In this miscellaneous proceeding, Maria M., petitioner, seeks an order discharging the co-guardians and terminating the guardianship pursuant to SCPA 1759(2).

Petitioner, represented by a court appointed attorney pursuant to Article 18-B of the County Law, was previously determined to be an individual with an intellectual disability pursuant to SPCA 1750-b by decree dated June 30, 2010 and letters of guardianship of the person were issued to Maria M.'s parents. Subsequently, her parents were appointed co-guardians of the property for purpose of pursuing a lawsuit against the school district in connection with a sexual assault on Maria M. After the issuance of the letters of guardianship of the property on February 2, 2012 proceeds of the lawsuit were deposited into a guardianship account. Petitioner now seeks to terminate her guardianship on the grounds that the guardianship is not necessary and is not in her best interest. Petitioner alleges that since the decree for guardianship of the person was entered more than fifteen years ago she has matured, become more independent and continued to have the support of her parents when needed. In recognition of these facts, the co-guardians have consented to the termination of the guardianship. A hearing was held pursuant to SCPA 1754 and 1759.

Jurisdiction has been obtained over all necessary parties. A guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the interest of Maria M., also consented to the requested relief.

At the hearing, the court heard testimony from Maria M. and her mother. Maria M. testified that she lives independently from the co-guardians with her two-year old son and her boyfriend (her son's father) of 6 years. She also testified that she manages all aspects of the household, including cooking, cleaning and grocery shopping. In fact, she gets her two-year old son ready for school every morning.

Maria M. further testified about her ability to manage her and her son's medical care. Despite experiencing a high-risk pregnancy, she attended all her prenatal appointments without assistance. In addition, since her son's birth she has made all of his medical decisions.

With respect to finances, Maria M. testified that she is in charge of her own finances, and that she pays her bills from the income she earns working part-time at an outreach center that provides food and clothing to those in need. She was recently offered a full-time position, where she would be even more financially independent. Maria M. also drives herself to and from work every day.

Lastly, when asked about what her plan was in regards to the money in the guardianship account, she testified that she would save half for her son's future and the remainder would be used to pay necessary expenses, and to pay off credit card debts.

The court also heard testimony from the co-guardian, Tania M. Ms. M. testified that the circumstances which originally led to the guardianship have changed. She explained that she and her husband had initially petitioned for guardianship some fifteen years ago at the advice of Maria M.'s then psychologist after the sexual assault incident. During her testimony, she acknowledged that Maria M. is more than capable of making her own medical decisions and those of her son, in addition to providing guidance to both of her parents after her father's heart attack. Furthermore, she testified that she and the father will continue to support Maria M. should she need it.

The guardian ad litem filed a report with the court and participated in the hearing. The guardian ad litem recommended that the guardianship be terminated as Maria M. no longer requires the protections afforded by the instant guardianship. In addition, she does not believe that the continuation of the guardianship was in Maria M.'s best interests. The guardian ad litem graciously waived her fees for services rendered in this matter.

Although a guardianship established pursuant to SCPA 17-A typically continues during the life of the person with a disability, SCPA 1759 provides for a proceeding to modify, amend or terminate the guardianship. Courts have recently terminated SCPA Article 17-A guardianships where the evidence demonstrates that there were less restrictive alternatives to meet the needs of the person (see Matter of Robert C.B., 207 AD3d 464; Matter of Capurso, 63 Misc 3d 725). In those matters, the court determined that it was in the bests interests of the individual to terminate the guardianship and restore their full rights.

The determination of what is in the individual's best interests is within the Surrogate's discretion (SCPA 1750-a; Matter of Sean O., 2016 NYLJ Lexis 3647, NYLJ Oct. 24, 2016 at 27, col. 1; Matter of Michael J.N., 58 Misc 3d 104(A)). At the core of that inquiry is striking a balance between providing for respondent's needs and ensuring that any resulting deprivation of respondent's liberty be by the "least restrictive means" available to protect both the individual [*2]and the community (see O'Connor v. Donaldons, 422 US 563; Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 NY2d 161; Manhattan Psychiatric Center v Anonymous, 285 AD2d 189). This balance is illustrated in Matter of Capurso, supra, where the ward "had gained greater independence since moving to [a group home], as he has been able to obtain and sustain employment, manage a bank account, maintain a social life, travel independently, take care of his hygiene, and engage with a supported decision-making network." In consideration of the ward's demonstrated autonomy, the court concluded that the system of supported decision-making that was in place constituted a less restrictive alternative to an SCPA Article 17-A guardianship and therefore terminated the guardianship.

Likewise, Maria M. has shown substantial improvement in her decision-making abilities and has demonstrated that she is capable of living independently. She also established that she is no longer in need of substituted judgment. She not only makes decisions about her own medical care and wellbeing but also assumes responsibility for the care of her son and to some extent her father. The record establishes that given Maria M.'s current adaptive functioning and supportive system, a plenary guardianship under SPCA 17-A is no longer necessary or in her best interests. Thus, based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, as well as the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, the application is granted.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the guardianship of the person of Maria M. is terminated; and it is further

ORDERED, that letters of guardianship of the person issued to Miguel and Tania are revoked; and it is further

ORDERED, that upon presentation of a certified copy of this order that the financial institution, in North Babylon, New York is hereby authorized to release the sum of $58,423.02 with accrued interest or other monies, if any, on deposit to Maria M.; and it is further

ORDERED, that upon completion of payments and transfer, the guardianship account be closed and letters of guardianship heretofore issued be revoked.