Recitation as per CPLR §§ 2219(a) and/or 3212(b) of papers considered on review of this motion:

Upon the foregoing cited papers and after considering oral argument on September 30, 2025, pursuant to CPLR § 3212, the motions for summary judgment by Defendants Ioannis Alagkiozidis, M.D., and Maimonides Medical Center (collectively "Maimonides") (Motion Sequence #10) and Defendant Sumit Saraf, M.D., (Motion Sequence #11) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

On April 20, 2021, Plaintiff Denise Williams commenced this action for ordinary negligence, medical malpractice, and lack of informed consent.^[FN1] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on September 29, 2020, during a surgical procedure for treatment of a pelvic mass, her gynecologist, Defendant Dr. Sumit Saraf, injured her ureter, and disseminated cancer cells through improper treatment of the mass.^[FN2] Plaintiff further contends that gynecologist-oncologist Defendant, Dr. Ioannis Alagkiozidis, who was called intraoperatively to assist Dr. Saraf, also rendered improper treatment and advice.^[FN3]

Following completion of discovery and the filing of the Note of Issue, Defendants moved for summary judgment.^[FN4] Plaintiff opposed Defendants' motions^[FN5] and Defendants replied to Plaintiff's opposition.^[FN6]

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to present their case at trial and should only be granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bonaventura v. Galpin, 119 AD3d 625, 625 (2d Dept. 2014). The Court's role on such a motion is not to resolve factual disputes or assess credibility, but solely to determine whether triable issues exist. See Stukas v. Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 23 (2d Dept. 2011). In making this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pearson v. Dix McBride, LLC, 63 AD3d 895, 895 (2d Dept. 2009).

Medical malpractice is a negligent act or omission by a healthcare provider that constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician to a particular patient. See Butler v. Wyckoff Heights Med. Ctr., 233 AD3d 745, 747 (2d Dept. 2024). To establish a cause of action for medical malpractice, the essential elements are:

(1) A deviation or departure from accepted medical practice, and

(2) Evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of the injury.

Where the acts or omissions complained of is not negligence in furnishing medical treatment to a patient, but the failure to fulfill a different duty, the claim sounds in ordinary negligence. See Butler, 233 AD3d at 746. To establish a cause of action for ordinary negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) A duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff,

(2) A breach thereof; and

(3) Injury proximately resulting therefrom.

To establish a cause of action for lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show:

(1) the provider failed to disclose alternatives and reasonably foreseeable risks that a reasonable practitioner would have disclosed;

(2) a reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not have undergone the treatment if fully informed, and

(3) the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury. Cox v. Herzog, 192 AD3d 757, 758 (2d Dept. 2021).

On a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing either no departure from accepted medical practice or that any departure was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Dye v. Okon, 203 AD3d 702, 703 (2d Dept. 2022). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must submit competent medical evidence to raise a triable issue of fact. Cerrone v. N. Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 197 AD3d 449, 450 (2d Dept. 2021). Where the parties submit conflicting expert opinions, [*2]summary judgment is inappropriate, as such credibility issues must be resolved by a jury. Gupta v. Lescale, 224 AD3d 668, 669 (2d Dept. 2024).

DISCUSSION

In support of their respective motions for summary judgment, the Maimonides Defendants provided the expert affirmation of John P. Koulos, M.D., to establish that Plaintiff's medical treatment conformed with accepted medical practice and was not the proximate cause of her injury.^[FN7] Similarly, Defendant Dr. Saraf provided the expert affirmation of Gary Mucciolo, M.D.^[FN8] and Jason Wright, M.D. to support his position. In opposition, Plaintiff's surgical oncologist and gynecologic oncologist expert affirmations^[FN9] opined that Defendants' medical treatment deviated from accepted medical practice. As the parties submitted conflicting expert testimony regarding Plaintiff's medical malpractice claims, summary judgment is inappropriate.^[FN10] See Gupta, 224 AD3d at 669. Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment on the cause of action for medical malpractice are denied.^[FN11]

As to Plaintiff's ordinary negligence claims, Defendants established prima facie entitlement to judgment, and Plaintiff offered no opposition. That cause of action is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

Regarding lack of informed consent, Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Defendants demonstrated prima facie entitlement to judgment on this claim, which is likewise dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, both motions for summary judgment by Defendants Ioannis Alagkiozidis, M.D., and Maimonides (Motion Sequence #10) and Defendant Sumit Saraf, M.D. (Motion Sequence #11) are granted to the extent that all claims for ordinary negligence and lack of informed consent are dismissed with prejudice against these Defendants with the remainder of [*3]their motions denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.