The following documents, numbered 1 through 7, were considered in connection with the notice of motion of the Plaintiff, dated December 11, 2025, (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 2"), seeking the entry of an Order granting the following relief:

1. Extending Plaintiff's time to effect service on Defendant;

2. Authorizing alternate service of the summons and complaint on Defendant; and

3. Such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.

On May 2, 2024, this matrimonial action was commenced with Plaintiff's filing of a summons with notice (hereinafter "Summons")^[FN1] which solely provided notice of the Plaintiff s [*2]intention to seek a dissolution of the parties' marriage pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 170(7), based on an irretrievable breakdown of the parties' marriage for a period of at least six months, and other ancillary relief.

On November 14, 2025, 561 days following commencement of this action, Plaintiff filed a request for judicial intervention,^[FN2] along with a motion by notice of motion (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"),^[FN3] seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief: (1) extending Plaintiff's time to effect service on Defendant; (2) authorizing alternate service of the summons and complaint on Defendant; and (3) such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

In support of this application, Plaintiff's counsel filed an affirmation, consisting of five paragraphs, in support which was devoid of any claims of due diligence in attempting to effectuate service of process on Defendant by Plaintiff:

"1. I am the attorney for R. R., Plaintiff in the above matter, and I submit this Affirmation in support of Plaintiff's request for an Order authorizing substituted service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant F. M.

2. On November 8, 2021, in connection with the earlier divorce action (Index No. XXXX), I emailed Defendant at [email protected], asking if he would accept service via email, and on November 10, 2021 Defendant responded that he would.

3. Defendant subsequently communicated with the Court by email in connection with that action.

4. Subsequently, in connection with the action for fraudulent conveyance, Plaintiff emailed Defendant at that same email address, and was subsequently contacted by attorneys purporting to act on Defendant's behalf (although they did not enter an appearance in the matter). Some settlement discussions ensued (ultimately unfruitful), and Defendant was copied at that same email address on those discussions.

5. In early November 2025, Plaintiff's attorney emailed Defendant with the Summons, Notice of Automatic Orders, and Notice regarding continuation of health care coverage, a notice of electronic filing. I received a receipt from my email server indicating that the email had been delivered. However, I have not received any communication from Defendant."

On December 3, 2025, a Decision and Order ^[FN4] pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 1 was entered wherein the relief requested was denied without prejudice.

On December 11, 2025, 588 days from the date of commencement of this action, Motion Sequence No. 2 ^[FN5] was filed, seeking the above-referenced relief. In support of his application, Plaintiff's counsel filed a memorandum of law asserting that personal service of the pleadings upon Defendant is impracticable:

"As stated above, Defendant lives in Turkey. Service of process in Turkey is governed by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (20 UST 361, TIAS No 6638 [1969]) (hereinafter 'the Convention'), to which both the US and Turkey are signatories. Foreign service on a natural person in Turkey is pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, which requires that the documents to be served be sent by the requesting state to the 'Central Authority' of the receiving state 'by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions.' In Turkey, that entails the Central Authority providing the documents to be served to the Chief Prosecutors Office, who in turns serves them on the person to be served, and then provides proof of service to the Central Authority, which then provides proof of service to the requesting state. The process is time consuming and takes many months, and if using a process server, costs thousands of dollars. Plaintiff has already expended significant monies in connection with the initial divorce action and the fraudulent conveyance action, and can ill afford the thousands of dollars in additional legal fees for Hague Convention service."

Plaintiff's counsel then provides the following to support his position that alternate service via e-mail and Federal Express should be permitted:

"Article 10 of the Convention authorizes service via mail, provided the receiving state does not object. However, Turkey has formally objected to service under Article 10, and so does not permit service via mail. Article 19 of the Convention, however, allows service by any method allowed by the internal laws of the receiving country. Service of process by email is allowed in both New York and in Turkey. Turkish Notification Law No 7201, which regulates the permitted methods of service of process within Turkey, permits service of process electronically by email to a registered email address. And 'both New York courts and federal courts have, upon application by plaintiffs, authorized e-mail service of process as an appropriate alternative method when the statutory methods have proven ineffective' Alfred E. Mann Living Tr. v. ETIRC Aviation S.a.r.l., 78 AD3d 137, 141, 910 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (1st Dept., 2010). Accordingly, service of process by email on Defendant F. M. is permissible under Turkish Law and therefore under the Convention (and Defendant F. M. has accepted service of process in the earlier matrimonial action via email). It is also permissible under New York law if service by other means is impracticable.

C.P.L.R. § 308 authorizes five methods of services. Section 308(1) authorizes service by delivering the summons to the person, 308(2) authorizes service by service on a person of suitable age and discretion, 308(3) authorizes service on an authorized agent, 308(4) authorizes "nail and mail" service, and 308(5) authorizes service "in such manner as the court, upon motion service under C.P.L.R. § 308(1) or (2) are impractical in this case for the reasons explained above. Personal service is not permitted in Turkey, and instead 'Service must be made through the post offices of the General Directorate of the Post and Telegraph Organization (PTT) either physically by general mail to the defendant's address or electronically (Article 1, Notification Law No 7201).' Defendant does not have an agent in Turkey who Plaintiff can serve, and Turkish law does not have any provision for 'nail and mail' service. Thus, service is not practical or permissible under C.P.L.R. §§ 308(3) or (4). Service via email, however, can be authorized under CPLR § 308(5), and [*3]has been Defendant F. M.'s mode of communication with Plaintiff, counsel herein, and even this Court in the earlier matrimonial action.

As stated, Defendant previously agreed to accept service of process via email in the earlier divorce action, and had communicated with Plaintiff's counsel (counsel herein) as well as with this Court as well as the Appellate Division by email. (O'Dwyer Affirmation, Exhibits A, B)."

A. Plaintiff's Request for Order Permitting Substituted Service.

In order to evaluate Plaintiff's request for an order granting alternate service, this Court will engage in a review of service requirements pertaining to matrimonial actions commenced in New York State and when alternate service is required and the implications of The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [1969], 1969 WL 97765) (hereinafter "Hague Convention").

1. Service Requirements For Matrimonial Actions

"In an action for a divorce, New York State Domestic Relations Law § 232 permits substituted service pursuant to CPLR 308 by court order upon a showing that personal delivery of the summons and complaint upon the defendant could not be effected despite efforts made with due diligence" (Florestal v. Coleman-Florestal, 124 AD3d 578 [2d Dept 2015]).

"CPLR 308(5) vests a court with the discretion to direct an alternative method for service of process when it has determined that the methods set forth in CPLR 308(1), (2), and (4) are 'impracticable'" (Astrologo v. Serra, 240 AD2d 606 [2d Dept 1997]). Whether service is "impracticable, 'depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding each case'" (MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v. Mayers, 209 AD3d 1009 [2d Dept 2002]; citing to Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Patel, 175 AD3d 1350 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Liebeskind v. Liebeskind, 86 AD2d 207 [1st Dept 1982]). "Although impracticality does not require a showing of actual attempts to serve parties under every method in the aforementioned provisions of CPLR § 308, the movant is required to make competent showings as to actual efforts made to effect service" (Joseph II. v. Luisa JJ, 201 AD3d 43 [3d Dept 2021] [internal citations omitted]).

The Courts have continuously focused on a movant's "due diligence" or lack thereof, as a barrier to issue a court order for substituted service, finding consistently that such an order is obtainable only upon a showing that service "could not be carried out by personal delivery despite the use of due diligence" (Rae v. Marciano, 227 AD3d 738 [2d Dept 2024]). "Once the impracticability standard is satisfied, due process requires that the method of service be 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise' the defendant of the action" (Contimortgage Corp. v. Isler, 48 AD3d 732 [2d Dept 2008], quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 70 S.Ct. 652 [1950]). "In order to be constitutionally adequate, the method of service need not guarantee that the defendant will receive actual notice," and "Indeed, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits" (Harkness v. Doe, 261 AD2d 846 [4th Dept 1999] [internal citations omitted]).

2. The Hague Convention

The Hague Convention "is a multilateral treaty designed to simplify the methods for serving process abroad to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions receive actual and timely notice of suit and to facilitate proof of service abroad" (Fernandez v. Univan Leasing, 15 AD3d 343 [2d Dept 2005] [internal quotations omitted]).

The Hague Convention has been in effect for the United States of America since February 10, 1969, following the following resolution of the United States Senate and ratification by then President Lyndon B. Johnson:

"WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 14, 1967, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said convention;

WHEREAS the President of the United States of America on April 24, 1967 duly ratified the convention, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate;

WHEREAS Article 27 provides that the convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification;

WHEREAS instruments of ratification were deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands as follows: United States of America on August 24, 1967; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on November 17, 1967; and the United Arab Republic on December 12, 1968;

AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Article 27 of the convention, the convention will enter into force on February 10, 1969;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, to the end that the convention and every article and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith on and after February 10, 1969, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this eighth day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred sixty-nine and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-third."

Article 29 of the Hague Convention provides the following provision permitting a member State (country) to set forth what constituent parts such as provinces or territories may be included within the State's membership of the Convention:

"Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that the present Convention shall extend to all the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible, or to one or more of them. Such a declaration shall take effect on the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned. At any time thereafter, such extensions shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The Convention shall enter into force for the territories mentioned in such an extension on the sixtieth day after the notification referred to in the preceding paragraph."

Pursuant to Article 29, the United States of America made the following designation and [*4]declaration including the State of New York as obligated to comply with the terms of the Hague Convention:

"5. In accordance with Article 29, it is declared that the Convention shall extend to all the States of the United States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands."

Articles 1 through 5 of the Hague Convention provide a summary of the process by which a litigant may seek to effectuate service in a member State:

"Article 2

Each contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will undertake to receive requests for service coming from other contracting States and to proceed in conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6. Each State shall organise the Central Authority in conformity with its own law.

Article 3

The authority or judicial officer competent under the law of the State in which the documents originate shall forward to the Central Authority of the State addressed a request conforming to the model annexed to the present Convention, without any requirement of legalisation or other equivalent formality. The document to be served or a copy thereof shall be annexed to the request. The request and the document shall both be furnished in duplicate.

Article 4

If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply with the provisions of the present Convention it shall promptly inform the applicant and specify its objections to the request.

Article 5

The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either - (a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or (b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed. Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily. If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State addressed. That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a summary of the document to be served, shall be served with the document."

Article 6 of the Hague Convention then provides the manner within which the Central Authority of the State which effectuated the requested service shall provide proof of service:

"The Central Authority of the State addressed or any authority which it may have designated for that purpose, shall complete a certificate in the form of the model annexed to the present Convention. The certificate shall state that the document has been served and shall include the method, the place and the date of service and the person to whom the document was delivered. If the document has not been served, the certificate shall set out the reasons which have prevented service. The applicant may require that a certificate [*5]not completed by a Central Authority or by a judicial authority shall be countersigned by one of these authorities. The certificate shall be forwarded directly to the applicant."

The Hague Convention, "including its service requirements, must be treated as the law of the land" (Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.a.r.l., 78 AD3d 137 [1st Dept 2010]; see also, U.S.C.A. Const. Art. VI cl. 2 ["This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"]).

In a matter similar to this, a spouse commenced a matrimonial action, the trial Court permitted alternate service on Defendant via e-mail and the appellate division reversed providing the following rationale:

"We next address the wife's argument that Supreme Court improperly authorized substituted service of the summons and complaint by email. Pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (20 UST 361, TIAS No. 6638 [1969] (hereinafter Hague Convention), of which both the United States and Italy are signatories, requests for service of documents must be sent to a central authority within the receiving state, which then serves the documents 'by a method prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state or by a method designated by the requester and compatible with that law' (Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 [1988]). New York requires that, in an action for divorce, the summons and a copy of the complaint be personally served upon the defendant or, alternatively, a copy of the summons be 'served on the defendant pursuant to an order directing the method of service ... in accordance with the provisions of [CPLR 308]' (Domestic Relations Law § 232[a]). As set forth in CPLR 308(5), 'if service is impracticable under [CPLR 308(1), (2) and (4)],' then personal service shall be made 'in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs.' 'Although impracticality does not require a showing of actual attempts to serve parties under every method in the aforementioned provisions of CPLR 308, the movant is required to make competent showings as to actual efforts made to effect service' (Oglesby v. Barragan, 135 AD3d 1215, 1216, 24 N.Y.S.3d 770 [2016]; see Cooper—Fry v. Kolket, 245 AD2d 846, 847, 666 N.Y.S.2d 775 [1997]).

In support of his application for substituted service, the husband failed to come forward with sufficient proof demonstrating *49 an actual effort to effectuate service upon the wife at her residence in Italy. The only proof submitted by the husband was an email — dated August 12, 2020, more than two months after commencement of the action — from an associate at a process service company that the husband's counsel often used for service of process. The email estimated that service upon the wife in Italy in accordance with the Hague Convention would take roughly 18 to 20 weeks in total, which included 'a few days' for Italian translation, 10 to 14 weeks for service and an additional two to four weeks for return of the proof of service. Although we are mindful that the COVID—19 pandemic remained an issue at the time of the August 2020 email, there was no indication in the email that the 18 to 20—week estimate was atypical or that the COVID—19 pandemic rendered service of process under the Hague Convention [*6]impracticable. Given the husband's failure **124 to make the requisite showing of impracticability and that 'a court is without power to direct expedient service pursuant to CPLR 308(5) absent [such] a showing,' Supreme Court erred in authorizing service of the summons and complaint upon the wife via substituted service (Cooper—Fry v. Kolket, 245 AD2d at 847, 666 N.Y.S.2d 775; see Oglesby v. Barragan, 135 AD3d at 1216, 24 N.Y.S.3d 770; Dime Sav. Bank of NY v. Mancini, 169 AD2d 964, 964—965, 564 N.Y.S.2d 859 [1991]; cf. Caban v. Caban, 116 AD2d 783, 784, 497 N.Y.S.2d 175 [1986]; compare Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 105 AD3d 1423, 1424—1425, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801 [2013]; Matter of Hofelich v. Garrow, 69 AD3d 1254, 1256, 894 N.Y.S.2d 553 [2010]). Accordingly, Supreme Court should have denied the husband's application for substituted service. As the husband failed to effectuate proper service upon the wife within the requisite 120 days following commencement of the action (see CPLR 306—b), we grant the wife's cross motion and dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction" (Joseph II v. Luisa JJ., 201 AD3d 43 [3d Dept 2021]).

3. Analysis of the Application

Here, much like Joseph II, the Plaintiff has failed to provide a requisite showing that service of process under the Hague Convention is impracticable. To the contrary, while Plaintiff's counsel asserts that this "process is time consuming and takes many months, and if using a process service, costs thousands of dollars", this Court has been provided with no corroborating proof of the cost or time-frame for this process, nor proof of any efforts of Plaintiff to engage in that process which is significant as this action was commenced in May of 2024. Since that date, nineteen months have passed wherein these efforts could have been made and likely completed.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's request for alternate service is denied.

B. Request for Extended Time To Effectuate Service.

Pursuant to New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 306-b, service of the pleadings shall be effectuated within 120 days of commencement and the Court may extend the time to serve either by "good cause shown" or "in the interests of justice".

1. Good Cause

"The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she exercised reasonably diligent efforts in attempting to effect proper service of process upon the defendant and, thus, did not establish "good cause" (CPLR 306—b; see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 104, 736 N.Y.S.2d 291, 761 N.E.2d 1018; Bumpus v. New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26, 32, 883 N.Y.S.2d 99; Kazimierski v. New York Univ., 18 AD3d 820, 796 N.Y.S.2d 638; Busler v. Corbett, 259 AD2d 13, 15, 696 N.Y.S.2d 615)" (Moudrakis v. Dellis, 96 AD3d 1026 [2d Dept 2012]).

Here, this case was commenced with the Summons, after which no action was taken by Plaintiff until the passage of 561 days when Motion Sequence No. 1 was filed seeking the entry of an order both granting alternate service and an extension of time to effectuate service on Defendant. At that time the 120-day period to effectuate service had expired and 441 additional days had passed, with Motion Sequence No. 1 providing no evidence that Plaintiff exercised diligent efforts in attempting to effectuate service of process on Defendant, and therefore did not establish "good cause."

2. Interests of Justice

"When deciding whether to grant an extension of time to serve a summons and complaint in the interest of justice, 'the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the [potentially] meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant' (Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 105—106, 736 N.Y.S.2d 291, 761 N.E.2d 1018; see Bumpus v. New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26, 31—32, 883 N.Y.S.2d 99)" (Thompson v. City of New York, 89 AD3d 1011 [2d Dept 2011]).

Notably, the Court of Appeals in Leader, Supra, affirmed a decision by the Appellate Division, Second Department, determining that the Appellate Court "did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law in concluding that an extension was not warranted under the circumstances", focusing specifically on the fact that the plaintiffs in that case had "offered no explanation for their failure to serve defendant after commencement of the first action. Nor did they offer any excuse for their delay in making the motion to extend the time for service nearly eight months after the 120-day service period expired" (Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 [2001]). Here, this Court notes Plaintiff's initial application to extend the time for service of the Summons (Motion Sequence No. 1) was approximately fourteen monthsafter the 120-day service period expired.

When considering the application, this Court has considered a number of factors, including Plaintiff's lack of diligence in requesting Court intervention until over a year after this action was commenced. This Court has also noted the lack of any statute of limitations pertaining to actions commenced pertaining to marriages, such as actions for divorce, and that in the absence of the requested extension Plaintiff could merely re-file this action to proceed with her efforts to obtain a dissolution of the parties' marriage. This Court has further considered the potential significant prejudice that could befall Defendant if this relief was granted, as it would, after nineteen months of commencement plus any additional time afforded to complete service, allow the date of commencement to remain, impacting many ancillary issues for this Court. Such issues being equitable distribution of marital assets, declaration of separate property, allocation of responsibility for debt, and spousal support. Balancing these factors leads the Court to the conclusion that the only just manner to proceed is to deny the requested relief.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the application for the entry of an order extending Plaintiff's time to effectuate service is denied.

C. Other Relief.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 2 is hereby denied; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief requested has not been granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.