The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 003) numbered 41-62 were read on this motion. The Court has considered the Notice of Motion dated August 7, 2025; the Affirmation in Support of Stephanie L. Boden, Esq.; the Statement of Material Facts and annexed exhibits; the deposition transcripts of Battiste, Browning, Jones, and Griggs; the Affirmation in Opposition of Robert S. Mazzuchin, Esq., with photographic attachments; the police report and MV-104 key as referenced; prior procedural orders; and all other papers submitted herein.

This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on May 16, 2023, on South Avenue in Staten Island, a two-way roadway containing two travel lanes in each direction. Third-party defendant Jones testified that he brought his rental vehicle to a stop in the right lane behind several cars as the signal at Amador Street changed from yellow to red. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 52 at 46). When the light turned green, the cars ahead began to move, and Jones proceeded forward at approximately ten miles per hour. (see id at 50). He then heard screeching and felt a rear impact. (see id). He denied any mechanical deficiencies and reported to the police that the tanker truck behind him had rear-ended his vehicle. (see id at 41).

Passenger Battiste testified consistently that the vehicle was stopped at the red light and had begun rolling forward when struck. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29 at 38-39). Passenger Browning, however, testified that their vehicle remained fully stopped for five to ten seconds and had not yet entered the intersection when the truck made contact. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 36 at 46-47). Browning further stated that the truck struck the rear directly and pushed the vehicle forward (see id at 50).

Truck operator Griggs offered a sharply contrasting description. He asserted that he initially observed the Jones vehicle traveling ahead of him in the left lane, that Jones subsequently maneuvered into the right lane in front of him, and that Jones intermittently tapped his brakes, diminishing the following distance. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 45 at 19-20). Griggs testified that, in response, he activated his directional signal and began to move left to pass. (see id at 26-32).

While partially occupying both lanes during this lane change, Griggs testified that Jones abruptly slammed on his brakes despite no vehicles ahead of him and despite a green light at the next intersection. (see id). According to Griggs, this created insufficient room to complete the maneuver, causing the front passenger-side fender of the tanker truck to strike the rear driver-side portion of the Jones vehicle. (see id at 22). He testified further that there was no reason for Jones to brake at that moment and that he "could have completed [his] goal" of passing without impact had Jones not braked. (see id at 46).

Photographs identified by Griggs depict damage to the rear driver-side corner of the Jones vehicle and the corresponding front passenger-side corner of the truck. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 51). The police diagram referenced by movant depicts a straight rear-end collision, but as noted in opposition, the officer did not witness the event, and unsworn MV-104 diagrams are not admissible on summary judgment. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 46-47).

Accordingly, the record contains significant disputes regarding vehicle positioning, whether braking was gradual or abrupt, whether traffic conditions justified braking, whether the Jones vehicle had entered the intersection, and whether the tanker truck was during a lane-change maneuver when the collision occurred.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only where the movant demonstrates entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, eliminating all triable issues of fact. (see Winegrad v NYU Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). The Court's role is issue-finding rather than issue determination (see Kriz v Schum, 75 NY2d 25 [1989]). Credibility assessments are improper on summary judgment (see Miele v Am. Tobacco Co., 2 AD3d 799 [2d Dept 2003]).

Rear-end collisions establish a prima facie case of negligence against the rear driver, who must then provide a non-negligent explanation (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906 [2008]; Lutz v Defabio, 140 AD3d 1032 [2d Dept 2016]; Cortese v Pobejimov, 136 AD3d 635 [2d Dept 2016]; Salako v Nassau Inter-County Express, 131 AD3d 687 [2d Dept 2015]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850 [2d Dept 2013]; Perez v Roberts, 91 AD3d 620 [2d Dept 2012]; Smith v Seskin, 49 AD3d 628 [2d Dept 2008]).

The presumption, however, is subject to recognized exceptions. A sudden, unexpected, or unjustified stop by the lead vehicle may provide a non-negligent explanation (see Carhuayano v J & R Hacking, 28 AD3d 413 [2d Dept 2006]; Delayhaye v Caledonia Limo & Car Serv., Inc., 49 AD3d 588 [2d Dept 2008]; Chepel v Meyers, 306 AD2d 235 [2d Dept 2003]). By contrast, unsupported allegations of sudden braking may be insufficient (see Edgerton v City of New York, 160 AD3d 809 [2d Dept 2018]).

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a] prohibits following another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, considering traffic and roadway conditions. Violations suggest negligence (see Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter, 78 AD3d 672 [2d Dept 2010]; Russell v J.L. Femia Landscape Servs., Inc., 161 AD3d 1119 [2d Dept 2018]; Niyazov v Hunter EMS, Inc., 154 AD3d 954 [2d Dept 2017]; Pawlukiewicz v Boisson, 275 AD2d 446 [2d Dept 2000]; Maxwell v Lobenberg, 227 AD2d 598 [2d Dept 1996]).

Where contact occurs during a lane change, negligence may attach to the driver who fails to maintain adequate clearance (see Dattilo v Best Transp. Inc., 79 AD3d 432 [1st Dept 2010]). Unsworn MV-104 materials are inadmissible on summary judgment (see Ezzi v Domino's Pizza, LLC, 74 Misc 3d 217 [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2021]).

Jones properly invokes the rear-end presumption and argues that Griggs, as the rear driver, bears sole responsibility under Tutrani and its progeny. In a straightforward scenario, where the lead vehicle is proceeding normally in traffic, summary judgment would ordinarily be [*3]warranted.

However, although the presumption is well developed in New York law, it is not automatically outcome-determinative in every instance of rear contact. The doctrine exists to allocate responsibility where the surrounding circumstances are uncomplicated, and the lead vehicle operates foreseeably. It does not mandate judgment where the lead vehicle's behavior may itself be negligent, nor where contextual conditions complicate the causal chain.

Consistent with Carhuayano, Delayhaye, and Chepel, a sudden, abrupt, or unjustified stop may constitute a valid non-negligent explanation. Griggs's testimony, if credited, suggests that Jones changed lanes ahead of him, tapped his brakes repeatedly, and then slammed his brakes unexpectedly despite a green signal and unobstructed roadway. Under such circumstances, a finder of fact could conclude that Jones's braking was erratic and unforeseeable, thereby contributing to causation.

The physical evidence reinforces this possibility. The location of damage, rear driver-side of the Jones vehicle and front passenger-side of the tanker truck, is consistent with lateral movement and aligns conceptually with Dattilo, which recognizes potential negligence in clearance judgment during lane transitions.

The competing testimony of the two passengers, rolling slowly versus fully stopped, creates further uncertainty. These discrepancies are not collateral; they implicate whether the stop was foreseeable, justified, or abrupt, all issues central to the sudden-stop exception.

Moreover, because credibility cannot be weighed on summary judgment, Kriz and Miele prohibit this Court from choosing between the competing narratives.

When it comes to unsworn diagrams (for example, schematic drawings or visual reconstructions that are not verified by affidavit or sworn testimony), the key questions are: (1) whether the diagram represents admissible evidence (or is derived from admissible evidence), and (2) whether the lack of sworn testimony or verification undermines its weight for summary-judgment purposes. Even if the diagram is helpful, without a sworn affidavit or deposition verifying the facts shown in the diagram, the movant (or opponent) risks the diagram being disregarded or deemed insufficient to support/oppose summary judgment (see Wong v 15 Monroe Realty, Inc., 194 AD3d 534 [1st Dept 2021]; Santiago v Burlington Coat Factory, 112 AD3d 514 [1st Dept 2013]).

Finally, the police diagram is unsworn, drawn by a non-witness, and cannot carry probative weight under Ezzi. For instance, the statute requires that the moving papers be supported by affidavit by a person having knowledge of the facts; it shall recite all the material fact and show that there is no defense. Thus, a bare diagram without a sworn statement verifying the underlying facts generally will not satisfy the moving party's burden to establish no triable issue of fact. Likewise, a party opposing summary judgment cannot rely solely on diagrams that are unsworn or non-authenticated to rebut the showing, because the opposition must rely on "evidentiary proof in admissible form" to create a triable issue.

To be sure, granting summary judgment here would require the Court to resolve the following issues:

1. whether Jones changed lanes;

2. whether his braking was intermittent or abrupt;

3. whether braking was justified;

4. whether the truck was in a mid-lane change; and

5. whether the contact angle reflects lateral movement.

Each issue turns on credibility, inference, or context, not properly resolved as a matter of law, and best left for a trier of fact.

Because material factual disputes exist; because a legally recognized, non-negligent explanation has been articulated; because the physical evidence supports more than one reasonable inference; and because the testimonial conflicts are substantial, third-party defendant Jones has failed to demonstrate entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the motion by third-party defendant John Jones for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 [b] is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED, that all claims and cross-claims asserted against John Jones shall continue; and it is further

ORDERED, that the parties shall appear for the next scheduled conference on December 11, 2025, at 9:30 AM for a settlement conference as previously directed by the Court.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.