I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 003) numbered 48-59, [*2]72, 76-78 were read on this motion. The Court has considered the following papers in connection with the motions herein:

(1) the Notice of Motion, dated November 13, 2025, and Affirmation in Support by Jessica Lizeth Thual, Esq., dated November 13, 2025, together with the exhibits annexed thereto;

(2) the Affirmation in Opposition by Joan Marie Cocha, Esq., dated November 17, 2025; and

(3) the Affirmation in Reply by Jessica Lizeth Thual, Esq., dated December 16, 2025, together with the exhibits annexed thereto.

II. Facts

As established by the record, the plaintiff was a pedestrian lawfully within a marked crosswalk and had the right of way at the time of the accident. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 53 at page 26-29; 34-37; 44-45; 54-55). to While the plaintiff was proceeding through the crosswalk, the defendant executed a left-hand turn across her path of travel and struck her with his vehicle, causing physical injury. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 54 at page 43-46).

The papers submitted in opposition do not dispute that the plaintiff was within the crosswalk or that the defendant turned left across her path. Nor do they submit evidence raising a factual issue as to whether the plaintiff acted negligently or contributed to the happening of the accident.

II. Conclusions of Law

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability

The plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In support of that relief, the plaintiff relies upon Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 [b] [2] and the Court of Appeals' decision in Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 [2018], both of which are expressly cited in the motion papers.

B. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 [b] [2]

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 [b] [2], as quoted in the record, provides that where a driver causes physical injury while failing to exercise due care, "there shall be a rebuttable presumption" that the driver operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused the physical injury.

The statute thus establishes a two-step framework. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant failed to exercise due care and that such failure resulted in physical injury. If those predicates are satisfied, the statute supplies a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's manner of operation caused the injury.

Here, the record establishes that the plaintiff was lawfully within a crosswalk and had the right of way, and that the defendant turned left across her path and failed to avoid the collision. The papers further establish that the plaintiff sustained physical injury as a result of that collision. These facts satisfy the statutory predicates set forth in VTL § 1146 [b] [2].

Once the presumption is triggered, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward [*3]with evidence sufficient to rebut it. The defendant has not done so. The opposition papers do not submit admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to causation or demonstrating that the collision occurred despite the exercise of due care. Accordingly, the statutory presumption remains unrebutted.

C. Comparative Fault and Rodriguez v. City of New York

The defendant's suggestion that issues of comparative fault preclude summary judgment is unavailing. As the plaintiff correctly notes, the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v City of New York (31 NY3d 312 [2018]), held that a plaintiff moving for summary judgment on liability "does not bear the double burden of establishing a prima facie case of defendant's liability and the absence of his or her own comparative fault."

Under Rodriguez, even if comparative negligence were implicated, it would not defeat summary judgment on liability but would instead be addressed by the trier of fact in connection with apportionment. Here, however, the defendant has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to any culpable conduct by the plaintiff in any event.

Accordingly, based on the unrebutted presumption under VTL § 1146 [b] [2] and the rule articulated in Rodriguez, the plaintiff has established entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR § 3126 to strike the complaint is DENIED, without prejudice; and it is further

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.