The main issue in this case is whether the People's initial failure to provide the correct gas chromatography and simulator solution documents requires dismissal when the People corrected the omission within one business day of being contacted by the defense. The answer is "no"—and that holds firm despite some other omissions by the People. Accordingly, the branch of the omnibus motion that seeks dismissal is DENIED. Huntley/Dunaway/Ingle/Johnson/Mapp/Atkins hearings are ORDERED.

Via a May 25, 2025 accusatory instrument, defendant N. Polonia ^[FN1] was charged with driving while intoxicated, driving while intoxicated per se, and driving while ability impaired, under V.T.L. § 1192(3), (2), and (1). The deponent officer claimed that when he arrived on the scene of a collision, he saw Polonia standing outside of the passenger side of a car, exhibiting signs of intoxication. At some point, Polonia allegedly admitted "driving from the club" and drinking "Don Julio," Accusatory Instrument at 1—statements for which the People served C.P.L. § 710.30(1)(a) notice (supplemented by an additional post-arraignment notice pertaining to other statements). Polonia later blew .13 at the precinct. Id. at 2.

The May 25 accusatory instrument appears to have been filed on May 26. Polonia was then arraigned on May 27.^[FN2] At arraignment, the People provided the Intoxicated Driver Testing [*2]Unit (IDTU) breath analysis test document, which indicated that the lot number used to test the breath sample was 25040. Defense's Mot., Ex. D.

The People declared ready for trial on August 22, 2025, about 88 days after the case commenced. By that time, the People had disclosed, among other things, body camera footage, activity logs for eight officers, 911 materials, impeachment material for three officers, and a suite of documents pertaining to the chemical breath test itself. See People's Resp., Ex. 4 at 1-2.

Seven days later, on Friday, August 29, defense counsel emailed the assigned ADA to flag five potential discovery issues. Three are relevant here.

Defense counsel observed that the reports for the lot number actually used in Polonia's breath test, lot # 25040, were missing from the discovery folder containing other, similar reports. The People had shared reports for other lot numbers, but not that one.

Defense counsel also pointed to the apparent omission of (1) a DA case summary and (2) the names, work affiliation, and records of EMS personnel who responded to the scene and examined Polonia, and whose activities could be seen in the body camera footage. Defense's Mot., Ex. A.

The assigned ADA responded on Tuesday, September 2, one business day later (accounting for the Labor Day holiday).

Regarding the IDTU reports, the ADA conceded that the appropriate simulator solution certificate and gas chromatography report had indeed been missing from the original August 22 disclosures. Defense's Mot., Ex. B at 1. The ADA shared an updated folder with those reports now included. Id.

Regarding the case summary, the ADA again conceded that the document had been omitted, as it was mistakenly not copied over to the correct folder. The ADA shared the correct document. Id.

Finally, regarding the EMS personnel, the ADA said that she did not have the information but was working on getting it. Id.

At the first post-readiness court appearance on September 5, the defense sought to invalidate the People's certificate of compliance based on the three omissions discussed above. The court deferred decision and adjourned the case for five days so that the People could obtain additional information on the EMS personnel and records. See Defense's Aff. ¶ 15.

The record reflects that the People's first effort to obtain these EMS materials came on September 5. On September 8, the People shared the name and work affiliation of one BronxCare Health System worker with the defense—information that had been possessed by the arresting officer—and disclosed that they had sent a subpoena to BronxCare Health System that day seeking all records relating to the incident. Id. ¶ 18.

This motion schedule was set at the next appearance on September 10. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

Polonia argues that the certificate of compliance must be invalidated, and the accusatory instrument dismissed, because the People did not timely disclose (1) the correct IDTU reports for the lot number actually used in the breath test, (2) the EMS contact information, and (3) the DA case summary. See Defense's Mot. at 12-23. These shortcomings, assessed under the revised due-diligence factors found in C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a), show a failure by the People to exercise due diligence.

Beginning with the IDTU reports, Polonia emphasizes that the People completely failed to timely disclose over a hundred pages of records relevant to the actual lot number used in the chemical breath test—a shortcoming that was undiminished by the People's disclosure of other IDTU information unrelated to that test. The delayed disclosure of these reports prejudiced the defense because Polonia could not effectively investigate the case and prepare for trial without assessing the chemical breath test's reliability. Id. at 12-18.

The nondisclosure of the EMS material further showed the People's lack of diligence, as Polonia contends that the People did not make any requests to obtain this material before declaring ready. The contact information actually possessed by the arresting officer was subject to automatic discovery under C.P.L. § 245.20(1), whereas all other contact information and records were the kind of documents that the prosecution should have tried to obtain under § 245.20(2). Defense's Mot. at 18-22.

Polonia limits the discussion of the DA's case summary to its cumulative effect, as the case summary was indisputably discoverable and yet was not turned over prior to the People declaring ready. This omission, taken together with the others, shows that the People did not exercise due diligence in discharging their discovery obligations. Id. at 22-23.

The People respond largely by defending their diligence on the merits.^[FN3] They detail their [*3]multiple rounds of outreach and efforts to assemble a complete disclosure packet within the 90 days permitted by statute. See People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 5-7 & Ex. 2. And they argue that any discovery shortcomings, none of which prejudiced the defense, were outweighed by the volume of discovery actually disclosed. See People's Resp. at 22-24.

Regarding the IDTU reports, the People attribute the omission to timing. The original IDTU paperwork folder dated from May 2025, before the People actually received the material for lot number 25040.^[FN4] Although those materials were received in June, they were inadvertently not integrated into the discovery folder shared with the defense. The People nevertheless swiftly corrected the error when alerted. People's Resp. at 15-17. And the belated disclosure led to at most "minimal prejudice" because the omission was fixed a "mere two weeks" after the initial declaration of readiness. Id. at 27-28.

Regarding the DA case summary, the omission was inadvertent, as the People thought the case summary had been included in the initial set of disclosures. The People again swiftly corrected the error upon being told of it. See id. at 13-14, 27. Substantively, the document duplicated material already in the possession of the defense on the arrest report and statement notice. See id. at 27.

Finally, the People argue that the EMS contact information and records were not in their possession and control, and otherwise encompassed material classified as medical records which the People could not obtain without a HIPAA release from Polonia—and which Polonia could have subpoenaed as the patient. See id. at 17-22. As to prejudice, the People did not intend to call any of those personnel as witnesses, although the People acknowledge that their identities could be salient to the defense case. See id. at 28.

In reply, Polonia contends that the shortcomings all reveal that the People did not discharge their discovery obligations with the appropriate care or diligence. In particular, the People functionally admit that they made no effort to obtain the EMS contact information that was in their possession prior to declaring ready. See Defense's Reply at 3-5.

While Polonia identifies real shortcomings in the People's exercise of their discovery obligations, the People have the better argument as to their overall diligence under the (nonexhaustive) list of factors contained in the revised C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a). The record reflects a comprehensive and thorough set of disclosures in this straightforward case, the product of generally reasonable efforts by the People to comply with their discovery obligations and far outweighing the omissions in terms of pure volume.

As to two of those omissions: there is no dispute that the materials for the appropriate lot number were relevant and discoverable, and that the DA's case summary was at least discoverable. But even assuming that both omissions were the product of carelessness, and setting aside the People's argument to the contrary on at least the former, the People appear to [*4]have intended for both to be disclosed. And the People swiftly responded to fix both omissions within one business day of being notified—an act relevant to several of the § 245.50(5)(a) factors.

The prompt response weighs in favor of a finding of diligence. There appears to be no question that the People had obtained and possessed the documents before declaring ready. For these two categories, the People did not fail to seek out and obtain the discovery, but failed to timely convey discovery they actually possessed. The revised Article 245 is (at a bare minimum) more forgiving of this kind of omission, where the People do not disclose documents they possess before declaring ready, but fix the mistake promptly upon being notified by the defense within the (implied) 35-day conferral window. See C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(b)-(c); cf. People v. Whitney, — Misc 3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op. 25248, at *5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (David, J.) (concluding that a conferral yielding acquisition of missing material satisfies "a number of the due diligence factors").

The People also persuasively argue that Polonia was not prejudiced by the short additional delay. It is true that Polonia might not have been able to ensure that the chemical test was valid within those materials. But Polonia experienced, at most, eleven additional days without access—fewer still if measured from the objection being lodged to the error being corrected.

The People also persuasively assert (and Polonia does not contest) that the DA case summary was substantively duplicative of material already in the defense's possession. Thus, Polonia was not prejudiced by its belated disclosure.

That leaves the contact information and other materials associated with the medical personnel—an altogether different problem, as the People did not possess this material when they declared ready. This, in contrast to the above, is an unambiguous lapse. The People did not investigate this issue before declaring ready, as is plain from the fact that the arresting officer was in possession of contact information for at least one of those responders, and was able to provide that information once the People requested it. That shortcoming weighs against the People and in favor of Polonia.

However, the People's rejoinder—that these were Polonia's records, which Polonia was in the better position to obtain—softens the impact of the lapse. Polonia would have been aware of receiving medical treatment at the scene, or at least interacting with emergency personnel.^[FN5] And while that does not excuse the People from failing to ascertain the existence of the material under § 245.20(2), it does possibly diminish the consequences of their failure to obtain that material when Polonia could have done so with or without a subpoena.^[FN6]

In sum, this issue, unlike the others, implicates a real lapse by the People—one that has, as of the time of writing, apparently not been remediated. But it also scans less like a reason to invalidate the COC and more like a potential reason to impose discovery sanctions, especially if the medical records or other evidence obtained from those sources undermine some aspect of the People's case against Polonia. That issue can be revisited by the trial judge.

In sum, the People have met their burden, see People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 213 (2023), of establishing due diligence under the revised Articles 30 and 245. Their COC is deemed valid. And because there appears to be no argument that the instrument is vulnerable to dismissal on speedy trial grounds if the COC is valid, the branch of the motion seeking dismissal is DENIED. The trial court may revisit the issue of discovery sanctions if warranted prior to hearings and trial.

Polonia also seeks Huntley/Dunaway/Ingle/Johnson/Mapp/Atkins hearings—that is, to suppress the fruits of an alleged unlawful stop/seizure, as well as to suppress any statements made to law enforcement for which the People served proper § 710.30(1)(a) notice. The case for some of these hearings is thin—in particular, there was no car-stop, and Polonia presumably has a better basis for seeking hearings than the blanket denials of illegal activity found in the motion—but (1) the People do not oppose this request for hearings at all and (2) the Huntley hearing would arise at least in part out of the same facts as any hearings related to the seizure. Because the People have not raised any opposition to hearings, judicial economy favors GRANTING the entire set, subject to the hearing court's discretion and the parties' prudence. See People v. Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 429-30 (1993).

Any Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Any request for relief not specifically mentioned is DENIED.