The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

Upon the foregoing documents, it is ordered that plaintiff Morris Gafni's motion and defendant Yoram Gafni's cross-motion are determined as follows:

Plaintiff Morris Gafni commenced this action on July 31, 2024, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to remove the Memorandum of Lease dated November 16, 2023, and recorded on November 29, 2023, in the City Register of the City of New York, Queens County, under [*2]CRFN 2023000313206, for the subject property located at 147-12 75th Avenue, Flushing, New York 11367 (Block: 6683, Lot: 5) (hereinafter the Property). Plaintiff moves for an order: i) pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment against defendant Yoram Gafni for the relief sought in the complaint and dismissing the affirmative defenses; ii) pursuant to CPLR 3211, dismissing the counterclaims; iii) pursuant to CPLR 3215 (a), for default judgment against defendant Rapid Foreclosure Refunds LLC (hereinafter Rapid Foreclosure) and Yoram Gafni; iv) terminating and canceling the Memorandum of Lease; v) pursuant to Real Property Law (RPL) § 329 to remove the Memorandum of Lease; and vi) granting special damages in an amount to be determined by this Court for defendants' slander of title claim.

Defendant Yoram Gafni, appearing pro se, opposes and cross-moves for an order: i) denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and default judgment in its entirety; ii) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 3212, dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; iii) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) and 1001 (a), dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to join necessary parties; iv) damages for emotional distress and health-related issues; and v) pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, sanctioning plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel for frivolous litigation tactics. Defendant Yoram Gafni also seeks relief on behalf of defendant Rapid Foreclosure, which is appearing without an attorney, for time to either obtain legal representation or dissolve the LLC, contending that "the financial constraints and identical interests of the sole member and the LLC, pro se representation should be permitted."

The underlying facts are as follows. On May 25, 1972, plaintiff Morris Gafni and Doris Gafni purchased the Property jointly as husband and wife. The deed was recorded on May 30, 1972 (hereinafter the 1972 Deed). On October 1, 2023, Doris Gafni, with power of attorney to act on Morris Gafni's behalf, executed a lease agreement dated October 1, 2023 (hereinafter the lease), as the landlord that leased the Property to defendant Yoram Gafni, their son, as the tenant. The lease reflects a lease term of 25 years, commencing October 1, 2023 through September 30, 2048, with an annual rent of one dollar ($1.00) per year. The lease contained a purchase option, which states: "Yoram Gafni shall have the option to purchase the demised property, located at 147-12 75th Avenue, Flushing, New York 11367 at any time during this lease for One ($1.00) Dollar by giving notice of such exercise of this option to Doris Gafni and/or Morris Gafni." The lease also contained a right of first refusal which provided that, upon receiving written notice of a bona fide written offer or purchase agreement for the sale of the Property, Yoram Gafni "shall have the right to notify Landlord that it is exercising its Right of First Refusal and will purchase the Property for the purchase price of One ($1.00) Dollar." On the same date, October 1, 2023, defendant Yoram Gafni assigned the lease between himself, as tenant, and Doris Gafni, as landlord, to defendant Rapid Foreclosure. Also on the same date, defendant Rapid Foreclosure entered into a lease with defendant Yoram Gafni, wherein defendant Rapid Foreclosure represents itself as landlord and defendant Yoram Gafni as tenant. Defendants then recorded this lease between defendant Rapid Foreclosure as landlord and defendant Yoram Gafni as tenant, in a Memorandum of Lease dated November 16, 2023 (hereinafter Memorandum of Lease), on November 29, 2023. On July 8, 2024, defendant Yoram Gafni sought to exercise his right under the lease to purchase the Property for $1.00. On July 17, 2024, Morris Gafni, through his attorney, rejected Yoram Gafni's exercise of the purchase option.

It is well established that the proponent of a summary judgment motion must establish a prima facie case showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, submitting sufficient [*3]evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Once this demonstration has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidence, in admissible form, sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Where there is no genuine issue to be resolved at trial, the case should be summarily decided (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]).

The Court will first address plaintiff's first cause of action to cancel the Memorandum of Lease. In support of the motion, plaintiff submits, among other things: i) his affidavit in support; ii) an attorney affirmation in support; iii) the 1972 Deed; iv) the Memorandum of Lease; v) email correspondence between plaintiff's counsel and defendant Yoram Gafni; vi) email correspondence with Part 24; vii) a Medicare letter addressed to plaintiff dated November 8, 2024; viii) an envelope and notice of purchase dated July 8, 2024; ix) defendant Yoram Gafni's demand to close dated July 15, 2024; x) adjournment requests; and xi) defendant Yoram Gafni's consent on NYSCEF.

Plaintiff attests in his affidavit that he is 93 years old, that defendant Yoram Gafni is his son, and the recording of the Memorandum of Lease on the Property has clouded the Property's title. Plaintiff further attests that he has never heard of defendant Rapid Foreclosure, that Rapid Foreclosure is not the owner of the Property, and the 1972 Deed is the last deed of record, which shows that he is the proper owner of the Property with his late wife, Doris Gafni, who passed away on October 15, 2023. Plaintiff attests that since he is the owner of record of the Property, he is the only party who has authority to enter into any leases. Accordingly, defendant Rapid Foreclosure is "not in any position to enter into any leases or OPTION TO PURCHASE agreements." Plaintiff further attests that he wishes to sell the Property and distribute the proceeds among his grandchildren, including defendant Yoram Gafni's son, before he passes away. Upon review of the submissions presented, including the 1972 Deed as the last recorded deed, plaintiff has demonstrated, prima facie, that he is the proper owner and his entitlement, as a matter of law, to the cancellation of the Memorandum of Lease.

A deed is documentary evidence of ownership (see Fleming v Kamden Props., LLC, 41 AD3d 781, 782 [2d Dept 2007]; Rodriguez v Peterson, 163 AD2d 467, 468 [2d Dept 1990]; Peldman v Podolsky, 148 AD2d 686, 687 [2d Dept 1989]). Conveyance of property to a husband and a wife creates a tenancy by the entirety (see Cruz v Cruz, 213 AD3d 805, 806 [2d Dept 2023]; Ciaccio v Wright-Ciaccio, 211 AD3d 900, 902 [2d Dept 2022]; Scarison, Inc. v Paracha, 7 AD3d 605, 606 [2d Dept 2004]). Where property is held in a tenancy by the entirety and one spouse dies, the surviving spouse receives the fee interest in its entirety by operation of law, free and clear of any debts, claims, liens or other encumbrances as against the deceased spouse (see Ciaccio, 211 AD3d at 903; Cormack v Burks, 150 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2d Dept 2017]; Lacroix v Limogene, 132 AD3d 817, 818 [2d Dept 2015]).

Where an instrument is improperly recorded related to real property or interest, RPL § 329 provides for the cancellation of such instrument of record by the owner, stating:

An owner of real property or of any undivided part thereof or interest therein or an owner of rent to accrue from a tenancy or subtenancy thereof, may maintain an action to have any recorded instrument in writing relating to such real property or interest therein, other than those required by law to be recorded, or any recorded assignment of rent to accrue [*4]from a tenancy or subtenancy of such property or interest therein declared void or invalid, or to have the same canceled of record as to said real property, or his undivided part thereof or interest therein, or as to the rent to accrue therefrom belonging to him.

Here, it is uncontroverted that the last recorded deed was the 1972 Deed, which reflects that the Property was conveyed to "MORRIS GAFNI AND DORIS GAFNI, his wife" as tenants by the entirety. When Doris Gafni died on October 15, 2023, the Property passed to Morris Gafni, who received the fee interest in its entirety by operation of law. Where, as here, the record reflects that no subsequent deeds were recorded, and no documentary evidence of the conveyance of ownership to defendant Rapid Foreclosure on or prior to the date of the Memorandum of Lease, the Memorandum of Lease is improper as it misrepresents that defendant Rapid Foreclosure is the landlord. Accordingly, plaintiff has demonstrated, prima facie, that he is the proper owner in fee of the Property, not defendant Rapid Foreclosure, and, therefore, the Memorandum of Lease should be canceled, pursuant to RPL § 329. The burden then shifts to defendant Yoram Gafni to produce evidence, in admissible form, sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact.

In his opposition and cross-motion, defendant Yoram Gafni submits, among other things, i) a power of attorney dated December 15, 2017; ii) the lease between Doris Gafni and Yoram Gafni dated October 1, 2023; iii) the assignment and assumption of the lease; iv) the lease between defendants Rapid Foreclosure and Yoram Gafni dated October 1, 2023; and v) the notice to exercise of option dated July 8, 2024. Upon review of the submissions presented, defendant Yoram Gafni has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. Significantly, defendant Yoram Gafni raises no opposition to plaintiff's contention that neither Rapid Foreclosure nor he are the record owners and lacked the standing or the authority to record the Memorandum of Lease against the Property. Defendant Yoram Gafni provides no evidence, such as a valid deed, that defendant Rapid Foreclosure possessed any ownership interest in the Property as the landlord on or prior to the date of the Memorandum of Lease. Although defendant Yoram Gafni proffers the assignment and assumption of the lease between him, as the tenant, and defendant Rapid Foreclosure, on October 1, 2023, as evidence of ownership rights, defendant Yoram Gafni was only able to assign his rights and interest as the tenant (see TPZ Corp. v Dabbs, 25 AD3d 787, 789 [2d Dept 2006]; In re Stralem, 303 AD2d 120, 122 [2d Dept 2003]). Inasmuch as defendant Yoram Gafni contends that he exercised a purchase option pursuant to the lease terms, the record clearly reflects that he did not attempt to exercise this option until July 8, 2024, which was months after the Memorandum of Lease at issue was recorded on November 29, 2023.

While defendant Yoram Gafni contends, among other things, that summary judgment is premature because of discovery, the mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment might be uncovered during further discovery is an insufficient basis to deny the motion (see Hope v Our Holy Redeemer Roman Catholic Church, 219 AD3d 595, 596 [2d Dept 2023]). Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to cancel the Memorandum of Lease is canceled pursuant to RPL § 329 is granted.

The Court will next address plaintiff's second cause of action for slander of title. "The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for slander of title are (1) a communication falsely casting doubt on the validity of [the] complainant's title, (2) reasonably calculated to [*5]cause harm, and (3) resulting in special damages" (Irizarry v Rosselli, 229 AD3d 778, 780 [2d Dept 2024], quoting 39 Coll. Point Corp. v Transpac Capital Corp., 27 AD3d 454, 455 [2d Dept 2006]). "The wrongful filing for record of a document which casts a cloud upon another's title to or interest in realty is clearly such an act of publication as to give rise to an action for slander of title, if provable damages result" (id.). "It has generally been held that the cause of action to recover damages for slander of title based upon the recording of an unfounded claim to the property of another does not arise until damages actually result, so that the period of limitations begins to run, not from the date of the initial recording, but from the time a prospective sale is lost because of the cloud on plaintiff's title" (Hanbidge v Hunt, 183 AD2d 700, 701 [2d Dept 1992]). Upon review of the submissions presented, plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of damages and establish, prima facie, his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law for slander of title. Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for slander of title is denied.

The Court now turns to the branch of plaintiff's motion seeking dismissal of defendant Yoram Gafni's affirmative defenses. In his verified amended answer and counterclaims, defendant Yoram Gafni lists eleven affirmative defenses, which are "1) Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 2) Plaintiff's own conduct, or by the conduct of its agents, representatives, and consultants bar this action; 3) Plaintiff lacks of capacity and or standing to sue as Defendant exercised defendant's option to purchase the demised property from the Plaintiff; 4) Waiver and estoppel; 5) Plaintiff's Unclean Hands; 6) Plaintiff failed to comply with his own obligations; 7) Claims are barred in whole or in part by the existence of a lease dated October 1, 2023 in which plaintiff is a party, agreed to same, and has a copy of said lease; 8) Plaintiff has failed to name an indispensable party to the lawsuit; 9) Plaintiff does not have standing to bring this complaint in that he is not the current full Legal and Equitable owner of the property; 10) Plaintiff has failed to meet all conditions precedent to bringing this action. By failing to attach a document upon which it relies; and 11) Plaintiff failed to notify the Defendant, Yoram Gafni, prior to his attempt to sell the property as required."

Under CPLR 3211 (b), "[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit." A court should grant a motion to dismiss affirmative defenses if the "defenses are without merit as a matter of law because they either do not apply under the factual circumstances of [the] case, or fail to state a defense" (Bank of Am., N.A. v 414 Midland Ave. Assocs., LLC, 78 AD3d 746, 748 [2d Dept 2010]). "[W]here affirmative defenses 'merely plead conclusions of law without any supporting facts,' the affirmative defenses should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b)" (id. at 750, quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v Farrell, 57 AD3d 721, 723 [2d Dept 2008]). However, "it is well established that a party may 'remedy any defects' in a pleading by submitting evidence in opposition to a motion to dismiss" (Lewis v U.S. Bank N.A., 186 AD3d 694, 697 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Benjamin v Yeroushalmi, 178 AD3d 650, 653 [2d Dept 2019]).

In the case at bar, defendant Yoram Gafni's verified amended answer and counterclaims merely plead conclusions of law without any supporting facts. However, to the extent defendant Yoram Gafni remedies these defects in his opposition papers and provide factual support, it will be considered.

Defendant Yoram Gafni contends that plaintiff "completely ignored the existence of the lease agreement in his complaint, omitting its key terms, including Bond requirement, the option to purchase, prepaid rent for the entire lease term, the right of first refusal, and the ability to sublet or assign the property without prior consent." He further contends that plaintiff failed to allege any breach of lease terms or failure to fulfill lease obligations. Here, plaintiff has established that plaintiff is the proper owner in fee of the Property, pursuant to the 1972 Deed, and as the surviving spouse after Doris Gafni passed away on October 15, 2023. Accordingly, the first affirmative defense is dismissed.

Defendant Yoram Gafni failed to address and remedy the second affirmative defense with any factual support. Where, as here, the affirmative defense is merely plead as a conclusion of law without any supporting facts, such defense is dismissed.

Defendant Yoram Gafni contends that plaintiff failed to take any steps to involve the estate of Doris Gafni in this lawsuit as a necessary party. Here, as previously set forth, plaintiff has established that he is the proper owner in fee of the Property, having received the fee interest in its entirety by operation of law upon his wife Doris Gafni's death. Accordingly, as plaintiff avers, the estate of Doris Gafni is not a necessary party. Further, RPL § 329 authorizes the owner to commence such action as here where the owner is seeking to cancel an instrument of record (see RPL § 329; Silverberg v Bank of NY Mellon, 165 AD3d 1193, 1193 [2d Dept 2018]). Accordingly, the third affirmative defense is dismissed.

Defendant Yoram Gafni contends that plaintiff's failure to object to the leases on October 1, 2023, coupled with his acceptance of lease benefits, constitutes waiver and estoppel. "A valid waiver requires no more than the voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known right which, but for the waiver would have been enforceable" (Golfo v Kycia Assoc., Inc., 45 AD3d 531, 532 [2d Dept 2007], quoting Nassau Trust Co. v Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 NY2d 175, 184 [1982]). A waiver "is not created by negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness, and cannot be inferred from mere silence" there must be proof that there was a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known and otherwise enforceable right (id. at 533, quoting Peck v Peck, 232 AD2d 540, 540 [2d Dept 1996]). Where, as here, there is no evidence that plaintiff waived his ownership rights to the Property, the fourth affirmative defense is dismissed (see Bank of Am., N.A. v 414 Midland Ave. Assoc., LLC, 78 AD3d 746, 750 [2d Dept 2010]).

Defendant Yoram Gafni contends that his father, Morris Gafni's, "attempt to mislead the court by denying his knowledge and possession of lease documents constitutes bad faith, barring him from equitable relief." Where, as here, the fifth affirmative defense does not apply under the factual circumstances of the case, such defense is dismissed (see Seagirt Realty Corp. v Chazanof, 13 NY2d 282, 285 [1963]).

Defendant Yoram Gafni contends, pursuant to the terms of the lease executed by Doris Gafni and Yoram Gafni, that plaintiff failed to post a bond in the sum of the market value of the premises. Where, as here, the instant action seeks to cancel the Memorandum of Lease between defendants Rapid Foreclosure and Yoram Gafni pursuant to RPL § 329, this defense is inapplicable. Accordingly, the sixth affirmative defense is dismissed.

As argued in his sixth affirmative defense, defendant Yoram Gafni contends that plaintiff "willingly executed, via the Power of attorney he freely gave Doris Gafni, his wife, the lease agreement, which includes clear provisions that contradict his claims." However, at issue in this action is the cancellation of the Memorandum of Lease between defendants Rapid Foreclosure and Yoram Gafni, wherein it was disputed whether Rapid Foreclosure was the landlord with any ownership interest in the Property at the time it was signed and recorded. Accordingly, the seventh affirmative defense is dismissed, as it is inapplicable.

As explained above in dismissing the third affirmative defense, the estate of Doris Gafni is not a necessary party. Accordingly, the eighth affirmative defense is dismissed.

As explained above in dismissing the first affirmative defense, plaintiff has established that plaintiff is the proper owner in fee of the Property, pursuant to the 1972 Deed, and as the surviving spouse of Doris Gafni. Accordingly, the ninth affirmative defense is dismissed.

No factual support has been presented regarding this purported affirmative defense. Where, as here, the affirmative defense is merely plead as a conclusion of law without any supporting facts, such defense is dismissed.

Defendant Yoram Gafni contends that plaintiff's actions in publicly listing the property for sale violated his contractual right of first refusal as well as constituted a material breach of the lease executed by Doris Gafni and Yoram Gafni. Where, as here, the instant action is to cancel the Memorandum of Lease between defendants Rapid Foreclosure and Yoram Gafni, this defense is inapplicable. Accordingly, the eleventh affirmative defense is dismissed.

Plaintiff also moves to dismiss defendant Yoram Gafni's counterclaims sounding in defamation for: i) "damages, special damages, actual damages and punitive damages totaling One Million ($1,000,000) Dollars" for plaintiff's false written statement to family members and [*6]home health aides on June 18, 2024, that Yoram Gafni "falsified documents and committed a big fraud"; and ii) "damages, special damages, actual damages and punitive damages totaling One Million ($1,000,000) Dollars" for plaintiff's false written statement to family members and home health aides that Yoram Gafni "hit him twice and he has witnesses."

"A cause of action contained in a counterclaim shall be treated, as far as practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint" (Banschick v Johnson, 222 AD3d 608, 611 [2d Dept 2023]). "On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim a court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d 971, 973 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Wand, Powers & Goody, LLP v Yuliano, 144 AD3d 1017, 1018 [2016]). "At the same time, however, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration" (Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012], quoting Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91 [1999] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

"The elements of a cause of action for defamation are (a) a false statement that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, (b) published without privilege or authorization to a third party, (c) amounting to fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and (d) either causing special harm or constituting defamation per se" (Banschick, 222 AD3d at 610-611). "Further, the complaint in a defamation action must set forth the particular words allegedly constituting defamation, and it must also allege the time when, place where, and manner in which the false statement was made, and specify to whom it was made" (Sternberg v Wiederman, 225 AD3d 820, 821 [2d Dept 2024], quoting Kimso Apts., LLC v Rivera, 180 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2d Dept 2020]).

Here, defendant Yoram Gafni fails to allege the particular defamatory words, the time when, place where, and manner in which such purported false statements were made. Accordingly, the first and second counterclaims are dismissed (see Sternberg, 225 AD3d at 821).

It is well settled that a limited liability company (LLC) may only appear by an attorney (see CPLR 321 [a]; Michael Reilly Design, Inc. v Houraney, 40 AD3d 592, 593-94 [2d Dept 2007] ["the LLC may only be represented by an attorney and not by one of its members"]). The failure of a corporate defendant to comply with CPLR 321 (a) warrants default judgment (see Pisciotta v Lifestyle Designs, Inc., 62 AD3d 850, 853 [2d Dept 2009]; Jimenez v Brenillee Corp., 48 AD3d 351 [1st Dept 2008]; Mail Boxes Etc. USA, Inc. v Higgins, 281 AD2d 176 [1st Dept 2001]). "On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215, the movant is required to submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting its claim, and proof of the defaulting party's default in answering or appearing" (Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v RJNJ Servs., Inc., 89 AD3d 649, 651 [2d Dept 2011]; see CPLR 3215 [f]; Peak Prop. & Cas. Ins. Corp. v Rodriguez, 230 AD3d 512, 514 [2d Dept 2024]; Lugo v Corso, 215 AD3d 944, 945 [2d Dept 2023]).

Here, it is undisputed that defendant Rapid Foreclosure, a LLC, has not appeared by counsel. Plaintiff further submits an affidavit of service dated March 8, 2024, demonstrating [*7]proper service on defendant Rapid Foreclosure.^[FN1] Upon review of the submissions, plaintiff has also established proof of the facts constituting his claim. Accordingly, the branch of plaintiff's motion for default judgment is granted as against defendant Rapid Foreclosure. To the extent that plaintiff seeks a default judgment against defendant Yoram Gafni, in his individual capacity, it is denied as he has appeared and answered in this action.

For all the reasons stated, plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that summary judgment is granted in plaintiff's favor as against defendant Yoram Gafni on the first cause of action, the first to eleventh affirmative defenses are dismissed, the first and second counterclaims are dismissed, and default judgment is granted as against defendant Rapid Foreclosure only.

In light of the foregoing determination, the only remaining branch from defendant Yoram Gafni's cross-motion pertains to sanctioning plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel for frivolous litigation tactics, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1.

A court, may, in its discretion, impose sanctions for frivolous conduct (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [b], [d]; Santaliz v OR FM Assoc, 2024 NY Slip Op 50794(U), *6 [2d Dept 2024]; M&T Bank v Friedmann, 217 AD3d 934, 936 [2d Dept 2023]). "[C]onduct is frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false" (Santaliz, 2024 NY Slip Op 50794(U) at *7, quoting 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]). Here, plaintiff has presented a non-frivolous claim that does not present as rising to the level of sanctionable conduct. Accordingly, defendant Yoram Gafni's cross-motion is denied in its entirety.

Under the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge, attorneys and parties are required to ensure that papers they prepare and sign are reviewed for accuracy, certifying by signing that the paper does not contain any false or frivolous authority or argument (see 22 NYCRR §§ 130-1.1, 130-1.1a). Parties appearing pro se are required to comply with the same rules, are afforded no greater rights than other litigants, and are expected to present legally competent evidence (see Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d 816, 819 [2d Dept 2024]; Benedetto v Tannenbaum, 186 AD3d 1596, 1598 [2d Dept 2020]; Duffen v State, 245 AD2d 653, 653 [3d Dept 1997]). Courts utilize and expend significant time and resources in carefully reviewing all of the parties' submissions.

Upon review of the papers submitted in the instant motion and cross-motion, defendant Yoram Gafni, a former attorney,^[FN2] submitted a combined total of 87 pages (Memorandum of Law 1 of 2, Memorandum of Law 2 of 2, Affidavit of Yoram Gafni 1 of 2, and Affidavit of Yoram [*8]Gafni 2 of 2 [NYSCEF Doc Nos. 85-88]), which contain fictitious or fabricated citations to authority (commonly known as hallucinations), citations to cases which do not exist, as well as cases which do not stand for the proposition cited or are wholly unrelated to the issues in this matter. Notwithstanding these fatal flaws, the Court nevertheless proceeded to consider defendant Yoram Gafni's arguments on their merits. The Court, however, issues a strong admonition against the further submission of papers containing fictitious or fabricated material: such conduct is wholly unacceptable and may result in the imposition of sanctions or other appropriate measures, including the refusal to consider any such filings.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff Morris Gafni's motion for summary judgment on the first cause of action is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to RPL § 329, the Memorandum of Lease dated November 16, 2023, and recorded on November 29, 2023, in the City Register of the City of New York, Queens County, under CRFN 2023000313206, for the subject property located at 147-12 75th Avenue, Flushing, New York 11367 (Block: 6683, Lot: 5), is canceled of record; and it is further

ORDERED that the Office of the City Register of the City of New York is directed to mark as discharged of record said Memorandum of Lease, upon service of a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry and upon the payment of any applicable costs; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff Morris Gafni's motion for summary judgment on the second cause of action is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff Morris Gafni's motion for summary judgment on defendant Yoram Gafni's affirmative defenses is granted, and the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh affirmative defenses are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff Morris Gafni's motion for summary judgment to dismiss defendant Yoram Gafni's counterclaims is granted, and the first and second counterclaims are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff Morris Gafni's motion for default judgment is granted only as against defendant Rapid Foreclosure; and it is further

ORDERED that defendant Yoram Gafni's cross-motion is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that any requested relief and/or remaining contentions not expressly addressed herein have nonetheless been considered and are hereby expressly rejected; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff Morris Gafni shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry upon defendants within twenty (20) days from the date of entry; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.