffing defendant, officers placed him in a marked radio patrol vehicle, thus ending Officer Ortiz's interaction with defendant.^[FN2]

Detective Anthony Taccetta (Det. Taccetta) and his partner, Detective Jimenez heard a radio transmission of shots fired at West Kingsbridge Road and Heath Avenue (hearing tr at 8, lines 16 — 25 to tr at 9, lines 1 — 6). While traveling to that location, Det. Taccetta listened to another radio transmission that officers were searching a garage for the individuals wanted for the shooting (hearing tr at 9, lines 8 — 13). The detectives proceeded instead to the garage on Sedgwick Avenue (id.). Upon arrival, Det. Taccetta saw defendant in the rear of a police vehicle. Believing more than one person was hiding in the garage, Det. Taccetta joined the search. After failing to find any other individuals, Det. Taccetta and his partner headed to West Kingsbridge, where he observed the accident scene and spoke with the man whose car the defendant had stolen. After speaking with him, Det. Taccetta directs uniform officers to take the civilian over to the garage to conduct an identification procedure. The civilian identifies defendant as the person who stole his vehicle (hearing tr at 12, lines 10 — 11). After the identification, Eric Emmanuel is arrested.

After defendant's arrest, Det. Taccetta learns that a person was struck by a car on Bailey Avenue (hearing tr at 12, lines 13 — 17). Only after additional detectives were assigned to assist in the investigation and surveillance footage was recovered did Det. Taccetta realize the car accident on West Kingsbridge and the cyclist/pedestrian knockdown on Bailey Avenue were related to the person apprehended in the garage on Sedgwick Avenue.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, Det. Taccetta and Detective Robinson questioned defendant at the 52nd Precinct about the circumstances concerning the theft of the Honda Accord. Det. Taccetta administered Miranda warnings to defendant before the questioning. Although the interrogation recording was over three hours long, the substantive portion of the interrogation occurred in the first ninety minutes. Defendant told the detectives about the car accident, the BMW occupants firing weapons in his direction, and the theft of the Honda. After some goading and upon being presented with surveillance footage of the accident, and photographs of the front side damage to the Honda, defendant admitted that he possibly struck the cyclist with the car.

From the automobile accident at West Kingsbridge Road and Heath Avenue to the apprehension of defendant at Bailey and Sedgwick Avenues, a total of eighteen minutes elapsed.

At a Dunaway hearing, the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant (People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 415 [*4][1984]; People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321 [1994]; People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]). To satisfy this burden, the People must introduce credible evidence that establishes the lawfulness of the police conduct (People v Carmona, 233 AD2d 142 [1st Dept 1996]; People v Quinones, 61 AD2d 765 [1st Dept 1978]). "In evaluating the police action, the court must determine whether it was justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances at the time" (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 [1976]). Once the People have met their initial burden, the defendant has the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the police conduct by a fair preponderance of the evidence (Berrios at 367; People v Pettinato, 69 NY2d 653, 654 [1986]).

The Court of Appeals in People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 222-223 (1976), set forth a four-level analysis to evaluate street encounters with the police. Level one permits an officer to approach an individual to request information so long as the request is supported by "some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality" (id. at 223). Level two allows an officer to further inquire and "interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible seizure" (id.). At level three, officers may forcibly stop and detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor. Level four permits officers to arrest a person upon probable cause that the person has committed a crime. Each progressive level authorizes greater police intrusion and therefore requires escalating suspicion by the officer (People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 185 [1992]).

Officer Ortiz responded to this incident after receiving a radio call of a vehicular accident with a report of shots fired. Once on the scene, Officer Ortiz surveyed the accident scene and conducted a canvas for witnesses. His brief interview of civilians at the scene was merely a request for information and was not necessarily indicative of criminality (People v Hollman). The testimony before this court establishes that Officer Ortiz was aware that a car accident predicated on gunfire had taken place at West Kingsbridge Road and Heath Avenue. Having visited the scene of the accident, he confirmed there were weapons involved from the recovered shell casings. Officer Ortiz knew the driver of the Mercedes had taken the car of a bystander, who confirmed there were individuals with weapons. Thus, at this point, Officer Ortiz knew that some of the individuals were armed, and that defendant had committed a crime when he stole a vehicle in his escape.

From the information gleaned from the civilian interviews, Officer Ortiz's knowledge elevated any potential encounter with the participants to at least a level two situation. Officer Ortiz understood that upon encountering defendant, he could stop him but could not forcibly detain him (see People v Holmes, 81 NY2d 1056 [1993]). Even though the physical description of defendant as a Hispanic male is generic, Officer Ortiz also knew he was driving a gray Honda Accord. As Ortiz had spoken to the vehicle's owner, he would also have the license plate, thus narrowing the pool of potential cars and suspects. Without accounting for the defense of justification, Officer Ortiz had sufficient information to stop and detain defendant for vehicle theft.

Officer Ortiz "received another call stating that there was a male inside of a parking lot" (hearing tr at 45, lines 7-8). The radio report, received from central at 3:05 p.m., indicated that a man who was possibly involved in the earlier shooting was inside a parking lot (People's Ex. 1 at 15:05:53 p.m.). Standing alone, "an anonymous phone tip giving a general description and location of a 'man with a gun' . . . will generate only a belief that criminal activity is afoot" (People v Stewart, 41 NY2d 65, 69 [1976]). However, this information should not be viewed in [*5]isolation. "[W]hen considered in conjunction with other supportive facts, it may collectively, although not independently, support a reasonable suspicion justifying intrusive police action" (People v Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, 270 [1980]). Based on Officer Ortiz's knowledge, he both reasonably suspected that defendant was committing a crime and reasonably believed that defendant was armed or otherwise dangerous (People v Brujan, 104 AD3d 481 [1st Dept 2013]; People v Albert, 217 AD3d 776 [2d Dept 2023]; People v Everett, 82 AD3d 1666 [4th Dept 2011]).

Arriving at the garage within three minutes of receiving the second radio call, Officer Ortiz canvassed the parking garage, and "saw a male Hispanic walking from the bottom floor up to the main floor" (hearing tr at 45, lines 19-20).^[FN3] At that point, the male made no furtive or suspicious movements. Instead, he raised his hands and got on the floor when ordered to do so by Officer Ortiz at gunpoint. The male was also cuffed and frisked for weapons before being allowed back on his feet.

At a minimum, Officer Ortiz effected a forcible stop that a reasonable suspicion of criminality must support. A police officer may forcibly stop and detain an individual for temporary questioning if the officer "reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit" a felony or a misdemeanor (CPL 140.50 [1]). Reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop comprises that "quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand" (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [1975]; see People v Stephens, 47 AD3d 586, 588 [1st Dept 2008] [emphasizing that a court must evaluate police conduct based on the "totality of the circumstances"]). Thus, to justify stopping and detaining the man, the People must demonstrate that Officer Ortiz reasonably suspected that he was engaged in criminal behavior.

Officer Ortiz had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant based upon the contents of the police dispatcher's radio broadcasts providing a general description of him, conversations with the car's owner, the proximity of defendant to the site of the crime, and the short passage of time between the commission of the crime and the observation of defendant. Further, before Officer Ortiz could ask the male a question, he volunteered, "I crashed over there and then I took off running,"^[FN4] (hearing tr at 50, lines 12 — 23) (see People v Gonzalez, 2022 NY Slip Op 50372 [U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2022] [defendant's statement that he had been "involved with the altercation outside," provided the police with the "quantum of knowledge" sufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard required for him to detain defendant for an investigation and to handcuff defendant]).

In this case, the People offered body-worn camera footage of Officer Ortiz. The body-worn camera footage demonstrates that while the defendant was handcuffed and initially being pat down, the defendant made several statements, from telling the officers that people were shooting at him, to the fact that after being involved in an accident, he ran.

The video evidence demonstrates that the defendant was not interrogated at any point during this time and that although the defendant was in custody at the time that his statements were made, all statements were genuinely spontaneous and "were in no way the product of an 'interrogation environment,' the result of 'express questioning or its functional equivalent'" (People v Harris, 57 NY2d 335, 342 [1982] quoting People v Stoesser, 53 NY2d 648, 650 [1981]; People v. Davis, 204 AD3d 1072, 1078 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1032 [2022]). Moreover, Officer Ortiz's follow-up inquiry to defendant's spontaneous statements "was merely intended to clarify defendant's spontaneous statements, which immediately preceded it and did not constitute a custodial interrogation" (People v. Davis, 155 AD3d 1311, 1315 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1114 [2018]). Accordingly, the statements are not subject to suppression.

The timing of events is crucial to this analysis. Here, there is a close spatial and temporal proximity between the earlier shooting and the police encounter in the parking garage. Proximity refers to "close temporal and spatial proximity of the detention and the crime" (People v Torres, 262 AD2d 161, 162 [1st Dept 1999]). The degree of temporal proximity that is required lies on the order of minutes (People v Smickle, 201 AD3d 525, 526 [1st Dept 2022] [finding reasonable suspicion to detain at gunpoint where "a violent crime . . . had occurred minutes before" police observed defendant]; People v Khan Li, 50 AD3d 284, 285 [1st Dept 2008] [finding reasonable suspicion to frisk where an assault happened and "[m]inutes later," police observed defendant matching radioed tip describing gender and ethnicity]). Here, defendant's detention occurred three minutes after the second radio call describing his direction of flight.

The specificity of a suspect's description and the proximity in time and place help narrow the field of possible suspects. A sufficient combination of these two factors would have "made it highly unlikely that the suspect had departed and that, almost at the same moment, an innocent person of identical appearance coincidentally arrived on the scene" (People v Johnson, 63 AD3d 518, 518 [1st Dept 2009]). But if too much time has passed since the commission of the crime, then a general description of the perpetrator becomes markedly less valuable and would not sustain reasonable suspicion. Here, the description of a male entering a parking garage that might be related to a shooting that occurred 18 minutes earlier, coupled with his statement concerning his involvement, furnishes reasonable suspicion that would justify the stop.

A defendant who is in custody may not be interrogated by law enforcement without being advised of his constitutional rights (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). "Both the elements of police custody and police interrogation must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda" (People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 33 [1976]).

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and the People must establish the voluntariness of defendant's statement beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]). In meeting its burden of proving the voluntariness of a defendant's statement, the People must establish that a defendant, in police custody, was advised of their constitutional rights before being subjected to interrogation (id.).

Here, Det. Taccetta administered Miranda warnings to defendant. In response, defendant verbalized understanding and acceptance of the Miranda warnings. The questioning, as measured by the entire videotaped recording, lasted approximately three and a half hours. During this period, the detectives offered food and drink to defendant. Defendant drank some soda while sitting in the interview room.

From the questioning, defendant related the sequence of events, starting with when a black BMW struck his car. A passenger in that car apparently flashed a gun at him. Defendant stated that he was scared for his life, crashed into a bus, and then got inside the gray Honda Accord. When Det. Taccetta asked defendant about a cyclist who was struck in the area, defendant denied seeing the cyclist. After the detectives presented defendant with video footage of the incident, he conceded that he could have inadvertently struck the cyclist. Defendant was also presented with still photographs. One of the photographs showed extensive front-end damage to the gray Honda Accord. The other picture appeared to depict defendant exiting the vehicle. When shown this second photograph, defendant stated that it was indeed him.

Defendant's interrogation began four hours after his apprehension. The initial seizure occurred at approximately 3:08 p.m. Defendant was then transported to the 52nd Precinct and given Miranda warnings at approximately 7:09 p.m. The adequacy of those Miranda warnings, however, was called into question by defendant.

Det. Taccetta's introductory remarks to defendant did not undermine the viability of the subsequently administered Miranda warnings. When a suspect is taken into custodial interrogation, procedural safeguards must be set in place, such as advising defendant of their Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona at 478-479). An officer's preamble to the Miranda warnings, however, may undercut the adequacy of those warnings depending on "whether or not [defendant was] ever 'clearly informed' of their Miranda rights in the first place, as is constitutionally required" (People v Dunbar, 24 NY3d 304, 316 [2014]). In particular, "if the Miranda warnings were preceded by statements that were directly contrary to those warnings," then the import of the subsequent Miranda warnings is undercut and therefore fails constitutional muster (id.). Before administering Miranda warnings, Det. Taccetta told defendant that "we just wanted to talk with you real quick. Before I speak to you, you know, you came here in handcuffs, so I got to read you Miranda warnings" (People's exhibit 3, at 19:09:16). These remarks did not weaken or otherwise distort the efficacy of the Miranda warnings (see People v Cornelius, 137 AD3d 663, 665 [1st Dept 2016] [finding waiver of Miranda rights where "nothing in the record suggests that police misinformed or misled defendant about her right to remain silent, or about the fact that her statements might be used against her"]). The fact that Det. Taccetta reminded defendant that Miranda warnings are routinely read to a suspect before questioning does not minimize the importance of those Miranda warnings (see Cornelius at 665 [finding warning adequate where detective did not make statements "that otherwise undermined the effect of the Miranda warnings"]; but see People v Galvez-Marin, 225 AD3d 622, 624 [2d Dept 2024] [finding warnings inadequate where detective asserted "that the Miranda warnings did not 'mean anything' and were 'just part of the process' "]).

Neither did subsequent questions to defendant weaken the adequacy of the previously administered Miranda warnings. Det. Taccetta said to Defendant that "you were a victim of that shooting and getting hit" (People's exhibit 3, at 19:37:23). Det. Robinson later said, "So right now we're looking at you as somebody that was being chased, being shot at" (id. at 20:30:24). The detective tried to glean more information from defendant, "keep in mind, I'm going to keep on going back to what happened before the chase" (id. at 20:32:33). Afterwards, defendant clearly stated that "I'd rather speak to my lawyer" (id. at 20:33:07). The questioning stopped immediately. That Det. Taccetta noted that he viewed defendant as a victim of an offense did not minimize the significance of the Miranda warnings (see People v Cutts, 133 AD3d 544, 545 [1st Dept 2015] [finding circumstances of questioning were not coercive where they "did not rise to [*6]the level of deception that would induce defendant to falsely confess"]). Multiple offenses occurred here, including a shooting, theft of an automobile, and assault against a bicyclist. The fact that defendant was possibly a victim of one offense does not imply that defendant was induced to confess to the offense. The record establishes that defendant was effectively advised of his Miranda rights and made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver (see Miranda at 444-445). Further, "defendant was not mistreated and was not questioned during the initial period of his [pre-Miranda] detention" (Rogers at 534).

The People have met their burden of proof on this Dunaway/Huntley hearing. Defendant's applications are denied in their entirety.

This shall constitute the decision and order of this court.