Summary

Ricardo Alvarez was arrested on June 30, 2025 and charged with reckless endangerment under Penal Law (PL) § 120.20, Reckless Driving, and Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs under Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) §§ 1212, and 1192(1) and (3). He was arraigned on July 1, 2025 and released on his own recognizance. The case was adjourned to August 7 and October 1, 2025 for conversion and for the prosecution to file their Certificate of Compliance (COC). At Mr. Alvarez's arraignment, the complaint alleged that Mr. Alvarez refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath. However, the prosecution stated that Mr. Alvarez consented to a blood test and that they were awaiting the results.

On July 17, 2025 the prosecution filed a statement notice under CPL § 710.30(1)(a). On August 7, 2025 the prosecution had not yet filed the necessary supporting deposition or COC. On August 11, 2025 the prosecution filed the one supporting deposition needed to convert the complaint. On September 25, 2025 the prosecution filed a superseding complaint, with a second supporting deposition for a second witness added to the superseding complaint, along with their COC and Statement of Readiness (SOR). The prosecution never filed a chemical analysis test certificate detailing the findings of the blood test. However, the superseding complaint explained the results of the blood test. On October 1, 2025 the defense argued that the complaint could not be converted without a chemical analysis test certificate detailing the results of the testing of Mr. Alvarez's blood. The court deemed the complaint converted over defense objection without prejudice for the defense to file a motion objecting to the conversion, and set the instant motion schedule.

The parties come before the court on a defense motion to dismiss. The defense argues [*2]that the prosecution failed to file a chemical analysis test certificate to convert the complaint and therefore were not ready for trial within the 90-day speedy trial deadline. The prosecution argues that the complaint was converted because they filed two supporting depositions: one for the arresting officer and one for a toxicologist who "analyzed the [blood] testing results" in this case. (Opposition at 22.)

Since the top charge in this case is an A misdemeanor, CPL § 30.30(1)(b) requires that the prosecution be ready within 90 days of arraignment (by September 29, 2025 in this case). See People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 403 (2016).

Under CPL § 30.30(5-a), an accusatory instrument must be fully converted with non-hearsay evidence supporting every element of every charge. "Compliance with § 30.30(5-a) is required for the People [to] announce readiness for trial and to stop the speedy trial clock." People v. Aviles, 72 Misc 3d 423, 425 (Crim Ct, Kings County 2021). In order to fully convert a complaint, the complaint must be "supported by non-hearsay allegations, such as by a certified laboratory test . . ." People v. Figueroa, 36 Misc 3d 605, 607 (Crim Ct, Kings County 2012). "[A]n accusatory instrument charging Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 . . . must be supported by a chemical test analysis certificate which is both verified by the individual who administered the test in compliance with CPL 100.30, and which indicates defendant's blood alcohol level. The absence of either of these factors renders the instrument jurisdictionally defective." People v. Lopez, 170 Misc 2d 278 at 279 (Crim Ct, Kings County 1996). See also People v. Strafer, 10 Misc 3d 1072(A) (Crim Ct, Kings County 2006) ("[VTL § 1192 charge] required the certified chemical test analysis for conversion."); Figueroa, 36 Misc 3d at 607 (Crim Ct, Kings County 2012) "[T]he information is facially insufficient. First, it is not supported by non-hearsay allegations, such as by a certified laboratory test . . ."); People v. Ortiz, 6 Misc 3d 1024(A) (Crim Ct, Bronx County 2004) ("In reviewing the plain language of the statute, this court finds that the factual part of the accusatory instrument must contain a laboratory analysis indicating the presence of a drug in defendant's blood . . .").

Here, the prosecution argues that in order to convert a criminal complaint into an information the prosecution needs either the blood alcohol level test result or the sworn signature of the test administrator, citing to Lopez, 170 Misc 2d 278. (Opposition at 23.) However, the Lopez decision held that in order to convert a complaint that includes a VTL 1192(2) charge to an information, the prosecution needs to file a chemical test analysis certificate that contains both the signature and the blood alcohol level. While the prosecution included the chemical test result in the complaint and provided a supporting deposition from the person who analyzed the test result, they never provided a copy of the chemical test analysis certificate. "[The VTL 1192(2) charge] was the only charge that required the certified chemical test analysis for conversion." People v. Strafer, 10 Misc 3d 1072(A) (Crim Ct, Kings County 2006).

The prosecution was not ready on the VTL § 1192(2) charge, and since they did not dismiss that charge, in order to certify that they were ready on the other charges, any SOR was not valid, and this case must be dismissed under CPL § 30.30(5-a). "Upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 . . .". CPL § 30.30(5-a).

Because the prosecution did not submit a chemical test analysis certificate, the [*3]superseding complaint was not converted, rendering their SOR invalid. Without a valid SOR, the prosecution was not ready within 90 days of Mr. Alvarez's arraignment, requiring dismissal of the instant matter pursuant to CPL § 30.30.

The forgoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.