Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in review of this Motion:

For the reason stated below defendants' notice of motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is granted.

Plaintiff commenced this action, by summons and complaint in 2025, against defendants to recover $49,500.00 from a wire transfer based upon a breach of contract allegedly occurring in 2020. On December 17, 2020, plaintiff requested a wire transfer of $84,500 and $49,500 that plaintiff authorized which commenced from defendant JPMORGAN CHASE BANK (herein referred as "CHASE") to an account holder at defendant CITIBANK (Herein Referred as "CITI"). Several days later defendant Chase informed plaintiff that the check plaintiff deposited that was used to wire money was an altered check that was dishonored. As a result, Plaintiff requested a return of the monies. After several months defendant CHASE informed plaintiff, they were able to recover the $84,500 and not the $49,500.00.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) on the ground that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, which plaintiff opposes. "It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be liberally construed, accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference" Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88-89 (1994); Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 (2d Dept 2010). A court evaluating a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), may freely consider [*2]affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any potential defects in the complaint. Martinez at 88. "The sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners, factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, maintain any cause of action cognizable at law, regardless of whether the plaintiff will ultimately manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail." Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 (1977). "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus" Sokol at 1181.

To recover damages for breach of contract plaintiff must show the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance pursuant to the contract, the defendant's breach of its contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach. See Pare v Aalbue 222 AD3d 769 773 [2d Dept 2023]. Generally, a party alleging a breach of contract must 'demonstrate the existence of a ... contract reflecting the terms and conditions of their ... purported agreement' " . Canzona v Altanasio, 118 AD3d 837, 839 (2d Dept 2014). In addition, "the plaintiff's allegations must identify the provisions of the contract that were breached". Id at 839.

Here there is no dispute that plaintiff did not submit a written contract between the parties. Nor did Plaintiff submit any written material, advertisement, brochure, or affidavits to support their breach of contract claim. Thus, plaintiff failed to allege the elements of a breach of contract in the complaint. Even, if this Court was to assume that the plaintiff breach of contract claim was in the context of the Wire Transfer Agreement that was attached as an exhibit C to plaintiff summons and complaint in 2020, such claim would also be dismissed.

The New York Uniform Commercial Code (herein referred as "UCC") under Article 4-A regulates electronic funds transfers, commonly known as wholesale wire transfers." Ma v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F3d 84, 87 (2d Cir 2010) (citing NY UCC § 4-A-102 & cmt.). Article 4-A, which was promulgated to "address the problems presented by the widespread use of electronic funds transfers," is a " 'comprehensive body of law' that 'use[s] precise and detailed rules to assign responsibility.' " Id. at 89 (quoting NY UCC § 4-A-102 cmt.) "Article 4-A created a "comprehensive body of law" that "use[s] precise and detailed rules to assign responsibility, define behavioral norms, allocate risks and establish limits on liability." NY U.C.C § 4-A-102; McCarthy v JP Morgan Chase Bank, 772 F.supp3d 298, 309 (EDNY 2025). Thus, NY UCC § 4 was designed to be the "exclusive means of determining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in any situation covered by particular provisions of the Article," Id at 309. Accordingly, the statute "preclude[s] common law claims when such claims would impose liability inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by Article 4-A." Id at 309. "However, not all common law claims 'are per se inconsistent with this regime.' " Id. at 28 (quoting Ma, 597 F.3d at 89); see also Sheerbonnet Ltd., v Am. Exp. Bank, Ltd., 951 F.Supp 403, 407-08 (SDNY 1995).

Plaintiff does not claim defendant CHASE improperly processed the wire transfer transaction but that they failed to detect an altered check that was deposited by plaintiff which was later used as funds for the wire transfer, and that defendant CHASE had an inconsistent recovery system since they recovered monies from one of the two wire transfers. The duty to warn was inconsistent with article 4 bank obligations. See McCarthy v JP Morgan Chase Bank, 772 FSupp3d 298 (EDNY 2025); Blum v Citibank, 162 AD3d 631 632 (2d Dept 2018). Moreover, plaintiff pleading sounds more in a claim of negligence. However, plaintiff negligence argument has long since expired since this transaction occurred in 2020 and this case was commenced in 2025. See CPLR §214.

Similarly, plaintiffs cause of action against defendant CITI also failed to state a cause of action. Plaintiff's attempt to impose, common law liability on a receiving bank for properly processing an authorized transfer, even though the funds used for the transaction was deemed a fraud, has been deemed inconsistent with Article 4. See Markatos v Citibank, NA, 76 Fsupp.3d 70, 81-84 (SDNY 2024). Moreover, plaintiff's blanket statement in the complaint that the Know Your Client and Anti-Money Laundering obligations were violated without pointing to a provision or facts must also fall.

Lastly, plaintiff argued that the inconsistencies of the wire transfer recoveries warrant discovery. Under CPLR 3211(d) provides that, where it appears "that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion " However, plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing that there were facts essential to oppose defendants that would be collected during discovery. "The mere hope that discovery may reveal facts essential to justify opposition does not warrant denial of the motion. Morrison v New York Archdiocese, 277 AD3d 703 704 (2d Dept 2024).

Thus, defendants' notice of motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is granted, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.