The following numbered papers were used on these motion(s):

Upon the foregoing papers, the Court having elected to determine the within motion(s) on submission pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-f and IAS Part 2 Rules, Part II (Motions & Special Proceedings), Subpart C (Appearances & Post-Order Matters), Section 6 (Personal Appearances) ("All motions presumptively are to be argued in person unless the Court informs the parties at least two days in advance that it has made a sua sponte determination that a motion will be determined on submission."), and due deliberation having been had thereon, the within four motions are determined as follows.

This action for personal injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiffs resulting from a two-vehicle collision occurring on July 29, 2023 near Eastern Parkway and Albany Avenue, in Kings County. One vehicle, with New York plates, allegedly was owned by Defendant Pipi Joseph and operated by Defendant Lee Almondo. The other vehicle, with North Carolina plates, allegedly was owned by Ean Holdings, LLC, rented out by Defendant Elrac, LLC, rented by Defendant Leeietta Gibbs, and operated by Defendant Alexandria Gibbs. Plaintiffs allegedly were pedestrians injured as a result.

Motion Sequence No. 4 (Cal. No. 7 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), a motion by Plaintiffs for a default judgment against Defendants Lee Almondo and Joseph Pipi

Plaintiffs' motion seeking a default judgment against Defendants Lee Almondo and Pipi Joseph is denied for the following reasons:

• The attorney affidavit submitted in support refers to the amended complaint as being filed under NYSCEF Doc. No. 1, which is incorrect.

• There was a failure to comply with IAS Part 2 Rules, Part II, Subpart B, § 19, which requires that when reference is made to a previously electronically-filed document, said document must be submitted as an exhibit on the motion. Plaintiffs have referred to previously filed documents (including the above one, which was incorrect), without including them as exhibits.

• There was a failure to comply with IAS Part 2 Rules, Part II, Subpart B, § 27, which requires that the papers be served on non-appearing parties by first-class mail with certificate of mailing and by certified mail, return receipt requested. There has been no showing that a certificate of mailing was obtained for a first-class mailing of the motion papers. There has been no showing that a return receipt was requested for a certified mailing of the motion papers. Further, no copies of a certificate of mail and a certified mail return receipt were submitted.

• The attorney affirmation states in paragraph 19 that no previous application has been made. This is incorrect. Plaintiffs previously moved for a default judgment.

• There is no showing by Plaintiffs that Defendants were apprised of the motion being on today's calendar, as required by IAS Part 2 Rules, Part II, Subpart C, § 2.

A trial court possesses the right to enforce the rules governing practice and procedure before it (e.g. Anuchina v Marine Transp. Logistics, Inc., 216 AD3d 1126 [2d Dept 2023] [motion relating to disclosure must be accompanied by moving counsel's affirmation attesting to having conferred with opposing counsel in good faith effort to resolve issues]; McGee v Putnam County Assistant Dist. Attorney David M. Bishop, 192 AD3d 1446 [3d Dept 2021] [memorandum of law page limit]; Hornsby v Cathedral Parkway Apts. Corp., 179 AD3d 584 [1st Dept 2020] [affirmation page limit]; Basie v Wiggs, 173 AD3d 1127 [2d Dept 2019] [Matrimonial Part rules]; Appleyard v Tigges, 171 AD3d 534 [1st Dept 2019] [60-day summary judgment motion deadline]; Shah v RBC Capital Mkts. LLC, 115 AD3d 444 [1st Dept 2014] [all outstanding discovery matters to be raised at compliance conferences]; Biscone v Jetblue Airways Corp., 103 AD3d 158 [2d Dept 2012] [provide working copies of electronically-filed documents]; Maddaus v Bowman, 12 AD2d 626 [2d Dept 1960] [Statement of Readiness Rule requiring plaintiff to furnish authorization to obtain hospital records]; Shmerelzon v Gravesend Mgt., Inc., 80 Misc 3d 1233[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51155[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [adjournment requests must contain specified data and be submitted three days in advance]; Wade v Khadka, 80 Misc 3d 1222[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51058[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [identify party seeking adjournment and good cause reason]; Brick&Mortar LLC v Momo Sushi Inc., 79 Misc 3d 1239[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50838[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [submission of referenced electronically-filed documents as exhibits to motion papers]; Stipa Sprecase v Tenreiro, 2023 WL 3972435 [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] [motions to reargue or renew be made by order to show cause]; Latorre v Rahman, 2022 NY Slip Op 32044[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2022] [no motions allowed until conference is held]; Bedingfield v Dairymade Farms, Inc., 46 Misc 2d 146, 148 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1965] [rule requiring statement of readiness be filed with note of issue "is consistent with the inherent power of the Court to control its business"]; Scully v Jefferson Truck Renting Corp., 43 Misc 2d 48 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1964] [statement of readiness be filed with note of issue]; cf. Crawford v Liz Claiborne, Inc., 11 NY3d 810 [2008] [IAS Part rule not in effect when preliminary conference order issued, resulting in application of Local Rules]). "[I]t is within [*2]the court's inherent and statutory power to control the order of its business, and to so conduct its business as to safeguard the rights of all litigants, to preclude unfair procedural advantage to any party, and to prevent needless disruption of orderly court procedures" (Maddaus v Bowman, 12 AD2d at 626).

This motion was previously adjourned to afford Plaintiffs an opportunity to comply with IAS Part 2 Rules. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have failed to do so. Therefore, this motion is denied with prejudice.

Motion Sequence No. 6 (Cal. No. 9 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), a motion by Defendants Alexandria Gibbs, Elrac, LLC, and Ean Holdings, LLC for summary judgment against Plaintiffs, to dismiss the complaint

Defendants Alexandria Gibbs, Elrac, LLC, and Ean Holdings, LLC move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs, asserting that Plaintiffs did not sustain a serious injury as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and as required by Insurance Law § 5104 (a).

Plaintiffs C.K. (adult) and D.L.K. (child) were both examined at an IME on Nov. 11, 2024, by Dr. Pierce Ferriter, an orthopedist. Plaintiff D.L.K. was examined at an IME on Nov. 18, 2024, by Dr. Warren E. Cohen, Board-certified in psychiatry and neurology.

Dr. Cohen recorded D.L.K.'s reflexes as 1+ while Dr. Ferriter recorded them as 2+ (see Martinez v Pioneer Transp. Co., 48 AD3d 306 [1st Dept 2008]).

Dr. Ferriter did not address allegations in the bill of particulars that C.K. sustained the following injuries: cerebrovascular concussion, body jerks, post-concussion syndrome, dizziness, paroxysmal episodes of dizziness, and anxiety. In fact, he stated that "complaints of head" were deferred "to the appropriate specialty (NYSCEF Doc No. 108 at 8). No other report from a doctor examining C.K. as to these alleged injuries was submitted by moving Defendants.

Neither Dr. Ferriter nor Dr. Cohen addressed allegations in the bill of particulars that D.L.K. sustained the following injuries: head pain, anxiety, and emotional stress.

Since not all alleged injuries were covered by the IME doctors in their reports, moving Defendants failed to make out a prima facie case to the effect that Plaintiffs did not sustain a serious injury as defined by the categories of permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member and significant limitation of use of a body function or system (see Salcedo v MTA-New York City Transit, 217 AD3d 698 [2d Dept 2023]; Rosales v Rivera, 176 AD3d 753 [2d Dept 2019]; Adams v Dura Cab Corp., 152 AD3d 634 [2d Dept 2017]; Haque v City of New York, 97 AD3d 636 [2d Dept 2012]; Krayn v Torella, 40 AD3d 588 [2d Dept 2007]). Moving Defendants failed to show that there is are no issues of fact regarding serious injury.

With moving Defendants lacking a prima facie case vis-à-vis permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member and significant limitation of use of a body function or system on their motions for summary judgment, consideration of the other asserted categories of serious injury is academic, and the Court need not review Plaintiffs' papers in opposition (see Curiale v Delfavero, 211 AD3d 905 [2d Dept 2022]). Moving Defendants' motion must be denied.

The issue of serious injury must be resolved at trial. If serious injury under any one category is established at trial, the respective Plaintiff is entitled to seek recovery for all injuries incurred as a result of the accident (see O'Neill v O'Neill, 261 AD2d 459 [2d Dept 1999).

Motion Sequence No. 8 (Cal. No. 10 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), a motion by Defendant Leeietta Gibbs for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint and dismissal of cross-claims against Leeietta Gibbs

This is a motion by Defendant Leeietta Gibbs, who rented the North Carolina-plated vehicle from Defendant Elrac, LLC which was owned by Ean Holdings, LLC. The motion seeks dismissal of the complaint and all cross-claims against Defendant Leeietta Gibbs who is alleged to have schemed by renting the vehicle and permitting Defendant Alexandria Gibbs to operate it.

The motion is denied (see infra).

Motion Sequence No. 9 (Cal. No. 8 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), a motion by Plaintiffs seeking summary judgment against Defendant Leeietta Gibbs and denial of her motion

Plaintiffs cross-move against Defendant Leeietta Gibbs for summary judgment on their negligent entrustment cause of action against her. Plaintiffs also oppose Defendant Leeietta Gibbs's motion (MS # 8). Ostensibly, Defendant Leeietta Gibbs gave the keys to Defendant Alexandria Gibbs's son (i.e., Defendant Leeietta Gibbs's grandson) to bring in luggage. Although Defendant Leeietta Gibbs knew of the dangerousness of her daughter Alexandria, she did not inquire about the vehicle for a while after she gave the grandson the keys. There is a strong presumption in favor of permission to operate the vehicle which must be rebutted by substantial evidence of lack of permission (see Marino v City of New York, 95 AD3d 840 [2d Dept 2021]). That there is an issue of fact is enhanced by Leeietta Gibbs's knowledge of her daughter's proclivities. The issue of implied or actual consent must be determined by the jury (see Murphy v Carnesi, 30 AD3d 570 [2d Dept 2006]). Plaintiffs have not established as a matter of law that Defendant Leeietta Gibbs is liable. Defendant Leeietta Gibbs has not established as a matter of law that she is not liable. The motion is denied to the extent that Plaintiffs seek summary on their negligent entrustment cause of action against Defendant Leeietta Gibbs.

Conclusion

It is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) Motion Sequence No. 4 (Cal. No. 7 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), the motion by Plaintiffs for a default judgment against Defendants Lee Almondo and Joseph Pipi is DENIED.

(2) Motion Sequence No. 6 (Cal. No. 9 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), the motion by Defendants Alexandria Gibbs, Elrac, LLC, and Ean Holdings, LLC for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint is DENIED, and if serious injury under any one category is established at trial, the respective Plaintiff is entitled to seek recovery for all injuries incurred as a result of the accident

(3) Motion Sequence No. 8 (Cal. No. 10 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), the motion by Defendant Leeietta Gibbs for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint and dismissal of cross-claims against Leeietta Gibbs is DENIED.

(4) Motion Sequence No. 9 (Cal. No. 8 on the January 8, 2026 calendar), the motion by Plaintiffs seeking summary judgment against Defendant Leeietta Gibbs is GRANTED TO THE EXTENT of denying the latter's motion (MS # 8). That branch seeking summary judgment on their negligent entrustment cause of action against is DENIED.