[*1]
People v Daniels
2025 NY Slip Op 51855(U) [87 Misc 3d 1240(A)]
Decided on November 14, 2025
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, New York County
Shamahs, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 14, 2025
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County


The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Niajere Daniels, Defendant.




CR-025783-25NY



For Defendant: Twyla Carter, The Legal Aid Society (Christine Brittain, Esq. of Counsel)

For the People: Alvin Bragg, New York County District Attorney's Office (ADA Ibrahim Aldajeh, Esq. of Counsel)


Elizabeth Y. Shamahs, J.

On May 29, 2025, at approximately 10:40 PM, across from 191 Chrystie Street, New York, New York, defendant, Niajere Daniels, struck his wife, E.D., in the face with a closed fist, causing bleeding, a broken tooth, and substantial pain to E.D. Officers responded approximately ten minutes later following multiple 911 calls, where the complaining witness filled out a Domestic Incident Report (DIR).

On the DIR she wrote that on May 29, 2025, "I was pushed in the inside by my husband and he also spit on me. He told me to go in the car then he begin to call me out of my name he then pushed twice in the face he then he took my phone he wouldn't give it back he the made it a threat to hurt me and destroy my life he drove off with my phone and didn't give it back to me." Underneath that it says, "false statements made herein are punishable as a Class A Misdemeanor, pursuant to 210.45 of the Penal Law." Underneath contains a line that says "Victim/Deponent Signature," with the purported signature of E.D. and a date of "5/29/25."

For these acts, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law [PL] §§ 120.00[1], [2]), one count of Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (PL 240.30[4]), and one count of Harassment in the Second Degree (PL 240.26[1]).

The criminal court complaint, sworn by Police Officer Osvaldo Ortiz of the 34th Precinct of the New City Police Department (NYPD), alleges that or about May 29, 2025, at about 10:40 PM, across from 191 Chrystie Street; in the County and State of New York the defendant, intentionally caused physical injury to another person. Specifically, it alleges that:

I am informed by [E.D.,] of an address known to the District Attorney's Office, that Ms. D. observed the defendant strike Ms. D. about the face with a closed fist causing bleeding, a broken tooth, and substantial pain to Ms. D.'s face.

On August 28, 2025, the People filed and served copies of the DIR filled out by E.D. on May 29, 2025, and moved this Court by oral motion to deem the complaint an information based upon the DIR. Defendant, through counsel, objected on the basis that the DIR does not mention any injury and because the complaining witness wrote that she was "pushed in the face" as opposed to "str[uck] about the face with a closed fist," as stated in the complaint, leaving uncorroborated hearsay allegations. A motion schedule was ordered as to conversion at the People's request.

Now, in papers dated September 18, 2025, pursuant to the Court's motion schedule, the People supplement their August 28, 2025 motion with a memorandum of law. The People argue that the criminal court complaint should be deemed an information because Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 100.20 does not require that the exact facts noted in a criminal court complaint be noted in a DIR for conversion (People's Memorandum of Law). Instead, they argue, CPL § 100.20 only requires a written instrument that supports or tends to support the charges, which was done in this instance. Id. The People rely on People v Morris, 44 Misc 3d 810 (Crim Court NY Co 2014) to support their proposition that there need not be precise factual symmetry between an accusatory instrument and a supporting deposition. Morris, 44 Misc 3d at 814. In opposition papers dated October 3, 2025, defendant, through counsel, argues that the People's motion should be denied on the ground that the DIR alleges different facts than the complaint and also on the ground that the DIR does not mention a place of occurrence (Defendant's Memorandum of Law).

After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

The purpose of a misdemeanor information in a criminal case is to ensure that a legally sufficient case can be made against a defendant. People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518 (2014); People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 138-139 (1987). Both a misdemeanor complaint and an information must comply with the form requirements of CPL § 100.15 and must contain, either in the body of the complaint or in combination with a supporting deposition, factual allegations that provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses charged. CPL § 170.40. Additionally, an information must contain, either in the body of the complaint or in a supporting deposition, non-hearsay allegations that establish, if true, every element of the offense charged. CPL § 100.40(1)(c). A supporting deposition is a "written instrument accompanying or filed in connection with . . . a misdemeanor complaint . . . subscribed and verified by a person other than the complainant of such accusatory instrument, and containing factual allegations of an evidentiary character, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, which supplement those of the accusatory instrument and support or tend to support the charge or charges contained therein." CPL § 100.20. A DIR may be received as a supporting deposition to an accusatory instrument. People v Stridiron, 175 Misc 2d 16 (Crim Ct Queens Co 1997).

In determining whether a DIR sufficiently corroborates an accusatory instrument, this Court must assess "[i]f the elements of the crime or crimes charged are established by the facts contained in the DIR and if the DIR is reasonably referable to the incident alleged in the accusatory instrument." People v Modica, 187 Misc 2d 635, 638 (Crim Ct Richmond County 2001). A complaining witness's factual account in a DIR does not need to be "identical to the assistant district attorney who drafted the complaint, who is trained in the drafting of accusatory instruments, is armed with a law degree, and operates with pre-programmed computer templates that are used when drafting a complaint." People v Salamone, 24 Misc 3d 1213(A) (Crim Ct NY [*2]Co 2009). See also People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680—681 (1999) ("[i]n the normal course of events, the deposition supporting a misdemeanor complaint will be secured within hours or days after the events complained of, thus satisfying the requirements for a valid information ... A victim would not necessarily know with any certainty, shortly after an attack, what its lasting effects will be. Under these circumstances, allegations of substantial pain, swelling and contusions, following kicks, must be deemed sufficient to constitute "physical injury" to support a facially valid local criminal court information."). Instead, "so long as the DIR and the misdemeanor complaint clearly refer to the same incident, and the DIR is not based on hearsay and is properly verified, it can convert a misdemeanor complaint into an information." People v Morris, 44 Misc 3d 810 (Crim Ct NY Co 2014).

Indeed, the statutory goals at the pleading stage are simply to confirm that "the incident alleged by the deponent in the complaint did, in fact, occur" and "to determine whether the hearsay in the underlying complaint has been removed." Id. Requiring a strict factual concord between the DIR and the complaint would "place[ ] form over substance" and "run[ ] contrary to the overall pleading rationale" set out in People v Casey (95 NY2d 354 [2000]). Id.

Here, the complaint alleging that defendant struck the complainant in the face and the DIR alleging defendant pushed the complainant twice in the face are clearly referring to the same incident as both assert that defendant committed an act of violence to the complainant's face. The fact that the DIR is devoid of mention of an injury is inconsequential given that the documents refer to the same incident. Morris supra. And where a DIR is proffered as a means of conversion, since DIRs are typically completed by individuals not versed in the intricacies of the CPL, the instrument is sufficient as long as it alleges an act of violence that is sufficiently extreme to permit a reasonable inference that the act was "an experience that would normally be expected to bring with it more than a little pain." People v Morris, 44 Misc 3d 810 (2014) (quoting People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 (2007) (defining substantial pain). The DIR, here, notes that defendant engaged in multiple acts of violence towards the complainant, such as spitting on her and pushing her twice in the face, after threatening to hurt her and destroy her life. Taking the complaint and the DIR together, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant intentionally caused the complaining witness physical injury, namely the injuries alleged in the complaint, which caused the complainant "more than a little" pain. Chiddick, 8 NY3d at 447. Thus, the DIR sufficiently corroborates a prima facie case of Assault in the Third Degree (PL §§ 120.00 [1], [2]).

Finally, contrary to defendant's assertion, the fact that the DIR does not make out the place of occurrence is of no moment because the place of occurrence is not an element of the offense or offenses charged, and CPL § 100.40 only requires that the elements of the offense be established. CPL § 100.40; Morris supra.

Accordingly, the court concludes that the DIR here makes out a prima facie case of Assault in the Third degree and fully converts the misdemeanor complaint into an information. Defendant's remaining contentions are denied for the foregoing reasons.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.

Dated: November 14, 2025
New York, New York
ELIZABETH Y. SHAMAHS, J.C.C.