The Adolescent Offender, J.D. ("AO"), is charged with one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (Penal Law ["PL"] § 265.03[3]), one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (PL § 265.02[3]), one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon on School Grounds (PL § 265.01-a) and Criminal Possession of a Firearm (PL § 265.01-b[1]). The People filed a motion to retain this case in the Youth Part due to extraordinary circumstances. The AO filed opposition papers to the People's motion. The People's Motion Opposing Removal is determined as follows:

The charges filed against the AO arise from an incident alleged to have occurred on September 17, 2025, at approximately 8:10 a.m., at Uniondale High School located at 933 Goodrich Street, Uniondale, Nassau County, New York. It is alleged that the AO entered the high school with a loaded firearm in his backpack. The firearm was discovered by two school security guards when the AO placed his backpack through an x-ray screening machine at the entrance of the school. One of the school security guards retrieved the firearm from the backpack and gave the firearm to the principal. The principal observed the firearm was loaded with two bullets.

The People argue that the AO's case should be retained in the Youth Part because extraordinary circumstances exist due to the AO acting in an "especially cruel and heinous manner" by bringing a loaded firearm into Uniondale High School. The People argue the mere fact of bringing a loaded firearm into a school constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, regardless of what the AO's intentions with the firearm were. The People argue this act is beyond what is usual, regular, or customary, especially in light of a national increase of school shootings. The People factually distinguish the instant case from People v Lloyd F based on the charges each youth faced. ( — NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583, [2d Dept 2025]). In Lloyd F, the youth was charged with possessing a loaded firearm outside his home or business which was [*2]discovered by a police officer when the youth posted a live video on social media of the youth pointing the firearm at the camera. (Id.) In the present case, the AO was charged with possessing a loaded firearm in a school which was only discovered by a security guard by the use of an x-ray screening machine. The People argue there are no mitigating circumstances to warrant the case's removal to the Family Court because the AO was on probation to the Family Court at the time this incident is alleged to have occurred for possessing a firearm and was not rehabilitated by the Family Court's services. Furthermore, the AO was previously suspended from school for possessing a knife and reprimanded for behavioral issues, does not regularly attend school and did not avail himself of services he has been provided with.

In opposition, the AO argues that the People have not alleged extraordinary circumstances to prevent the statutory presumption of removal. The AO argues that the facts of the instant case are not heinous, hateful or shockingly evil. The possession of a loaded firearm in a school is not one of the scenarios legislatures contemplated when they envisioned a case that rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances. In addition, the AO contends that the proposition People v Lloyd F stands for requires the matter be removed to the Family Court. (, — NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583, [2d Dept 2025]). Furthermore, the AO argues the AO was previously compliant with his conditions of probation which shows he would benefit from the services of the Family Court. Finally, the AO mentioned his previous mental health issues and employment as mitigating factors that support the case's removal to the Family Court.

Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 722.23(1)(d) requires the Court deny the People's Extraordinary Circumstances Motion unless the People establish the existence of "extraordinary circumstances" which warrant retaining this case in the Youth Part. The People must "identify conduct that falls outside of the range of behavior that the Legislature presumed would be more appropriately addressed in Family Court." (People v Lloyd F, — NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583, [2d Dept 2025]). As the term "extraordinary circumstances" is not statutorily defined under CPL § 722.23, the Court is tasked with ascertaining the "legislative intent" and construing CPL § 722.23 to effectuate that intent. (See People v Lloyd F, — NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583 [2d Dept 2025]. See also People v Roberts, 31 NY3d 406, 418 [2018]). After referring to the common dictionary definition ^[FN1] of the term "extraordinary", the Court interprets "extraordinary circumstances" to mean that the People's Extraordinary Circumstances Motion must be denied unless they establish the existence of an "exceptional" set of facts which "go beyond" that which is "usual, regular or customary" ^[FN2] and which warrant retaining the case in the Youth Part instead of removing it to the Family Court.

The Court finds further guidance on the legislative intent from the legislative history of the Raise the Age ("RTA") legislation. (See People v Roberts, 31 NY3d at 423; see also People v Andujar, 30 NY3d at 166). In a debate that preceded the passing of the RTA legislation, legislators expressed that they intended the "extraordinary circumstances" standard "to be determined and shaped by a judge's ruling after the enactment and effectiveness of [the RTA legislation]"; and that they intended the presiding judge to take into consideration all the circumstances, including the facts of the crime and the circumstances of the youth. (Assembly, Record of Proceedings, April 8, 2017 ["Assembly Record"], p. 39, 83). Recognizing that "every case is going to be different," legislators directed that every case would be "looked at by the judge individually, to determine what kind of factors— both aggravating and mitigating—there are in the case, to determine whether or not" a particular case "passes the exceptional circumstances test." (Assembly Record, p. 83-84). Aggravating factors contemplated by the legislators include whether "the defendant act[ed] in an especially cruel and heinous manner" and whether the defendant was a "ringleader who threatened and coerced reluctant youths to participate in the crimes." (Assembly Record p. 40). Mitigating factors suggested by the legislators include "economic difficulties, substandard housing, poverty, learning disabilities, . . . educational challenges, lack of insight and susceptibility to peer pressure due to immaturity, absence of positive role models, behavior role models, abuse of alcohol or controlled substances by the defendant, by family, or by peers." (Id.). The legislators predicted that the cases would be "rare" where the Court would find "extraordinary circumstances" which warrant keeping a case in the Youth Part. (Assembly Record, p. 85). The overarching consideration is whether the youth's "deficiencies will be reformed, or, conversely, whether there is strong proof that the young person is not amenable or would not benefit in any way from the heightened services in the family court." (People v Lloyd F, — NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583 [2d Dept 2025] [citing Assembly Record p. 39]).

In this case, mindful of the legislative directives discussed above, and after considering the arguments raised by both parties in their motion papers, the Court finds that "extraordinary circumstances" exist to warrant retaining the matter in the Youth Part. The charge itself is disturbing to the Court. The AO not only brought a firearm to school, but a loaded firearm into a high school while school was in session. These facts certainly fall outside behavior that is customary, regular or usual in a high school. It is not lost upon this Court the heightened security schools are required to enforce in light of the increase in school shootings around the country. Uniondale High School is no exception as evidenced by the presence of two security guards, a metal detector and an x-ray screening machine. But for this increased security, the loaded firearm would have been available for discharge at the school.

The instant case is factually distinguishable from People v Lloyd F because of the location each youth possessed the firearm. (— NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583, [2d Dept 2025]). The youth is Lloyd F was charged with possessing a loaded firearm in a high crime area. (Id.) The AO is charged with possessing a loaded firearm inside a school during school hours. This distinction is not insignificant. A school building is not a high crime area. A high school that is in session holds hundreds of unsuspecting individuals who are present to learn and teach and do not expect to encounter firearms. Under the auspices of the Penal Law, legislatures consider the possession of a weapon on school grounds an aggravating factor because they created a separate charge for possessing a weapon specifically on school grounds. Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (PL § 265.01) is a class A misdemeanor, except, [*3]when the weapon is a rifle, shotgun or firearm and is possessed on school grounds, the charge is elevated to a class E felony. Although the legislatures did not designate possession of a loaded firearm inside a school as a basis to automatically disqualify the removal of the case to the Family Court pursuant to CPL § 722.23, these facts are viewed as an aggravating factor in evaluating whether extraordinary circumstances exist.

This case is additionally distinguishable from People v Lloyd F because each youths' prior adjudications were different. (— NYS3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 04583, [2d Dept 2025]). The youth in Lloyd F was previously adjudicated a youthful offender for a group assault where the youth was not a primary actor. (Id.) The Court found the youth's conduct did not reflect a pattern of recidivism or escalation of conduct. (Id.) In contract, the AO was previously adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for Criminal Possession of a Firearm—one of the exact same charges the AO currently faces. The fact that the AO is charged with the exact same crime shows a pattern of recidivism and supports that the AO has not benefited from the services the Family Court has already provided the AO. Furthermore, the AO's conduct has escalated; not only is he charged with possessing a loaded firearm, but now he faces charges for possessing a firearm inside a school.

The Court acknowledges that mitigating factors exist. The AO was diagnosed with ADHD and Bipolar disorder and was previously hospitalized for mental health issues. The AO is no longer under the care of a psychiatrist because the AO ceased taking medication. The AO was previously suspended from school for possessing a knife in school, behavioral issues and missing classes. Although the AO would benefit from mental health services and behavioral intervention, these factors do not outweigh the extraordinary circumstances that exist to retain the matter in the Youth Part. The facts alleged in this case are troubling and serious. As noted above, this is not the AO's first encounter with the criminal justice system, specifically for firearms. The AO was previously afforded the opportunity to benefit from the Family Court's extensive services. As evidenced by the pending charges, the AO was not deterred from future crime or rehabilitated by the services provided. As such, the aggravating factors present outweigh the mitigating factors.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds, having balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant retaining the AO's case in the Youth Part. See, e.g., People v BH, 63 Misc 3d 244, 250 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County, 2019).

Accordingly, the People's Extraordinary Circumstances Motion is granted. The matter will remain in the Youth Part and will not be removed to the Family Court.

This constitutes the opinion, decision and order of this Court.