A suppression hearing was held in this matter on November 20, 2024 and January 17, 2025, the facts are simple, straightforward.

The Court found the People's witnesses (SPO Brent Vaughn, IPD Officer Israel Cosgrove, PO Kevin Harmer) to be entirely credible. The People's witnesses were also completely corroborated by the law enforcement body camera evidence received into the record (People's Exhibit 4).

Codefendants Corbin Whyte and James Marshall were parolees supervised by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). Defendant Whyte was on parole following a conviction for Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (People's Exhibit 1). Defendant Marshall was on parole following convictions for two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, and one count of Attempted Assault in the First Degree (People's Exhibit 2).

As a requirement of their release to the community, both Whyte and Marshall agreed in writing to certain terms and conditions of parole supervision (People's Exhibits 1 & 2). Whyte and Marshall gave their permission for parole officers to search their "person, residence, and property" and promised to refrain from the use or possession of "any controlled substances" and not to act in concert with anyone "engaged in illegal activity." (People's Exhibits 1 & 2 at ¶4, 7 & 11). Furthermore, defendant Whyte agreed as a "special condition" that he would "not operate, own, purchase, rent or possess a motor vehicle without the knowledge and permission of my Parole Officer and a valid New York State driver license." (People's Exhibit 1, p.5, at ¶15(GC24)).

On October 11, 2023, defendant Whyte was scheduled to report to Parole Officer Kevin Harmer at the Tompkins County DSS building in the City of Ithaca (Hearing 28). On that same day, Senior Parole Officer Brent Vaughn ("SPO Vaughn") was attempting to locate a different [*2]parolee named Michael Baez, who had an outstanding warrant of arrest (Hearing 28). SPO Vaughn believed Baez might be with defendant Whyte so he watched the reporting area of the DSS building (Hearing ^[FN1] 28). Ultimately, however, Baez reported to parole on his own that day.

With Baez's whereabouts resolved, SPO Vaughn turned his attention to defendant Whyte, who Vaughn believed did not have valid driver's license (Hearing 28-29). Earlier that day, SPO Vaughn had been communicating with Tompkins County Sheriff's Office Sgt. Jamie Vann concerning the whereabouts of Baez so when he wanted to confirm the status of Whyte's license, he again contacted Sgt. Vann (Hearing 29). Sgt. Vann confirmed to Vaughn that defendant Whyte's license was suspended (Hearing 29).

When defendant Whyte completed his check-in at the DSS building, PO Harmer notified SPO Vaughn that defendant Whyte was leaving the building (Hearing 29). SPO Vaughn then drove his car from the DSS parking lot to West State Street, where he observed defendants Whyte and a person he later confirmed was defendant Marshall across from CARS (the substance abuse treatment center) (Hearing 30, 34). From his vantage point down the street, SPO Vaughn watched defendant Whyte entering and exiting the front and back seat of a black Toyota 4 Runner SUV with Kansas license plates (Hearing 30). Over the course of the next thirty to forty minutes, SPO Vaughn observed numerous people walking up to the SUV, reaching into the SUV, shaking hands, hugging, and briskly walking away (Hearing 31). Based on his past surveillance experiences while working as a parole officer, SPO Vaughn estimated he observed approximately a dozen hand-to-hand drugs sales (Hearing 31, 45). The Court finds that Vaughn credibly testified that he did in fact observe what appeared to be numerous drug transactions. SPO Vaughn reasonably suspected that there were narcotics and possibly firearms in the vehicle (Hearing 32). Vaughn contacted the Ithaca Police Department and was provided with contact information for Ithaca Police Officer Israel Cosgrove (Hearing 32). SPO Vaughn, who was driving an unmarked Chevy Impala, informed Officer Cosgrove that he intended to search the SUV if defendant Whyte drove the vehicle.

Vaughn observed defendant Whyte drive off in the SUV and Vaughn asked Officer Cosgrove to initiate the traffic stop (Hearing 32). Prior to effectuating the traffic stop at the direction and request of SPO Vaughn, Officer Cosgrove also independently confirmed with Spillman that Whyte did not possess a valid driver's license as a result of 1) a child support suspension and 2) license expiration. To be clear, the Court finds that Officer Cosgrove was provided with reliable and credible information from SPO Vaughn that Whyte was driving while suspended. Officer Cosgrove did not just rely upon Vaughn's word, but Cosgrove also ran a corroborating Spillman check. The Court further finds that, on October 11, 2023, at the time Cosgrove ran Whyte's license status, it indicated as still suspended for child support ^[FN2] and also [*3]indicated that it had expired on May 8 2023. Whyte drove the SUV approximately a block-and-a-half and Officer Cosgrove stopped the vehicle on North Albany Street (Hearing 33, 82).

Officer Cosgrove walked up to the SUV as defendant Whyte exited the driver's side with his hands raised. Officer Cosgrove loudly instructed defendant Whyte to "Stay in the car" five times. Instead of complying with the instructions, defendant Whyte stay dropped to the ground onto his knees. (People's Exhibit 3: 01:40- 01:50). Officer Cosgrove then asked, "What are you doing? Why are you out of the car?" Officer Cosgrove, with the assistance of another police officer, placed defendant Whyte in handcuffs. (People's Exhibit 3: 01:5002:00). Officer Cosgrove spoke to defendant Whyte about his license suspension. Defendant Whyte told Officer Cosgrove that he "just left DSS" and had "the lift taken off." (Id.: 02:0003:30). At one point, defendant Whyte pleaded with Officer Cosgrove to obtain the license of his girlfriend (passenger and codefendant Destynie Edwards) to let her drive the car (Id.: 06:15-08:15).

Having followed behind Officer Cosgrove, SPO Vaughn was also at the traffic stop location communicating with his supervisor, who authorized a search of the vehicle. (Hearing 35-36). SPO Vaughn contacted PO Harmer and told him to come to the scene to assist in the search (Hearing 35). After defendant Marshall and codefendant Edwards were removed from the vehicle, SPO Vaughn and PO Harmer searched the vehicle. During the search, the parole officers discovered two handguns, each located in separate backpacks in the SUV, and illegal narcotics in one of the backpacks. (Hearing 37-38).

Once a parolee agrees as a condition of parole that a search of his person or property may be conducted, "such a search may be performed by his parole officer if it 'was rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole officer's duty' and was performed 'to detect and to prevent parole violations for the protection of the public from the commission of further crimes.'" People v. Walker, 80 AD3d 793, 794 (3rd Dept. 2011), quoting, People v. Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 181 (1977).

Here, the stop of Whyte's vehicle and subsequent search of said vehicle was predicated upon SPO Vaughn's directly observed violations of Whyte's and Marshall's parole conditions. Vaughn observed what he credibly and reasonably believed to be hand to hand drug transactions and he also observed Whyte drive the SUV without permission of a parole officer and without a valid driver's license. Where a parolee is observed by a parole officer to be in violation of a parole condition, such justifies an extensive search "to determine the true extent of [the parole violations] and, as such, [is] reasonably related to the parole officers' efforts to supervise defendant while on parole." People v. Walker, 80 AD3d 793, 794 (3rd Dept. 2011); See also, People v. Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 182 (1977) (search of home justified by parolee's failure to report violations).

Here, Vaughn's and Harmer's search of the contents of the vehicle Whyte was observed unlawfully driving, in violation of his parole conditions, was most certainly "reasonably and rationally" related to their parole officers duties. Furthermore, Vaughn had observed Whyte and Marshall engage in what he reasonably believed to be hand to hand drug sales, and that observation also provided lawful authorization for the stop and search of the SUV Whyte was unlawfully driving. If a parole officer has reason to believe a parolee violated the terms of parole, "[a] parole officer may search a parolee's home for evidence of a parole violation," and the officer may look "for evidence of other parole violations." People v. Moore, 229 AD3d 1279, 1280 (4th Dept. 2024).

Furthermore, the Court concludes that IPD Officer Cosgrove was acting as an agent of SPO Vaughn. SPO Vaughn was at all times directing this parole violation investigation. The parole violation investigation and search was predicated upon and justified by the openly brazen parole violations by the defendants Whyte and Marshall which SPO Vaughn personally and directly observed, not any independent criminal investigation by the police. There simply was no independent police investigation underway. This was a parole violation investigation. There is simply no other conclusion that can be drawn from the unambiguous record. See, People v. Sapp, 147 AD3d 1532 (4th Dept. 2017).

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Whyte's and Defendant Marshall's suppression motions are DENIED.

The jury trial will commence June 2, 2025 at 9:00 a.m.

This constitutes the Decision of the Court entered upon notice to all parties. A notice of appeal, if applicable, must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision and order.