Petitioners County of Rensselaer and the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Office (collectively, "the County") commenced this proceeding pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking to permanently stay an arbitration demanded by respondent Rensselaer County Correction Officer's Union, Council 82, Local 975 (hereinafter, "the Union") on behalf of Correction Officer Phonnah Yen (hereinafter, "CO Yen"). With issue having fully joined upon the Union's filing of a verified answer and notice of cross-motion seeking to compel arbitration, and having considered all the parties' submissions in support and opposition to their motion and crossmotion, respectively as uploaded onto the New York State Courts' Electronic Filing system ("NYSCEF"), and for the reasons that follow, the Court grants the County's motion to permanently stay the arbitration, denies the Union's cross-motion seeking to compel arbitration, and orders that the arbitration be permanently stayed.

CO Yen, an employee of the County and member of the Union, sought to obtain benefits pursuant to section 207-c of the General Municipal Law for work-related injuries allegedly sustained back on February 6th of this year. The terms of CO Yen's employment are set forth in a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the parties that, through continuous tentative settlement agreements, was in force at the time CO Yen sought to obtain these statutory benefits.

The CBA's procedures for obtaining these benefits can be found in Article 26 of the CBA itself. Of relevance here is section 26.6a, which addresses appeals of adverse final determinations and written demands for arbitration vis a vis benefits under section 207-c. That section reads, in its entirety:

"In the event that a corrections officer disagrees with any final determination regarding a proposed light duty assignment or the initial or continued eligibility of benefits, the corrections officer, within ten (10) calendar days of the receipt of the determination, shall present to the Sheriff or the Sheriff's designee, a written demand for arbitration. Compliance with the steps and timeframes specified in this procedure shall be a condition precedent to arbitration"

As discussed above, CO Yen claims to have sustained injuries on February 6, 2025, that fall within the ambit of section 207-c, and as a result filed an application therefor with his employer. The County, specifically a lieutenant from the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Office, issued a memorandum on official letterhead, dated March 3, 2025, in reference to "Employee [*2]Reported Injury/Illness 02/06/25" (see Memorandum, dated March 3, 2025, NYSCEF Doc. No. 7). The very first sentence in that memorandum reads: "Officer Phonnah Yen . . . I am writing to inform you that your application for General Municipal Law (GML) 207-c benefits has been denied" (id.). The lieutenant would go on to state that the request for benefits was denied for CO Yen's purported failure to resubmit the request in a timely manner (the initial application was, according to the lieutenant, "incomplete" and thus warranted resubmission), and because CO Yen purportedly failed to provide sufficient medical documentation or evidence in support of the request (according to the lieutenant, certain documentation that was previously submitted did not establish CO Yen had a specific injury or illness triggering the issuance of benefits pursuant to section 207-c) (id.). In a second memorandum referencing the same matter, dated March 6, 2025, the lieutenant acknowledged receipt of certain documents provided by CO Yen but nevertheless reiterated that the latter's benefits application was denied per the memorandum dated March 3rd (Memorandum, dated March 6, 2025, NYSCEF Doc. No. 8).

On April 24, 2025, approximately seven to eight weeks later, CO Yen submitted to the County a Demand for Arbitration, asserting he was "unquestionably injured [while] performing his Rec Yard duties" and that the denial of his statutory benefit was "based on [the] need for more medical information" (Demand for Arbitration, dated April 24, 2025, NYSCEF Doc. No. 9). According to CO Yen, the County ignored his "repeated entreaties for a final determination," prompting him to seek resolution by way of arbitration pursuant to Article 26 of the CBA (id.).

The County filed a notice of verified petition and verified petition seeking a permanent stay of the arbitration pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR, with the Union filing opposition papers on behalf of CO Yen, along with their own cross-motion seeking to compel arbitration, which the County answered. Issue having been joined and the matter fully briefed, the question of whether to stay or compel arbitration is now ready for decision.

When considering a motion to stay or compel arbitration, a court is limited to addressing the following threshold questions: (1) Whether the parties made a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) if so, whether the agreement has been complied with; and (3) whether the claim sought to be arbitrated would be time-barred if asserted in state court (see Matter of Wiederspiel [Carstens], 36 AD3d 971, 973 [3d Dept 2007], citing Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 9 [1980]; see also Matter of Conifer Realty LLC [EnviroTech Services, Inc.], 106 AD3d 1251, 1252 [3d Dept 2013], citing Primiano Constr. Co., 51 NY2d at 6-7). The process of arbitration is contractual in nature, such that the parties may choose to make any particular contract requirement either a "condition precedent to arbitration" or a "condition in arbitration," and the question of "[w]hether a condition precedent to arbitration has been satisfied is a determination to be made by the courts in the first instance" (Matter of Brenda DeLuca Trust [Elhannon, LLC], 108 AD3d 902, 903 [3d Dept 2013]; citing Primiano Const. Co., Inc., 51 NY2d at 8-9; see also Raisler Corp. v New York City Hous. Auth., 32 NY2d 274, 282 [1973]).

With respect to the first question, the Third Judicial Department has previously noted that the process of obtaining benefits under GML § 207-c may be subject to collective bargaining [*3](see Sullivan County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Sullivan, 224 AD3d 972, 973 [3d Dept 2024]). Given that the parties signed the CBA and its settlement agreements, the CBA, and the arbitration provisions contained therein pertaining to GML § 207-c, is valid. As such, the first threshold question is to be answered in the affirmative.

Regarding the second question, the CBA, which was signed by all parties and extended by way of signed settlement agreements through the time of the relevant arbitration demand, unequivocally states that the timing for presenting a written demand for arbitration, set at ten calendar days from receiving the determination, shall be a condition precedent to arbitration. Thus, the parties chose to make the timing of the demand for arbitration a condition precedent, rather than a condition in arbitration. Given that CO Yen failed to comply with this condition precedent due to his untimely filing, he failed to comply with the agreement (see Primiano Const. Co., Inc., 5l NY2d at 9).

The Union invites the Court to entertain the argument that the demand for arbitration was tolled, arguing that the March 3rd memorandum was ambiguous in its denial of CO Yen's request for benefits under GML § 207-c. However, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals this is clearly not the case. The memorandum states in no uncertain terms that the claim was denied and sets forth the reasons therefor. The memorandum did not invite CO Yen to submit additional information, a liberal construction of GML § 207-c notwithstanding. The Union's remaining contentions lack merit.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the County's motion to permanently stay the arbitration is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Union's motion to compel the arbitration is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the arbitration be permanently stayed.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court. The original Decision and Order will be uploaded onto NYSCEF for electronic entry by the Rensselaer County Clerk. Upon such entry, counsel for petitioners shall promptly serve Notice of Entry on all parties entitled to such notice.