Pending before the court is a C.P.L. § 30.30 motion to dismiss. It alleges that the prosecution failed to file a valid certificate of automatic discovery compliance before stating ready for trial.

The prosecution commenced this case on September 13, 2024, by filing a criminal complaint. The criminal complaint described the offense as personally observed by only one person, Officer Frank Nappi. Eighty-eight days after commencing the case, on December 10, 2024, the prosecution filed their certificate of compliance. The certificate designated Officer Nappi as a potential testifying prosecution witness. However, the prosecution did not disclose any "LEOW letter" or underlying police misconduct records for Officer Nappi. The prosecution did not disclose the "LEOW letter" and associated records until the day of the suppression hearing on May 7, 2025—148 days after arraignment. These records included NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau documents showing a substantiated allegation that Officer Nappi violated body-worn camera rules in a previous case by prematurely deactivating his camera.

Before applying the law to the facts before it, the court must determine the relevant standards that apply. While this motion was pending, the Legislature's 2025 amendments to C.P.L. § 245.50 took effect. In People v. Calvin Y., 86 Misc 3d 1270[A] [Crim. Ct., NY County Sept. 2, 2025], a Manhattan criminal court discussed what effect those amendments have on such a motion. This court agrees with its analysis.

First, "the new procedural requirements of the amended CPL § 245.50[4] do not apply retroactively to motions, like the defendant's, that were filed before the new statute's effective date of August 7, 2025." (Id. at *2). This conclusion flows from the well-established principle that "retroactive operation is not favored by courts and statutes will not be given such [*2]construction unless the language expressly or by necessary implication requires it." (People v. Pastrana, 41 NY3d 23, 29 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]). As Calvin Y. explains:

While the statute does apply 'to all criminal actions pending on [August 7, 2025],' its application to motions filed before its effective date is a wholly different question. The People's argument runs counter to New York's rules of statutory interpretation (see Editors' Notes, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Statutes § 55 ["it takes a clear expression of legislative intent to justify a retroactive application . . . so as to affect proceedings previously taken in [pending] actions"]), and its effect would be to nullify a huge number of potentially meritorious motions researched and drafted based on the law in effect at the time. Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that the legislature intended such a drastic result. Thus, the new procedural requirements contained in the amended CPL § 245.50 (4) do not apply to a COC challenge filed before August 7, 2025.

Although subsequent iterations of C.P.L. 245.50[4] place affirmative obligations upon a defendant when challenging the People's COC, including that a defendant must file a motion challenging the People's discovery within 35 days of service of the COC, at the relevant time for this case, the statute provided only that challenges to, or questions related to a certificate of compliance shall be addressed by motion.

(People v. Mazelie, 2025 NY Slip Op. 05849, at *4 n.5 [3d Dep't Oct. 23, 2025] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, the previous statute explicitly stated that "nothing" in its C.P.L. § 245.50[4] subsection "shall be construed to waive a party's right to make further challenges, including but not limited to a motion pursuant to section 30.30." (C.P.L. § 245.50[4][c] [former]). Thus, the defense did not run afoul of any procedural requirements here. Still, even if one applied the amended statute, anyway, the defense in fact met its requirements. The defense emailed the prosecution on April 8, 2025, requesting a witness list, and followed up on April 24, 2025. (See Def. Mot. Ex. C). The prosecution did not respond until May 7, 2025, the day of the hearing, when it also disclosed related impeachment materials. (Id.). The prosecution provided no indication that the missing materials in fact existed before May 7, 2025—only that it was seeking to ascertain whether they did exist.^[FN1] The defense could not have known that the prosecution had impeachment material in their possession until the prosecution admitted it existed. (See C.P.L. § 245.50[4][c][ii]).

Second, the amended statute's substantive "due diligence" standard is conceptually indistinguishable from the standard articulated in People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 209-210 [2023]. [*3]As Calvin Y. explains:

Both Bay and CPL § 245.50 (5) (a) list as relevant factors the "efforts made by the prosecutor," "the volume of discovery" provided and outstanding, "the complexity of the case," "the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse," and the People's response when "apprised" of "missing discovery." Further, much of the new language in the statute provides specifics that were already clearly implicit in Bay's broader language (compare, e.g., CPL 245.50 [5] [c] [listing such factors as "whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action"] with Bay, 41 NY3d at 212 [listing "efforts made by the prosecutor" as a factor]. Perhaps the most notable change is the statute's direction that courts consider "whether . . . delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial . . . or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (CPL 245.50 [5] [a]). But importantly, prejudice is relevant to the inquiry only as it reflects on the People's diligence (see id.). Read through this lens, this factor requires courts to consider again the volume, importance, and usefulness to the defense of any missing discovery — considerations that were already present in Bay, either explicitly or implicitly (see 41 NY3d at 212 [listing "the volume of discovery . . . outstanding" and "how obvious any missing material would likely have been" as relevant factors]).

(86 Misc 3d 1270[A], at *4). This court, like the court in Calvin Y., concludes that C.P.L. § 245.50[5][a] is a "codification" of Bay. (Id.). Any retroactivity analysis is therefore unnecessary.

The question of due diligence, which Bay noted is a "familiar and flexible standard," requires the court to look at the prosecution's efforts overall and determine whether they exercised "the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement." (Bay, 41 NY3d at 211). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone." (Id. at 211-212). This question is "case-specific," and it will "turn on the circumstances presented." (Id. at 212). Due diligence is an objective standard—it is not met simply by the prosecution's good-faith efforts.

On a C.P.L. § 30.30 motion, such as this one, the prosecution "bear[s] the burden" of "establishing" that they, "in fact," exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries "prior to filing" their certificate. (Bay, 41 NY3d at 213; see also People v. Hooks, 78 Misc 3d 393, 402 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2023] [the prosecution must "show[] how their actions were diligent"]; People v. Critten, 77 Misc 3d 1219[A], at *3 [Crim. Ct., NY County 2022] [assessing "due diligence requires the People to show how due diligence was exercised"]; People v. McKinney, 71 Misc 3d 1221[A], at *7 [Crim. Ct., Kings County 2021] [the prosecution must provide the "necessary factual basis" on which a court could find "due diligence"]). "If the prosecution fails to make such a showing, the COC should be deemed improper, the readiness statement stricken as illusory, and—so long as the time chargeable to the People exceeds the applicable CPL 30.30 period—the case dismissed." (Bay, 41 NY3d at 214).

Here, considering all the factors listed in C.P.L. § 245.50[5][a], the prosecution fails to establish that they exercised due diligence in their efforts to obtain and provide automatic discovery, (see C.P.L. § 245.20[1]), to the defense.

At the outset, the prosecution failed to "comply with the disclosure timeline mandated by C.P.L. § 245.10[1][a][ii], which requires automatically discoverable items to be shared with the defense within thirty-five days after arraignment" when the accused person is not in custody. (See, e.g., People v. Mesan-Moran, 2025 NY Slip Op. 25188 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County Aug. 14, 2025]). Instead, they disclosed discovery and filed their certificate eighty-eight days after arraignment. The prosecution's dilatory conduct "weighs against a finding" that they exercised "due diligence," (e.g., id.), which, again, is "the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement," (Bay, 41 NY3d at 211). A legal team that seeks to reasonably fulfill a legal requirement does not fail to meet their statutory deadline by more than twice over.

Next, consider the context of this case within the overall system: this is a simple, garden-variety misdemeanor DWI. In any such case, the volume of materials is relatively small. And in this case, there are no forensics, search warrants, or other complicated investigatory steps. Discovery is fairly standardized here, and as part of that standard practice, the prosecution routinely discloses "LEOW letters" for their testifying police witnesses. (See, e.g., People v. Best, 76 Misc 3d 1210[A] [Crim. Ct., Queens County 2022]; see also People v. Coley, 240 AD3d 122 [2d Dep't 2025] [also describing "LEOW letters"]). Various decisions have also required prosecutors to disclose any documents in their actual or constructive possession underlying the matters in a LEOW letter, so long as those documents tend to impeach the officer's credibility. (See, e.g., Coley, 240 AD3d 122). This is because the discovery statute requires prosecutors to disclose "[a]ll evidence and information" that "relate[s] to the subject matter of the case" and "tends to . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness." (C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv]).^[FN2] In fact, in their response here, the prosecution reports that they have a "LEOW Unit" that is "responsible for obtaining information and documents from the NYPD and the Civilian Complaint Review Board ('CCRB') related to civil lawsuits, as well as allegations and findings of misconduct, against law enforcement officers that could constitute potential impeachment material." (Pr. Resp. at 4).

This standard practice is especially appropriate for misdemeanor DWI cases, where a testifying officer's credibility is often critical. These cases routinely involve an officer's alleged observations as to the reason for their approach, stop, questioning, and arrest. They also routinely involve an officer's alleged observations regarding a person's "indicia of intoxication." (See, e.g., Gerstenzang & Sills, Handling the DWI Case in New York § 1:1, In General [2024] ["Once the motorist is pulled over, the police will invariably observe common indicia of intoxication (e.g., the odor of an alcoholic beverage, glassy/bloodshot eyes, flushed face, [*4]impaired speech, impaired motor coordination, etc.)."]). These cases, in other words, are often the type of cases where "[i]mpeachment evidence . . . may make the difference between conviction and acquittal." (People v. Garrett, 23 NY3d 878, 886 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]). And in this case, specifically, Officer Nappi is described as the main witness to the events in the criminal complaint and was the prosecution's main witness at the suppression hearing. Nonetheless, the prosecution failed to disclose their LEOW letter for this main testifying witness until the day of the suppression hearing, 148 days after arraignments.

The prosecution's explanation for their failure here evinces both an unreasonable breakdown in their own internal communications and an unreasonable application of the discovery statute's plain text.

To begin with, the prosecution's response is vague as to why it failed to disclose Officer Nappi's LEOW material. It refers to "requests for Leow letters," but does not explicitly state to whom those requests were made, (see, e.g., Pr. Resp. at 24; id. at 35); refers to unclear timelines like "a later date," (see id. 6); and provides vague reasons for their failures like "an oversight," (see id.). (The prosecution's response also appears to contain copy-and-pasted statements from another case, three times referencing an "officer Bonti," who does not appear relevant to this case, see Pr. Resp. at 20). This record falls far short of meeting the "burden" required to establish the prosecution's efforts. (See, e.g., Bay, 41 NY3d at 213).

However, read most charitably, the prosecution's response indicates that the actual cause of their failure to disclose was that their "LEOW Unit" failed to respond to the line prosecutor's requests for the relevant LEOW letter. (See Pr. Resp. at 6 ["The People also made requests for Leow letters for Police officers involved in the instant matter. At a later date, the People, also called the Leow unit, and requested that these letters be expedited."]; see also id. at 35). The fact that the prosecution, once alerted to this issue by the defense, produced the missing material within an hour bolsters this interpretation. The response also appears to refer to the line prosecutor as "the People." Of course, that is an incorrect description of the prosecution, which includes the district attorney's office as a whole, not simply the line prosecutor. So, this is not a case where the district attorney's office was not aware of Officer Nappi's "LEOW" materials, (cf. Garrett, 23 NY3d 878), but rather a case where one arm of that office failed to communicate timely with the other. The prosecution provides no reason for this apparent breakdown in communication, let alone a reasonable one. And to be clear, this is regarding a major category of information of which the prosecution has a responsibility to diligently ascertain and disclose. (See, e.g., C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k][iv]; Coley, 240 AD3d 122). In sum, the district attorney's office knew that this important category of material existed; has an entire unit dedicated to it; failed to self-report their failure to disclose for months; only remedied the situation once alerted by the defense; and then provided an unclear record in response that, at best, suggests an unreasonable communication breakdown within their own office.

The prosecution also advances an alternative argument: an unreasonable interpretation of the law to argue that impeachment or "LEOW" material is categorically beyond the scope of the discovery statute. The court rejects this strategy. Contrary to the prosecution's claim, the [*5]Appellate Division in People v. Coley did not find that impeachment material was discoverable only because it "involved the unusual circumstance where one of the police officers designated as a testifying witness for the prosecution had an adverse credibility finding in a prior case involving one of the same defendants charged in the case before the court." (Pr. Resp. at 41). Rather, Coley affirmed the plain text of the discovery statute. It held that an officer's prior misconduct "relate[s] to the subject matter of the case because the material [goes] toward the weight of the credibility of the witness and could be used for impeachment purposes." (240 AD3d at 138 [citing People v. Smith, 27 NY3d 652 [2016] [noting that prior bad acts by a police officer are "proper fodder" for impeaching the officer's credibility]]). The prosecution's citation to People v. Henderson, 247 AD3d 853 [2d Dep't 2025], is inapposite as that case was about an officer whom the prosecution "did not intend to call . . . as a testifying witness," (id. at 854), and their arguments about unsubstantiated matters are irrelevant as the failure here included a substantiated allegation. Moreover, Officer Nappi's substantiated allegation involved his failure to abide by police department rules about when his body-worn camera must be activated. This is not simply some technical violation of an unimportant administrative rule. "The purpose of body-worn-camera footage is for use in the service of . . . key objectives . . . such as transparency, accountability, and public trust-building." (Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of City of New York v. De Blasio, 171 AD3d 636, 637 [1st Dep't 2019]). In criminal cases, it is critical evidence against which an officer's testimony is often compared. (And, contrary to the prosecution's claim that "witnesses are not impeached at hearings," Pr. Resp. at 47, a witness's credibility is at issue whenever they testify.) That Officer Nappi was found to have violated the NYPD's own rules about when he had to have his camera activated is a legitimate basis to impeach his credibility in his other work as a police officer. It is unreasonable for the prosecution to conclude that such a matter is "unrelated to the subject matter of the case."

As the prosecution fails to show that their certificate of compliance was effective, their statement of readiness was illusory. The prosecution commenced this case on September 13, 2024. Without a valid statement of readiness, it is the prosecution's burden to prove that any time thereafter "should be excluded" and to provide the necessary evidence to substantiate their claims. (E.g., People v. Wearen, 98 AD3d 535, 537 [2d Dep't 2012]; People v. Reinhardt, 193 AD2d 1122, 1122 [4th Dep't 1993]). Here, the prosecution fails to invoke any proper C.P.L. § 30.30[4] exception.^[FN3] The clock runs at least from September 13, 2024, to May 7, 2025, when [*6]suppression hearings commenced. (See C.P.L. § 30.30[4][a]). That is 148 days.

The case must be dismissed. (See C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b]).

The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.