This decision addresses an arbitration between petitioner, the law firm of Moses & Singer LLP, and respondent, eMusic.com, Inc. The arbitration resulted in an award of $62,571.47 for unpaid legal fees, pre-award interest, arbitration costs and fees, and post-award interest at 9% per year on any unpaid balance. (NYSCEF No. 1.) The arbitrator agreed with petitioner's main claim, denied petitioner's claim to recover additional attorney fees for the arbitration, and rejected respondent's counterclaims. (NYSCEF No. 33.)

In this case, the retainer agreements between the two entities provides that "except for claims for legal fees between $1,000 and $50,000, all claims concerning legal fees 'shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration in New York, New York in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association,'" and that "judgment on any award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction." (NYSCEF No. 1 at 3.)

Petitioner now moves to confirm the arbitration award. (NYSCEF No. 1.) Respondent cross-moves to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the initial award is excessive, without support in the record, and irrational as a matter of law. (See NYSCEF No. 15 at 1; NYSCEF No. 16 at 8.) Respondent asserts that a corporate attorney from Moses & Singer failed to keep contemporaneous time records and merely estimated his hours at the end of each day based on how long he was in the office. (NYSCEF No. 15 at 1.) Respondent further asserts that plaintiff's billing was inconsistent, because attorneys recorded different times for the same meetings and that no evidence supports the claimed hours. (NYSCEF No. 15 at 1.)

According to CPLR 7511 (b) (1), an award shall be vacated if a party's rights are "prejudiced" by (1) "corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award," (2) the "partiality of an arbitrator," (3) the lack of "a final and definite award" from an arbitrator, or (4) improper procedures. The burden falls on the moving party to show one of these elements. (Id.) A judgment may be vacated if the arbitrator frustrated public policy or manifestly disregarded the law. (Matter of Falzone New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 15 NY3d 530, 534 [2010]; Cheng v Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 45 AD3d 356, 357 [1st Dept 2007] [holding that a disregard of the law applies when an arbitrator is aware of a well-defined legal principle, but fails to apply it, or egregiously ignores it].) Public policy may include well-defined provisions in constitutional, statutory, or common law. (See Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 94 NY2d 321, 327 [1999].)

A strong policy favors arbitration as a resolution, and judicial review is limited. (E.g. Matter of CEO Bus. Brokers, Inc. v 1431 Utica Ave. Corp., 187 AD3d 1185, 1186 [2d Dept 2020].) Even "a barely colorable justification" may suffice to confirm an arbitration award. (Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F2d 691, 704 [2d Cir 1978]; see also Matter of Kirchhoff-Consigli Constr. Mgt., LLC v Mechtronics Corp., 144 AD3d 682, 683 [2d Dept 2016] [stating that an award is "irrational where there is no proof whatever to justify the award"].)

A court may not review the factual substance of an arbitration award or replace the arbitrator's judgment merely because it believes that a different interpretation would be preferable; courts do not act as supervisors to adjust awards. (Matter of Centurion Cos., Inc. v Bowne Tech Constr. Corp., 240 AD3d 778, 781 [2d Dept 2025].) Moreover, when arbitrators misapply the law, this does not necessarily mean that they "manifestly disregarded it." (Solow Bldg. Co., LLC v Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of NY, 30 AD3d 273, 275 [1st Dept 2006].)

Petitioner contends that the arbitrator was fair and viewed all relevant materials when calculating the final award, citing CPLR 7510 and the arbitrator's credentials. (NYSCEF No. 1 at 4.) It further argues that no suggestion of fraud or misinterpretation of law appears in the arbitrator's 15-page decision, which breaks down each element of the final award. (NYSCEF No. 1 at 10.)

Respondent's cross-motion does not provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut [*2]petitioner's motion. (See Matter of Briscoe Protective, LLC v North Fork Surgery Ctr., LLC, 215 AD3d 956, 957 [2d Dept 2023] [holding that a moving party seeking to vacate an arbitration must provide clear and convincing evidence].) Respondent provides nothing in the record to suggest that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.

Respondent suggests that petitioner's counsel did not keep contemporaneous time records and estimated the hours he spent in the office. Because the arbitrator relied on these allegedly vague records to calculate the final award, respondent suggests that the entire award is unfair, excessive, and contrary to public policy. (NYSCEF No. 16 at 2-7.) Specifically, respondent suggests that the arbitrator "did not carefully review the billing records in whole to determine if the work was performed or whether it was excessive in light of the work performed." (NYSCEF No. 16 at 6 at ¶ 34.) Other allegations are that the arbitrator did not take into account respondent's "purpose" for sending a letter to petitioner and that by allowing petitioner to introduce exhibits and testimony, it cost respondent more money. (NYSCEF No. 17 at 8-10.)

These allegations are insufficient to vacate an arbitration award under CPLR 7511 (b) (1). The arbitrator made a final and definite award after reviewing all necessary materials, including a retainer agreement, testimony, and all emails between the parties. (NYSCEF No. 33.) Upon review, the arbitrator found the bulk of petitioner's counsel's testimony convincing and reasonable, taking into account the complexity of the work involved and noting counsel's 41 years of practice. (NYSCEF No. 33 at 5.) The arbitrator noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission's retainer agreement between petitioner and respondent, in connection with preparing associated SEC filings between the two parties, explicitly provided that the billing rate was $900 an hour for counsel. (See NYSCEF No. 4 at 1; NYSCEF No. 33 at 5.) This billing rate should have come as no surprise to respondent and further allowed the arbitrator to arrive at a final award amount. (NYSCEF No. 33 at 5.) A court may vacate an award if an arbitrator blatantly refuses to review records or relevant material (Seedman v Lockrey, 1 AD2d 656, 656 [1st Dept 1955]), but that is not the case here.

Petitioner also makes a strong claim that the arbitrator was meticulous in reviewing each invoice involved. For example, he deducted an entry when the petitioner's counsel "marked up the same document." (NYSCEF No. 32 at 4.) This combats respondent's allegation that the arbitrator ignored factual issues about petitioner's counsel's record keeping. (NYSCEF No. 16 at 6.)

Further, the arbitrator in this case showed neutrality. Petitioner argued that an email amended the original SEC retainer agreement to include attorney fees, a point respondent disputed. (NYSCEF No. 4 at 1.) After analyzing the correspondence, the arbitrator concluded that the parties lacked a "meeting of the minds" about the term "collection fees," which respondent did not interpret to mean "attorney fees." (NYSCEF No. 33 at 12.) He then denied petitioner's claim for these attorney fees. (NYSCEF No. 33 at 12.) This analysis of the meeting of the minds is in line with well-accepted legal principles about contracts, showing both fair analysis and proper application.

Finally, the arbitrator relied on CPLR 5004 to calculate interest fees. (NYSCEF No. 33.) [*3]This contrasts with cases like Matter of Centurion Cos., Inc. v Bowne Tech Constr. Corp. (240 AD3d 778, 781 [2d Dept 2025]), in which the Court held that the arbitrator lacked a rational basis to apply a $1,000-per-day rate for delay damages because the party admitted responsibility for its own delays. (Id.)

In essence, no concrete evidence in this motion suggests violations of public policy, fraud, disregard of the law, or misinterpretation of the law on the arbitrator's part.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that petitioner's motion to confirm the arbitration award is granted, and petitioner is awarded a money judgment against respondent for $62,571.47, with interest from July 8, 2025, plus costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent's cross-motion is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that petitioner shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry on respondent; and on the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), who shall enter judgment accordingly.