[*1]
AP v RP
2025 NY Slip Op 52138(U) [88 Misc 3d 1205(A)]
Decided on December 30, 2025
Supreme Court, Richmond County
Castorina, Jr., J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on December 30, 2025
Supreme Court, Richmond County


AP, Plaintiff,

against

RP, Defendant.




Index No. Redacted



Attorney for the Plaintiff
Antonio Monaco
Monaco And Monaco, LLP
7610-7612 13th Ave Fl 2
Brooklyn, NY 11228
Phone: (718) 872-0533
E-mail: [email protected]

Attorney for the Defendant
Adelola Sheralynn Dow
Dow Divorce Law, PLLC
900 South Ave Ste 5
Staten Island, NY 10314-3418
Phone: (347) 273-1285
E-mail: [email protected]


Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 002) numbered 57-63 were read on this motion. Oral argument was waived, and the motion was accepted on submission. Upon the foregoing documents, Motion Sequence No. 002 is resolved and therefore, it is hereby,

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's request that the Court reject the current valuation [*2]performed by KLG Business Valuators and Forensic Accountants, LLC, dated September 8, 2025, as incomplete is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED that the Plaintiff's request to direct the Defendant to produce RJP, Sr. for examination and order KLG to conduct a revised valuation upon receipt of complete financial disclosures is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the Complaint to add RJP, Sr. as a Third-Party Defendant is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED, that any relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED; and it is further,.

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.

Memorandum Decision


I. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action for divorce by filing a Summons with Notice on or about May 23, 2022. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 1). Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint on March 15, 2024. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 9).

Defendant filed an Answer on May 17, 2024. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 10). On November 19, 2024, a preliminary conference was completed and in addition to a Preliminary Conference Order (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 18), an Order for the appraisal and a normal income analysis of the construction company AOC by KLG Business Valuators & Forensic Accountants, LLC, was issued (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17). Defendant is a partner in the construction company.

On October 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed Motion Sequence No. 002 by Notice of Motion seeking: (1) leave to amend the Complaint to add RJP, Sr. as a Third-Party Defendant; (2) rejection of the current valuation performed by KLG Business Valuators and Forensic Accountants, LLC, dated September 8, 2025, as incomplete, or in the alternative directing the Defendant to produce RJP, Sr. for examination and order KLG to conduct a revised valuation upon receipt of complete financial disclosures; and (3) such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Defendant filed Opposition on November 17, 2025. Plaintiff filed Reply on November 21, 2025. Parties waived oral argument and requested the motion be accepted on submission.


II. Statement of Facts

Parties were married on May 25, 2008 in South Carolina. There is one child of the marriage, to wit: GP, born XX XX, 2007. There is no other child as a result of this marriage, and no other child is expected. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 4). Defendant owns a twenty-five percent [25%] interest in AOC which is a home improvement contracting construction company. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 19). On November 20, 2024, the Court issued an Order for an appraisal and current valuation of AOC to be performed by KLG Business Valuators and Forensic Accountants, LLC, hereinafter referred to as KLG. (NY St Cts Filing [*3][NYSCEF] Doc No. 59). KLG issued a report dated September 8, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 60).

KLG reported that AOC files a Form 1065 tax return annually. (see id). Tax returns indicate that AOC was formed in 2017, however, Defendant reported AOC was started by his father, RJP, Sr., hereinafter referred to as Senior, prior to 2017 under a different name. (see id). In 2011, the name of the company was changed and simultaneously with the name change, both CP and RP, Jr., (brothers and Senior's sons) were made members with a twenty-five percent [25%] interest each with Senior retaining fifty percent [50%] of the company. (see id).

AOC is a construction business that builds laundromats. (see id). Defendant contends the company can build around seven [7] laundromats a year with each job taking about 6 months depending on the size of the location being built. (see id). The KLG report provided that the 25% ownership interest of Defendant in AOC is valued at $7,900 (Fair Market Value as of the valuation date, May 23, 2022). (see id). KLG stated in their appraisal that the value was discounted in-part due to Defendant's limited control and liquidity. (see id).

Plaintiff contends that the KLG valuation was conducted based on limited documentation and without the participation of all business members, noting that RJP, Sr., who owns 50% of AOC, was not interviewed or independently examined by the evaluators. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 58). Plaintiff further contends the omission of the testimony of Senior prevents KLG from verifying whether all accounts, contracts, or revenues were disclosed; the existence or disposition of company-held cash, tools, or property; and the presence of any related-party transactions or off-book arrangements benefiting family members or affiliates. (see id). Plaintiff maintains the absence of Senior's input renders the valuation inherently incomplete and unreliable as to the true fair market value of the business. (see id).

Defendant contends that during the KLG report preparation, KLG was able to speak with and had access to all parties associated with the business that they, in their professional opinion, deemed necessary and relevant to produce the final report as required by the Court. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 61). Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's claims of incomplete documentation and lack of participation by Senior do not invalidate the valuation as KLG stated it was able to attain all information it required, without his participation, from the appropriate sources, which included the accountant who had all intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the business. (see id).

In an email, dated October 8, 2025, responding to inquiries regarding the need for an interview with Senior, KLG Partner David Gralnick responded, "we did not feel it was necessary to speak to the father as we received all of the information we required." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 62).


III. Discussion

A. Business Valuation

"The equitable distribution statute mandates that the court 'shall determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate and marital property'" (see Albano v Albano, 230 AD3d 723 [2d Dept 2024] quoting Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [a]; citing Kaufman v [*4]Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31 [2d Dept 2020]; Colonna v Colonna, 208 AD2d 671 [2d Dept 1994]).

"There is no uniform rule for valuing a business for purposes of equitable distribution and valuation is a matter within the fact-finding power of the trial court, guided by expert testimony" (see id citing Lieberman-Massoni v Massoni, 215 AD3d 656 [2d Dept 2023]).

"The valuation of a marital asset must be founded in economic reality. However, [t]here is no uniform rule for fixing the value of a business for the purpose of equitable distribution. Valuation is an exercise properly within the fact-finding power of the trial court, guided by expert testimony. The determination of the factfinder as to the value of a business, if within the range of the testimony presented, will be accorded deference on appeal if it rests primarily on the credibility of expert witnesses and their valuation techniques" (see Miller v Miller, 216 AD3d 1154 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Davenport v Davenport, 199 AD3d 637 [2d Dept 2021]).

"Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in determining equitable distribution of marital property, and the determination should not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has improvidently exercised that discretion" (see id).

"The determination of the factfinder as to the value of a business, if within the range of the testimony presented, will be accorded deference on appeal if it rests primarily on the credibility of expert witnesses and their valuation techniques" (see Wasserman v Wasserman, 66 AD3d 880 [2d Dept 2009] citing Ivani v Ivani, 303 AD2d 639 [2d Dept 2003]; L'Esperance v L'Esperance, 243 AD2d 446 [2d Dept 1998]).

KLG was appointed by the Court to conduct a business appraisal regarding AOC on November 20, 2024. KLG is a qualified, independent expert, well versed in conducting financial forensic valuations. The qualifications of KLG are not in question. During this report preparation, KLG was able to speak with and access all parties associated with the business that they, in their professional opinion, deemed necessary and relevant to produce the final report as required by the Court.

Plaintiff's claims of incomplete documentation and lack of participation by Senior do not invalidate the valuation. KLG has stated it was able to attain all information it required, from the appropriate sources, including the accountant who had intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the business thus negating the need for Senior's participation.

The question of the inclusion and need for participation by Senior was specifically addressed in direct communication with KLG, initiated by Plaintiff's counsel on October 8, 2025. In direct response to counsel's query of whether KLG had been able to communicate with Senior and was provided with all information necessary to complete the report, KLG replied verbatim, "As mentioned on our zoom, we did not feel it was necessary to speak to the father as we received all of the information we required." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 62).

There appears to have been no failure to cooperate with the forensic valuation that can be attributed to the Defendant. KLG determined in their expert opinion that an interview with Senior was unnecessary to their evaluation and that KLG was in receipt of all information deemed necessary to complete their valuation of AOC.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request that the Court reject the current valuation performed by KLG Business Valuators and Forensic Accountants, LLC, dated September 8, 2025, as incomplete is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED that the Plaintiff's request to direct the Defendant to produce RJP, Sr. for examination and order KLG to conduct a revised valuation upon receipt of complete financial [*5]disclosures is DENIED.

B. Amend Complaint to Add RJP, Sr.

"Parties who should be joined. Persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiffs or defendants." (see CPLR § 1001 [a]).

CPLR § 1007 authorizes a defendant to implead a third party "who is or may be liable" for the claim asserted. "The liability to be imposed upon a third-party defendant in a third-party action commenced pursuant to CPLR § 1007 should 'arise from or be conditioned upon the liability asserted against the third-party plaintiff in the main action'" (see Lucci v Lucci, 150 AD2d 649 [2d Dept 1989] quoting BBIG Realty Corp. v Ginsberg, 111 AD2d 91 [1st Dept 1985]; citing Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 786 [2d Dept 1983]).

"It is well settled that a court may, on its own motion, find that there is nonjoinder of necessary parties and that it has wide latitude in the addition of necessary parties" (see Schmidt v Schmidt, 99 AD2d 775 [2d Dept 1984] citing CPLR § 1003; Lezette v Board of Education, 35 NY2d 272 [1974]).

Alleged third-party transferees of marital property subject to a distribution dispute, have been properly determined to be necessary parties to an action (see id citing Deleno v Deleno, 61 AD2d 788 [2d Dept 1978]). However, attempts to join alleged transferees of marital property as necessary parties to an action pursuant to CPLR § 1001 [a] were properly rejected by the court since the defendant's claims remained, at that juncture, speculative. (see Katsaros v Katsaros, 133 AD2d 611 [2d Dept 1987] citing Deleno v Deleno, 61 AD2d 788 [2d Dept 1978]).

Plaintiff contends that Senior, the fifty percent [50%] owner and controlling member of AOC, controls AOC's finances and assets making him a necessary party to ensure full adjudication of the parties' respective property interests. Plaintiff maintains that without Senior's participation, any judgment regarding the valuation of AOC or the equitable distribution of Defendant's twenty-five percent [25%] interest will rest on partial and potentially inaccurate evidence.

Plaintiff speculates that should some future and as of yet unknown discovery later reveal that Senior diverted or withheld assets belonging to the marital estate, Plaintiff would be forced to commence separate proceedings, causing delay and duplication of effort.

It is undisputed that Senior is a fifty percent [50%] owner of AOC, the Defendant's brother; however, CP is also a twenty-five percent [25%] owner of AOC, yet his involvement is not deemed necessary, nor is he being requested to be made a party to this action by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends the need to include Senior into this action by claiming that "the analysis was conducted based on limited documentation and without the participation of all business members. Notably, RJP, Sr., who owns 50% of AOC, was not interviewed or independently examined by the evaluators." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 58 at ¶5).

Plaintiff further contends "This omission is material. As a majority owner and the individual who founded and continues to oversee the company's mechanical, electrical, and plumbing operations, RJP, Sr. maintains direct access to the company's books, assets, and income streams." (see id at ¶6). This assertion is a creative interpretation of the facts of this case.

KLG was appointed by the Court as a neutral forensic expert to conduct a business appraisal of AOC. KLG is on the Part 36 list and as such is a qualified, independent expert, well versed in conducting valuations. During the preparation of this valuation, KLG had access to all [*6]parties associated with the business that they, in their professional opinion, deemed necessary and relevant to produce the final report. Plaintiff's allegations of incomplete documentation and lack of participation by Senior do not invalidate the valuation. KLG maintains attained all the information it required, without his participation, from the appropriate sources, including AOC's accountant, who had all intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the business.

The evidence indicates Defendant has fully cooperated with the valuation process and provided all necessary documentation to KLG as requested. KLG, decided, in their expert opinion, that additional interview of Senior was unnecessary to their evaluation, and they were in receipt of all information necessary for the AOC valuation report. Joinder of RJP, Sr., pursuant to CPLR § 1001 [a] is not the appropriate avenue for counsel to utilize to seek a redo of the Court Ordered appraisal of AOC or force the participation of people the Court appointed appraiser specifically determined was not needed.

Should Plaintiff wish to contest the veracity of the neutral forensic report, Plaintiff has the power to subpoena pursuant to CPLR § 3101 [a] [4]. CPLR § 3101 [a] provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." "The words 'material and necessary' as used in [CPLR §] 3101 must be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (see JFK Family L.P. v Millbrae Natural Gas Dev. Fund 2005, L.P., 132 AD3d 731 [2d Dept 2015] quoting Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32 [2014]).

CPLR § 3025 [a] provides "A party may amend his pleading once without leave of court within twenty days after its service, or at any time before the period for responding to it expires, or within twenty days after service of a pleading responding to it." This matter commenced on May 23, 2022 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No.1) and the Verified Complaint was filed on March 15, 2024 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 9). Plaintiff is beyond the time for amending the Complaint pursuant to CPLR § 3025 [a].

CPLR § 3025 [b] provides

A party may amend his or her pleading, or supplement it by setting forth additional or subsequent transactions or occurrences, at any time by leave of court or by stipulation of all parties. Leave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just including the granting of costs and continuances. Any motion to amend or supplement pleadings shall be accompanied by the proposed amended or supplemental pleading clearly showing the changes or additions to be made to the pleading.

"[I]n the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit" (see MB v KB, 81 Misc 3d 938 [Sup Ct Richmond County 2023] quoting Gurewitz v City of New York, 175 AD3d 655 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Marcum, LLP v Silva, 117 AD3d 917 [2d Dept 2014]; citing CPLR § 3025 [b]; Bernardi v Spyratos, 79 AD3d 684 [2d Dept 2010], Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220 [2d Dept 2008]).

"Only an excuse, not a reasonable excuse, is necessary to support the plaintiff's application to add a new defendant, as long as the delay was not intentional" (see id quoting Pansini Stone Setting, Inc. v. Crow & Sutton Assoc., Inc., 46 AD3d 784 [2d Dept 2007], citing Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173 [1995]; Davis v Larhette, 39 AD3d 693 [2d Dept 2007]; DeLuca v Baybridge at Bayside Condo. I, 5 AD3d 533 [2d Dept 2004]).

This matter is distinct from MB v KB. In MB v KB Plaintiff presented credible evidence [*7]of bank drafts being made out to the defendant that were deposited into the account of the proposed third party. Plaintiff in MB v KB further presented evidence that drafts were issued to proposed third party for significant amounts of funds from known clients of the defendant's business and Defendant did not deny these deposits but implied in a most circumspect manner that the deposits in question relate to some form of loan repayment.

In this matter, there are no allegations of misconduct or collusion between the Defendant and the third party. Every indication from the Court appointed neutral expert is that the forensic valuation was cooperated with. In the Court's discretion, the proposed allow amendment to add RJP, Sr., pursuant CPLR § 3025 [b] is patently devoid of merit.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the Complaint to add RJP, Sr. as a Third-Party Defendant is DENIED.


IV. Decretal Paragraphs

It is hereby ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's request that the Court reject the current valuation performed by KLG Business Valuators and Forensic Accountants, LLC, dated September 8, 2025, as incomplete is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED that the Plaintiff's request to direct the Defendant to produce RJP, Sr. for examination and order KLG to conduct a revised valuation upon receipt of complete financial disclosures is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the Complaint to add RJP, Sr. as a Third-Party Defendant is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED, that any relief not expressly granted herein is DENIED; and it is further,

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.



Dated: December 30, 2025
Staten Island, New York
E N T E R,
HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT