In this motion sequence, Defendant seeks to vacate the Amended Decision After Inquest issued by this Court on July 31, 2024, to vacate the Judgment of Divorce entered on October 24, 2024, and to restore the matter to the Court's calendar. Although this motion was filed on October 25, 2024 and was assigned to the Justice presiding over this matrimonial matter, it was referred to this jurist nearly a year later on October 22, 2025 (see NYSCEF Doc. 391). Plaintiff opposes the motion. The motion is now determined in this decision.

Like other contentious matrimonial matters, the case has seen numerous motions and countless appearances and changes of counsel. Unfortunately, the life of this matrimonial matter, commenced in 2019, has continued far too long and is often lacking in rationality and reason.

In the first phase of the action, the Court spent its energy on addressing custodial concerns as well as pendente lite financial concerns. In connection with interim financial concerns, it is notable that both this jurist and the prior jurist assigned to this matter (Hon. [*2]Mattthew F. Cooper, retired) found that Defendant caused delay in this matter such that it became protracted and caused plaintiff to incur additional counsel fees (see NYSCEF Docs XX, XXX). This included delay related to discovery and in connection with custodial issues.

Despite significant efforts to resolve custody without further litigation, this Court ultimately presided over an eight-day custody trial in the Fall of 2022. Notably, in the lead up to the custody trial, Defendant again caused significant delays. Among other things, he chose to represent himself at trial, leading to various procedural delays. He failed to pay multiple experts which also caused delay. Stunningly, after contesting custody and various serious concerns raised in the case, which he intended to refute, he chose not to testify at the trial he demanded.

Most relevant here, though, is that, despite knowing the trial dates well in advance, Defendant chose to have a back/spinal surgery during the pendency of the custody trial, causing the cancellation of one of the planned trial dates. Indeed, he sought to adjourn that entire trial claiming a surgery and disability. The adjournment request was denied. However, at his request, the Court accommodated Defendant by permitting him to remain seated throughout the trial. As observed by the Court, Defendant was fully capable of participating throughout the trial. It is also significant that throughout the proceedings leading up to and during the custody trial, the Court was often advised by Defendant of longstanding issues with his back, shoulder, and arthritis, as well as past and potential future surgeries needed to address these concerns.^[FN1]

At the custody trial, the Court heard extensive testimony from a forensic psychiatrist regarding safety concerns raised by the cocktail of medications Defendant has been taking for years, particularly in combination with his alcohol use. These included various pain medications and testosterone, and the psychiatrist questioned whether Defendant's pain medications and treatment plan were in fact necessary, given Defendant's extensive exercise regimen of lifting heavy weights, and whether the medications could themselves cause pain. Overall, the psychiatrist was concerned with overmedication and misuse of prescription drugs, and recommended a review of his pain management and orthopedic issues.^[FN2]

In addition, the Court heard credible testimony from Plaintiff that Defendant had a history of misuse and manipulation in connection with his medical issues. Specifically, she spoke about Defendant having performance issues at work in 2017 and his having scheduled an elective surgery in order to be on disability and thus protect his job. She added that the surgery could have been scheduled at any time. She noted that he had utilized similar tactics to avoid negative consequences in life and at work and that he had explained these maneuvers to her. She thus found it "curious" that he had a surgery during that trial.

By the time the case was approaching the financial trial, the Court had significant concerns about Defendant's efforts to delay the progress of the case, his multiple changes of [*3]counsel, and his having taken untenable positions relating to custody and interim financial issues. Based on compelling evidence at the custody trial and its own observations, the Court was also alarmed by Defendant's entire surgical history, pain management, use and/or overuse of medications, and his use of his purported medical/surgical needs to manipulate situations and escape obligations.

Most critically, it was never demonstrated that the surgery Defendant chose to undergo during the pendency of the custody trial was necessary to complete at precisely that time. But, the Court did become familiar with Defendant's efforts to use his claimed medical needs as a means to delay the litigation and to avoid trial dates selected long before any medical needs were raised. Moreover, the Court observed that despite the surgery and medical issues, Defendant was able to fully and competently participate and engage in the trial. This included cross-examining witnesses, making evidentiary objections, and providing an oral summation.

On February 5, 2024, the Court held a pretrial conference with the parties and counsel (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX). Although Defendant had retained new counsel in 2023 for the financial portion of the case, by the end of 2023 that counsel had withdrawn leaving Defendant to represent himself once again. Defendant did, however, have an attorney prosecuting the appeal of the custody decision.

At the February 2024 conference, it became clear that very little effort had been made towards settlement of the financial issues. Defendant was also very resistant to proceeding to trial despite the age of the case, and insisted on unnecessary additional discovery. When the Court selected the dates of May 20 and 23, 2024 for the trial, Defendant first claimed he needed to prepare for the custody appeal, despite having counsel on the appeal. He also claimed he needed a "reasonable amount of time, again to attend my medical appointments, which we knew are ongoing and inescapable." (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX at pg. 61, 63). In any event, in consideration of the parties' other scheduling issues, the Court afforded the parties until May 6, 2024 to upload trial documents.

Almost immediately after the conference, Defendant attempted to have the trial adjourned. On February 7, 2024, he emailed Plaintiff's counsel demanding that she agree to reschedule the trial and stating that he is filing an application with the court for an adjournment (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX). Plaintiff's counsel would not consent (see Opposition at ¶ 8).

On April 15, 2024, one month before the trial, Defendant requested a pretrial conference to obtain additional discovery, because "[t]he trial date is approaching quickly and Discovery is necessary," even though the Court had determined that apart from updated documents, discovery was complete. The Court responded on the same day with proposed dates for a conference in May 2024 (see NYSCEF Docs. XXX, XXX).

Then, on the following day, April 16, 2024 at 8:03 AM, Defendant once again claimed there were discovery issues, stated that he may retain counsel, and suddenly claimed that "we didn't settle on trial dates." (see NYSCEF DOC XXX).

Following further exchanges, on the same day at 8:28 PM Defendant requested a "disability accommodation" from the Court, advising for the first time that he was discharged from the hospital the prior week following a spinal surgery. Notably, he did not attach medical records but only a document showing that his insurance had pre-authorized him for a procedure. He claimed that although he agreed to a pretrial conference, he did not agree to a trial date on May 20th as "that's 4 weeks away and infeasible." He also raised discovery issues and the custody appeal again and demanded an "orderly, reasonable schedule that is not disruptive to my [*4]medical treatment." (see NYSCEF Doc XXX, XXX).

On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel responded, noting that Defendant had known of the trial dates for some time, had even acknowledged the same in his April 15th email, and was aware of the dates when he scheduled his surgery. She also noted that there was an extension granted on the custody appeal. Counsel contended that Defendant had not provided a valid reason to adjourn the trial, and stated that Plaintiff did not agree to an adjournment (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX).

On April 18, 2024, the Court advised that it would not adjourn the trial but "as an accommodation, similar to last time, the court will permit [Defendant] to be seated as much as is necessary." (NYSCEF Doc. XXX). On April 29, 2024, in response, Defendant insisted that the timeline for the trial was not feasible and asked for reconsideration. Clearly dissatisfied with the Court's answer, Defendant suggested that he might engage a "disability division" within the court to seek relief (NYSCEF Docs. XXX, XXX).

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel responded that: defendant did not produce any pre-operative substantiation of his condition to reflect the immediate necessity of the procedure and/or the urgent nature of the surgery (given his knowledge of the previously scheduled May 20 and 23, 2024 trial dates); defendant did not produce the dates of admission and discharge from the hospital for his surgery; defendant did not produce any documentation of a "disability" supporting an accommodation request; defendant did not produce medical follow-up notes/instructions relating to the procedure that would have justified an adjournment; Defendant provided only a letter from his insurance company dated March 19, 2024 reflecting coverage for the procedure; and that defendant did not produce documentation that he was out from work on a disability (NYSCEF Doc. XXX).

Defendant next submitted an ADA Accommodation Request on May 14, 2024 to the Court ADA administrator's email address. In it, he once again sought an adjournment of the trial based on his surgery and purported medical issues (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX). The request was forwarded to this part by the Chief Clerk of the court who explained that scheduling concerns could only be determined by the jurist overseeing the matter.

In response to the request, the Court issued an order denying the request for an adjournment but granting the request to the extent of converting the trial from in-person to a virtual trial to commence on May 20, 2024 (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX).

On the eve of trial, May 19, 2024, Defendant sought to adjourn the trial again, and sent another ADA Accommodation request to the Clerk of the Court (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX). In it, he claimed to have suffered a fall while carrying heavy boxes, and stated that he re-injured the area where he had spinal surgery. He stated that he was hospitalized at SUNY/Stonybrook and asked for the Clerk to advise this jurist that he could not attend the trial. No medical documentation of any kind was attached (see NYSCEF Doc. XXX). Although Defendant did not contact the Part directly, the Court did not hold him in default, and, based on this representation, on the morning of May 20, 2024, the Court adjourned that trial date.

In response, later that day, Plaintiff's counsel noted that while she and Plaintiff were appearing before the Court in the trial link, Defendant was accessing a link with Plaintiff's proposed exhibits. She also noted that based on Defendant's claimed new injury it was clear he had travelled to his parents' home in the Hamptons and thus questioned why he could not have appeared for an in-person trial. She next questioned why or how he was carrying heavy boxes given his claimed physical limitations, and noted that all the documents were available digitally. [*5]Finally, she requested medical records relating to the hospital admission and surgery.

In the afternoon on May 20, 2024, the Court emailed all parties, stating:

Today's appearance was adjourned based on [Defendant's] admission to the hospital.

Please advise whether you are still admitted to the hospital or not.

If you have been discharged from the hospital, it is the court's expectation that everyone appears virtually.

If you are still admitted and wish to adjourn again, the court will require medical documentation from the physician/ appropriate hospital staff as to why a virtual appearance cannot take place.

Otherwise, this matter will appear for trial virtually on May 23, 2024 at 10am, as previously scheduled, on the Hearings/Trial link. . .

Please note, that the trial will proceed on default for failure to appear without providing sufficient documentation for the absence from Thursday's virtual appearance. (NYSCEF Doc. XXX, XXX).

Defendant ignored the Court's directives and did not respond to the Court's email or provide any of the requested medical documentation to the Court. Rather, on May 21, 2024 at night, he, for no discernable reason, emailed the Clerk of the Court that he would be travelling to the hospital on the day of the trial. He then sent the Clerk of the Court an unsworn letter from his doctor on May 22, 2024 (see NYSCEF Docs. XXX, XXX).

The unsworn letter dated May 22, 2024 was from a Dr. Darren R. Lebl, M.D. He provided scant details, stating only that Defendant was his patient and that due to his "condition and recent visit to the ER, he is unable to attend the hearing scheduled for May 23rd, 2024. He is scheduled to see me tomorrow for a revisit of ongoing back issues." (NYSCEF Doc. XXX). The letter did not indicate that Defendant was physically/medically unable to appear virtually as directed by the Court, and made clear that he was well enough to travel to his doctor's office. Nor did the letter describe any emergency circumstances or significant change of condition for Defendant such that he could not appear virtually. At no time did Defendant communicate directly with this part or submit detailed sufficient medical documentation about his claimed condition.

In response, the Court emailed all parties, stating:

The court received the below email from our ADA personnel.

Again, the court provided directives on how to request an appropriate adjournment. At this time, we have yet to receive medical documentation sufficient to support the adjournment request. Unless and until one is received, the matter will remain on the calendar for tomorrow, May 23, 2024 at 10:00am on the Hearings/Trial link here: . . . Failure to appear will constitute a default. (NYSCEF DOC. XXX).

Defendant did not respond to the email sent by the Court on May 22, 2024 and did not provide any of the required medical documentation to request an adjournment. Defendant did not appear for the virtual trial on May 23, 2024. As noted in the Court's Decision After Inquest, the Court heard extensive argument from Plaintiff's counsel as to the above history, and other history of delay in this matter. Ultimately, in light of Defendant's default in appearance, failure to communicate with this Part, and failure to submit sufficient medical evidence, the Court found Defendant to be in default and proceeded to inquest (see NYSCEF DOC. XXX).

The Court issued a decision after inquest setting forth much of the above history and explaining the basis for proceeding to inquest (NYSCEF DOC. XXX).

In his moving papers in support of this motion to vacate, Defendant submitted his affirmation (see NYSCEF DOC. XXX). Attached as exhibits were the Court's Decision After Inquest, copies of email correspondence referenced above, and the unsworn letter from Dr. Lebl discussed above. Notably, Defendant did not include any additional medical documentation to support his claimed excuse.

According to Defendant, in November 2022, he suffered from a herniated and degenerative disk in his lower spine L3-L4, which required a multipart surgery with two (2) surgeons operating, four (4) days in hospital, including two (2) in the ICU and several months recovery. He states that fourteen (14) months later, his right leg became weak and unstable and he was unable to walk due to his spinal cord being compressed. He thus states that he required another surgery in the beginning of April 2024. He adds that his surgeon scheduled him for a minimally invasive procedure to clear space, but that this surgery was unsuccessful as his disk was crumbling (NYSCEF DOC XXX at ¶6).

Defendant notes that he began requesting an adjournment of the trial shortly after his April 2024 surgery. He expresses his shock that Plaintiff's counsel did not consent to the adjournment and that the Court did not simply adjourn the trial scheduled many months earlier. He never explains why none of these medical concerns were raised with the Court between February and April. Nor does he explain why the surgery could not have been scheduled for after the trial.

According to Defendant:

On Sunday, May 19, 2024, while preparing for the in-person trial by moving and carrying boxes of legal and financial documents, I fell in my basement staircase after my weak leg buckled due to my spinal injury. At 10:50PM, I communicated with the Court, ccing Ms. Cajuste, informing the Court of my accident, including a photo of my emergency room ("ER") admission wristband, and renewing my request for adjournment of the trial. . . I noted I suffered multiple injuries to my ribs, possible lung puncture, and re-injured my spinal surgery site and that it was unclear whether damage was caused to the titanium rods and screws, placed in spine during surgery in November 2022. . . Upon my discharge on May 20, 2024, I was directed to schedule an appointment with my spine surgeon at HSS within forty-eight (48) hours. According to ER imaging, there was a loose screw in my spine resulting from my fall (Id at ¶14).

Defendant claims he was unable to schedule an appointment with his surgeon earlier than May 23, 2024. Yet, he never explains why he could not appear virtually as directed for the entire day of May 23, 2024. Although Defendant states that due to his "lung and rib injuries, I was unable to engage in regular conversation, let alone represent myself in a trial," he provides no medical documentation to substantiate this claim (Id. at ¶16).

Defendant insists that the letter he provided from Dr. Lebl was sufficient to demonstrate his medical condition and warrant an adjournment. He adds that his surgeon explained that "due to my fall on May 19, the screws placed in my spine had shifted and required another surgery to fix" (Id. at ¶18). Despite the claimed seriousness of his condition, Defendant notes that he still has not had this required procedure due to purported insurance issues. He also states that he has [*6]been living with "indescribably immense pain, limited mobility, and inability to perform even simple daily tasks." (Id.) Again, he provides no medical documentation of his claimed pain, medical condition or surgical needs.

As to a meritorious defense, Defendant raises various points regarding the Court's determination of equitable distribution and child support. He claims the Court awarded Plaintiff too high a percentage of certain accounts. He also contends the Court failed to properly consider jewelry in the Plaintiff's possession. He additionally questions the incomes used to calculate child support, and disagrees with the award relating to add-on expenses for the child. Finally, he challenges the award of counsel fees to the Plaintiff.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that, given Defendant's history of delay and manipulation throughout these proceedings, the Court properly proceeded to inquest in the absence of sufficient medical documentation from Defendant. She adds that "Defendant's Affidavit in support of his current motion, with lengthy paragraphs explaining his medical history and on-going medical issues, is not a substitute for his failure to provide the Court with the requested medical documentation." (see Opposition at ¶ 34) She also contends that Defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear, and thus the Court need not reach the issue of meritorious defense.

In his reply papers, for the first time in this litigation, Defendant provided medical documents to support his claims. Notably, they are unsworn and are not certified records. In any event, he provided his operative record from April 2, 2024 (NYSCEF DOC. XXX), a CT SCAN from May 19, 2024 (NYSCEF DOC. XXX), and discharge paperwork dated May 19, 2024 (NYSCEF DOC. XXX). He also provides an insurance pre-authorization for additional procedures (NYSCEF DOC. XXX), and a spinal X-Ray from December 2024 (NYSCEF DOC. XXX).

In order to vacate a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015[a][1], the moving party must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense. This is always the burden carried by the movant, even in matrimonial actions where the Courts have adopted a more liberal policy regarding vacating defaults (see Ugweches v Ugweches, 78 AD3d 558 [1st Dept 2010]; Capurso v Capurso, 134 AD3d 974 [2d Dept 2015]; see also Barone v Barone, 54 Misc 3d 599 [Sup Ct. Monroe Cty. 2016][discussing the significant and "demanding" burden to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for defaulting in a matrimonial action]). The determination of what constitutes a "reasonable excuse" lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (Goldman v Cotter, 10 AD3d 289 [1st Dept 2004]).

Here, in support of his motion to vacate, Defendant offers only his self-serving affirmation regarding his condition and the unsworn and undetailed letter from Dr. Lebl. Numerous cases have held that these submissions are plainly insufficient to meet the requisite burden. Indeed, a "conclusory and unsubstantiated claim of ill health should be rejected" (Fuchs-Goren v Goren, 229 AD3d 520, 521 [2d Dept 2024][quoting Moore v Moore, 216 AD3d 938, 939 [2d Dept 2023]]).

The burden is not met where the movant fails to provide any medical documentation or an affirmation to demonstrate the claimed illness or condition (see Moore, 216 AD3d at 939; see also Peroni v Peroni, 189 AD3d 2058, 2060 [4th Dept 2020]["To the extent that he contends that the side effects of certain medications impaired his judgment and constituted a reasonable excuse, we conclude that he failed to submit any evidence to support his conclusory [*7]allegation"]).

Further, the letter provided from Dr. Lebl is not in admissible form and is thus insufficient (see CPLR 4518; Ward v Ward, 172 AD3d 955, 956 [2d Dept 2019][finding absence of reasonable excuse where medical evidence was not in admissible form]). Notably, in Seitzer v McFadden (219 AD3d 1262 [1st Dept 2023]), the Defendant had submitted an unsworn letter and emails from his treatment providers to support his motion to vacate a default judgment. The First Department found that the Defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default because "he did not provide competent admissible medical evidence showing that his mental health issues prevented him from appearing and protecting his rights during the pendency of the action." (Id at 1262; see also M.W. v R.W., 241 AD3d 1190 [1st Dept 2025][denying motion to vacate where "Respondent's motion was not supported by any competent admissible medical evidence showing that he was hospitalized on May 11, 2023 and unable to appear for the inquest."]). This is the situation faced by the Court here.

In contrast, a reasonable excuse has been established where an affirmation from a doctor is provided in support of the motion. For example, in Dankovich v Weisinger (305 AD3d 105, 106 [1st Dept 2003]), the Court found a reasonable excuse for default had been shown where "the court received an affirmation from plaintiff's surgeon stating that, upon examining plaintiff the day before she was ordered to appear in court, he determined that she urgently required major abdominal surgery to alleviate her severe gastrointestinal symptoms, that he recommended that she confine herself immediately to rest at home and cancel her scheduled court appearance, and that arrangements were being made to schedule the proposed surgery for the following week." Unlike in Dankovich, no affirmation and no competent admissible medical evidence has been submitted here to support the motion.

Moreover, while Defendant submitted additional medical documentation in his reply papers, he cannot meet his "burden on the motion by submitting evidence in reply" (Dankenbrink v Dankenbrink, 154 AD3d 809, 810 [2d Dept 2017]). In any event, the reply exhibits were also not in admissible form.

Even were the Court to consider these improper reply documents, they do not provide a medical expert's explanation of Defendant's condition, his condition on the date of the trial, whether his condition had actually significantly changed from his ongoing issues, what caused his condition, or state that he was physically/medically unable to appear for a virtual trial on the trial date (see Matter of Amirah Nicole A. (Tamika R.), 73 AD3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2010]["respondent's medical documentation is silent as to her medical condition on the date of the hearings, thus failing to evince that she was in fact ill on that date."]). Nor can the Court be expected to decipher the medical meaning of an MRI report, CT Scan, hospital discharge papers, or an operative record.

In exercising its discretion on these motions, a Court should consider the procedural history and particular facts and circumstances of the case. This was the point made in Capurso v Capurso (134 AD3d 974 [2d Dept 2015]). In Capurso, the Second Department found the motion court had providently exercised it discretion in denying a motion to vacate a judgment of divorce in light of the history and facts in that case. Similar to this case, the movant did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default in that she "failed to adequately substantiate her excuse that she had swine flu and had to be hospitalized due to a back injury resulting from a fall" (Id. at XXX).

Beyond the clear failure to meet his burden on the motion, the Court here is secondarily [*8]considering the Defendant's history of delay, manipulation, and efforts to prolong the case and avoid crucial moments of this litigation. He raised various excuses in order to avoid or adjourn the 2024 financial trial. He has repeatedly sought to use issues with his back to delay the matter. This included scheduling a prior surgery during the midst of the custody trial in 2022, and a history of using his purported medical/surgical needs to manipulate situations and escape obligations. It was never demonstrated to this Court that Defendant needed to schedule his two surgeries at exactly the time the two trials had been scheduled.

Given this history and the concerns raised about his misuse of his medical issues, as well as the Court's own observations of Defendant, it was reasonable for the Court to require admissible and detailed medical evidence to adjourn the financial trial, and it is similarly warranted to require such admissible medical evidence be attached to the moving papers. There is no basis to accept Defendant's self-serving affirmation on his own medical condition or to accept his claim that his condition had significantly changed.

Further, competent evidence was required to establish a change in his condition. As noted, Defendant had consistently advised the Court of issues with his back throughout the entirety of the case. These conditions lasted for years and at minimum back to 2022 when he began raising concerns. However, despite these concerns, and although he had a spinal surgery in November 2022, the Court observed that Defendant was able to fully and competently participate and engage in the custody trial in late 2022. Accordingly, without admissible medical evidence, there was nothing other than Defendant's conclusory claims to support a conclusion that his condition had actually significantly changed, or that he was unable to appear virtually for a trial.

A similar situation faced the court in Wilson v Wilson (201 AD3d 581 [1st Dept 2022]). In Wilson, the defendant had longstanding health issues including a seizure condition. Despite these issues, the trial court was able to observe defendant participate in the proceedings without problem. Yet, the defendant failed to appear for the trial in 2017. Although the trial court recognized these longstanding medical issues, it found there were no changes to his condition that would render him unable to attend the trial. In addition, based on its prior observations, the trial court concluded that "defendant was using his preexisting medical condition to prolong the proceedings" (Id. at XXX). Accordingly, the trial court found the defendant in default and proceeded to inquest, and later denied the motion to vacate the judgment of divorce. On appeal, the First Department affirmed, finding that the motion court providently rejected the excuse for failing to appear at trial.

Here, as in Wilson, defendant purports to have a longstanding medical issue with his back. Yet, despite these issues, this Court has observed him participating in all phases of the proceedings, including at the 2022 custody trial just after an earlier spinal surgery. Like the court in Wilson, this Court has determined that Defendant has used his preexisting medical condition to prolong this litigation. To the extent Defendant is claiming a significant change to his longstanding condition based on a purported fall, it was incumbent on him to present admissible competent and convincing medical evidence that he could not appear virtually for the trial in May 2024. He failed to submit any such evidence.

Defendant misplaces reliance on Zeledon v Zeledon (211 AD3d 1387 [3d Dept 2022]). Indeed, in that case the claim of severe pain from shingles was supported by an affidavit from a physician's assistant who had diagnosed the husband. Nor is defendant aided by Osman v Osman (83 AD3d 1022 [2d Dept 2011]) which involved the defendant being taken directly from court to [*9]the hospital by ambulance. To the contrary, there were no personal observations of defendant's condition made by the Court here, as defendant failed to appear entirely.

Finally, because defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the default, the Court does not determine whether he had a potentially meritorious defense.

Ultimately, the motion must be denied because Defendant failed to meet his burden to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default with competent admissible medical evidence to support his claims.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion is denied in its entirety.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.