The defendant has been found unfit to stand trial and is currently in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (hereinafter "DOC") pending commitment to the custody of the Office of Mental Health (hereinafter "OMH") pursuant to an Order of Commitment issued by this Court. He now moves for an order holding OMH in criminal contempt of court for failing to comply with this Court's Order of Commitment dated April 1, 2025.

The Kings County District Attorney's Office takes no position.

The New York State Attorney General opposes on behalf of OMH.

For the reasons set forth herein, the defendant's motion is denied.

The defendant is charged by Indictment Number 70212-25 with Burglary in the Second Degree and other related charges listed in the indictment. The defendant is separately charged by Indictment Number 70209-25 with Assault in the Second Degree and other related charges.

On February 5, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on both of these indictments in Part TAP2 of Kings County Supreme Court. On that date, counsel for the defendant requested that the defendant be examined pursuant to CPL § 730.

On March 10, 2025, the defendant was examined by two psychological examiners, and a report was later issued finding that the defendant was unfit to proceed.

On April 1, 2025, the People and the defense jointly moved to confirm these findings, and the Court issued an Order of Commitment (hereinafter "Commitment Order"). The Commitment Order for R.S. states:

It is ORDERED that the above named defendant is hereby adjudicated an incapacitated person and is hereby committed to the custody of the Commissioner of OMH for care and treatment in an appropriate facility operated by the OMH to be designated by the appropriate commissioner, for a period not to exceed one year from the date of this order, and it is further ... ORDERED that the [*2]defendant, if he be in detention, be continued in detention at Rikers Island, pending designation of an appropriate facility by the OMH and upon notice by the appropriate Commissioner of the designated facility, be delivered thereto by the Commissioner of Correction of City of New York.

On May 7, 2025, OMH received this Court's Commitment Order. The same day, OMH designated the defendant to Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center ("Mid-Hudson"). (Schatzel Affidavit at 7). As of that date, 91 people were pending admission to Mid-Hudson, and all of OMH's other secure facilities had existing waitlists. (Schatzel Affidavit at 7; see OMH's Response at 9). Defendant was placed on the Mid-Hudson waitlist. OMH asserts that shortly after the defendant was designated to Mid-Hudson, OMH evaluated the defendant for admission to an alternative facility, the Manhattan Psychiatric Center ("MPC"), but the defendant did not meet MPC's eligibility criteria.

On September 15, 2025, counsel for the defendant filed this Order to Show Cause, seeking an order holding OMH in contempt of court for its failure to comply with this Court's April 1, 2025, Order of Commitment.

On September 25, 2025, OMH filed its response papers, which indicated that as of September 25, 2025, the defendant was the 18th male on the waitlist of individuals pending admission to Mid-Hudson. (Schatzel Affidavit at 7). The defendant's anticipated date of admission to Mid-Hudson would be in October 2025 but OMH was not able to provide a specific date for his admission. (Id.)

On October 6, 2025, counsel for the defendant filed a reply, and on October 10, 2025, OMH filed its sur-reply. On October 16, 2025, the Court heard oral arguments.

To date, the defendant remains in the custody of DOC and has not been transferred to Mid-Hudson or any other designated OMH facility. It has been 210 days since the Court issued its order.

Defendant's motion seeks an order holding OMH is in criminal contempt of court pursuant to CPL § 730.60 and New York Judiciary Law § 750(A)(3). His reply papers indicate he is also seeking an order finding that OMH is in civil contempt of court pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 753(A)(3). He asserts that OMH "willfully disobey[ed] a lawful order for defendant's immediate placement in the appropriate designated OMH institution." (Defense Reply at 1). The defendant asserts that this has denied defendant due process and asks the court to use its equitable powers to order OMH to immediately admit R.S. to a facility where he can receive care and treatment.

Defendant asserts that since the Commitment Order was issued on April 1, 2025, R.S. has suffered significant harm while in DOC custody, where he has been held in a mental observation unit and not received adequate psychiatric care. Rather, defendant states that R.S. has languished in a state of unfitness for over six months without receiving the treatment and support necessary to restore him to fitness so that his criminal cases can proceed.

OMH argues that the Court should decline to hold OMH in contempt because, first, it has not violated a clear and unequivocal court order; second, it has been impossible for OMH to transfer the defendant to a hospital because there is no space available for him; and, third, requiring the parties to engage in a collaborative approach would be more productive than holding OMH in contempt. OMH argues that any failure to comply with the Commitment Order was not willful, but rather was a result of factors outside OMH's control. OMH provides an affidavit from Matthew S. Schatzel, Director of the Bureau of Institutional and Transitional Services, a bureau within OMH. Mr. Schatzel's affidavit explains the transfer process for defendants committed to OMH for restoration pursuant to CPL § 730 and provides reasons for systemic delays in their transfer to OMH's secure facilities, including a 35% increase in the number of felony CPL § [*3]730 orders since 2021. It details OMH's efforts to address transfer delays, including opening a restoration unit with 25 additional beds at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center, expanding capacity at other facilities, and beginning construction on a large expansion of capacity at Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Facility. They further assert that injunctive relief compelling OMH to immediately admit R.S. to a hospital would harm others on the waitlists by prioritizing his treatment and further delaying the treatment of others who have been waiting even longer to receive such care.

Regarding the Commitment Order, Mr. Schatzel's affidavit states that OMH designated Defendant to Mid-Hudson, a secure psychiatric facility, on May 7, 2025. As of that date, ninety-one people were already pending admission to Mid-Hudson ahead of R.S., and all of OMH's other secure facilities were full and had their own waitlists. OMH also evaluated Defendant for admission to MPC but he did not meet the eligibility criteria for that facility. As of September 25, 2025, Defendant was the eighteenth male on Mid-Hudson's waitlist, and OMH expected that he would be admitted to that facility in October 2025.

Judiciary Law § § 753(A)(3) and 750(A)(3) allow courts to hold individuals or parties in civil or criminal contempt, respectively, for disobeying lawful mandates of the court.^[FN1] "The burden of proof is on the proponent of the contempt motion, and the contempt must be established by clear and convincing evidence." Matter of Serena W., 218 AD3d 597, 599 (2d. Dept. 2023) (internal citations omitted). "Any ambiguity in the court's mandate should be resolved in favor of the would-be contemnor." Richards v Estate of Kaskel, 169 AD2d 111, 122 [1st Dept. 1991], lv dismissed in part and denied in part, 78 NY2d 1042 [1991]).

For a party to be held in civil contempt under Judiciary Law § 753(A)(3), the movant must establish that: (1) a court order establishing an unequivocal mandate was in effect and disobeyed; (2) the party had knowledge of the order; and (3) the movant's rights have been prejudiced. McCain v. Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 (1994); see also People v. L.G., 83 Misc 3d 1030, 1032-33 (Sup. Ct. NY County, March 29, 2024), aff'd as mod, 238 AD3d 568 (1st Dept. 2025). See also Matter of Serena W., 218 AD3d at 599.

For a party to be held in criminal contempt, the movant must meet a higher standard: they must show that the party has engaged in "willful disobedience" of the court's lawful mandate. Judiciary Law § 750(A)(3). "A key distinguishing element between civil and criminal contempt is the degree of willfulness of the subject conduct. To be found guilty of criminal contempt, the contemnor usually must be shown to have violated the order with a higher degree of willfulness than is required in a civil contempt proceeding." Dept. Of Environmental Prot. Of City of NY v. Dept. of Environmental Prot. Of State of NY, 70 NY2d 233, 240 (1987). "Punishment for a criminal contempt is a drastic remedy for willful wrong," and "[g]uilt arises only where the authority of the court is flouted." Matter of Spector v. Allen, 281 NY 251, 259-60 (1939).

While deeply troubled by the circumstances of R.S.'s confinement and the delay in his receiving treatment and care necessary to restore him to fitness, the Court cannot find that defendant has met his burden by showing by clear and convincing evidence that OMH has disobeyed an unequivocal court mandate.

To sustain a finding of contempt, the court must find that the alleged contemnor violated an unequivocal court mandate. McCain v. Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216. The Second Department has consistently held that to be considered unequivocal for purposes of supporting a finding of contempt, the court order must [*4]include a deadline. See Chambers v. Old Stone Hill Rd. Assoc., 66 AD3d 944, 946 (2d. Dept. 2009) (holding that the order at issue "did not express a clear and unequivocal mandate to remove the original facility immediately or by a specific deadline"); Matter of Serena W., 218 AD3d at 599 (finding that an order directing payment of fees that "did not provide a deadline for the payment" "did not clearly express an unequivocal mandate" necessary to sustain a holding of contempt).

While several courts of concurrent jurisdiction in other boroughs have found OMH in civil contempt in cases involving similarly situated defendants, in each of those matters, the courts' commitment orders contained unequivocal language establishing a timeline for transferring those defendants to an appropriate designated facility. See People v. L.G. 83 Misc 3d at 1031 (commitment order required that "L.G. be transferred to an appropriate institution 'forthwith'"); People v. M.T., 86 Misc 3d 1212(A), *1 (Sup. Ct. NY County June 5, 2025) (commitment order dated February 11, 2025, required that the defendant "was to 'be transferred into the custody of the Office of Mental Health no later than March 11, 2025'" and "[t]he Court's Order further stated that '[f]ailure to do so will result in a finding of contempt pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 753(A) and § 750(A).'")

In holding that the Supreme Court in L.G. had not abused its discretion by holding OMH in civil contempt, the Appellate Division specifically noted that the court order in that matter "directed that defendant be transferred 'forthwith' to the appropriate psychiatric institution designated by OMH; thus, it contained a clear, unequivocal mandate that defendant's transfer occur 'without delay, at once, promptly.'" People v. L.G., 238 AD3d 568, 569 (1st Dept. 2025).

Such language was not included in the commitment order at issue here, which was drafted to comply with 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 111.8(C)(16-f). That regulation requires that orders of commitment conform to an official format established by the Chief Administrator of the Courts or the Commissioner of Mental Health and designed for uniform use throughout the state to implement the provisions of article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The official form order, and this Court's Commitment Order, do not include a timeline for compliance, and therefore fail to establish an unequivocal mandate as required for a finding of contempt.^[FN2]

Further, the Court finds that OMH's delay in accepting custody of the defendant is not willful and is solely attributable to its lack of resources. The parties do not dispute that upon receipt of the Commitment Order, OMH designated an appropriate facility, Mid-Hudson, for the defendant. That facility was full and defendant was placed on the waitlist. It is also undisputed that OMH screened the defendant for placement in an alternative facility but that defendant did not meet the eligibility criteria for that facility. OMH has also shown that it is making efforts to expand capacity to handle the significant increase in need for treatment and restoration of incapacitated defendants, including by adding capacity to existing facilities and beginning construction on a major expansion of Mid-Hudson.^[FN3] On these facts, the Court does not find that OMH has violated an unequivocal mandate of the court or that OMH has acted willfully in failing to comply with an order.

Accordingly, the Court declines to hold OMH in contempt of its Commitment Order.

Defendant further asserts that OMH's lengthy delay in accepting him into their care for restoration services constitutes an ongoing violation of R.S.'s federal and state due process rights. He seeks equitable relief in the form of an order from the court commanding that OMH immediately accept defendant into its custody for restoration services. The parties disagree about the standard to be applied to this claim, and OMH disputes that its delay constitutes a due process violation. Without reaching these issues, the Court notes that the only equitable relief R.S. is seeking would effectively move him to the front of the waitlist, thereby prejudicing other similarly situated defendants who have been waiting even longer for transfer to an OMH facility. As a matter of fairness, the Court declines to order this form of relief.

The Court is appalled that R.S. and other incapacitated defendants are languishing in the custody of DOC and not receiving the care they need to be restored to fitness. This is a complex and multifaceted problem; its potential solutions require stakeholders from all branches of government to recognize the problem, prioritize addressing it, and collaborate to ameliorate it. This Court is limited to addressing the narrow forms of relief sought by Defendant's motion. For the reasons explained above, Defendant's motion is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.