The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 1) 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

In this action to recover damages for personal injuries arising out of an alleged construction accident, plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment on his claims under Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6). Defendants oppose.

On August 30, 2018, plaintiff was injured while working as a carpenter at a construction project located at LaGuardia Airport, Terminal B, Queens County.Pursuant to a 2016 lease between non-party Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) and defendant LaGuardia Gateway Partners, LLC (LGP), LGP agreed to operate, maintain, and initiate the redevelopment of Terminal B at LaGuardia Airport. Pursuant to a Design-Build Contract, LGP, as developer, retained defendants Skanska USA Building Inc. ("Skanska Building"), Skanska USA Civil Northeast Inc. ("Skanska Civil"), and Walsh Construction Company II, LLC ("Walsh" and, together, "Skanska-Walsh"), as a "design-builder" joint venture, to redevelop and build out Terminal B at LaGuardia Airport. Skanska-Walsh subcontracted with V.R.H. Construction Corp. ("VRH") to perform some of the interior work, which in turn subcontracted plaintiff's employer, non-party Curtis Partitions ("Curtis"), for sheetrocking and related work.

Plaintiff testified that he was tasked to perform sheetrocking and framing on the project, which involved the use of ladders and scaffolds, including a Baker scaffold, which Curtis provided. Plaintiff received his instructions from a Curtis employee or foreman. Plaintiff never got on the Baker scaffold; he worked at floor-level while his coworker worked on the scaffold, with plaintiff preparing sheetrock material and passing it up to his coworker.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was lifting a 14-16 foot Baker scaffold to move it from a wooden platform down about 10-12 inches onto an adjacent cement floor. During this process, the left wheel fell off the scaffold, causing it to tilt when the right wheel touched the ground. Plaintiff responded by lunging to grab the scaffold with his hand, when he felt a "pop" in his shoulder.

A party seeking summary judgment "must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of triable issues of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). "[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat summary judgment (id.). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be denied if there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]).

While plaintiff's notice of motion seeks summary judgment on his claim under Labor Law § 241 (6), no arguments were set forth by plaintiff in support of this claim. Therefore, that part of plaintiff's motion seeking summary judgment under Labor Law § 241 (6) is denied.

Labor Law § 240 (1) provides in relevant part that where there is erection, demolition, repairing, or altering of a building, contractors and owners "shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed." "The statute imposes upon owners, contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty that renders them liable regardless of whether they supervise or control the work" (Barreto v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 25 NY3d 426, 433 [2015]). "[W]here an accident is caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff's own negligence does not furnish a defense; however, where a plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Thus, in order to recover under section 240 (1), the plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury" (id.). Labor Law § 240 (1) is to be liberally construed so as to accomplish its legislative purpose of protecting workers (Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc., 41 NY3d 217, 221 [2023]; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]).

"Not every worker who falls at a construction site, and not every object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1)" (Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). "[L]iability is contingent upon the existence [*2]of a hazard contemplated in section 240 (1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein" (id., citing Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]).

"In order to prevail on summary judgment in a section 240(1) 'falling object' case, the injured worker must demonstrate the existence of a hazard contemplated under that statute and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein (Fabrizi v 1095 Ave. of the Americas, LLC, 22 NY3d 658, 662 [2014][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "Essentially, the plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time the object fell, it either was being "hoisted or secured," or "required securing for the purposes of the undertaking" (id. [internal citations omitted]). Section 240(1) does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker; a plaintiff must show that the object fell "because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute" (id. [emphasis removed, citation omitted]).

The Court finds that plaintiff has met his prima facie burden under Labor Law § 240 (1) by demonstrating that at the time the scaffold tilted, it required securing for the purposes of the undertaking, which was not provided in violation of the statute, and such violation was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Moreover, plaintiff's injury flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity given that the defective scaffold became unstable when a wheel detached from the scaffold and tilted in plaintiff's direction (see generally Ruiz v Phipps Houses, 216 AD3d 522, 522 [1st Dept 2023]). Although the elevation differential was relatively short, the Baker scaffold stood 14- to 16-feet high, weighed approximately 200 pounds, and coupled with the force of gravity, brings the accident within the protections of the statute (Hernandez v Port Auth. of NY & N.J., 241 AD3d 1069, 1069 [1st Dept 2025]).

In opposition, any sole proximate cause or recalcitrant worker argument fails if the defendants' statutory violation of providing a defective safety device served as a proximate cause for the accident; thus, plaintiff cannot be solely to blame for the accident (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of NY City, Inc., 1 NY3d 280, 290 [2003]). Also, defendants' argument that plaintiff proximately caused his injuries by not enlisting help from other workers in the area is of no merit as "people are not safety devices within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1)" (Iuculano v City of New York, 214 AD3d 535, 536 [1st Dept 2023]). Thus, any alleged negligence by the plaintiff amounts to comparative negligence and would not defeat his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim.

Moreover, any argument that LGP is not a proper Labor Law defendant is unpersuasive. Although LGP leased the subject premises from Port Authority, a lessee may be held liable as an "owner" under Labor Law § 240 (1) since LGP contracted for the construction work being performed by plaintiff at the time of the accident (Otero v 635 Owner LLC, 210 AD3d 435, 437 [1st Dept 2022] [finding lessee liable as "owner" of premises where lessee retained general contractor for construction work plaintiff performed at time of accident)].

Likewise, VRH may be held liable under Labor Law § 240 (1), as the scope of its contractual responsibilities amount to being a contractor or statutory agent within the meaning of the Labor Law. Here, VRH was delegated the supervision and authority over the work when it actually coordinated and retained plaintiff's employer, Curtis, to perform sheetrocking and framing (id.).

Defendants contend, and plaintiff does not address or otherwise refute, that defendants Skanska/Walsh Joint Venture, Skanska/Walsh JV, Skanska/Walsh Design-Build, Joint Venture, [*3]and Skanska/Walsh Design-Build, JV are not proper Labor Law defendants or parties to any of the relevant construction contracts. The Court notes, however, that defendants do not move for dismissal of the Labor Law claims against these defendants.

The Court has considered the parties' remaining arguments and any requested relief not specifically addressed is denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART in that plaintiff is awarded judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim against defendants LaGuardia Gateway Partners, LLC, Walsh Construction Company II, LLC, Skanska USA Building, Inc, Skanska USA Civil Northeast Inc., and V.R.H. Construction Corp., and the motion is otherwise denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for as pre-trial conference to be calendared by the Clerk of the Court.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.