The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 2) 45-56, 63, [*2]65, 71, 76 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

Plaintiff Juan Sanchez moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for partial summary judgment as to liability on his claims for violation of Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) asserted against defendants Mike & Mark LLC (M&M) and Urena Construction & Design, Inc. (Urena Construction). Defendants separately oppose the motion.

On September 13, 2021, plaintiff was working at a construction site located at 8-14 Gunhill Road, in the Bronx, when a section of the roof plaintiff was demolishing collapsed, causing plaintiff to fall to the floor below and sustain injuries. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was employed by non-party subcontractor Pro-Interior Builders. M&M was the owner of the building and Urena Construction was the project's general contractor.

Plaintiff argues in support that he is entitled to summary judgment as to liability under Labor Law § 240 (1), because defendants failed to provide him with an appropriate safety device to protect him from elevation-related harm; and defendants' failure to provide such safety device was a proximate cause of his injuries. Plaintiff further argues that he has established defendants' liability as a matter of law under Labor Law 241 (6), by establishing defendants' violation of Industrial Code § 23-3.3(l), by failing to provide sound flooring, and that such violation proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.

In opposition, defendants maintain that issues of fact exist as to whether any safety device enumerated in Labor Law 240(1) could have prevented plaintiff's fall during roof demolition work. They contend that all the safety devices listed in that provision would have been impractical or ineffective under the circumstances here. Concerning plaintiff's Labor Law 241 (6) claim, defendants argue that even if plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of Industrial Code § 23-3.3(l), there is an issue of fact as to whether such violation was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

A party seeking summary judgment "must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). "[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat summary judgment (id.). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be denied if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]).

Labor Law § 240 (1) provides in relevant part that where there is demolition, repairing or altering of a building, contractors and owners "shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed." "The statute imposes upon owners, contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty that renders them liable regardless of whether they supervise or control the work" (Barreto v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 25 NY3d [*3]426, 433 [2015]). "[W]here an accident is caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff's own negligence does not furnish a defense; however, where a plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Thus, in order to recover under section 240 (1), the plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury" (id.). Labor Law § 240 (1) is to be liberally construed so as to accomplish its legislative purpose of protecting workers (Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc., 41 NY3d 217, 221 [2023]; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]).

"Not every worker who falls at a construction site, and not every object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)" (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). "[L]iability is contingent upon the existence of a hazard contemplated in section 240 (1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein" (id., citing Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]).

Plaintiff has demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. It is undisputed that defendants, as owner and general contractor, are subject to the nondelegable duties imposed by the statute and failed to provide plaintiff with a safety device. Plaintiff further established that he sustained injuries when the roof he was demolishing collapsed under his feet (see Guity v 400 Great Neck Road Realty, LLC, 189 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2020]; Mihelis v i.park Lake Success, LLC, 56 AD3d 355, 356 [1st Dept 2008]; Ortiz v SFDS Development, 274 AD2d 341 [1st Dept 2000]). Defendants have failed to raise an issue of fact to overcome liability as a matter of law.

Labor Law § 241(6) "imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care upon owners and contractors 'to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety' to persons employed in, or lawfully frequenting, all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed" (Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348 [1998]). To establish a claim under Labor Law section 241 (6), plaintiff must show that defendant "violated an Industrial Code regulation that sets forth a specific standard of conduct and is not simply a recitation of common-law safety principles" (Toussaint, 38 NY3d at 94 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Labor Law § 241 (6) requires that a plaintiff establish that a violation of a safety regulation was the proximate cause of the accident (Gonzalez v Stern's Dept. Stores, 211 AD2d 414, 415 [1st Dept 1995] [citation omitted]).

Plaintiff discusses Industrial Code § 23-3.3(l) to support his Labor Law § 241 (6) claim, thereby abandoning all other predicates not raised in his legal arguments (87 Chambers, LLC v 77 Reade, LLC, 122 AD3d 540, 542 [1st Dept 2014]).

Plaintiff alleges the violation of a sufficiently specific Industrial Code provision (see Hart v Turner Const. Co., 30 AD3d 213, 214 [1st Dept 2006]). Industrial Code § 23-3.3(l) provides that "[a]ny person working above the first floor or ground level in the demolition of any building or other structure shall . . . be provided with safe footing consisting of sound flooring" (12 NYCRR 23-3.3[l]["Safe footing required"]). A plaintiff may establish violation of this regulation by demonstrating that plaintiff was performing demolition work above ground level, and that the roof on which he was standing collapsed (see Cueva v 373 Wythe Realty, Inc., 111 AD3d 876, 877 [2d Dept 2013]).

Plaintiff has established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 241 (6) claim predicated on a violation of Industrial Code § 23-3.3(l). Plaintiff demonstrates that on the date of the accident, while performing demolition work, the uncut portion of the roof that plaintiff was standing on collapsed. Defendants fail to raise an issue of fact.

The parties remaining contentions not addressed herein have been considered by the Court and are unavailing.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion by plaintiff Juan Sanchez for partial summary judgment as to liability on his claims under Labor §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6), against defendants Mike & Mark LLC and Urena Construction & Design, Inc., is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon defendants within 20 days of entry hereof; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a status conference to be calendared by the Clerk of the Court.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.