The defendant is charged with Attempted Murder in the Second Degree and other offenses in relation to an incident alleged to have occurred on October 18, 2024. The defendant moves to suppress identification, physical, and statement evidence. This court conducted a combined Huntley/Dunaway/Wade/Mapp/Payton hearing on August 6 and September 11, 2025. Police Officers Anthony Lagrutta and Jose Ruiz, and Ulises Santiago, a Kings County District Attorney's Office Spanish Interpreter, testified on behalf of the People. The defense did not present any witnesses. After the testimony was concluded, the court heard oral arguments from both sides.

The court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Officer Anthony Lagrutta has been employed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for approximately eight years and is currently assigned to the 72nd Precinct (8/6/25 tr at 13). The court credits Officer Lagrutta's testimony to the extent set forth herein.

On October 18, 2024, at approximately 6:40 p.m., Officer Lagrutta was working patrol with his partner, Officer Ruiz, when he received a 911 radio call regarding an assault at a taco restaurant in Kings County (8/6/25 tr at 14-15, 23-24). Upon arriving at that location at 6:50 p.m., he observed the complainant "bleeding from the arm" (id. at 16, 24). Officer Lagrutta learned from Officer Ruiz that the complainant indicated in Spanish that he was assaulted by his coworker (id. at 17). Officer Ruiz informed Officer Lagrutta that the complainant's brother (the brother) who arrived at the scene after the officers, stated that he "observed someone assault" the complainant, he knew who it was, and that the person lived on 58th Street (id. at 17, 18, 25, 36). Officers Lagrutta and Ruiz then had the brother accompany them to that location (id. at 18-19, 26-27).

At approximately 7:02 p.m., the officers and the brother arrived at the 58th Street address, which Officer Lagrutta described as a residential location five to 10 blocks away from the incident location (8/6/25 tr at 18-19, 26-27). Upon arrival, Officer Lagrutta observed two individuals outside of the location but does not know what they said to Officer Ruiz in Spanish (id. at 19-20, 27-28).

The officers proceeded up the exterior stairs of the location and entered through the front door into the interior hallway, at which point Officer Lagrutta observed an apartment door that was "ajar" (8/6/25 tr at 20, 28-29). Officer Ruiz pushed the door open and "crossed the threshold of the apartment" (id. at 20, 29). Once the door was pushed open, the brother "pointed out the individual" standing in the kitchen cooking, who the officer later learned was Mainor Ben Chalcu, the defendant herein (id. at 20-21, 29, 33). Officer Lagrutta could not "remember exactly where" the brother was when he "pointed out" the defendant (id. at 30).

Officer Lagrutta then entered the apartment and placed the defendant under arrest (8/6/25 tr at 20-22, 33). Officer Lagrutta did not have an arrest warrant, nor did he knock or ask for consent before entering the apartment (id. at 29, 31). Further, to his knowledge, the defendant did not consent to the officers' entry, the complainant was not present, no one inside the residence required assistance, and there was no emergency occurring inside the apartment (id. at 31-32).

During a subsequent search of the defendant, Officer Lagrutta recovered a box cutter from the defendant's back pants pocket (8/6/25 tr at 22, 34). The defendant was then transported to the 72nd Precinct for arrest processing (id. at 22).

Officer Jose Ruiz has been employed by the NYPD for approximately 10 years and is currently assigned to the 72nd Precinct (9/11/25 tr at 11). The court credits Officer Ruiz' testimony to the extent indicated herein.

Officer Ruiz is fluent in the Spanish language (9/11/25 tr at 8, 33). On October 18, 2024, at approximately 6:40 p.m., he and his partner, Officer Lagrutta, responded to a 911 call for an assault at a taco restaurant in Kings County (id. at 9, 33-35). Officer Ruiz' interactions with the defendant were captured on his body-worn camera (BWC), a copy of which was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 2.

When they arrived on scene at approximately 6:55 p.m., Officer Ruiz observed a male standing on the corner with a slash wound to his left arm, later identified as the complainant (9/11/25 tr at 10, 34, 50). Speaking in Spanish, the complainant told Officer Ruiz that his coworker attempted to stab him in the head and that he sustained the injury on his arm while defending himself (id. tr at 11). Later, while still on scene, Officer Ruiz observed the complainant's brother arrive and stand next to the complainant (id. at 11, 36). According to Officer Ruiz, the brother corroborated the complainant's account that a dispute occurred between coworkers, during which the coworker attempted to stab the complainant (id. at 11). The brother also provided the name Mainor for the coworker (id. at 22-23; see People's Exhibit 2 at 5:12-5:17).While the brother spoke to Officer Ruiz in Spanish, Officer Ruiz observed that the brother and the complainant spoke to each other in a language the officer did not understand, but which he believed to be a Guatemalan dialect (9/11/25 tr at 11, 36-38).

The complainant also informed the officers that he believed the assailant resided on 57th [*2]Street (see People's Exhibit 2 at 2:30-2:42). At one point while on scene, Officer Ruiz observed the complainant and the brother speaking on the phone with a purported cousin who provided an address on 58th Street as the address of the coworker (9/11/25 tr at 12, 37, 39). The brother, however, was "not sure" in which apartment the coworker resided (id. at 23). Officer Ruiz and his partner placed the brother in their patrol car and drove to that address, which was "like a five-minute drive" from the scene (id. at 12-13, 38).

They arrived shortly before 7:30 p.m. (9/11/25 tr at 13). Upon arrival, the officers observed two individuals standing outside a building next to a bicycle speaking both Spanish and English (id. at 13). According to Officer Ruiz, one of them stated, "he is inside," and the individuals also informed Officer Ruiz that "he was on the first floor, the apartment" (id. at 13-14). As they climbed a flight of stairs to enter the building, the brother pointed to a bicycle outside and stated it belonged to the coworker (id. at 13-14).

Officer Ruiz testified that the building's front door was unlocked, and that the officers proceeded into the vestibule area without obtaining consent from any individual (9/11/25 tr at 13-14, 42). Officer Ruiz then observed that the apartment door on the first floor was "propped open a little bit" (id. at 14). Officer Ruiz' BWC footage depicts the officer lightly knocking on the door and then pushing the door open (People's Exhibit 2 at 11:38-11:42). "As soon as the door opened," Officer Ruiz observed an individual standing at the stove who appeared to be cooking (id. at 15, 44-45). The brother then, from outside of the apartment, indicated that the coworker-assailant was the individual standing in the kitchen and the officers immediately handcuffed the individual, who the officer identified at the hearing as the defendant herein (id. at 14-15, 44-45; People's Exhibit 2 at 11:42-11:46).

Officer Ruiz acknowledged that he did not have an arrest warrant for the defendant, nor did he obtain consent to enter the building or apartment (9/11/25 tr at 30, 38, 42-44). There were no 911 calls, cries for help, or indications of an ongoing emergency at the 58th Street address (id. at 39).

As he was being handcuffed, the defendant stated in Spanish, "they constantly bother me that's why I did what I did" (9/11/25 tr at 15). At that time, Officer Ruiz did not ask the defendant any questions about the incident, nor did he make any threats or promises (id. at 16). Both officers' firearms remained holstered (id. at 16). Officer Ruiz responded, "But you can't do what you did" (People's Exhibit 3 at 3).

Prior to placing the defendant in the police vehicle, the officers conducted a search of the defendant and recovered a box cutter from the defendant's pants pocket (9/11/25 tr at 16-17, 45-46; see People's Exhibit 1). The defendant stated, "I used it for work" (id. at 16).

When Officer Ruiz entered his vehicle in which the defendant was situated, Officer Ruiz stated, unprompted, "But anyway, you can't do what you did" (People's Exhibit 3 at 5). The defendant was then transported to the 72nd Precinct stationhouse for arrest processing (9/11/25 tr at 17-18). When they arrived at the precinct, Officer Ruiz stated, after approximately five minutes of silence, "I understand, but as you know, you can't do that" (People's Exhibit 3 at 5-6). At the precinct, while Officer Ruiz attempted to obtain pedigree information, the defendant made further statements in Spanish, saying that "[t]hey keep bothering him," "he had to do something," and that "he was scared and they needed to learn" (id. at 18-19, 27-28). Officer Ruiz testified that no Miranda warnings were given prior to these statements (id. at 47).

Ulises Santiago is a staff interpreter and translator for the Kings County District Attorney's Office (KCDA) and has served in that capacity for approximately four years (9/11/25 tr at 52). He is fluent in both English and Spanish and routinely interprets for Grand Jury proceedings and translates police body-worn camera footage, interviews, and other documents (id. at 52-53, 59). He is also certified by the New York State Unified Court System to interpret and translate in court proceedings (id. at 54).

Mr. Santiago testified credibly that he reviewed Officer Ruiz' BWC footage (People's Exhibit 2) and prepared a transcript and translation of the Spanish-language portions of the BWC, including defendant's recorded statements at the precinct (9/11/25 tr at 54-58). A copy of the English translation he prepared, beginning at timestamp 11:43 until the end of the BWC, was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 3 (id. at 56-59).

At a suppression hearing, the People bear the initial burden of showing, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct (People v Hernandez, 40 AD3d 777, 778 [2d Dept 2007]; People v Moses, 32 AD3d 866, 868 [2d Dept 2006]; see also People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321, 329 [1978]; People v Whitehurst, 25 NY2d 389, 391 [1969]). In evaluating the police action, the court must determine whether it was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances at the time (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 222 [1976]). If the People satisfy their initial burden, the defendant "bears the ultimate burden of proving that the evidence should not be used against him" (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]).

As to the Dunaway portion, "probable cause to arrest requires the existence of facts and circumstances which, when viewed as a whole, would lead a reasonable person possessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that an offense has been or is being committed, and that the defendant committed or is committing that offense" (People v Wright, 8 AD3d 304, 307 [2d Dept 2004], citing People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]). "It is well established that the eyewitness victim of a crime can provide probable cause for the arrest of [his] assailant despite the fact that [his] reliability has not been previously established or [his] information corroborated" (People v Griffin, 161 AD2d 799, 800 [2d Dept 1990]).

Here, the officers responded to a 911 radio call for an assault that occurred at a taco restaurant in Kings County. Upon their arrival, the complainant informed the officers, in Spanish, that his coworker attempted to stab him in the head and that he sustained the injury while defending himself. The officers personally observed a fresh slash wound and the complainant bleeding from the arm. These circumstances provided the officers with a direct accusation from an eyewitness victim of a slashing, corroborated by the physical injuries observed. Thus, the officers had reliable information that (1) an assault occurred; and (2) the assailant was the complainant's coworker (see People v Crespo, 70 AD2d 661 [2d Dept 1979] ["an eyewitness victim of a crime can provide probable cause for the arrest of his assailant"]).

While still at the scene, the complainant's brother told the officers that he "knew who it was" and provided the officers with the name "Mainor." Further, the complainant informed the officers that he believed the coworker resided on 57th Street. The complainant then telephoned [*3]an individual who was purportedly his cousin to obtain an exact address for the coworker, which was provided as the 58th Street address. Once the officers arrived at that address, two individuals outside the building informed the officers that "he is inside" and "he [is] on the first floor, the apartment." The brother also identified a bicycle outside the residence as belonging to the coworker.

In its totality, the information provided by the complainant, coupled with the brother's information and the cousin's, provided sufficient cause to believe that the crime of assault was committed by a coworker named Mainor who resided at the 58th Street address (see People v Geddes, 171 AD3d 1210, 1213 [2d Dept 2019] [probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances]; People v Sanders, 239 AD2d 528 [2d Dept 1997] ["information provided by an identified person, accusing another identifiable individual of a crime, is sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest"]). Moreover, the brother's identification of the defendant from the hallway as the coworker-assailant furnished additional support for probable cause to believe the defendant was the perpetrator (see People v Brown, 146 AD2d 793 [2d Dept 1989] [identified citizen pointing out defendant as alleged robber was sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest]; People v McCain, 134 AD2d 623, 623 [2d Dept 1987] [citizen witness pointing out defendant as perpetrator legally sufficient to provide police with probable cause]).

As to the Payton portion, the Payton doctrine prohibits police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effect an arrest based upon probable cause, absent exigent circumstances (see Payton v New York, 445 US 573 [1980]). Thus, "[a]bsent one of two narrow circumstances, exigent circumstances or voluntary consent, the police many not enter a private dwelling to arrest its occupant without an arrest warrant" (People v Cuencas, 40 NY3d 480, 488 [2023]).

The court first considers whether the officers' entry through the front exterior door of the 58th Street building was itself constitutionally significant. Residents of multi-unit dwellings do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in "the open areas of a building which are subject to the common use of the tenants in that building" (People v Allen, 54 AD3d 868, 869 [2d Dept 2008]). Therefore, the officers' entry through the building's unlocked front door into a common area does not implicate Payton.

Although the vestibule and common hallway are not protected, the threshold and interior of an individual's apartment are fully protected under Payton and entry is prohibited absent exigent circumstances or consent (see People v Minley, 68 NY2d 952, 953 [1986] [Payton prohibits the police from crossing the threshold of a suspect's home to effect a warrantless arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances]). Here, it is undisputed that the defendant was arrested inside his apartment. As demonstrated by the evidence, the defendant's apartment door was slightly ajar, but did not permit the officers to see inside the apartment or discern whether any individual was inside. Officer Ruiz knocked lightly once and then pushed the door open. After the complainant identified the defendant, Officer Ruiz stepped inside the apartment. He and his partner then immediately handcuffed the defendant who was standing in the kitchen.

The People contend that the officers' entry into the apartment was justified by exigent circumstances. To determine whether exigent circumstances exist, the court should consider all relevant factors, including: "(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense; (2) whether the [*4]suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is a reliable basis for believing the person being sought is in the premises in issue; (4) the possibility the suspect will escape; (5) whether there has been a clear demonstration of the existence of probable cause to make an arrest; and (6) the time of day of the entry and whether the entry was peaceful in nature" (People v Green, 103 AD2d 362, 363-64 [2d Dept 1984]). These enumerated factors are offered as "guidelines," not as a "rigid formula" (see People v Williams, 181 AD2d 474, 476 [1st Dept 1992]).

Applying the exigent circumstances factors to the case at bar, the court notes that the underlying offenses are of a serious and violent nature, in that the complainant reported to the police that the defendant attempted to stab him resulting in a bleeding slash to his left arm. Additionally, based on the information provided by the brother and the two individuals outside the apartment building, the officers possessed a reasonable basis to believe the defendant was inside the premises. Further, the officers' entry, which occurred during the early evening hours, was not accompanied by force or violence.

On the other hand, the evidence before the court establishes that the situation presented no imminent threat to life, no hot pursuit, and no indication of destruction of evidence or risk of flight (compare People v Robert, 156 AD2d 730, 730 [2d Dept 1989] [although there was probable cause to arrest defendant after he allegedly consummated a drug transaction with an undercover police officer, police entry into defendant's home was not justified by any existing exigent circumstances], with People v Caputo, 155 AD3d 648, 649-650 [2d Dept 2017] [hot pursuit justified warrantless entry]; People v Torres, 140 AD2d 564, 565 [2d Dept 1988] [exigent circumstances found where defendant had previously fled jurisdiction to avoid apprehension and evidence established likelihood of defendant fleeing the jurisdiction again]; People v Mathis, 132 AD2d 626, 628 [2d Dept 1987] ["evidence that the defendant was armed and was planning to commit another armed robbery in the immediate future" established exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry]). As conceded by both officers, when the officers arrived at the defendant's residence there was no one in need of help, there had been no 911 calls, and "there was no emergency of any kind occurring inside of [the] residence."

There was also no indication that the defendant was attempting to flee or that there was any meaningful risk of escape. The record reflects that the officers had sufficient time to respond to the scene of the incident, interview witnesses, secure an ambulance for the complainant, transport the brother from the scene to the defendant's residence, confer with individuals outside the residence, and approach the apartment without any sign that the defendant was preparing to leave. Further, according to Officer Ruiz' testimony, the defendant was not combative during the arrest procedure.

Finally, with respect to whether the suspect was reasonably believed to be armed, it was alleged that the defendant stabbed the complainant during the earlier altercation; however, at the time of their arrival at the defendant's home, the police did not possess any specific information that the defendant was presently armed or posed any immediate threat within the residence. To the contrary, after Officer Ruiz pushed the apartment door open, he observed the defendant standing at the kitchen stove cooking (cf. People v Crippen, 156 AD3d 946 [3d Dept 2017] [exigent circumstances found where after pushing door open wide enough to see inside, police observed defendant brandishing a knife]; People v Garcia, 27 AD3d 307 [1st Dept 2006] [exigent circumstances justified entry into open door of apartment where, "from the common hallway, (police) observed a man inside with a gun in plain view"]; People v Jackson, 203 AD2d [*5]956, 957 [4th Dept 1994] [exigent circumstances existed where through open door, police observed a butcher's knife in plain view on the floor and within the co-defendant's reach]).

Considering these factors collectively, the record does not demonstrate the type of immediate, compelling emergency that the exigent circumstances doctrine is intended to address (see People v Levan, 62 NY2d 139, 146 [1984] [no exigent circumstances where police by their own conduct created appearance of exigency]). Accordingly, the court finds that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the warrantless entry into the defendant's home (see e.g. People v Lott, 102 AD2d 506, 509-511 [4th Dept 1984] [notwithstanding allegations that woman had "just been robbed" of her money, keys and purse by defendant at his apartment house and that defendant a gun and drugs in the apartment, police lacked exigent circumstances to justify warrantless entry into defendant's home]).

At a Wade hearing, the People have the burden in the first instance to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, " 'the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness in a pretrial identification procedure' " (People v Coleman, 73 AD3d 1200, 1203 [2d Dept 2010], citing People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 335 [1990], cert denied 498 US 833 [1990]). Once the People have met their burden, "the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the hearing court that the [identification] procedure was improper" (People v Holley, 26 NY3d 514, 521 [2015]).

In this case, the People gave notice of a single identification procedure, which they characterized as a "point-out." The brother's identification occurred within a reasonably short time after the reported assault and within a short distance from the crime scene. The officers had transported the brother to locate the coworker-assailant based on information provided by the complainant and the brother. Inasmuch as the brother was transported from the crime scene to the 58th Street address for the specific purpose of determining whether the defendant was the coworker-assailant, the resulting point-out was a "police-arranged" identification, requiring the court to assess whether it was conducted in a manner that created an undue degree of police suggestion (see People v Dixon, 85 NY2d 218, 224 [1995]).

As an initial matter, the exclusionary rule generally provides that "when the police have acted illegally, evidence which has been come at by exploitation of that illegality should be suppressed" (People v Gethers, 86 NY2d 159, 161-162 [1995] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, however, the brother's identification occurred prior to the impermissible intrusion into the apartment wherein defendant was located. Because the identification preceded the unlawful entry, it was not the product of, nor was it facilitated by, the subsequent Payton violation. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule is not implicated with respect to this pre-entry identification.

The evidence demonstrated that the brother identified the defendant from a natural vantage point in the hallway. The BWC footage further establishes that the police did not employ any verbal cues, prompts, or conduct intended to single out the defendant as the perpetrator (see People v Howard, 22 NY3d 388, 403 [2013] [considering the lack of verbal suggestion from any police officer about suspect's identity]). Rather, the complainant's recognition was nearly immediately upon observation.

There is no indication that the identification procedure was employed in a manner [*6]creating a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Stated differently, the identification procedure employed in this case was not unduly suggestive.

Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress identification evidence on Wade grounds is denied.

With respect to the box cutter, where, as here, the arrest of a defendant is unlawful, evidence recovered in a search incident to said unlawful arrest must be suppressed (see Levan, 62 NY2d at 145-146 [in reversing the Appellate Division, Court of Appeals found that arrest of defendant in his home was improper and so, "gun seized in defendant's apartment and testimony as to its discovery there" should have been suppressed as fruits of an unlawful arrest]; Robert, 156 AD2d at 730 [where defendant's arrest inside his apartment was unlawful, evidence obtained by police "subsequent to their unjustified entry must be suppressed as the product of an illegality"]). Accordingly, the box cutter recovered from the defendant's pants pocket subsequent to his arrest must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure.

Turning to the Huntley portion, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary (see People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72, 74 [1965]). A defendant who is in custody may not be interrogated by law enforcement without being advised of his constitutional rights (Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). "However, both the elements of police 'custody' and police 'interrogation' must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda" (People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 33 [1976]).

The People served noticed of three statements, two of which were made on the scene and the third of which was made at the precinct. The defendant's initial statements were made immediately after his arrest (see People's Exhibit 3 at 2). After the defendant made this statement, Officer Ruiz responded, "But you can't do what you did" (People's Exhibit 3 at 3). Then, upon entering the police vehicle to transport the defendant to the stationhouse, Officer Ruiz repeated without prompting, "But anyway, you can't do what you did" (People's Exhibit 3 at 5). Upon arrival at the precinct, after approximately five minutes of silence, Officer Ruiz again stated, "but as you know, you can't do that" (People's Exhibit 3 at 5-6).

Given their temporal proximity to the Payton violation and the absence of any intervening circumstances, these statements are subject to suppression pursuant to the exclusionary rule (see People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 441 [1991] [statements suppressed after Payton violation based upon the temporal proximity of the arrest and the statement and the absence of intervening circumstances]).

Assuming arguendo that the statements are not barred by the exclusionary rule, there is no doubt that at the time the defendant made each of these statements he was in police custody. The defendant was handcuffed and escorted out of an apartment he occupied. Exculpatory or inculpatory statements adduced from custodial interrogation are admissible where the prosecution demonstrates that an individual is first advised of the safeguards commonly referred to as Miranda warnings, namely, that "they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say [*7]can and will be used against them in a court of law, that they have the right to the presence of an attorney prior to and during the course of questioning, and that if they cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them prior to any questioning" (People v Dunbar, 104 AD3d 198, 205-206 [2d Dept 2013], affd 24 NY3d 304 [2014]). An individual may then waive their constitutional rights provided it is shown "that the waiver was made with 'a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it' " (id. at 206, quoting Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421 [1986]).

Interrogation in the Miranda context "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" (People v Reardon, 124 AD3d 681, 683 [2d Dept 2015]). Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, Officer Ruiz' statements were, in effect, accusatory statements reasonably likely to prompt the defendant to either explain, deny, or otherwise elaborate on his alleged conduct. Such remarks went beyond background information incidental to processing an arrest and instead constituted an implicit invitation for the defendant to provide additional details about the offense for which he had just been taken into custody.

It is undisputed that the defendant was not administered Miranda warnings at any point prior to the making of the noticed statements. Accordingly, the noticed statements are also subject to suppression as the product of police interrogation in violation of Miranda.

For the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion to suppress is granted in part and denied in part. The branches of the defendant's motion to suppress his statements and the box cutter recovered are granted. The branch of the defendant's motion to suppress the pre-arrest identification made by the brother is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.