[*1]
MC v JS
2025 NY Slip Op 52128(U) [88 Misc 3d 1202(A)]
Decided on December 22, 2025
Supreme Court, Richmond County
Castorina, Jr., J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 22, 2025
Supreme Court, Richmond County


MC, Plaintiff,

against

JS, Defendant.




Index No. Redacted



Attorney for the Plaintiff:
Erin Kathleen Colgan
Angiuli & Gentile, LLP
1493 Hylan Blvd.
Staten Island, NY 10305
Phone: (718) 816-0005
E-mail: [email protected]

Attorneys for the Defendant
Michael A Coscia
Abrams Fensterman Fensterman Eisman Formato Ferrara & Wolf, LLP
1 Metrotech Center Suite 1701
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Phone: (718) 215-5300
E-mail: [email protected]

Ferris Kim
Abrams Fensterman
1 Metrotech Ctr Ste 1701
Brooklyn, NY 11201-3949
Phone: (310) 444-9060
E-mail: [email protected]

Attorney for the Children
Soukaina Sourouri
Sourouri Law Firm, P.C.
94 Hancock St
Staten Island, NY 10305
Phone: (718) 887-5215
E-mail: [email protected]


Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 003) numbered 119-125, 139-143, 150-152 were read on this motion. Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a], the following papers were considered in the determination of Defendant's motion seeking modification of pendente lite support:

1. Defendant's Notice of Motion filed October 14, 2025, together with supporting affirmations and exhibits annexed (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 119-125);
2. Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition dated November 17, 2025, together with counsel's affirmation (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 139-143);
3. Defendant's Reply Affirmation dated December 15, 2025, together with exhibits annexed (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 149-151);
4. This Court's Decision and Order dated May 27, 2025 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 115); and
5. All pleadings and proceedings previously had herein.

II. Facts

This matrimonial action was commenced in 2023. The parties are married and are the parents of four minor children. During the pendency of this action, the Court has addressed applications concerning interim financial relief and enforcement.

By Decision and Order dated August 21, 2024 (Motion Sequence No. 001), the Court directed Defendant to pay pendente lite support consisting of temporary maintenance in the amount of $10,000 per month and temporary child support in the amount of $10,000 per month, for a combined obligation of $20,000 per month. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 57). Defendant was further directed to pay 100% of certain child-related add-on expenses, including medical insurance premiums, unreimbursed medical expenses, and extra-curricular activities. (see id). The Order was expressly pendente lite and entered without prejudice to the parties' claims at trial. (see id).

Defendant thereafter failed to consistently satisfy the pendente lite obligations, resulting in the accrual of arrears. Plaintiff moved by Order to Show Cause dated April 3, 2025, seeking, among other relief, to hold Defendant in contempt. Defendant conceded noncompliance with certain financial obligations. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 91-102).

By Decision and Order dated May 27, 2025, this Court denied Plaintiff's contempt application and made express findings concerning Defendant's financial circumstances and ability to comply with the then-existing pendente lite structure during the period addressed by that application. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 115).

On October 14, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking modification of the [*2]pendente lite award, including a reduction of the combined maintenance and child support obligation to $12,000 per month, together with related equitable relief. Defendant's Notice of Motion includes a prayer for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Plaintiff opposes the motion, contending that exigent circumstances have not been established and that any perceived inequities in pendente lite support should be resolved at trial.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Governing Principles of Pendente Lite Relief

Pendente lite relief in a matrimonial action is provisional and equitable in nature. It is not designed to finally resolve disputed financial issues, but to provide reasonable support during the litigation while preserving the parties' rights for trial. Because such relief is interim, it must function in practice as an instrument of stability rather than as a catalyst for continuing default, compounding arrears, and serial enforcement proceedings.

The Second Department has described pendente lite awards as an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse and the payor spouse's ability to comply (see Landau v Landau, 258 AD2d 508 [2d Dept 1999]). The Court reads the accommodation principle as both a guidepost and a limit: an interim award should not be set, or maintained, at a level that is effectively impossible to satisfy, because a structurally unworkable interim award does not preserve the status quo; it distorts it by creating predictable noncompliance and litigation.

Accordingly, the pendente lite inquiry is necessarily practical. The Court must evaluate whether, on this record and in this posture, the current interim structure continues to operate as a workable accommodation pending trial.

B. Modification of Pendente Lite Awards and Exigent Circumstances

The authorities cited in the parties' papers recognize that pendente lite awards may be modified upon a showing of exigent circumstances, including demonstrated inability to comply or where justice otherwise requires (see Maliah-Dupass v Dupass, 140 AD3d 832 [2d Dept 2016]; Weinberg v Weinberg, 123 AD3d 697 [2d Dept 2014]; Trajkovic v Trajkovic, 98 AD3d 575 [2d Dept 2012]; Sinanis v Sinanis, 67 AD3d 773 [2d Dept 2009]; Winnie v Winnie, 199 AD3d 1258 [3d Dept 2021]).

These decisions operate as a coherent framework. Landau supplies the baseline proposition; interim relief must be an accommodation. The exigent circumstances decisions recognize that the Court retains authority to recalibrate when the interim structure no longer serves its stabilizing purpose. This is not a license to relitigate pendente lite relief upon every disagreement; it is a safety valve where the interim structure is, in effect, failing.

C. Inability to Comply as a Central Equitable Consideration

A key feature of the cited authority is the appellate focus on ability to comply as a matter of equity, not merely sympathy.

In Weinberg v Weinberg, (123 AD3d 697 [2d Dept 2014]), the Appellate Division emphasized that pendente lite relief must be measured so that it does not ignore the payor's [*3]capacity to meet basic financial obligations. The holding of Weinberg is not that a payor's hardship automatically compels reduction; it is that a court cannot sustain an interim structure that, on the record before it, is incompatible with compliance. An order that cannot be complied with predictably yields arrears, which in turn yields motion practice, which in turn diverts resources from the children and the household and into litigation. In that sense, inability to comply is not simply a defense to enforcement; it is a warning that the interim order is no longer functioning as interim relief is intended to function.

That doctrinal emphasis bears directly here because this Court has already made express findings in this action, by Decision and Order dated May 27, 2025, regarding Defendant's inability to comply with the then-operative pendente lite structure during the period addressed. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 115). While that contempt ruling does not freeze all future periods, it is not an academic footnote. It is a judicial determination, on submissions, that Defendant's inability was credible in the context of enforcement. Those findings are relevant to whether the current interim structure continues to represent the "accommodation" contemplated by Landau.

D. Continued Enforcement, Arrears Accrual, and Interim Inequity

The Court also considers the line of cases recognizing that modification may be appropriate where continued enforcement becomes inequitable in light of circumstances and the functioning of the interim order (See Trajkovic v Trajkovic, 98 AD3d 575 [2d Dept 2012]; Sinanis v Sinanis, 67 AD3d 773 [2d Dept 2009]).

The Court does not hold, and does not need to hold, that arrears alone compel modification. Rather, the Court examines arrears as an objective indicator of whether the interim order is operating as intended. If the existing interim structure repeatedly produces default and necessitates recurring enforcement proceedings, the Court must consider whether the interim order has ceased to be a stabilizing measure and has instead become a generator of continued litigation. In such circumstances, Trajkovic and Sinanis support the Court's discretion to adjust interim relief so that it is realistically capable of compliance.

This perspective is consistent with the accommodation principle of Landau. An order that cannot be complied with is not an accommodation. It is a litigation accelerant. The purpose of pendente lite relief is not served when the case is forced into a cycle of default, arrears, and enforcement applications.

E. The "Speedy Trial" Principle and Its Proper Role

Plaintiff relies on the principle, quoted in Maliah-Dupass v Dupass (140 AD3d 832 [2d Dept 2016]), derived from Dowd v Dowd (74 AD3d 1013 [2d Dept 2010]), that perceived inequities in pendente lite awards can best be remedied by a speedy trial. The Court accepts that admonition as an important caution: pendente lite motion practice is not the proper vehicle for final determinations concerning income, credibility, and ultimate support.

But the "speedy trial" principle is not a categorical rule of abstention. It is best understood as a judicial preference that recognizes the limits of the pendente lite record. Maliah-Dupass itself appears in the parties' papers within the same doctrinal universe that recognizes modification upon exigent circumstances. Thus, the principle must be harmonized with the [*4]exigent-circumstances cases, not treated as displacing them.

The Court therefore reads Maliah-Dupass and Dowd as directing restraint when the interim structure is workable, and the asserted inequity can be appropriately addressed through expedited trial. But where the interim structure is not functioning, where it is producing continuing arrears and repeated enforcement applications, deference to trial as the exclusive remedy may itself become inequitable. In that circumstance, interim modification does not undermine the "speedy trial" principle; it preserves the ability to reach trial without the case being consumed by collateral enforcement litigation.

F. Support for Flexibility in Interim Relief

The parties also cite authority recognizing the provisional character of pendente lite determinations and the need for flexibility to prevent interim unfairness (see Winnie v Winnie, 199 AD3d 1258 [3d Dept 2021]). Although from another Department, it is cited here for the uncontroversial proposition that interim support is a practical measure, and that equity may require adjustments during the pendency of the litigation.

Read together with the Second Department authorities cited, Winnie supports the Court's conclusion that pendente lite relief should remain sufficiently flexible to accomplish its interim purpose. That proposition is fully congruent with Landau's accommodation principle and the modification framework reflected in Weinberg, Trajkovic, Sinanis, and Maliah-Dupass.

G. Application to the Procedural History of This Action

Applying the foregoing principles to the posture of this case, the Court finds that exigent circumstances have been established warranting interim modification.

First, the Court has already made express findings in this action regarding Defendant's inability to comply with the pendente lite structure during the period addressed by the May 27, 2025 Decision and Order. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 115). While the Court does not convert that ruling into a permanent decree for all future periods, it is a judicial credibility determination that materially informs the present assessment of whether the existing structure remains workable.

Second, the record reflects the continuing practical consequence of maintaining an interim structure that is not being satisfied: arrears accrue, and enforcement litigation follows. The Court is not required to ignore that practical reality. Under Landau, pendente lite relief must be an accommodation. Under Weinberg, inability to meet basic obligations is a significant equitable consideration. Under Trajkovic and Sinanis, modification may be warranted where continued enforcement becomes inequitable. And under Maliah-Dupass, even in light of the "speedy trial" language drawn from Dowd, interim modification remains available where exigent circumstances are demonstrated and necessary to restore the intended stabilizing function of pendente lite relief.

Accordingly, the Court determines that the prior pendente lite obligation should be modified to a combined amount of $12,000 per month, delineated as set forth below.

H. Structure of the Modified Pendente Lite Relief

The Court finds it appropriate to delineate the modified pendente lite obligation between [*5]temporary maintenance and temporary child support, both to preserve clarity and to maintain continuity with the prior structure. The allocation of $6,000 per month as temporary maintenance and $6,000 per month as temporary child support reflects an interim determination made without prejudice to trial. This delineation also assists in enforcement and reduces the risk of confusion regarding the nature of the obligations.

The Court further finds it equitable and appropriate to require Defendant to pay a defined monthly amount toward arrears. This arrears-payment directive is not an arrears compromise and does not impair Plaintiff's enforcement rights. Rather, it is a compliance mechanism designed to reduce continuing accrual and to encourage regularized payment while the action proceeds.

I. Effective Date; Ancillary Equitable Relief Under the Catch-All Prayer; Preservation of Vested Arrears

The Court addresses the effective date with particular care. Defendant did not separately enumerate "nunc pro tunc relief" as a specific item of requested relief. However, Defendant's motion includes a prayer for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. That catch-all prayer supplies a procedural basis for ancillary equitable relief that is reasonably related to the core modification request and necessary to render the relief effective.

Absent application of the modified obligation to the filing date of the motion, Defendant would continue to accrue arrears under the unmodified structure solely due to the pendency of motion practice. That result would risk rendering the modification partially illusory and would perpetuate the very interim instability that pendente lite relief is intended to prevent. Accordingly, the Court applies the modified pendente lite obligations nunc pro tunc to October 14, 2025.

At the same time, the Court expressly finds, and states here to avoid any mischaracterization, that this nunc pro tunc application does not forgive, waive, reduce, compromise, or retroactively modify any arrears accrued prior to October 14, 2025. All such arrears remain fixed, vested, and fully enforceable. The nunc pro tunc application serves solely to fix the effective date of the modified interim obligation and to permit appropriate crediting of payments made on or after the filing date against the obligations as modified.

Finally, this determination is strictly pendente lite. All final determinations, income, credibility, statutory calculations, arrears, credits, and final support, remain reserved for trial.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, upon the foregoing papers and proceedings, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Defendant's motion is GRANTED to the extent set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Decision and Order dated August 21, 2024, is modified on a pendente lite basis such that Defendant shall pay $6,000 per month as temporary maintenance and $6,000 per month as temporary child support, for a combined obligation of $12,000 per month; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant shall additionally pay $2,000 per month toward satisfaction of pendente lite arrears until all arrears are paid in full; and it is further

ORDERED, that, upon consideration of Defendant's request for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, and in order to effectuate the equitable modification granted herein, the modified pendente lite support obligations are applied nunc pro tunc to October 14, 2025, the date of filing of the motion; and it is further

ORDERED, that any sums paid by Defendant toward support on or after October 14, 2025 shall be credited against Defendant's obligations as modified herein, without constituting a forgiveness, waiver, reduction, compromise, or recalculation of arrears accrued prior thereto; and it is further

ORDERED, that all arrears accrued prior to October 14, 2025 remain fixed, vested, and fully enforceable; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Court expressly finds, as a decretal determination, that the nunc pro tunc application granted herein is ancillary equitable relief grounded in the motion's catch-all prayer, and that absent application to the filing date, continued enforcement of the prior pendente lite structure during the pendency of the motion would unjustly exacerbate arrears and undermine the stabilizing purpose of pendente lite relief; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall, pendente lite, be responsible for her pro rata share of medical insurance premiums, unreimbursed medical expenses, and extra-curricular activities; and it is further

ORDERED, that all other provisions of the August 21, 2024, Decision and Order not expressly modified herein shall remain in full force and effect; and it is further

ORDERED, that this determination is made without prejudice to the parties' claims at trial; and it is further

ORDERED, that any relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.


Dated: December 22, 2025
Staten Island, New York
E N T E R,
HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT