On August 31, 2025, at approximately 12:30 AM, in front of 98 Riverside Drive, New York, New York, Police Officer Kerome Grant, assigned to the 20th Precinct, of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) observed defendant, Raisa Shikh, sitting behind the wheel of a Black Lexus automobile with the engine running on a public street, with damage to the front bumper. Officer Grant further observed defendant to have watery and bloodshot eyes and a strong odor of alcohol on her breath. In addition, defendant was unsteady and swaying on her feet, had difficulty walking, making slow movements, and had incoherent speech. Based on these observations, Officer Grant concluded that that defendant was intoxicated. Defendant also stated to Officer Grant, "No, I didn't crash. Can I call my husband." Defendant was subsequently placed under arrest and removed to the 28th Precinct, where she refused to submit to chemical testing after being read refusal warnings.

For these acts, defendant was subsequently charged and with two counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) §§ 1192 (1), (3).

On August 31, 2025, defendant was arraigned before the Honorable Elizabeth Y. Shamahs, where the People filed and served statement notice and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) paperwork, specifically the Highway District Intoxicated Driver Examination Report Pages 1 and 2, Arrested Officer's Report — Intoxicated Driver's Arrest form, Interrogation Warnings to Persons in Police Custody form , NYPD Highway District Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit — NYS Evidential Breath Analysis Test form, and Report of Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test to the Court and defense counsel. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt, and the Court deemed the criminal court complaint an information over defense counsel's objection. Defense counsel requested a motion schedule, which was granted by this Court.

Now, pursuant to that motion schedule, in papers dated September 24, 2025, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for an Order, inter alia, suppressing physical evidence and statements and for preclusion. Defendant further claims that she makes her motion pursuant to the Court's motion schedule, which she does not consent to, and that her motion, therefore, does not toll speedy trial (Defendant's Motion at 3). The People oppose, in papers dated October 10, 2025.

Upon review of the parties' submissions and annexed exhibits therein along with the court file and minutes, the Court's Decision and Order is as follows.

Defendant's motion for the suppression of physical evidence as the fruit of an illegal arrest made without probable cause, or for a Dunaway/Mapp hearing alternatively, is denied.

A combined Dunaway/Mapp hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether physical evidence recovered from defendant, such as a weapon or contraband, should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. A motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. Pursuant to CPL § 710.60, a defendant must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). A motion to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal arrest can be denied without a hearing when the motion lacks factual allegations to support the conclusion that defendant was unlawfully seized. See People v Brunson, 226 AD2d 1093 (4d Dept 1996); People v Purcelle, 282 AD2d 824 (3d Dept 2001). Conclusory allegations of an unlawful seizure can also result in summary denial of a suppression motion. See People v Toxey, 220 AD2d 204 (1st Dept 1995); People v Lofton, 129 AD2d 970 (4d Dept 1987).

In assessing the sufficiency of the defendant's factual allegations, and whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing, the Court of Appeals in People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993) provided the following guidance: "[T]he sufficiency of defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant's access to information." It must also be borne in mind that "[h]earings are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations." Id. at 422; see also People v Long, 36 AD3d 132, 133 (2006), aff'd. 8 NY3d 1014 (2007).

Here, defendant's moving papers fail to allege a factual basis for relief. Specifically, defendant fails to identify any physical evidence recovered from her that would be the subject of suppression or a Mapp hearing, and the People note that they do not intend to offer at trial any physical evidence seized from defendant (People's Response). Defendant's papers also fail to allege how and when defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and how and when she was illegally seized. Importantly, defendant does not factually dispute the intoxication, signs of intoxication, or operation of the vehicle, or any such claim, as the People correctly point out (People's Response 7). In this vein, defendant's motion papers are entirely devoid of even any contention of lawful or innocuous conduct. Thus, defendant does not contest any of the facts giving rise to probable cause for defendant's arrest. Accordingly, defendant's motion does not amount to sworn allegations of fact sufficient to support any ground for suppression, nor does it create any factual issue warranting a hearing. See People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 (2006); People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 422 (1993). Next, defendant's contention that she [*2]lacks adequate facts at this early stage in the proceedings for her motion so this Court should nevertheless grant a hearing is meritless as defendant has sufficient facts to dispute the allegations in the complaint and she has access to some discovery. Accordingly, defendant's motion for suppression, or a Mapp/Dunaway hearing, is denied. Defendant's other contentions in this branch are similarly denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements as the product of an unlawful arrest and seizure, or a Dunaway/Huntley hearing in the alternative, is denied. A combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether a post-arrest statement from defendant should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. As noted above, a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. The motion must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion, which she has failed to do here, as noted supra. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). Moreover, and in any event, this Court notes that defendant's statement was pre-arrest and not post-arrest. Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing is denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression, or a Huntley hearing in the alternative, to test the voluntariness of defendant's statement is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered based upon the allegations contained in counsel's affirmation, entitling him to such relief. CPL §710.60 (3); CPL §60.45). Defendant is not required to set forth specific factual allegations of involuntariness in order to obtain a Huntley hearing. Accordingly, a Huntley hearing is ordered as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements.

In sum, a defendant's motion for suppression, or hearings in the alternative, is granted only to the extent that a Huntley hearing as to the voluntariness of defendant's statement is ordered.

Defendant's motion to preclude the offering of any unnoticed statement evidence or unnoticed identification evidence pursuant to CPL §710.30, is denied as premature, as the People have not identified any unnoticed evidence.

Defendant seeks the preclusion of using defendant's prior bad acts and/or prior convictions at trial pursuant to People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), and People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974) on the People's direct case or upon cross-examination.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where it is offered solely to raise an inference that a defendant has a criminal propensity. People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Wright, 288 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 2001). Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it helps to establish a defendant's motive, intent, identity, knowledge, common scheme or plan, lack of mistake or accident, to complete the narrative of the crime, or provide the jury with background information. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981); People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321 (1987); People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); People v. Davis, 169 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1991). In order to use this evidence, the People are required to notify the court and defendant, prior to jury selection, of their intent to introduce the [*3]evidence as part of the case-in-chief and identify the basis upon which they consider it admissible. People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). Once a showing is made that the evidence is relevant, a trial court may admit the evidence as long as its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice. People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988); People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-42 (1987). The permissible scope of such evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. See People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior bad act evidence is deferred to the trial court.

Should she testify, defendant, like any other witness, places her credibility in issue. Although a witness may not be questioned about an arrest per se, it is a provident exercise of the Court's discretion to permit cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, dishonest and or criminal act, even if defendant was not formally charged with it. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 373 (1974); People v Rockwell, 18 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2005); People v Di Bella, 277 AD2d 699 (3d Dept 2000); People v Connolly, 259 AD2d 1039 (4d Dept 1999); People v Maiolo, 122 AD2d 586 (4d Dept 1986); Prince, Richardson on Evidence, 11th Ed., 6-406. A witness may also be impeached by instances of conduct demonstrating a "willingness ... to place his self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." People v. Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461—462 (1994).

The People's disclosure obligation is governed by People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), which directs the People to notify the defendant, prior to the commencement of jury selection, of the acts which they will seek to use for impeachment purposes. However, it is defendant who must demonstrate that the prejudicial effect of such evidence so far outweighs its probative worth that it must be excluded, as it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. See People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 378 (1974). The permissible scope of such impeachment evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709, 712 (1995); People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459 (1994). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior convictions is therefore deferred to the trial court. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974).

Defendant's remaining requests are denied as duplicative, premature, moot, unsupported by the record, or without merit.

Specifically, and in addition, defendant's contention that speedy trial is not tolled on the basis that she did not consent to the Court's motion schedule is denied, meritless, and belied by the record. A review of the arraignment minutes reveal that defense counsel requested the instant motion schedule, which the Court granted. See CPL § 30.30 (4)(a) (excluding motion practice from speedy trial computations).

Defendant's application for an extension of time to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL §255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.