Summary

Euri Rojas-Minaya was arrested on October 24, 2024 and charged with leaving the scene of an incident without reporting under Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) § 600. The charge is based on an alleged traffic accident that occurred ten months earlier on December 9, 2023. He was arraigned on October 24, 2025, released on his own recognizance, and the case was adjourned to December 10, 2024 and January 27, 2025 for conversion and for the prosecution to file their Certificate of Compliance (COC). On December 10, 2024 the prosecution filed a superseding complaint based on the same conduct and charge. The prosecution filed their supporting depositions before the next court date and their initial COC on January 13, 2025. On January 27, 2025 the superseding complaint was deemed an information, Mr. Rojas-Minaya was arraigned and pled not guilty. The defense needed time to review the discovery, so the case was adjourned to March 4, 2025.

On March 4, 2025 the defense waived time and the case was adjourned to April 1, 2025 for possible disposition. On April 1, 2025 the court set an omnibus motion schedule for decision on August 4, 2025, and also adjourned the case for a discovery conference to April 29, 2025. At the April 29, 2025 appearance, the COC was deemed valid and the court maintained the August 4, 2025 adjournment date. On May 8, 2025, the defense sought an administrative adjournment from August 4, to September 3, 2025 due to discovery issues and possible disposition that the court granted. The defense filed their instant motion on June 11, 2025, the prosecution filed a response on July 22, 2025, and the defense replied on September 12, 2025. Another administrative adjournment was necessary adjourning the case from September 3, 2025 to [*2]November 5, 2025.

The parties are before this court on a defense motion to dismiss in the interest of justice under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) §§ 170.30(1)(g) and 170.40(1). The defense argues that the case should be dismissed because Mr. Rojas-Minaya's actions were justified; the case rests on the testimony of complaining witnesses who, according to the defense are not credible; Mr. Rojas-Minaya has an exemplary personal background and record of public service; and the prosecution is engaging in selective prosecution because members of the Bronx DA's office signed a letter in 2020 expressing the desire to hold police officers accountable for criminal conduct.^[FN1] The prosecution argues that the justification defense is not applicable when the emergency was precipitated by Mr. Rojas-Minaya, there is no compelling factor warranting dismissal, witness credibility is a trial issue, selective prosecution allegations are misguided and the assigned Assistant District Attorney was still in law school when the letter the defense raised was signed by DA's office staff,^[FN2] and there is ample evidence of guilt in this case.

Mr. Rojas-Minaya has been a New York Police Department (NYPD) officer since 2010, presently at the rank of Sergeant (Sgt.), with no misconduct or criminal record. It is alleged that on December 9, 2023, Mr. Rojas-Minaya was in a car accident with another car that hit a highway wall, spun around and stopped, facing traffic. There were two occupants of that car. Each was transported to, and treated at, a local hospital. One of the occupants suffered pain to her back and arm, and the other had back and knee pain that required steroid injections and nine months of physical therapy. Neither occupant could identify Mr. Rojas-Minaya as the driver of the other car, but a bystander took a photo of the license plate of a white Acura car as it left the scene. An investigation revealed that the car was registered and owned by Mr. Rojas-Minaya. An NYPD Internal Affairs investigation tracked Mr. Rojas-Minaya's movement from a Christmas party in Brooklyn to the scene of the accident at the relevant time. The prosecution was able to obtain an insurance claim dated March 27, 2024 with a handwritten explanation allegedly signed by Mr. Rojas-Minaya, where he writes that he was in an accident in the Bronx when driving his Acura at the date and time alleged in the information. This insurance report also claims that both vehicles involved in the accident were traveling approximately 50 mph. The defense argues that there are inconsistencies in statements made by the witnesses that were presented to the assigned prosecutor in this case, and when these inconsistencies were raised with the prosecutor, the response was, "it doesn't matter." (Motion at 15.)

Pursuant to CPL § 170.30(1)(g), a court may dismiss an information if the "[d]ismissal is required in the furtherance of justice within the meaning of section 170.40." CPL § 170.40[1] provides that a court may dismiss an information if there exists "some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the [*3]defendant . . . would constitute or result in injustice." See People v. Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 207 (2d Dept, 1973). The court must consider the factors listed in CPL § 170.40[1] and state reasons on the record. See People v. Berrus, 1 NY3d 535, 536 (2003).

To determine whether compelling factors, considerations, or circumstances exist, the court must consider to the extent applicable, the following:

(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;

(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;

(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;

(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;

(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant;

(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense;

(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;

(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system;

(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion;

(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose.

The court considers the following factors when deciding a Motion to Dismiss in Furtherance of Justice:

(a) Seriousness and Circumstances of the Offense. The allegations here are that Mr. Rojas-Minaya got into an accident with another vehicle, causing the other vehicle to spin around and hit a highway wall, then left the scene without reporting to the police, other emergency responders or judicial officers. The defense argues much about Mr. Rojas-Minaya's need to leave the scene for his own safety and to avoid additional accidents, even going so far as to commission a report from TPD Engineering, DPC (TPD), a traffic engineering company that opined it was unsafe for Mr. Rojas-Minaya to stop or remain at the scene. (Defense Exhibit B.) The defense does not, however, address the safety of the occupants of the other vehicle or other drivers who would happen upon the scene or the accident. (Opposition Exhibit E.) There is no suggestion that Mr. Rojas-Minaya attempted to contact the police, a judicial officer or any emergency responder as soon as he was out of any potential harm's way. For an offense under VTL § 600(2)(c), where personal injury has been caused to another person, the penalty shall not exceed three months (see Penal Law (PL) § 70.15(2)), or the equivalent of a B misdemeanor. The court finds that the allegations, if true, are serious.

(b) Extent of Harm Caused by the Offense. Mr. Rojas-Minaya is alleged to have collided with a vehicle while each was traveling approximately 50 miles an hour, causing the other vehicle to spin around, strike a highway wall and stop, facing oncoming traffic. This is alleged to have caused injury to each passenger of that other vehicle. Both passengers were transported to the hospital where they were treated for injuries. One [*4]passenger required nine months of physical therapy treatment. Despite vague references to the two cars involved in the accident, no specific references were made to damage to the vehicles. Thus, the extent of harm caused by the offense was physical harm, not harm to property.

(c) Evidence of Guilt. A bystander witness was able to identify Mr. Rojas-Minaya's vehicle and take a picture of a license plate registered to him. Further, Mr. Rojas-Minaya is alleged to have submitted an insurance claim admitting to details consistent with the allegations in this case. The prosecution was also able to obtain the cell phone records of Mr. Rojas-Minaya, placing him at the time and location of the accident. The Third Department found that evidence was sufficient to convict an accused under VTL § 600 when the accident occurred on a rural road, the driver left the scene and notified the police of the accident within about 15 minutes of the accident when he got home. See People v. Sorrell, 196 AD3d 923 (3rd Dept, 2021). Here we do not have any evidence that the accident was ever reported to law enforcement. See People v. Villeneuve, 232 AD2d 892, 893 (3rd Dept, 1996) (where a driver knows they were in an accident then immediately leaves the scene of that accident without providing their information, they cannot argue that there were no police to whom their information could be provided). Thus, there is evidence of guilt.

(d) The History, Character and Condition of the Defendant. According to the defense, Mr. Rojas-Minaya is a distinguished NYPD Sergeant with no previous misconduct or criminal record. This factor weighs in Mr. Rojas-Minaya's favor, but as an NYPD Sergeant, Mr. Rojas-Minaya's substantial training and experience would have prepared him not to leave the scene of an accident without reporting it to any first responders, especially when others are involved and could potentially be injured. For him to leave the scene without checking on the occupants of the other vehicle or to contact some kind of emergency response on their behalf is a dereliction of his duty and training. Nevertheless, Mr. Rojas-Minaya's service to the community is noted and his history, character and condition do not weigh in favor of dismissal.

(e) Any Exceptionally Serious Misconduct of Law Enforcement Personnel in the Investigation, Arrest and Prosecution of the Defendant. The defense argues that there was misconduct in that there are inconsistent statements by witnesses, and that when those inconsistencies were presented to the prosecution the response was "it doesn't matter." (Motion at 15.) Additionally, the defense argues that since a number of staff in the Bronx District Attorney's Office signed a letter in 2020 expressing a desire to hold police accountable for criminal conduct, the prosecution of Mr. Rojas-Minaya is a selective prosecution. The court sees no evidence of misconduct by law enforcement or the prosecution in this case and no evidence of selective prosecution. There were many Assistant District Attorneys (ADA) who are said to have signed on to this letter, but many more that did not. The ADA assigned to the instant matter could not have been a signatory to the letter because he was still in law school at that time. There is nothing that connects the ADA assigned to this case to that letter and no evidence of selective prosecution. Further, holding police accountable for criminal conduct is not selective prosecution, but fair and equal treatment under the law. "[J]ust as the defendant should not be, and is not being, targeted for prosecution because he is a police officer, his status as a police officer alone does not entitle him to the extraordinary remedy of dismissal." [*5]People v. Meade, 64 Misc 3d 1234(A) (Crim Ct, NY County 2019). The court does not find any misconduct on the part of law enforcement or the prosecution in this case.

(f) Purpose and Effect of Imposing Authorized Sentence Authorized for the Offense. "The purpose of the section [600] is to prevent negligent motorists from seeking to evade civil or criminal consequences by leaving the scene without making the required report including their identification and its mandate is applicable to both motorists who are as well as those who are not at fault for the accident." Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 188, 191 (E.D.NY 1967). As noted by the defense it took some 10 months after the accident until Mr. Rojas-Minaya was arrested. This happened after the prosecution conducted an investigation including of cell phone and insurance records. While the evidence presented in the briefs on this motion do not make clear which party is at fault for the accident, it appears that the prosecution makes out a prima facie case that Mr. Rojas-Minaya was involved in an accident, left the scene and never reported the accident to law enforcement. Dismissing the case at this point would likely frustrate the purpose of VTL § 600 because, if the allegations are true, Mr. Rojas-Minaya would evade the civil and criminal consequences of leaving the scene of an incident without providing his license and insurance card, or even reporting the incident to anyone. The purpose and effect of any sentence authorized by law in this case weighs in favor allowing this case to continue.

(g) Impact of a Dismissal on the Safety or Welfare of the Community. The court is concerned that a dismissal in the interest of justice based on these allegations would have a negative impact on the safety and welfare of the community. Those involved in accidents could evade civil and criminal liability if they were allowed to leave the scene before providing their license, insurance card and personal information to the injured party or to law enforcement. Thus, the safety and welfare of the community would favor allowing this case to continue.

(h) Impact of a Dismissal Upon Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System. While the defense bases much of its motion on Mr. Rojas-Minaya's status as a NYPD Sergeant with no negative history, that does not entitle him to dismissal of the charge against him. Dismissal of his case based on his employment could leave the public with the impression that the legal system treats law enforcement personnel as above the laws they are charged with enforcing. "[I]f [the court] were to dismiss this case [against a police detective] in the interest of justice without a full airing of the proof available to both parties, it would undermine the public trust in the criminal justice system." People v. Figueroa, 164 Misc 2d 814, 821 (Crim Ct, Kings County 1995). See also Meade, 64 Misc 3d at 1234(A) (motion to dismiss denied for longtime NYPD officer who was accused of a vehicle and traffic offense). Therefore, dismissing this case could harm public confidence in the legal system.

(i) Attitude of the Complainant or Victim with Respect to the Motion. Neither party has addressed the desires of the alleged victims in this case. Regardless, it is not necessary that the alleged victims seek to press charges as this case involves harm to the public. By fleeing the scene of an accident, this case involves public harm. "[VTL § 600] is designed to protect the public from the dangers of negligent drivers ...." People v. Lewis, 162 Misc 2d 954, 957 (Crim Ct, Bronx County 1994). There is no information from the alleged victims for the court to consider.

(j) Any Other Relevant Fact Indicating that Conviction Would Serve No Useful Purpose. This court has been presented with no other relevant information upon which to consider this motion.

This court commends Mr. Rojas-Minaya for his unblemished record as a member of the NYPD. However, his rank in the NYPD does not excuse his private conduct. Arguably this position requires a higher standard. Thus, dismissing the charges against him as defense requests, because he is a sergeant, is inappropriate. Meade, 64 Misc 3d 1234(A) (Crim Ct, NY County 2019) (despite the defendant's exemplary employment history with the New York City Police Department and his lack of a criminal history, dismissal is not warranted given the serious nature and circumstances of the allegations and the lack of any compelling factors in the defendant's favor"). See also, People v. Norman, 5 Misc 3d 1016(A) (Sup Ct, Kings County 2004) (denying dismissal in the interest of justice of an indictment against an accomplished member of the New York State Assembly); People v. Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 (1st Dept, 1984) (reversing the Supreme Court's order dismissing counts of an indictment in the interest of justice where the court noted accused's lack of a prior criminal record, his "exemplary" background at work, in the Air Force, as a father and as a civic affairs volunteer).

The defense presents potential defenses to the charges in this case. However, a motion to dismiss is not a substitute for a trial. See Figueroa, 164 Misc 2d 814, (a police detective was not entitled to dismissal in the interest of justice based on her job, and a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice is not the appropriate vehicle way to assert one's innocence). Further, after a review of all of the factors required under CPL § 170.40, this court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Rojas-Minaya has not demonstrated that any compelling factor, consideration, and/or circumstance would result in injustice to him were this case to continue. He has also not demonstrated that he is entitled to a hearing on the issues presented in his motion.

The forgoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.