On March 21, 2025, Latchman Singh (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant"), was arrested and charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law ("V.T.L.") § 1192[3], an unclassified misdemeanor, and related charges. The Defendant was arraigned on March 23, 2025, and released on his own recognizance.

Defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("C.P.L.") §§ 250.4[c] and 30.30.[1][b]. Defendant contends that the statutory speedy trial period has elapsed because the People did not comply with their discovery obligations pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 245.20[1] and 245.50[3].

In the alternative, Defendant moves for pre-trial hearings regarding suppression of tangible and non-tangible evidence and properly noticed statements (Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]; Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]; People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]).

Although the People did not exercise due diligence prior to filing the initial certificate of compliance, Defendant's motion for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to C.P.L. 30.30[1][b] is DENIED, as only eighty-nine [89] days are chargeable to the People.

Defendant's motion for pre-trial Mapp/Dunaway/Ingle/Huntley hearings is granted.

On March 23, 2025, Defendant was arraigned on a top charge of V.T.L. § 1192[3], common law driving while intoxicated, and related charges. Defendant was arrested following a car accident, wherein he was alleged to have driven his Hyundai into the back of a Subaru, which in turn struck a Jeep occupied by three passengers. Following arraignment, Defendant was released on his own recognizance, and the case was adjourned to May 1, 2025, for conversion [*2]and discovery compliance.

On May 1, 2025, the case was not converted, and the People were not discovery compliant. The case was adjourned to June 23, 2025, again for conversion and discovery compliance.

On June 18, 2025, the prosecution filed and served, off calendar, a supporting deposition. On June 20, 2025, the prosecution filed and served a certificate of compliance ("COC") and statement of readiness ("SOR"); the People contemporaneously moved for a protective order pursuant to C.P.L. 245.70[1].

On June 23, 2025, the parties appeared before this Court in Part AP5. Defendant objected to the validity of the COC, and the instant motion schedule was set. By motion dated August 4, 2025, Defendant moved to strike the COC and demanded dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 245.50[4][c] and 30.30[1][b], contending that the prosecution was not ready for trial within the statutorily allotted ninety-day period. The People filed their opposition on September 12, 2025; the defense reply followed on September 19, 2025.

While the instant motion schedule was pending, the parties conferred, and defense counsel consented to the People's motion for a protective order. The prosecution served additional discovery and filed a supplemental certificate of compliance ("SCOC") on August 13, 2025.

The prosecution must be ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action where, as here, the top count charged is a misdemeanor punishable by more than three months' imprisonment (C.P.L. § 30.30[1][b] and V.T.L. § 1193[1][b][i]). Periods of reasonable delay resulting from pre-trial motions, including motions for a protective order, are not charged to the prosecution's statutorily allotted ninety-day period (C.P.L. §§ 30.30[4][a] and 245.70[8]).

The speedy trial clock is statutorily tethered to the prosecution's discovery obligations under C.P.L. Article 245 (C.P.L. §§ 245.50[3] and 30.30[5]). Before the People may be deemed ready for trial, thus tolling the speedy trial clock, they must serve on the defense a vast array of material in their possession from over twenty enumerated categories (C.P.L. § 245.20[1]). The People must also file with the court and serve on the defense a valid certificate of compliance, certifying that they have exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and disclose all material subject to discovery (C.P.L. § 245.50[1]).

Discoverable material possessed by law enforcement agencies is deemed to be in the People's constructive possession (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]). Additionally, the People must "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under [C.P.L. § 245.20(1)] and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control" (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]). The People are not, however, required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum material which the defense itself could obtain by subpoena (id.).

A COC's validity hinges on whether the prosecution exercised due diligence to comply with their discovery obligations prior to the COC's filing, and it is the People's burden to demonstrate that they acted with such diligence (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 [2023]). Courts assessing due diligence must consider a range of factors, including "the efforts made by the [*3]prosecutor to comply with the requirements of Article 245; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and, whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (C.P.L. § 245.50[5][a]).

Defendant asserts that the certificate of compliance was invalid, primarily due to the People's failure to obtain and disclose medical records for three civilian witnesses prior to the COC's filing.^[FN1]

Defendant's Hyundai was alleged to have struck a Subaru, which in turn struck a Jeep carrying three occupants (People's Opposition at 1-2). The Jeep's occupants were subsequently transported to Jacobi Hospital for treatment, and the prosecution has indicated their intent to call these witnesses at trial (People's Opposition Exhibit B). Defendant contends that these witnesses' medical records are automatically discoverable pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.20[1][e], which requires the prosecution to disclose "[a]ll statements related to the subject matter of the case, written or recorded or summarized in any writing or recording, made by persons who have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto" which are "in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control." Defendant also contends that these records are discoverable under C.P.L. § 245.20[1][j], which directs the prosecution to disclose "[a]ll reports, documents, records, data calculations or writings. . . concerning physical or mental examinations, or scientific tests or experiments or comparisons, relating to the criminal action or proceeding which were made by or at the request or direction of a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity." The defense argues, somewhat confusingly, that the witnesses' FDNY and hospital records are in the NYPD's possession, as the witnesses were examined at the direction of law enforcement, and that these records are thus constructively possessed by the People (Defense Motion at 10, citing People v Rahman, 79 Misc 3d 129(A) [App Term, 2d Dept, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2023]).

The prosecution contends that the medical records are not automatically discoverable, as [*4]they were not in the People's actual or constructive possession; consequently, the People were not required to obtain and disclose these items prior to filing the COC (citing People v Peralta, 79 Misc 3d 945 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2023]). The People assert that, as both FDNY and Jacobi Hospital are independent entities who are not within NYPD's custody or control, the assigned prosecutor went beyond the requirements of C.P.L. Article 245 by issuing subpoenas for the medical records.

Neither party's filings address whether EMS was summoned to the scene by law enforcement, a fact salient to People v Rahman's holding that EMS records were automatically discoverable (79 Misc 3d 129(A) [App Term, 2d Dept, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2023]). In Rahman, the complainant went to the 114th Precinct to report a physical altercation; at the precinct, NYPD personnel called EMS, who treated the complainant upon arrival. Because the complainant was examined at the direction of law enforcement, records related to that treatment possessed by FDNY, "EMS's parent agency," were deemed automatically discoverable under C.P.L. § 245.20[1][j] (id.). Here, responding officers were flagged down by a civilian near the automobile collision (People's Opposition at 1), and it is unclear who called EMS to the scene.

Nonetheless, the records appear to be otherwise discoverable under C.P.L. § 245.20[1][e], as they presumably contain statements related to the subject matter of the case "made by persons who have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto." As the records contain statements made by witnesses whom the People intend to call at trial, they may also contain potential impeachment material, thus requiring disclosure under C.P.L. § 245.20[1][k].

Although the records were not in the People's active or constructive possession, the People have a duty pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.20[2], to "make a diligent, good faith effort" to determine whether material otherwise discoverable under C.P.L. § 245.20[1] exists, and to cause this material to be made available to the defense. On June 20, 2025, the same date the COC was filed, the prosecution first issued a subpoena to the FDNY for EMS records. On the date the COC was filed, the People also spoke to their civilian witnesses for the first time and became aware that the witnesses had been treated at Jacobi Hospital (Defense Reply Exhibit A). The People subsequently obtained signed HIPAA forms from these witnesses and first issued a subpoena for their hospital records on July 1, 2025, eleven days after the COC was filed (id.). While the prosecution is not required to subpoena material that the defense may itself obtain in this manner (C.P.L. § 245.20[2]), Defendant was not in a position to obtain the witnesses' medical records via subpoena. In the instant matter, the People furnished signed HIPAA forms with their subpoenas, a method not available to the defense, particularly as at least one witness intends to initiate civil litigation involving the Defendant (People's Opposition at 23). The People's eleventh-hour attempts to obtain medical records for their witnesses militates against a finding that they exercised due diligence to obtain this material prior to the COC's filing.

The prosecution has since obtained and disclosed the civilian witnesses' records from Jacobi Hospital. These records are not duplicative of other discovery and are substantive in nature; as the documents may contain witness observations about the collision, recorded shortly after the event, they are fundamental to Defendant's ability to adequately cross-examine the state's witnesses and to otherwise prepare for trial. Moreover, the Court credits Defendant's assertion that the belatedly disclosed medical records comprise 200 pages that must be reviewed, a large volume of the total discovery (Defense Reply at 14).

The assigned prosecutor recounts that she was reassigned the case on or about the fifty-[*5]second chargeable day; that the previously assigned prosecutor requested discovery from the 43rd Precinct on April 3, 2025, and April 29, 2025; and that the 43rd Precinct furnished discovery on April 30, 2025, and May 3, 2025 (People's Opposition at 18). When the currently assigned prosecutor received the case, she reviewed the discovery and noted that additional items required disclosure (People's Opposition at 3). Subsequently, she spoke with the civilian witnesses, obtained their signed HIPAA forms, and issued subpoenas to FDNY and Jacobi Hospital for their records. Although the currently assigned prosecutor took significant steps to obtain the medical records, these efforts occurred contemporaneous with or subsequent to the COC's filing. The People's opposition does not address why the People first spoke with their witnesses on June 20, 2025, or why no prior attempts were made to obtain the witnesses' medical records.

Ultimately, the People have not established that they exercised due diligence to comply with their discovery obligations prior to the filing of the June 20, 2025, COC. As such, the COC is invalid.

The prosecution disclosed the civilian witnesses' medical records obtained from Jacobi Hospital on August 12, 2025, and filed the supplemental certificate of compliance the next day (Defense Reply at 2). The defense objects that the SCOC is invalid, as the FDNY records remain outstanding, as do records related to the witnesses' ongoing medical treatment. Prior to filing the SCOC, however, the prosecution issued two subpoenas to the FDNY Legal Affairs Bureau, the first on June 20, 2025, and the second on July 1, 2025 (Defense Exhibit A). The assigned prosecutor affirms that an FDNY liaison has stated that the average turn-around time for subpoenaed FDNY records is currently three to four months, and that she continues to await these materials (People's Opposition at 21).

As to medical records relating to the witnesses' ongoing treatment, the People contend that they learned of these records and disclosed their existence to defense counsel on August 29, 2025. As of September 12, 2025, the People awaited receipt of signed HIPAA forms from their witnesses to serve with subpoenas for these records.

As the prosecution has twice issued subpoenas for the FDNY records, they have demonstrated due diligence to obtain this material prior to the filing of the SCOC. Regarding records related to the witnesses' ongoing treatment, the prosecution learned of this material subsequent to the SCOC and disclosed its existence to the defense. Additionally, the prosecution has taken affirmative steps to obtain these records. Upon review of the facts before the Court, the SCOC, issued August 13, 2025, is valid.

The People are reminded of their duty to timely disclose subpoenaed FDNY records upon receipt, as well as their ongoing duty to exercise due diligence to obtain and disclose medical records related to the witnesses' ongoing treatment.

Although the Court deems the initial COC invalid, the People filed a motion pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.70[2] on June 20, 2025. Such a motion, filed in good faith, tolls the speedy trial clock (C.P.L. §§ 245.70[8] and 30.30[4][a]). The prosecution subsequently filed a valid supplemental certificate of compliance on August 13, 2025.

Possible remedies or sanctions for belated disclosures are referred to the trial court upon a showing of prejudice to the Defendant (C.P.L. § 245.80[1][a]).

The first day counted for speedy-trial purposes is March 24, 2025, the day following the commencement of the criminal action (People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 [1987]). The case was adjourned to May 1, 2025, for supporting deposition and discovery compliance (March 24, 2025—May 1, 2025 = 39 days charged).

On May 1, 2025, the case was adjourned for discovery compliance to June 23, 2025. On June 20, 2025, the prosecution filed and served a COC, SOR, and motion for a protective order pursuant to C.P.L. 245.70[1]. Although the COC was invalid, as discussed supra, the People's motion for a protective order tolled the speedy-trial clock, pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 245.70[8] and 30.30[4][a] (May 2—June 20, 2025 = 50 days charged).

The parties negotiated an agreement regarding the protective order on August 4, 2025, while the instant motion schedule was pending. The People filed and served a valid supplemental certificate of compliance on August 13, 2025.

Accordingly, 89 days are chargeable to the People.

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30[1][b] is DENIED.

The prosecution is reminded of their ongoing discovery obligations pursuant to the outstanding subpoenaed materials.

Defendant's motion for pre-trial Mapp/Dunaway/Ingle/Huntley hearings is granted.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and the order of the Court.