On May 24, 2025, at approximately 1:05 AM, at the corner of 3rd Avenue and East 109th Street, New York New York, which is a public highway, Police Officer Anthony Bux, assigned to the 23rd Precinct of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), observed the scene of a vehicle collision after responding to 911 calls regarding two cars involved in a collision, in which a 911 caller reported that his wife had been injured after they were struck by another vehicle. On scene, Officer Bux observed, defendant, Tina Colon, standing at the side of one of two crashed vehicles and she stated, in sum and substance, "he struck me first." Officer Bux observed defendant to have the odor of alcohol emanating from her breath, watery and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and was further unsteady on her feet. Officer Bux concluded that defendant was intoxicated, and defendant was placed under arrest and removed to the NYPD Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit (IDTU) for chemical testing, where she was determined to have a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.09. Defendant also stated that she did not have a license and handed over a learner's permit when being placed under arrest.

For these acts, defendant was subsequently charged and arraigned in Criminal Court with two counts of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] §§ 1192 [2], [3]) and one count of Unlicensed Driving (VTL 509[1]).

On May 24, 2025, an accusatory instrument was filed, and defendant was arraigned the next day, and the case was adjourned to Part E for supporting deposition.

Thereafter, the People began obtaining discovery. The assigned prosecutor reached out to coordinate with several different departments and liaisons within the New York County District Attorney's Office that have been established to streamline communication and effectuate obtaining discovery from law enforcement agencies, such as a Body Worn Camera (BWC) Unit, a Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED) Unit, and a Litigation Support Unit (LSU). From [*2]agencies, the People obtained and disclosed approximately two-hundred-and-eighty (280) pieces of discovery with defense counsel, before filing and serving a Certificate of Compliance (COC) and Statement of Readiness (SOR) with defense counsel and the Court, on August 18, 2025. The disclosures consisted of activity logs for all testifying witnesses, NYPD arrest paperwork, complaint reports, DA paperwork, DWI paperwork, civilian witness contact information, calibration and maintenance reports, prisoner holding pen roster, prisoner movement slip, pedigree card, photographs, a 911 call, radio runs, property vouchers, BWC videos, vehicle paperwork, arrest photographs, law enforcement witness information including NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) paperwork and Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) paperwork, miscellaneous items, and more.

On September 8, 2025, defense counsel notified the prosecutor via email of purportedly omitted discovery. Specifically, defense counsel noted that, (1) while she received activity logs, they were all in-progress, so she was requesting the completed end-of-tour activity logs for nine police officers, (2) that defendant had received medical treatment but she had not received any medical treatment of prisoner forms, (3) that she was not in receipt of a picture taken by an officer of defendant's learner's permit, (4) she was inquiring into the existence chain of custody reports regarding defendant's vehicle, and (5) she only received certified records for the simulator solution used during defendant's breath test, but not any subsequent records and further requested records regarding different simulator solution lot numbers.

The prosecutor responded the same day informing defense counsel that he reached out as to the existence of the requested items and further noted that, (1) as to simulator solution lot numbers and associated records, that the simulator solutions are within the custody and control of the manufacturer who makes the instrument, that the issue has been well-settled, and attached a decision for counsel's review.

On September 10, 2025, the People were ready for trial in Part E, but defendant failed to appear. A bench warrant was stayed at counsel's request and the case was adjourned to September 17, 2025, in Part E-W, for defendant to appear. On the same day, the People received and disclosed updated activity logs and medical treatment form and filed a Supplemental Certificate of Compliance (SCOC) and SOR.

On September 11, 2025, defense counsel notified the prosecutor of additional missing discovery, namely, (1) a second 911 call, (2) intoxilyzer calibration records six months after, (3) portable breath test (PBT) certificate of analysis for the ethanol standard, and (4) field sobriety notes. The prosecutor informed her, that same day, that (1) he was unaware of additional 911 calls but ordered expedited 911 calls, (2) that he was disclosing a subsequent calibration report, (3) that he was disclosing the certificate of analysis for the ethanol standard, and (4) that he was unaware as to any field sobriety tests.

On September 12, 2025, defense counsel alerted the prosecutor that two officers are observed on BWC taking photographs, of defendant's learner's permit and the other of a PBT result, but she was not in receipt of them. The prosecutor informed her that he would ask the officers about the photographs and obtain them, subsequently obtaining and sharing the tow photographs with defense counsel the same day. The People filed a SCOC on the same date.

On September 15, 2025, defense counsel notified the prosecutor of additional outstanding discovery, namely, (1) updated CCRBs for four testifying officers, (2) Central Personnel Index (CPI) for three out of the four testifying officers, (3) a Department Advocate Office's (DAO) report for Officer Taborda in regard to IAB Log # 19-1413/CCRB #201900865; (4) [*3]CCRB investigative recommendations for case numbers 201900865, 201800074, and 202301835, regarding Officer Taborda, and (5) updated docket for a civil case involving Officer Taborda, including any settlements and dispositions. The prosecutor also filed a SCOC on this date.

On September 16, 2025, the prosecutor noted that those records, especially if not in the People's actual possession, were not subject to automatic discovery. Nevertheless, the prosecutor further noted that the District Attorney's Office receives CCRB allegation history on a quarterly basis from the CCRB, which is subsequently disclosed. Furthermore, the prosecutor noted that CCRB only sends an updated history for an officer only if there is something new to report. Thus, there were no updated records to disclose. In addition, the prosecutor noted that with respect to defendant's specific requests, (1) the most recent CCRB allegations were disclosed as noted, (2) he was only in possession of the CPI as to Officer Taborda and that Officer Almonte's CPI contained no discoverable allegations, and that the dispositions for those requested cases were closed as pending litigation, exonerated, and unfounded, (3) the Department Advocate Office is only involved in the most serious allegations and that they were not involved in the case at issue, as it was investigated by the precinct, and (4) defense counsel was also able to search publicly available dockets, such as on PACER, with respect to defendant's requested information, such as settlement amounts, that the People were not in possession of that information unless it was noted in documents already disclosed.

On September 17, 2025, defendant and defense counsel failed to appear in court in Part E, and a bench warrant was ordered for defendant's arrest. Later that day, defense counsel notified the prosecutor of three additional items of purportedly missing discovery, namely, (1) underlying attachments listed for Officer Taborda's IAB logs under case numbers: 2019-1413, 2018-8484, and 2017-51697; (2) a command discipline report for Officer Taborda's "Schedule B" command discipline related to a substantiated claim of failing to engage child safety locks or install a seat belt while transporting a prisoner, as contained in IAB log 2019-1413, and (3) Officer Almonte's IAB log 2024-8021.

On September 18, 2025, defendant voluntarily returned on the warrant and the case was called in Part E. Defense counsel requested the instant motion schedule, which was granted by the Court.

On September 20, 2025, the People responded to defense counsel's September 17, 2025, email stating that IAB logs are not discoverable, and citing relevant caselaw in support. They further argued that because the underlying offense was for failure to install a seat belt or engage in child safety lock while transporting a prisoner, that it does not tend to impeach.

Now, in papers dated September 22, 2025, defendant through counsel, moves this Court for an Order deeming the People's initial August 18, 2025, COC invalid, and its accompanying SOR illusory, on the ground that certain materials were belatedly disclosed or undisclosed and dismissing the misdemeanor information on speed trial grounds. Additionally, by omnibus motion dated October 14, 2025, defendant moves this Court for dismissal of the accusatory instrument on facial sufficiency grounds, the suppression of physical evidence, or a Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson hearing in the alternative, for Atkins/Capraella and Victory hearings, suppressing statement evidence, or granting a Huntley hearing in the alternative, granting a pre-trial voluntariness hearing, for the preclusion of evidence, for a Bill of Particulars, for timely compliance of discovery, for the preservation of evidence, for additional evidence, for the People to file an additional COC, for a Sandoval hearing; and reservation of rights. The People oppose [*4]in papers dated November 12, 2025. Defendant filed a reply on November 24, 2025.

After a thorough review of the parties' moving papers, along with the annexed exhibits therein, the court file, and the court minutes, the Court's Opinion is as follows:

Defendant moves this Court for an Order deeming the People's initial August 18, 2025 COC invalid, and its accompanying SOR illusory, on the ground that certain materials were belatedly disclosed or undisclosed. Specifically, defendant takes issue with belatedly disclosed calibration reports, certifications, activity logs, photographs, medical treatment of prisoner form, and a 911 call as well as with undisclosed CCRB and IAB records. The People oppose, arguing that their COC was valid, filed in good faith after exercising due diligence, and that the belated disclosures do not vitiate the validity of the initial COC. They additionally argue that defendant's claimed undisclosed materials do not constitute automatic discovery and consequently cannot vitiate the validity of the initial COC.

As recently amended, effective August 7, 2025, Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 requires the People to disclose to a defendant "material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or under the prosecution's direction and control," and provides a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to "automatic" disclosure. CPL § 245.20(1). Under CPL § 245.20(2), the People are required to "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under [CPL § 245.20(1)] and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control." The People are not required, however, "to obtain material or information if it may be obtained with the use of a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material with the use of a subpoena duces tecum." CPL § 245.20(2).

The People must also certify their discovery compliance in writing by filing a COC. Importantly, the People may file their COC even if they have not yet disclosed all automatically discoverable items provided that they have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the discovery required by [CPL § 245.20(1)]." CPL§ 245.50(1). The COC must "state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." CPL § 245.50(1). The COC must also identify "the items provided" and "the items that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence as evaluated under this section." CPL § 245.50(1). If the People provide additional discovery in connection with their ongoing obligations outlined in CPL § 245.60, they must file "a supplemental certificate" that "identif[ies] the additional material and information provided." CPL §245.50(1). A SCOC will not impact the validity of the original COC if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence or when the additional discovery did not exist when the initial COC was filed. CPL §245.50(1-a).

Once the People file a COC, a defendant must notify the People of any potential deficiencies in the COC by making "good faith efforts to confer with the [prosecution] regarding the specific and particularized matters" regarding the allegedly missing discovery. Then, if "no accommodation can be reached," the defense may file a motion to invalidate the People's COC provided that: (1) they do so within thirty-five days of the service of the People's COC; and (2) [*5]they file an accompanying affirmation of conferral stating that the defense "conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the [prosecution] regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge, that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the [prosecution] or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached." CPL § 245.50(4)(b)-(c). Significantly, the statute further specifies that "the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in [CPL § 245.80]." CPL § 245.50(1). Any such remedy or sanction must be "appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure." CPL §245.80(1).

To determine the validity of the People's COC, a reviewing court must assess the People's due diligence. As the Court of Appeals held in People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), due diligence is a "flexible standard that requires the People to make reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives." Bay, 41 NY3d at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Reasonableness, then, is the touchstone—a concept confirmed by the statutory directive to make 'reasonable inquiries.'" Id. at 211-12. Moreover, the Court recognized that, "[a]lthough the relevant factors for assessing due diligence may vary from case to case, courts should generally consider, among other things:" (1) "the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor's office to comply with the statutory requirements;" (2) "the volume of discovery provided and outstanding;" (3) "the complexity of the case;" (4) "how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence;" (5) "the explanation for any discovery lapse;" and (6) "the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery." Id. at 212. These six factors are now part of the statutory due-diligence analysis under CPL § 245.50(5)(a). This section also requires courts to consider whether: (1) "the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied;" (2) "the omission was corrected;" (3) "the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention;" and (4) "whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial." CPL § 245.50(5)(a). A reviewing court must "look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with the provisions of [article 245], rather than assess the party's efforts item by item." CPL § 245.50(5). The statute further directs that "[t]he court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in [CPL § 245.50(5)(a)] and no one factor shall be determinative." CPL § 245.50(5)(b).

Indeed, the Bay decision made clear that, in assessing the validity of a COC, the reviewing court should engage in a "holistic assessment of the People's efforts to comply with the automatic discovery provisions, rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require [a court] to conclude that a COC is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery." People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 (4th Dept 2024); see also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (People's COC was valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt). Notably, "[a]rticle 245 is not intended for use as a 'sword,' whereby [ADAs] are expected to run themselves ragged in at times futile or near-futile attempts to procure material in which defense counsel has no substantive interest beyond exhausting the People's statutory speedy trial time or hoping that the People, in frustration, opt to abandon the prosecution." People v Barrios, 82 Misc 3d 606, 613 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2024); see also People [*6]v Thompson, 79 Misc 3d 1220(A), *2 (Crim Ct Kings Co 2023) (article 245 "does not require the impossible; it does not demand that every scrap of discoverable information be turned over before the People may file a [COC]") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence and efforts made by the prosecution to comply with statutory obligations. Bay at 210-213. If the delay is a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable, or voluminous files, the Bay decision clearly posits that a court should apply a "holistic assessment" of the efforts made by the People to comply with their discovery obligations when evaluating the validity of a COC. Id. Moreover, several courts have found that certain delays or discovery issues should not invalidate a COC that was made in good faith, after the exercise of due diligence, and where, for example, the delay was a result of oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, voluminous discovery, non-existent items, or material unrelated to the case. People v Cano, 71 Misc 3d 728 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020); People v Lustig, 68 Misc 3d 234 (Sup Ct, Queens County 2020) (Zayas, J)(court found the People's certificate of compliance to be valid, since it was clearly filed in good faith under CPL § 245.50(1) and, therefore, no adverse consequence to the prosecution should result from the fact that the certificate was filed prior to the disclosure of the database search results).

Here, after a thorough review of the moving papers, court file, COC, the Court applied a "holistic assessment" of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, being mindful that perfection is not required. See Bay, 41 NY3d at 212. The People's discovery list demonstrates that they obtained and disclosed well over two-hundred items prior to certifying discovery compliance. These disclosures consisted of activity logs for all testifying witnesses, NYPD arrest paperwork, complaint reports, DA paperwork, DWI paperwork, civilian witness contact information, calibration and maintenance reports, prisoner holding pen roster, prisoner movement slip, pedigree card, photographs, a 911 call, radio runs, property vouchers, BWC videos, vehicle paperwork, arrest photographs, law enforcement witness information including IAB and CCRB paperwork, miscellaneous items, and more, demonstrating good faith and due diligence. The People's disclosures were extensive and substantial, especially in comparison to the few items of undisclosed materials that defendant cites. After defense counsel requested additional discovery, the People were responsive to those requests to resolve any potential discovery lapses as they made attempts to provide defense counsel with requested materials and did so, continuing to confer with defense counsel and addressed every line item demand and provided a legal basis for nondisclosure.

In addition, the New York County District Attorney's Office has made considerable and laudable efforts to facilitate discovery compliance, such as a creating BWC, LED, and LSU units and assigning paralegals and support staff to obtain discovery. And contrary to defendant's contention, "[t]he creation of these additional units and allocation of resources to generally address their discovery obligations under CPL Article 245 support a finding of due diligence on the part of the [New York] County District Attorney's Office in fulfillment of their discovery obligation in this case." People v Antunez, 86 Misc 3d 1265(A), *5 (Sup Ct Queens Co 2025) (Yavinsky, J). Taken together, this all demonstrates that the People's initial COC, made in good faith and after exercising due diligence, was valid.

Next, the People's alleged discovery errors are reasonable under the circumstances. This [*7]Court finds it reasonable to inadvertently omit the calibration report (six month after) and the final approved activity logs because they were generated after the COC was filed. With respect to the two on-scene photographs, "[i]t is not reasonable to expect the assigned ADA to watch all [bodyworn] camera videos disclosed in this case from start to finish at this stage of the proceedings in an effort to double-check that there were not additional photographs taken." People v Arbaszewski, 85 Misc 3d 1218(A) *6 (Sup Ct Queens Co 2025) (Yavinsky, J). Furthermore, one of the photographs was of defendant's own learner's permit, something that defendant is already in possession of.

As to the second 911 call, this Court notes that CPL 245.55(3) prescribes that "[i]f the prosecution fails to disclose such an electronic recording to the defendant pursuant to paragraphs (e), (g), or (k), or subdivision one of section 245.20 due to a failure to comply with this obligation by police officers or other law enforcement or prosecution personnel, the court upon motion of the defendant shall impose an appropriate remedy or sanction pursuant to section 245.80 of this article." This is true even in cases where the People have failed to exercise any diligence, let alone due diligence, with respect to disclosing a 911 call. See People v Diaz, — Misc 3d — at *3-5 (Sup Ct Queens Co, 2022) (Johnson, J) (People failed to exercise "even minimal effort in securing and/or preserving the 911 Call" but court applied CPL 245.55(3)(b) and granted defendant adverse inference under CPL 245.80 as to deleted 911 call). Here, unlike in Diaz, the People exercised due diligence, and defendant has not been prejudiced. Accordingly, this Court will not invalidate the People's COC on this ground and the People's actions were diligent, made in good faith, and reasonable under the circumstances.

This Court accepts the People's proffered explanations of inadvertent error as to remaining items such as the ethanol standard for the PBT and the medical treatment of prisoner form. This Court notes that like defendant's learner's permit, defendant was presumably aware of defendant's own medical treatment. Here, defendant received these items, as well as the second 911 call and photographs, albeit belatedly. As initially outlined above, "belated disclosures should not invalidate a [COC] that was made in good faith after the exercise of due diligence where the delay resulted from, for example, minor oversights in the production of material, delayed discovery of the existence of certain items, or a good faith position that the material in question was not discoverable." People v Perez, 73 Misc 3d 171, 176 (Sup Ct Queens Co 2021). Here, the People's COC was valid where the People exercised due diligence, "as evidenced by the extensive, voluminous documents" initially provided, and the People's belated disclosures, which were "minimal, insignificant, and voluntarily provided to the defense once the People were made aware of the existence of the undisclosed material," were made in good faith. People v Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158 (2d Dept 2024) See also People v Williams, 224 AD3d 998, 1006-07 (3d Dept 2024) (COC valid even though three discoverable items had not been disclosed where People provided "extensive" discovery before filing a COC, identified missing items when they filed the COC, and acknowledged their duty to provide missing items upon receipt); People ex rel. Nieves obo Taipe v McGinley-Liddie, 2024 WL 4660126 (2d Dept November 4, 2024) (COC upheld where People disclosed additional materials after filing it); People v Pondexter, 76 Misc 3d 349, 356 (Crim Ct NY Co 2022) ("once alerted to the single missing document—which was of minimal importance—the People immediately sought and disclosed it and provided a reasonable explanation for its belated production").

Furthermore, defendant hasn't received "any evidence or information that he had not received or that he had received too late to use effectively." People v Elmore, 211 AD3d 1536 [*8](4th Dept 2022) and is entirely unprejudiced as a result. There has been no hearing or trial, not a single witness has been sworn, and defendant was still investigating discovery upon receipt of the belated discovery. For all these reasons, the People's COC, made in good faith and after exercising due diligence, was valid.

The remainder of defendant's cited undisclosed materials are not subject to automatic discovery under CPL §245.45. Consequently, the failure to provide these materials with the initial COC cannot disturb its validity. In this vein, defendant's claim that he is entitled to law enforcement disclosures as impeachment material, such as IAB attachments, CCRB records, and CPI sheets is denied and meritless.

Under CPL § 245.20 (1)(k), the People are required to disclose "all evidence and information that relate to the subject matter of the case . . . that tends to . . . (iv) impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness." However, the People do not have to disclose "the entire disciplinary record for every law enforcement officer involved in the case." People v Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158, 1160 (2d Dept 2024). Defendants are not entitled to automatic discovery of the entirety of a police officer's personnel file. People v Johnson, 218 AD3d 1347 (4th Dept 2023). Rather, defendants are only entitled only to such records to the extent they "related to the subject matter of the case." Id. at 1350 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2023). People v Jawad, 84 Misc 3d 31, 34 (App Term 2d Dept 2d, 11th, and 13th Jud Dists 2024) (People not required to turn over underlying documents of disciplinary proceedings for testifying officers not related to subject matter of the case); People v Earl, 84 Misc 3d 44, 47 (App Term 2d Dept, 2d, 11th, and 13th Jud. Dists 2024) (People not required to turn over arresting officer's underlying disciplinary records for substantiated claims from "long before the events underlying this case," as they did not relate to the subject matter of the case); People v Fuentes, 81 Misc 3d 136(A), *1-2 (App Term 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2023) (only underlying records that are related to the subject matter of the case are required to be disclosed as part of automatic discovery, and the IAB files at issue, which "involved the officer's conduct in connection with a wholly unrelated case involving a different individual more than two years before defendant was charged" were not subject to automatic discovery). The Court of Appeals has emphasized that in assessing whether a document is discoverable, "[t]he question instead is whether the document 'tends to . . . impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness.'" Id. Furthermore, where the substance of the misconduct allegation is disclosed, "[n]othing in CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) . . . requires the People to disclose every single document referencing impeachment material subject to disclosure based solely on that reference." Id. at *12.

In People v Lewis, 78 Misc 3d 877, 879-80 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2022), the court found that the defendant did not "allege that any of the misconduct occurred during the investigation of [that] case or that any of the misconduct relate[d] to the charges against him or to any potential defense he might assert," and thus concluded that the People's disclosure, which consisted of summaries of unsubstantiated allegations and impeachment material already in the People's possession, was sufficient to comply with their obligation under section 245.20(1)(k). People v Lewis, 78 Misc 3d 877, 879-80 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2022). See also People v Masaquiza, Decision and Order, Docket No CR-031542-23NY (Crim Ct NY Co 2024) (McGrath, J) (citing People v. Sherman, 78 Misc 3d 975 (Dist Ct Suffolk Co 2023)) ("entire underlying [IAB] files need not be produced to satisfy the requirements of CPL article 245," the People must disclose sufficiently detailed information such that defendants can understand the nature and degree of [*9]the alleged misconduct).

While defendant argues that she should be entitled to Officer Taborda's IAB log attachments and his command discipline report on the basis that his complaint is substantiated, just like the defendant in Lewis, defendant has failed to show that any of the alleged misconduct by law enforcement witnesses occurred during the investigation of this case or that it relates to the charges against him or to any potential defense she might assert. Instead, a review of the parties' papers demonstrates that none of defendant's claimed impeachment material relates to the subject matter of the case as they are about wholly inconsequential and unrelated matters far removed in time from the instant case. Indeed, Officer Taborda has a substantiated case from 2019 for failing to engage child safety locks while transporting a prisoner, and this Court cannot fathom how this relates to the subject matter of the case or tends to impeach in this case. In that regard, the material at issue is akin to the material that was not discoverable in Earl and Fuentes. Accordingly, defendant's claim is denied.

Defendant's related claim that the People must disclose CPIs themselves is equally unavailing and denied. CPIs are known to contain exonerated and unfounded complaints and are also not generated for law enforcement purposes. Multiple courts have held that exonerated and unfounded complaints are not discoverable as potential impeachment material (see e.g. People v Barralaga, 153 NYS3d 808 [Crim Ct, New York County 2021]; People v Montgomery, 159 NYS3d 655 [Sup Ct, New York County 2022]), and here, these pages are mostly blank. Thus, these CPIs cannot be said to "tend to impeach," or related to the subject matter of the case, and are accordingly not subject to automatic discovery.

Next, defendant's related contention that he is entitled to CCRB records, such as additional CCRB records for Officer Taborda, is meritless for the reasons noted above. The CCRB is not a law enforcement entity and is, therefore, not within the People's control. See People v Washington, 86 NY2d 189 (1995). See id.; People v Alvarez, 71 Misc 3d 1206(A), *9 (Sup Ct, Queens Co, 2021, Lopez, J) (holding that the People are under no obligation to disclose underlying CCRB records where they do not have them in their possession); See People v Misciagna, Decision and Order, Docket No CR-033247-23NY (Crim Ct NY Co 2024) (McDonnell, J); People v Masaquiza, Decision and Order, Docket No CR-031542-23NY (Crim Ct NY Co 2024) (McGrath, J); People v Hidalgo, Decision and Order, Docket No CR- 0033261-23NY (Crim Ct NY Co 2025) (Haniff, J); People v Soto, 80 Misc 3d 473, 477 (Crim Ct NY Co 2023). Here, the People have already disclosed the CCRB materials that they have in their actual possession to defendant and the People do not have to seek or disclose additional records. Thus, defendant's claim is denied.

Finally, this Court also finds that defendant "incorrectly conflates the People's obligations — clearly set forth by the Legislature — to disclose [statutory materials] with an obligation to go on a wild goose chase for [material] that may exist somewhere — or that may not". People v Edwards, 77 Misc 3d 740 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2022). Furthermore, "that Garrett information is automatically discoverable in no way means that Article 245 requires the People to play Where's Waldo with every bit of anything potentially Garrett that could possibly exist for each and every law enforcement officer connected in even the most tangential of ways to the criminal matter." Barrios, 82 Misc 3d at 613. Nor is it incumbent upon the "People to undertake a fishing expedition to search the dockets of every case in every federal and state court in New York for complaints against their police witnesses, even when they had no active role in the investigation of the case." People v Morales, 86 Misc 3d 1227(A) (Crim Ct Kings Co 2025) [*10]citing City of Las Cruces v United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41506, *23 (NM Dist Ct 2022) ("[c]ourt cannot countenance a fishing expedition simply because it may catch some fish"). The mere fact that the People may, in some cases, disclose certain potential impeachment materials for law enforcement witnesses at the time they file a COC in the spirit of disclosure, does not mean that such materials must always be disclosed pursuant to article 245 such that a COC filed prior to such a disclosure is invalid. Accordingly, as to the aforementioned records, this Court finds that they are not subject to automatic discovery under the statute, and defendant's claims as to these records are denied as meritless.

In sum, after a thorough review of the moving papers, court file, COC, and supplemental COCs filed, the Court applied a "holistic assessment" of the People's efforts to comply with the discovery. The People have demonstrated that they acted in good faith and exercised due diligence by describing the detailed actions they took to comply with discovery obligations and disclosed more than two-hundred items. They meaningfully addressed and delineated the items listed in the defendant's papers. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that the People have in fact complied with their discovery obligations pursuant to CPL §245, and therefore, the COCs are valid. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC is denied. Defendant's remaining contentions are denied as meritless.

Defendant moves this Court to dismiss this action on the basis that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial, claiming that the People have exceeded their statutory speedy trial allowances under CPL § 30.30. In support of his claim, he argues that the People are attributable with well over their 90-day limit, and that the People — having repeatedly failed to validly declare their readiness on August 18, 2025 to the present — are attributable with 109 chargeable days, from the commencement of the criminal action on May 24, 2025, to September 18, 2025, the date of defendant's omnibus motion. The People oppose, contending that they have not exceeded their statutory allowances and are within their 90-day window, with only 85 chargeable days.

To prevail on a motion to dismiss under CPL §30.30 (1)(a), a defendant must present sworn allegations of fact establishing an unexcused delay that exceeds the statutory limit. People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 (2016); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 (1992); People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 357 (1980). At a minimum, the defendant must claim that the People failed to announce their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed period to meet their initial burden. People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 (2011); People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41 41 (2016); People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant has asserted that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of a criminal action without a valid declaration of readiness from the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay. People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980).

Pursuant to CPL §30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within "ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action" where a defendant is charged with "a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months . . . " See CPL §30.30(1)(b). Here, the criminal action commenced, on a misdemeanor with a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, on April 18, 2025, where the accusatory instrument was filed and defendant arraigned the same day, so speedy trial began to run the same day with an allowable ninety-days.

At all times until the People announce that they are ready for trial, the People are chargeable with the time that elapses unless they can show that the specific delay is not chargeable to them pursuant to an exception enumerated in the statute. CPL §§ 30.30(1), (4); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525-26 (1st Dept 2022). Moreover, under the newly enacted discovery laws defined in CPL Article 245, the People's compliance with their discovery obligations is now a prerequisite to asserting trial readiness. See CPL §§ 245.50(3); 30.30(5). Specifically, CPL §245.50(3) states that "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of §30.30 of this chapter until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to subdivision one of this section." CPL §30.30(5) provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20."

Once the People have met this statutory predicate by filing a proper COC, an accompanying statement of readiness is "presumed truthful and accurate and that a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory" People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392 (2016). Thus, "[i]n the absence of proof that [a] readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People's position ..., the People [have] discharged their duty under CPL 30.30" People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 (1998)).

The law distinguishes between delays occurring before the People have announced their readiness for trial from those that occur after the People have announced ready. People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534 (1985). While pre-readiness delays are excludable only if the People can establish that they fit within a category specifically excludable by statute, post-readiness delays are charged to the People only if they actually cause the People to become not ready for trial and are not specifically excludable by statute. People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 210 (1992); Anderson, 66 NY2d at 534. And once in the post-readiness context of the case, the People will only be charged with delays that are attributable to their inaction and that directly implicate their ability to proceed to trial. People v Nielsen, 306 AD2d 500 (2d Dept 2003).

With respect to the post-readiness posture, the burden shifts to defendant to show that delays occurred under circumstances that should be charged to the People. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; Anderson, 66 NY2d at 541; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993); see also CPL § 210.45(7). However, it is the prosecution's burden, in the first instance, to ensure the that the record of the proceedings with respect to adjournments is clear as to who is attributable with any delay to allow courts to make an informed decision on a 30.30 motion. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 215-16; People v Collins, 82 NY2d 177 (1993). In addition, the People are not required to declare their readiness repeatedly through the pendency of a criminal action. Cortes, 80 NY2d at 214.

Cognizant of all the relevant and applicable standards of law, and after reviewing the parties' submissions and their annexed exhibits, along with the court minutes, the Court's speedy trial computation and analysis is as follows:

The criminal action was commenced on May 24, 2025, upon the filing of the accusatory instrument, and defendant was arraigned the next day. The People were not ready for trial and the case was adjourned for trial in Part E on July 22, 2025. The date of reckoning is excluded from the computations. People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987). (59 days charged, 59 days total).

On July 22, 2025, the People were not ready for trial and the case was adjourned to September 10, 2025, in Part E, for trial. In the interim, on August 18, 2025, the People filed a COC and SOR with the court and defense counsel, after sharing approximately two-hundred-and-eighty files with defense counsel, bringing the case into the post-readiness context. See [*11]People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434 (1998). (27 days charged, 86 days total).

On September 10, 2025, the People were ready for trial in Part E, but defendant failed to appear. A bench warrant was stayed at counsel's request and the case was adjourned to September 17, 2025, in Part E-W, for defendant to appear. This period is excluded. CPL §30.30(4)(b) and (c); People v Espinosa, 170 AD2d 309 (lst Dept 1991); People v Cruz, 236 AD2d 322, 323 (1st Dept 1997) ("We note specifically that periods during which the court stayed a bench warrant are excludable"). (0 days charged, 86 days total).

On September 17, 2025, defendant and defense counsel failed to appear in court in Part E, and a bench warrant was ordered for defendant's arrest. Defendant voluntarily returned to court on September 18, 2025. This period is excluded because the time from when a court issues a bench warrant to the day defendant returns on the warrant is excludable. CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(ii). See People v Murry, 50 AD3d 383, 384 (1st Dept 2008). (0 days charged, 86 days total).

On September 18, 2025, defendant requested a motion schedule, which was granted by this Court and the case was adjourned for decision on defendant's motion on December 17, 2025, in Part E. This period is excluded for defendant's motion practice. CPL §30.30(4)(a). (0 days charged, 86 days total).

This period is separately excluded because the period of delay immediately following defendant's return on a warrant is excludable. People v Muhanimac, 181 AD2d 464 (1st Dept), lv denied 79 NY2d 1052 (1992); People v Munden, 276 AD2d 297 (1st Dept 2000); People v Degro, 141 Misc 2d 810 (Crim Ct NY Co 1988) (excluding the period because to hold otherwise "would unduly burden the People by requiring them to be ready for hearings or trials everyday of the year ... on the chance that the defendant might choose to appear"). (0 days charged, 86 days total).

In sum, the People are attributable with 86 days, well within their 90-day statutory allowances, and defendant's CPL §30.30 motion is denied without a hearing. Defendant's other claims are also denied for the foregoing reasons and this Court declines to address the parties' remaining contentions.

Defendant moves this Court to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that it is facially insufficient to support the charges. In support of this claim, she argues that the information fails to demonstrate that defendant was operating any vehicle because there is no observation of her driving. In this regard, defendant also argues that her on-scene statement of, "he hit me first," is insufficient to establish that defendant was driving on the basis that it is ambiguous, and the information provides no inculpatory context for the statement. Defendant additionally argues that the information fails to allege that defendant was not duly licensed to operate a vehicle.

The People oppose, arguing that the accusatory instrument is sufficient to make out the charges because the information establishes that Police Officer Bux observed the scene of a vehicle collision on a public highway and observed defendant standing at the side of one of the crashed cars in addition to defendant's admission, "he hit me first," suggesting defendant was driving the car.

An information is jurisdictionally sufficient where it states facts of an evidentiary character supporting the charges (Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] § 100.15[3]), and the factual allegations, together with any supporting depositions, provide "reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged." CPL § 100.40(1)(b). In order for the reasonable [*12]cause standard to be met, the factual allegations in the instrument must be sufficient to show that it is reasonably likely that a crime was committed, and that the defendant committed it. People v Hightower, 18 NY3d 249, 254 (2011).

In addition, the information and supporting depositions must include "[n]on-hearsay allegations" that "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof." CPL § 100.40(1)(c); People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000). This is referred to as the "prima facie case requirement." People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 (2009) (citations omitted). The prima facie case requirement in an accusatory instrument "is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial, nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial." People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 (2015) (citations omitted).

The Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized, "[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also People v Berrezueta, 31 NY3d 1091, 1092 (2018); Smalls, 26 NY.3d at 1066; People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100 (2010); Kalin, 12 NY3d at 230; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 576 (2004).

In evaluating the adequacy of an accusatory instrument, a reviewing court must do so in the light most favorable to the People, and should consider not only the facts expressly alleged, but also the reasonable inferences and obvious implications that can be drawn from those allegations. See People v Drelich, 32 NY3d 1032 (2018); People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747 (2012); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360. "[R]eason and common sense" govern the sufficiency of pleadings. People v Acevedo, 51 Misc 3d 137(A) (2016);People v Thompson, 54 Misc 3d 137(A) (App Term, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists, 2017). While "conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice," it is not necessary that all conceivable innocent explanations for the accused's conduct be eliminated (People v Desantis, 44 Misc 3d 133(A) [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]) and a reviewing court need not negate every other plausible theory when a reasonable view of the facts establishes the offense charged (People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 525-526 [2014]).

In this case, the information charges violations of VTL § 1193(3) ("No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.") and VTL § 1193(1) ("No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol."). The "common elements" of both offenses are "(1) operation of a vehicle, (2) on a public road as defined in [ ] § 1192(7), in either (3) an intoxicated or impaired condition." People v Valera, 58 Misc 3d 369, 375 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2017) (Collins, J.). The information also charges VTL 509(1), which additionally requires the element of "without being duly licensed." VTL 509(1).

The accusatory instrument, sworn by Police Officer Almonte, specifically alleges:

I am informed by Police Officer Anthony Bux, Shield # 15241 of the 23rd Precinct, that Officer Bux observed the scene of a vehicle collision on a public highway at the above described location, and the defendant standing at the side of one of the crashed motor vehicles. I am further informed by Officer Bux, that the defendant stated in substance to Officer Bux, 'he hit me first.' I am further informed by Officer Bux that Officer Bux knew the defendant was intoxicated because the defendant had an odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath, watery and bloodshot eyes, slurring her words, and unsteady on [*13]her feet.

I observed Police Officer Jonatan Taborda, Shield 20193 of Highway Unit No. 1, administer a test to determine the defendant's blood alcohol content and the test indicated that the defendant had a blood alcohol content of .092 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in her blood.

When I asked the defendant for her driver's license, the defendant stated in substance to me, 'I don't have one,' and handed me a learner's permit bearing her biographical information on said learner's permit.

The People have filed and served a supporting deposition executed by Officer Bux and DWI paperwork.

Here, while defendant accurately asserts that the information does not allege any direct observation as to her driving, such proof is not required to show operation for pleading purposes. Instead, operation is made out where a person "intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle" (People v Prescott, 95 NY2d 655, 662 [2001] [internal citations omitted]). And defendant's own inculpatory statements are nonhearsay admissions (see People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 151 n.* [2005]), that are more than adequate to establish that she intentionally acted to "set in motion the motive power of the vehicle," People v Prescott, 95 NY2d 655, 662 (2001). As the People aptly point out, defendant's statement that, "he hit me first," amply demonstrates that defendant was driving. Indeed, if the other driver hit her "first", then, logically, she must have hit him second. Moreover, the information establishes that Officer Bux observed a scene of a motor vehicle collision that had defendant standing next to one of the crashed motor vehicles. This fact, too, established that defendant had been operating the vehicle. See People v King, 83 Misc 3d 29, 33—34 (App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2024) (operation established by defendant exhibiting signs of intoxication while standing next to a car looking at damage inflicted on parked car it collided with).

Moreover, defendant "had an odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath, watery, and bloodshot eyes slurring her words, and unsteady on her feet," along with her statement as to fault, that the other driver, "struck [her] first." "These facts, coupled with an absence of anything that would suggest [defendant] became intoxicated only after driving the car, are sufficient to plead both impairment and intoxication". People v Minnock, 86 Misc 3d 1207(A), at *2 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2025). See eg, People v Granda-Vintmill, 41 Misc 3d 135(A), at *1—2 (App. Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2013) (misdemeanor information adequately pleaded facts of motor vehicle accident and officer's observation of "indicia of intoxication," and was therefore facially sufficient); see also People v Litto, 8 NY3d 692, 705 (2007) (explaining that a violation of § 1192(1) requires "impairment by alcohol," while a violation of § 1193(3) permits "a circumstantial showing of inability to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol").

Defendant's additional contentions that defendant's statement is ambiguous, and the information does not provide any additional context surrounding the statement is unavailing. As noted above, an accusatory instrument does not need to eliminate all conceivable innocent explanations for the accused's conduct (People v Desantis, 44 Misc 3d 133(A) [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]) and a reviewing court need not negate every other plausible theory [*14]when a reasonable view of the facts establishes the offense charged (People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 525-526 [2014]).

Defendant's related claim that the information does not establish that defendant was not duly licensed to operate a motor vehicle is also without merit for the same reasons noted above. The information establishes that defendant admitted to the police officer that "[she] d[idn't] have one," when asked to produce her driver's license, handing over her learner's permit instead, is sufficient to establish that she was not licensed.

Accordingly, the allegations, if true, sufficiently demonstrate that defendant was not licensed to drive, was drinking and got behind wheel, resulting in two crashed vehicles, and a BAC of .09. Thus, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (Casey, 95 NY2d at 360), the allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant committed each element of the crimes of VTL §§ 1192 (1) and (3) along with VTL 509(1). And by "stat[ing] the time, date, and location of the[] events," the information was "sufficient to prevent defendant from facing double jeopardy on the same charges." People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 519 (2014). Accordingly, the information sufficiently pleads a prima facie DWI case and defendant's motion is denied as meritless. Defendant's other contentions are also denied for the foregoing reasons.

Defendant's motion for the suppression of tangible and intangible evidence as the fruit of an illegal arrest made without probable cause, or for a Dunaway/Mapp/Johnson hearing alternatively, is denied.

A combined Dunaway/Mapp/Johnson hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether physical evidence, such as chemical test results, should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. A motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. Pursuant to CPL § 710.60, a defendant must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). A motion to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal arrest can be denied without a hearing when the motion lacks factual allegations to support the conclusion that defendant was unlawfully seized. See People v Brunson, 226 AD2d 1093 (4d Dept 1996); People v Purcelle, 282 AD2d 824 (3d Dept 2001). Conclusory allegations of an unlawful seizure can also result in summary denial of a suppression motion. See People v Toxey, 220 AD2d 204 (1st Dept 1995); People v Lofton, 129 AD2d 970 (4d Dept 1987). In order to obtain a Dunaway hearing, a defendant must allege a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate there was some material factual dispute that requires resolution by such a hearing. People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993). In this regard, the Court of Appeals has explicitly stated, "[a]n allegation that 'I did nothing giving rise to probable cause' is without more, plainly insufficient because probable cause is a mixed legal-factual issue, and the pleading lacks the factual portion of the equation." Id. at 427.

Here, defendant's argument that she was approached by police officers absent probable cause and that she was not engaged in any unlawful behavior and simply standing in the vicinity of the crashed vehicle (Defendant's Motion 29-30), is woefully inadequate to grant her a hearing. Notably, defendant also readily admits elsewhere throughout her motion that there was at least one 911 call placed by the driver of the other vehicle, reporting, in sum and substance, that defendant struck his car, and that defendant stated, "he hit me first," to officers. Defendant also [*15]does not dispute that officers responded to the scene in response to the 911 call, the observations regarding the scene of the motor vehicle collision, the observations as to defendant's intoxicated condition, or any other fact giving rise to probable cause.

Thus, the information previously supplied to police officers regarding the complainant, an identified citizen, is presumed reliable. People v Boykin, 187 AD2d 661 (2d Dept 1992). See also People v Burch, 59 AD3d 266 (1st Dept 2009) (summary denial appropriate where defendant failed to raise legal basis for suppression and defendant fully aware that arrest based on citizen victim complaint). Accordingly, defendant's motion does not amount to sworn allegations of fact sufficient to support any ground for suppression, nor does it create any factual issue warranting a hearing. See People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 (2006); People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 422 (1993). For these reasons, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a combined Dunaway/Mapp/Johnson hearing is denied.

Defendant moves this Court for a hearing on the basis that defendant's breath test was administered more than two hours from defendant's arrest. The People do not dispute defendant's allegations and furthermore, consent to an Atkins hearing. Accordingly, a combined Atkins/Capraella hearing is ordered.

Defendant's motion for a Victory hearing is denied. In Victory, the court held that a hearing is necessary to determine whether a chemical test "is sufficiently reliable to be admissible. People v Victory, 166 Misc 2d 549, 550 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 1995). The decision essentially manufactured a rule of admissibility from the two-hour consent rule from VTL § 1194(2)(a)(1). See People v Lopez, 86 Misc 3d 1246 (Crim Ct Kings Co 2025). However, such a hearing is not required, and defendant may challenge the reliability of such a test at trial. People v Rosa, 112 AD3d 551 (1st Dept 2013). See also People v DR, 23 Misc 3d 605 (Sup Ct Bronx Co 2009).

Defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements as the product of an unlawful arrest and seizure, or a Dunaway/Huntley hearing in the alternative, is denied. A combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether a post-arrest statement from defendant should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. As noted above, a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with CPL § 710.60. The motion must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion, which she has failed to do here, as noted supra. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing is denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression, or a Huntley hearing in the alternative, to test the voluntariness of defendant's statement is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered based upon the allegations contained in counsel's affirmation, entitling her to such relief. CPL §710.60 (3); CPL §60.45). Defendant is not required to set forth specific factual allegations of involuntariness in order to obtain a Huntley hearing. Accordingly, a Huntley hearing is ordered as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements.

The branch of defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding [*16]unnoticed statements sought to be used solely on cross-examination of the defendant pursuant to CPL §60.45; CPL §710.20(3); and CPL §710.40(3), is denied, as premature, with leave to renew if it is determined that such statements exist. The determination as to whether a statement was properly noticed is left to the sound discretion of the hearing or trial judge.

The branch of defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding statements made by the defendant to civilian(s) is denied. The defendant has not asserted that the defendant made any voluntary or involuntarily statements pursuant to CPL §60.45. Accordingly, the defendant's request for a voluntariness hearing is denied.

The branch of defendant's motion to preclude the offering of any unnoticed statement evidence or unnoticed identification evidence pursuant to CPL §710.30, is denied as premature as the People have not sought to offer any such evidence.

Defendant's moves this Court for an Order directing the People to supply her with a Bill of Particulars under CPL §200.95. In support of this motion, she argues that the accusatory instrument is factually vague and conclusory, and that defendant cannot adequately prepare a defense without the information requested with respect to the offenses charged. The People oppose, arguing that the facts supplied in their Automatic Discovery Form (ADF) and other discovery adequately apprises defendant of the charges, and that a Bill of Particulars is therefore unnecessary. They additionally contend that the rest of defendant's requests are evidentiary matters not within the scope of CPL §200.95.

The Court has reviewed the People's ADF, along with the Criminal Court information, and holds that they clearly apprise defendant of the conduct constituting the subject of the accusations made against him with particularity, rendering a Bill of Particulars moot. Moreover, this Court notes that defendant has access to all the discovery available in this case and was served with a COC. It therefore cannot be credibly claimed that defendant is ignorant of the substance of the accusation. Accordingly, defendant has already been provided all the particulars to which he is entitled. See CPL § 200.95.

The other information requested is evidentiary detail beyond the scope of a bill of particulars. See People v Davis, 41 NY2d 678, 680 (1977) ("[a] bill of particulars serves to clarify the pleading; it is not a discovery device"). The remaining matters sought are either beyond the scope of CPL § 200.95 or are matters of evidence. Therefore, pursuant to CPL § 200.95(4), the People do not need to supply further particularization of the information and ADF. Hence, defendant's motion is denied.

Defendant seeks the preclusion of using defendant's prior bad acts and/or prior convictions at trial pursuant to People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), and People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974) on the People's direct case or upon cross-examination.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where it is offered solely to raise an inference that a defendant has a criminal propensity. People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Wright, 288 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 2001). Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it helps to establish a defendant's motive, intent, identity, knowledge, common scheme or plan, lack of mistake or accident, to complete the narrative of the crime, or provide the jury with background information. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Ventimiglia, 52 [*17]NY2d 350 (1981); People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321 (1987); People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); People v. Davis, 169 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1991). In order to use this evidence, the People are required to notify the court and defendant, prior to jury selection, of their intent to introduce the evidence as part of the case-in-chief and identify the basis upon which they consider it admissible. People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). Once a showing is made that the evidence is relevant, a trial court may admit the evidence as long as its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice. People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988); People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-42 (1987). The permissible scope of such evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. See People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior bad act evidence is deferred to the trial court.

Should she testify, defendant, like any other witness, places her credibility in issue. Although a witness may not be questioned about an arrest per se, it is a provident exercise of the Court's discretion to permit cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, dishonest and or criminal act, even if defendant was not formally charged with it. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 373 (1974); People v Rockwell, 18 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2005); People v Di Bella, 277 AD2d 699 (3d Dept 2000); People v Connolly, 259 AD2d 1039 (4d Dept 1999); People v Maiolo, 122 AD2d 586 (4d Dept 1986); Prince, Richardson on Evidence, 11th Ed., 6-406. A witness may also be impeached by instances of conduct demonstrating a "willingness ... to place his self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." People v. Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461—462 (1994).

The People's disclosure obligation is governed by People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), which directs the People to notify the defendant, prior to the commencement of jury selection, of the acts which they will seek to use for impeachment purposes. However, it is defendant who must demonstrate that the prejudicial effect of such evidence so far outweighs its probative worth that it must be excluded, as it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. See People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 378 (1974). The permissible scope of such impeachment evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709, 712 (1995); People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459 (1994). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior convictions is therefore deferred to the trial court. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974).

The People are ordered to respond to defendant's demand to produce discoverable material in accordance with CPL §245, to the extent they have not already done so. CPL §245.20. The People are reminded of their continuing obligations pursuant to Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) and People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 (1961), and are ordered to provide such material as requested in the moving papers, to the extent they have not already done so. See People v Consolazio, 30 NY2d 446 (1976). As to the defendant's specific Brady/Vilardi production requests, the People are reminded of their continuing duty to provide evidence or information that is favorable to the defendant.

Defendant's remaining requests are denied as duplicative, premature, moot, unsupported by the record, or without merit.

Defendant's application for an extension of time to file additional motion is denied subject to rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.

The People seek reciprocal discovery from defendant, namely, information pertaining to alibi. Defendant is hereby directed to supply the People with alibi information and comply with her reciprocal discovery obligations pursuant to CPL §245.20(4), including filing and serving a Defense Certificate of Compliance with the People and the Court.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.