The State of New York ("State" or "Defendant") moves to dismiss what it characterizes as an unverified Claim. The Claim arises from a purportedly tainted parole-revocation process. The State argues the Claim must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), (7), and (8) and Court of Claims Act § 11 because the Claim fails to meet basic pleading requirements, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction, and because Claimant otherwise fails to state a claim. Claimant has not responded to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the State's motion to dismiss and dismisses the Claim with prejudice.

Claimant apparently seeks through this action to challenge a March 31, 2025 parole decision "sending him back to prison" (Velasco Affirm., Ex. A [Notice of Intention to File a Claim]; see also Claim No. 144278 ["Claim"], p. 1-2). On June 9, 2025, Claimant served Defendant with a Notice of Intention to File a Claim, alleging that his parole officer returned him to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") based on "false terms" after Claimant refused a "sexual advance" by the parole officer (Velasco Affirm., Ex. A). On July 14, 2025, Claimant filed a Claim alleging that he, inter alia, suffered "Sexual Harassment" by a parole officer; retaliation by the same parole officer; "perjury" by DOCCS personnel in a parole hearing; and a "Conflict of Interest" by a county court judge (see Claim, p. 1). The Claim filed with the Clerk of the Court was verified by Claimant (see id., p. 3). It appears, however, that the copy of the Claim served by Claimant on the Attorney General on or about July 14, 2025 was not verified (see Velasco Affirm, Ex. B, Ex. C).

On July 15, 2025, Defendant notified Claimant by letter that it was treating his Claim as a nullity pursuant to CPLR 3022 because the Claim was not verified (see Velasco Affirm., Ex. C). Claimant did not respond to the July 15 notification (see Velasco Affirm., ¶ 14). On August 22, 2025, Defendant filed the instant pre-answer motion to dismiss. Claimant did not respond to the motion.

Court of Claims Act § 11 requires a claimant to file and serve on the Attorney General a verified claim, and specifies that a verified claim must include the "time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, the items of damage or injuries claimed have been sustained and . . . the total sum claimed." These pleading requirements are intended "to enable the State . . . to investigate [claims made against it] . . . to ascertain its liability" (Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

The filing, service, and pleading requirements contained in Court of Claims Act § 11 are jurisdictional in nature, meaning that failure to comply deprives the Court of Claims of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim (see Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 NY3d 277, 280-281 [2007], rearg denied 8 NY3d 994 [2007]; Flowers v State of New York, 175 AD3d 1724, 1725-1726 [3d Dept 2019]; see also Lepkowski, 1 NY3d at 209; Gang v State of New York, 177 AD3d 1300, 1301-1302 [4th Dept 2019]). When a pleading defect relates to verification, the State must reject the pleading in accordance with CPLR 3022, or else it "waives any objection to an absent or defective verification" (Lepkowski, 1 NY3d at 210; see Scott v State of New York, 18 Misc 3d 455, 458-459 [Ct Cl 2006] [to preserve a jurisdictional objection stemming from an absent or defective verification, the State must follow CPLR 3022, and must also raise the defense via an answer or pre-answer motion to dismiss]).

In addition to meeting the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11, a claim must plead a cognizable legal claim to avoid dismissal. When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the Court must "accept the facts as alleged in the [claim] as true, accord [claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Dismissal will only be warranted under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) where a claimant "fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" (Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137, 142 [2017]).

A. The Claim is jurisdictionally defective because Claimant failed to serve the Attorney General with a verified Claim.

The statutory service requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly followed as a precondition of commencing a suit against the State (see Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992]). Section 11 requires a claimant to file and serve on the Attorney General a verified claim. Where a claimant serves an unverified copy on the Attorney General and the Attorney General timely rejects the document, the State may treat the claim as a nullity (see CPLR 3022 ["[w]here a pleading is served without a sufficient verification in a case where the adverse party is entitled to a verified pleading, he may treat it as a nullity provided he gives notice with due diligence to the . . .adverse party" (emphasis added)]). This is true even where a claimant files a verified claim, but serves an unverified version (see Newman v State of New York, 5 Misc 3d 640, 642 [Ct Cl 2004] [service of unverified claim constituted a jurisdictional defect, even where filed version was verified]; see [*2]also CPLR 3022). Indeed, CPLR 3022, by its plain language, focuses only on service of a pleading, not filing. As long as the Attorney General follows the procedures set forth in CPLR 3022 to alert a claimant to the defect, the subject claim will be treated as a nullity.

Here, Claimant filed a verified Claim, but served an unverified version on the Attorney General. The Attorney General acted with due diligence in promptly rejecting and returning the Claim the day after it was served, notifying Claimant that the State was treating the Claim as a nullity because of the lack of a verification (see Velasco Affirm. Ex. B, Ex. C). The Attorney General provided notice to Claimant within the original statutory window to file and serve a timely claim, meaning that Claimant had time to serve a corrected, verified version of the Claim on the Attorney General. Claimant failed to rectify the error or otherwise respond to the Attorney General's rejection of his Claim, and he has failed to respond to the instant motion to dismiss. The Court holds, therefore, that Claimant has failed to adequately comply with the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 in that he did not serve a verified Claim on the Attorney General. Because the service of an unverified Claim constitutes a jurisdictional defect, and because the Attorney General timely rejected the Claim under CPLR 3022 (see Lepkowski, 1 NY3d at 209-210; Newman, 5 Misc 3d at 642), the Court must dismiss the Claim.

B. In any event, the Claim does not state a viable cause of action that may be heard by the Court of Claims.

Even if the Claimant had met the service requirements of the Court of Claims Act, the Court would still be compelled to dismiss the Claim because the apparent causes of action are either not reviewable by this Court, or do not fit under a cognizable legal theory, warranting dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2) and (7). "The determination to be made on this motion goes beyond whether the claim states a cause of action to whether Claimant has a cause of action" (Alsaifullah v State of New York, UID No. 2015-018-627, Claim No. 125893 [Ct Cl, Fitzpatrick, J., June 25, 2015] [dismissing claim alleging wrongdoing by judge in criminal proceedings (citing Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976]; and Liberty Affordable Hous. Inc. v Maple Ct. Apts., 125 AD3d 85, 89 [4th Dept 2015]).

The Court is mindful that the Claimant here is proceeding pro se, and, therefore, the Court affords his Claim a liberal reading (see Orrego v Knipfing, 240 AD3d 605, 607 [2d Dept 2025]; Mc Gee v State of New York, UID No. 2019-054-047, Claim No. 132316 [Ct Cl, W. Rivera, J., June 20, 2019]; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v Spencer, 166 AD3d 1514, 1515 [4th Dept 2018] [pro se answer afforded a liberal reading]). Nonetheless, after careful review of the Claim, the Court finds that it fails to state a cause of action, and, thus, must be dismissed.

1. Parole decisions are not reviewable by the Court of Claims.

Though the Claim lacks important details and contextual information, it contains enough detail to ascertain that it is challenging a parole decision made by the State (presumably by DOCCS and the county court judge referenced in the Claim) (see Claim, p. 1-2). However, "[i]t is well settled that regardless of how a claimant categorizes his or her claim, if the claim requires review of an administrative agency's determination, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction" (Word v State of New York, UID No. 2009-032-152, Claim No. 116177 [Ct Cl, Hard, J., Oct. 13, 2009] [finding that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of the New York State Parole Board (citation omitted)]). "[D]eterminations pertaining to parole and its revocation . . . are deemed strictly sovereign and quasi-judicial in nature and, accordingly, [defendant], in making such determinations, is absolutely immune from tort liability" (Polanco v State of New York, 130 AD3d 1494, 1495 [4th Dept 2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). This is true even where an agency or judge's [*3]determination was allegedly "tainted by improper motives" (Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 518 [1986]). "Allegations of improper motives and even malicious wrongdoing are insufficient to circumvent absolute immunity" (Mertens v State of New York, 73 AD3d 1376, 1377 [3d Dept 2010] [affirming dismissal of action attempting to challenge parole determination even where the determination allegedly included "egregious factual errors" (citations omitted)], lv denied 15 NY3d 706 [2010]).

Here, Claimant appears to allege that the State improperly revoked his parole based on false allegations and testimony in retaliation for Claimant rejecting a parole officer's inappropriate conduct (see generally Claim). Claimant further alleges that a county court judge who, presumably, was involved in the parole determination had a conflict of interest (see id.). Regardless of the motivation or any bias behind the parole decision, the fact remains that Claimant is attempting to dispute a parole decision. Because such decisions are entitled to absolute immunity, Claimant has no viable cause of action in this Court, and this Court, therefore, must dismiss this portion of the Claim (see Tarter, 68 NY2d at 518).

2. There is no civil cause of action for perjury in New York.

To the extent that the Claim can be interpreted as asserting a civil cause of action for perjury, no such cause of action exists in New York (see e.g. Campaign v Esterhay, 61 Misc 3d 662, 667 [Sup Ct, NY County 2018] [dismissing an attempted cause of action for perjury on a CPLR 3211 motion]; Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v Jackson, 2014 NY Slip Op 32053[U], *3 [Sup Ct, NY County 2014] ["As a general rule there is no civil cause of action for perjury in the State of New York" (citations omitted).]; Exman v State of New York, UID No. 2024-066-527, Claim No. 139086 [Ct Cl, Haak, J., Apr. 29, 2024] [finding that the claimant failed to state a cause of action for perjury because there is no such cause of action under New York law]); Baptiste v State of New York, UID No. 2023-045-013, Claim No. 134141 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, J., Mar. 24, 2023] ["it is well established that actions to recover damages in tort for perjury committed in a prior action or proceeding do not lie" (citations omitted)]). In other words, Claimant cannot, by law, state a cause of action for "perjury committed in a Contested Parole Revocation Hearing" (see Claim, p. 1), and that portion of the Claim must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

3. There is no common-law cause of action for sexual harassment in New York, and the other generalized allegations in the Claim fail to state a claim with the requisite particularity.

To the extent that the Claim attempts to assert a cause of action for sexual harassment by a DOCCS employee, that portion of the Claim must be dismissed as well. Although there are statutory claims for sexual harassment arising in specific contexts such as the employer-employee context, "New York does not recognize an independent, common-law cause of action to recover damages for sexual harassment" (Budha T. v State of New York, 187 AD3d 1090, 1091 [2d Dept 2020] [citations omitted]; Doe v Doe, 83 Misc 3d 1282[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51143[U], *3 [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2024] [dismissing counterclaim for sexual harassment allegedly occurring between two individuals outside of any "workplace environment"]; M.D. v State of New York, UID No. 2022-058-018, Claim Nos. 132461, 132462 and 132474 [Ct Cl, Leahy-Scott, J., May 31, 2022] [granting State's post-trial motion to dismiss claim for sexual harassment by a DOCCS employee against an incarcerated individual].

Here, Claimant pleads in conclusory fashion that a parole officer subjected him to "Sexual Harassment" (Claim, p. 1). Even if Claimant had pleaded sufficient detail regarding the alleged sexual harassment - such as what sexual comments, gestures, propositions or conduct [*4]occurred - he still would not be able to state a claim against the State because, outside of very specific contexts, which are not present nor pleaded here, no such cause of action exists under New York law. CPLR 3211 (a) (7) thus compels dismissal of this portion of the Claim.

Finally, insofar as the Claim generally alleges "[i]ntentional, unintentional tort, and State Constitutional tort by DOCCS employee's [sic]" (Claim, p. 1), the Claimant has failed to provide any further detail to indicate what other specific intentional, unintentional, or state constitutional tort he intended to allege beyond the potential causes of action already discussed herein, and, thus, he has failed to comply with the legislatively-mandated pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) (see Kolnacki, 8 NY3d at 281; Pettus v State of New York, UID No. 2007-015-244, Claim No. 113892 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Oct. 17, 2007] ["fleeting mention of the defendant's alleged failure to provide medical attention" failed to meet the pleading requirements of the Court of Claims Act]). These generalized statements fail to state a claim with any particularity, and, thus, are jurisdictionally defective (see Lepkowski, 1 NY3d at 207-209). As a result, the Court is compelled to dismiss the Claim in its entirety.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the State's motion to dismiss, motion number M-102697, is hereby GRANTED, and Claim No. 144278 is dismissed with prejudice.