Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of respondent's notices of motion (Seq. 2 and 3) and any other relief as the court may find appropriate:

This is a holdover proceeding predicated on a 90-day notice of termination from a supportive housing scatter-site provider. The parties first appeared in July of 2025 and the proceeding was adjourned for the respondent to go through intake in the Universal Access to Counsel program. The proceeding was adjourned to September 2025. Petitioner failed to appear and the proceeding was dismissed by the court without prejudice (NYSCEF #6). Petitioner filed a motion seeking restoration of the proceeding (Motion Seq. 1, NYSCEF #7-13). Respondent did not appear, despite appropriate service. The motion was heard in October and the court granted the vacatur of the default and adjourned the proceeding to November 2025 for inquest or all purposes. The respondent, who was unable to retain an attorney, then filed two motions. Respondent's first motion (Seq. 2) seeks to vacate the default from the October date (NYSCEF #15). The second motion (Seq. 3) seeks that the court "uphold NYC Right to Counsel Law" and [*2]to "stay the instant case [for] no less than 60 days" (NYSCEF #20). Petitioner did not submit any written opposition. However, the court exercised its discretion in allowing the petitioner to present oral, in lieu of written, opposition (Messam v Omeally, 52 Misc 3d 144 [A][App Term 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

After substantial argument and taking into account the above listed papers, the court denies Motion Seq. 2, pursuant to CPLR §5015(a)(1). In Essence, Motion Seq. 2 seeks to open respondent's default such that she could challenge Petitioner's motion (which itself sought to vacate Petitioner's default). Respondent, while having a reasonable excuse for not appearing on the argument date has not negated, as a matter of law, the petitioner's potentially meritorious claim such that Petitioner's original failure to appear should not be excused (see Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Luden, 91 AD3d 701 [2d Dept 2012]; Woodhull Park 191 LLC v W.M., 83 Misc 3d 1254[A][Civ Ct Queens County 2024]). The court adheres to its prior decision that vacated petitioner's default. There is no prejudice to the respondent. There is currently no judgment against her, and she has every opportunity to litigate this proceeding on the merits.

Motion Seq. 3 presents a more interesting question. Respondent moves for the court to appoint an attorney and staying the proceeding for an opportunity to obtain meaningful representation from said attorney. Petitioner opposes. In her papers and during argument Respondent referred to the "Right to Counsel Law" (NYSCEF #20). The respondent stated that she obtained information about this purported right through her internet research.

While New York City is referred to as the first "right to counsel" jurisdiction ^[FN1] in the country (Ericka Petersen, Building a House for Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Evictions, 16 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties 63, [2020]) calling the current state of the law "right to counsel" is, at best, a misnomer if not a mere branding tactic. There is no "right to counsel" in housing court. New York City Housing Court, which hears hundreds of thousands of cases per year, does not require that each litigant is represented by an attorney. No statute mandates such representation. Contrary to the case at bar that type of "right to counsel" has existed for years in the criminal, Article 10, and occasionally immigration contexts (Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [1963]; Family Court Act §262(a)(i); see New York Immigrant Family Unity Project [NYIFUP]). Under these systems, excepting exceptional circumstances, the proceeding may not continue without counsel retained and present. Here, the court hears thousands of cases daily with only one party represented.

This misnamed Right to Counsel Law, under the various added provisions to the New York City Administrative Code only mandates that New York City "establish a program to provide access to legal services for covered individuals in covered proceedings in housing court" (Administrative Code of the City of NY, §12-1302[a]); 1106 Remsen Realty LLC v Hayden, 77 Misc 3d 1235[A][Civ Ct Kings County 2023]). In fact, the true name of this law is the Universal Access to Counsel Law (UAC). The law then created the Office of Civil Justice (OCJ). The Office complied with the law and created a system whereby tenants are given "access" to Legal [*3]Services Providers (LSPs). In practice, what that "access" means can range from full representation to purely brief services such as giving advice and providing information ^[FN2] . Timing, despite the law's clear mandate that the litigant receive access to services "no later than their first scheduled appearance in [housing court or as soon thereafter as is practicable," continues to be problematic (Administrative Code of the City of NY, §26.1302).^[FN3] Often, LSPs are requesting adjournments on the second or third time the proceeding is scheduled to be on the calendar because attorneys have only been assigned days prior to the appearance. Anecdotally, legal services providers throughout the city are overworked and understaffed, which has led to a bevy of litigants coming before the court after having been told that the LSPs have reached capacity for indeterminate amounts of time and that the litigant will not be represented.

Even if the city adequately funded the UAC program and the LSPs were able to staff to levels that are appropriate to the demand, there would still not be codified right to counsel. That this court believes that the right should be extended to all litigants is of no consequence and outside of the scope of its mandate. The benefits of a true right to counsel are impossible to ignore. The different outcomes for represented versus unrepresented litigants is well-documented with reduced evictions and other positive results (Heidi Schultheis, Caitlin Rooney, A Right to Counsel is a Right to a Fighting Chance [2019], https://www.americanprogress.org/article/right-counsel-right-fighting-chance/).

This court adheres to the legal realist school of thought. With this guiding philosophy as backdrop, the court notes the significant tension between the value and importance of housing rights as enunciated, for example, in Article XVIII of the New York State Constitution and the value of real estate in a capitalist economy. The creation, and funding, of the UAC Law often conflicts with the interests that are inherent to the summary proceeding court environment itself, which is the environment where New York City eviction proceedings are heard. By requiring attorneys to perform their due diligence, investigate, and litigate their cases, the UAC program necessarily seeks to slow down eviction proceedings. While the UAC seeks thoroughness, the reality is that the system of laws as it exists now has its own values and interests, and tilts toward the speedy recovery of residential housing where appropriate (see Dubowsky v Goldsmith, 202 AD 818 [2d Dept 1922]; South Brooklyn Ry. Co. v Heung Man Lau, 84 Misc 3d 527 [Civ Ct Kings County 2024]). This tension creates more pressure on the individual litigants, attorneys, and the court system to both speed up the resolution of these proceedings as well as allow for more time for what has become a robust, complicated, and interesting area of the law. Inserting the UAC program to the Housing Court environment as it is constructed is akin to stepping on a car's gas and brake pedal simultaneously.

Some of the possible solutions to harmonizing these tensions that the legislature could [*4]enact could be removing the questionably accurate term "summary" from these proceedings and allowing the vigorous litigation environment to shape itself or actually assigning attorneys to each proceeding at the first instance of court contact, either at the answer stage or during the court filing stage. However, whatever "ancient and undisputed" control the judiciary has over its own calendar does not fill the gap in changes required to implement any true solution to the implementation of an actual right (see Public Adm'r of County of New York v Cohen, 221 AD2d 297 [1st Dept 1995]). It is only the legislature that has the ability to change the laws to such a degree that a balance between these competing pressures could be achieved.

One notable exception to the court's lack of ability to appoint lawyers exists under CPLR §1102 which states that where a court grants under CPLR §1101(a) a motion to waive the costs, fees, and expenses of a proceeding the court may, in its order determining that motion, may assign an attorney to the moving party (see CPLR §1102). In the court's own multi-decade experience in New York City Housing Court, the court is unaware of this type of appointment ever having been made. The authority however exists in discreet situations. This is not a novel statement of the law. The appellate courts have noted the results of lack of counsel in civil matters for 50 years (Matter of Smiley, 36 NY2d 433 [1975]; Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v Swinick, 66 Misc 2d 833 [App Term 1st Dept, 1971]). While the court may have the ability, pursuant that line of cases, to appoint counsel, a mechanism that does not infringe on the constitutional rights of lawyers to do so is hard to cognize. For example, it could create an unreasonable burden on the Bar, both collectively and individually, both professionally and financially. Perhaps, as the court in Smiley, stated if more relief is sought to fix this lack of services it "must be provided by the Legislature" and cannot be a judicially-filled one.

Ultimately, the court must deny the motion because it lacks the authority/jurisdictional ability to unilaterally order a legal services provider to be assigned to a case under this posture. The court does note that various legal services providers spoke to the respondent after being in the part on the day of argument. However, no notice of appearance has been filed on behalf of the respondent.

Additionally, the court must address the CPLR Article 12 concerns made relevant by the type of housing at bar. Petitioner's counsel stated on the record that his client is a supportive housing provider for people with "certain issues." Counsel, however, was unable to clarify for the court what population, under the 2010e HRA rubric, respondent came to be referred to the petitioner for housing needs. Petitioner's counsel also vociferously opposed the appointment of a GAL. The court orders, pursuant to CPLR §409(a), petitioner to bring to court on the return date any documentation it has as to respondent's original referral to this supportive housing provider for ex parte in camera examination. While the court did not witness any particular acts or behavior which would lead to the court sua sponte appointing a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) pursuant to CPLR §§1201 and 1202, the court readily admits to not having the clinical or medical expertise necessary to make any type of diagnoses. The court also notes that disabilities which may trigger CPLR §1201 are not always readily visible, especially during a brief colloquy in an extraordinarily busy courthouse, like New York City housing court. However, the court disavows petitioner's comments that merely by bringing two cases ^[FN4] , that lost, against petitioner, [*5]that respondent does not meet the Article 12 qualifications. It could be, rather, that the inability to succeed on those claims or to bring non-frivolous cases could point towards the need for that type of GAL. While the court maintains the authority to appoint a GAL and has ordered the petitioner to bring to court documentation regarding the respondent's original referral, it is not, at this point, ordering a GAL appointment hearing. Should the petitioner obtain information that the respondent does require the aid of an Article 12 guardian, petitioner should move for that relief.

The court, for the reasons set forth above, denies both motions. This proceeding is restored to the calendar on April 1, 2026 at 9:30am in Room 502/Part J for all purposes. This constitutes the decision/order of the court.