This proceeding arises from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request by petitioner Angel Ayala. Petitioner is currently incarcerated following his 1996 conviction of multiple counts of second-degree murder, conspiracy in the first degree, and criminal possession of weapons. The convictions stemmed from petitioner's alleged role as an enforcer for the "Young Talented Children" (YTC) gang, a violent narcotics organization active in Manhattan in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In July 2020, petitioner submitted a pro se request under New York's FOIL. He sought 29 categories of records from the New York County District Attorney's Office (DANY) related to his prosecution. DANY denied the request, asserting various statutory exemptions. Petitioner appealed. Following limited administrative review, DANY agreed to reconsider category 22 of the FOIL request, which sought financial records concerning witness-related expenditures, including funds paid to experts, rent assistance, and stipends.

After reconsideration, DANY, on January 9, 2025, denied the request for category 22 records. DANY asserted that disclosure could endanger the safety of witnesses and law enforcement personnel under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (f) and that the records were further exempt under FOIL's statutory exemption clause, Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (a), because they implicated grand jury secrecy as provided in CPL 190.25 (4) and Penal Law § 215.70.

On February 10, 2025, petitioner administratively appealed the denial through counsel. The appeal argued that petitioner had already heard these witnesses testify at trial, that disclosure [*2]posed no present threat, and that financial documents were not inherently connected to grand-jury proceedings. On February 25, 2025, DANY denied the administrative appeal, reiterating the same grounds it had already relied on.

On June 20, 2025, petitioner commenced this article 78 proceeding. He seeks judicial review of the denial of category 22 of his FOIL request. Petitioner requests disclosure or, alternatively, in-camera inspection, as well as attorney fees.

Respondents, Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., in his official capacity as the New York County District Attorney, and DANY, oppose the petition. Respondents argue that all exemptions were properly invoked and that attorney fees should be denied regardless of the court's ruling on the merits.

Under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (f), an agency may deny access to records if disclosure could endanger the life or safety of any person. FOIL exemptions must be narrowly construed to preserve the statute's underlying purpose: promoting governmental transparency and public access to records. (Gould v New York City Police Dept., 89 NY2d 267, 274 [1996].) But courts have applied the public-safety exemption in various contexts involving potential witness endangerment, including in Matter of Bellamy v New York City Police Dept. (87 AD3d 874 [1st Dept 2011]). The Court upheld withholding police reports if, as in that case, they contained witness names and statements from a gang-related homicide investigation, finding that disclosure could endanger witnesses' lives if the investigation involved a gang-related homicide. Similarly, in Matter of Prisoners' Legal Servs. of NY v New York State Dept. of Corr. (209 AD3d 1208, 1212 [3d Dept 2022]), the court determined that a "possibility of endangerment" was sufficient to satisfy the burden under this exemption.

Petitioner's assertion that respondents must provide greater specificity about the danger lacks merit. Appellate courts have held that in a criminal prosecution, a law-enforcement agency is not required to make a unique evidentiary showing of danger. (See Matter of Abdur-Rashid v New York City Police Dept., 31 NY3d 217, 226 [2018]; Matter of Whitley v New York County Dist. Attorney's Off., 101 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept 2012].)

Respondents have satisfied their burden. First, petitioner's criminal history establishes a foundation for safety concerns. Petitioner served as a YTC enforcer and hitman. He carried out acts of extreme violence. These included murders for which he was ultimately convicted. His role involved intimidating and silencing rivals and potential witnesses. (See NYSCEF No. 15 at 2-3.) Second, the requested materials pose genuine safety risks. The records involve witness-related expenditures. These include funds for expert payments, witness accommodations, and rent assistance. They encompass living expenses and food stipends. Most concerning are files from the "Witness Security Program." These materials could reveal identifying information about protected witnesses. (Id. at 10.) Third, respondents assert that the withheld records contain sensitive details beyond the dollar amounts of witness-related payments. In their view, those records could include witness names; payment dates could suggest investigative timelines [*3]unknown to petitioner; and other incidental details might expose confidential aspects of the prosecution's case. (Id. at 12.)

Petitioner argues that respondents have not established why the public-safety exemption applies to allegations over 30 years old. But New York courts hold that the applicability of public-safety exemption depends on the violent nature of the underlying conduct, the continuing risk of retaliation, and the need to preserve law-enforcement cooperation, rather than on the mere passage of time. (See Matter of Exoneration Initiative v New York City Police Dept., 114 AD3d 436, 437 [1st Dept 2014]; Center for Appellate Litig. v New York County Dist. Attorney's Off., 2024 NY Slip Op 31910[U], *4 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024].)

Finally, petitioner's claim that he already knows the witnesses' identities because they testified publicly at trial over 30 years ago does not overcome the safety exemption. Knowledge of who testified at trial differs materially from access to records that explicitly document who testified before the grand jury, the dates of the testimony, and the investigative context surrounding the grand jury witnesses' participation. The exemption protects against disclosing detailed information regardless whether witness identities may be publicly known from other sources. (Matter of Exoneration Initiative, 114 AD3d at 438.)

Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (a) provides an exemption for records that constitute "matter attending a Grand Jury proceeding." This statutory language has been interpreted expansively to encompass records that could reveal witness identities or their involvement in grand jury proceedings. (See Matter of James v Donovan, 130 AD3d 1032, 1036 [2d Dept 2015].) In Matter of James, the Court emphasized that the presumption of confidentiality applies to all records related to grand jury proceedings, even those not formally introduced into evidence.

Respondents contend that witness-payment records fall within a "matter attending a Grand Jury proceeding," because they could disclose witness names, testimony dates, and participation details, undermining grand jury secrecy protections. (See NYSCEF No.15 at 13.) Petitioner argues that financial payment records are not inherently connected to grand jury proceedings and do not constitute "matter attending" the Grand Jury. This argument is unpersuasive. Respondents have established that disclosing these financial payment records will violate statutory grand jury secrecy, which extends beyond transcripts to encompass all records reflecting matters "attending" a grand jury proceeding.

Courts treat grand jury secrecy as a "strong presumption." It should not be pierced unless the movant makes a threshold showing of a "compelling and particularized need" by establishing through concrete facts that the requested material is indispensable to advancing a legitimate legal claim and cannot reasonably be obtained from alternative sources. (Matter of Dist. Attorney of Suffolk County, 58 NY2d 436, 444-45 [1983].) For example, in Matter of Aiani v Donovan (98 AD3d 972, 974 [2d Dept 2012]), the Court found such a need when foreign bank records were essential to tracing misappropriated funds and unavailable through other means because the banks were beyond subpoena power. Here, however, petitioner seeks payment records based only on speculation that they "might" contain impeachment evidence of cooperating witnesses to support a wrongful-conviction claim. Petitioner does not, however, provide concrete proof that such records exist or demonstrate that alternative sources are inadequate. Without this factual [*4]foundation showing that the payment records exist and are uniquely necessary to the case, the strong presumption favoring grand jury secrecy must prevail.

Accordingly, the branch of the petition challenging respondents' reliance on the public-safety exemption and on the grand jury exemption is denied.

Brady and Giglio violations pertain to prosecutors' failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, including information that could impeach witness credibility. (See Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 [1963]; Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 153 [1972].) These obligations are codified in CPL 245.20 and rooted in constitutional duties to ensure a fair trial.

In this case, petitioner seeks access to the payment records of cooperating witnesses under FOIL, asserting that these records may contain impeachment material supporting a potential Brady violation claim. Respondents point out that any alleged Brady violation must be raised through direct appeal or a motion to vacate judgment under CPL 440.10, not through an article 78 FOIL proceeding. By framing the FOIL request as tied to a Brady claim, petitioner is trying to circumvent established post-conviction remedies.

The limited question before this court is whether the requested records fall within FOIL's disclosure framework and exemptions, not whether petitioner can develop evidence to challenge his conviction. FOIL is not designed as a vehicle to litigate post-conviction discovery or to create an evidentiary record for a CPL 440.10 motion. Even if petitioner believes that the records could bolster a collateral attack on his conviction, that is precisely the type of claim that must be raised through CPL 440.10 procedures, which allows a trial court to evaluate the alleged Brady violation within the appropriate framework. To allow FOIL to be a backdoor to circumvent the confidentiality of grand jury materials or to compel production of potential impeachment evidence would improperly conflate FOIL's disclosure standards with the distinct procedural safeguards of criminal post-conviction review.

Accordingly, the branch of the petition seeking relief under Brady and Giglio is denied.

Petitioner argues that even if safety concerns exist, this court should independently conduct an in camera review of the requested records and, if appropriate, order redacting sensitive details, rather than accepting respondents' blanket assertion of exemption. Respondents argue that redaction is limited under FOIL to the personal-privacy exemption in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (b). When broader exemptions like grand jury secrecy (§ 87 [2] [a]) or public safety (§ 87 [2] [f]) apply, respondents say the records are wholly exempt from disclosure, and thus neither in camera review nor redacted release is required. This court agrees with respondents.

FOIL authorizes redaction only under the personal-privacy exemption found in Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (b). (See Matter of NY Civil Liberties Union v New York City Police Dept., 32 NY3d 556, 562 [2018].) The Court explained that FOIL permits agencies to "delete identifying details" solely to prevent an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under Public Officers Law § 89 (2) (a). (Id. at 560.)

In its reply, petitioner contends that respondents' reliance on the safety exemption under [*5]Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (f) constitutes a misreading of FOIL and effectively allows agencies to avoid disclosure by sweeping broad categories of information under the exemption. (See NYSCEF No. 20 at 1.) Courts have consistently required agencies to provide a particularized and fact-specific justification demonstrating how disclosure would endanger life or safety, rather than relying on conclusory or generalized assertions. (See Matter of Whitfield v Foil Appeals Officer, Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 221 AD3d 1341, 1345 [3d Dept 2023].) Here, respondents have met that standard by tying petitioner's violent criminal history, the nature of the requested witness-related expenditures, and the sensitive details in the withheld records to concrete safety risks contemplated by § 87 (2) (f). Accordingly, respondents have met its obligation to justify the application of the public-safety exemption.

When records are exempt under § 87 (2) (a), in which a state or federal statute expressly mandates confidentiality, the Legislature has not authorized courts to require disclosure in redacted form. The Appellate Division applied this principle in Matter of Judicial Watch, Inc. v City of NY (178 AD3d 540, 541 [1st Dept 2019]). There, the Court rejected a request for redacted records. It reiterated that redaction authority exists only for the privacy exemption. Under § 87 (2) (a), agencies must establish that records fall within a state or federal statute that expressly makes them confidential. (Id.) Once established, the record is wholly exempt. FOIL's redaction authority does not apply. (See Matter of NY Civil Liberties Union 32 NY3d at 565-566.) Here, CPL 190.25 (4) (a) is a state statute that expressly requires confidentiality. Records falling within this scope are wholly exempt from disclosure under Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (a). These include transcripts, exhibits, or any document revealing matters "attending" the grand jury, such as witness-payment records. FOIL's redaction provisions do not apply.

An in camera review is not appropriate. The requested records are wholly exempt under the grand jury confidentiality statute. Accordingly, petitioner's claim for in camera review and redaction is denied.

Petitioner is not entitled to fees under Public Officers Law § 89 (4) (c). Both the mandatory and discretionary provisions of § 89 (4) (c) require that petitioner "substantially prevail." Petitioner has not substantially prevailed here. And mandatory fees under § 89 (4) (c) (ii) would be unavailable in any event, because respondents had a reasonable basis for denial grounded in well-recognized statutory exemptions.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the petition is denied, and this proceeding is dismissed, no costs; and it is further

ORDERED that respondents serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on petitioner; and on the office of the County Clerk Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), which shall enter judgment accordingly.