Plaintiff commenced this action for harassment and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of a relationship between plaintiff and defendants in their mutual capacities as members of certain political organizations in Saratoga County, New York. Plaintiff previously served as chair of the Town of Malta Republican Committee, while defendant Suhrada is the chair of the Saratoga County Republican Committee and defendant Sartin is the chair of the [*2]Saratoga County Conservative Committee.^[FN1] Each of those political committees is also named as a separate defendant. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for facial insufficiency under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), as well as under the state's anti-SLAPP provisions contained in Civil Rights Law § 75-a and CPLR 3211 (g). Plaintiff opposes the motion, citing for the first time Executive Law article 15 and workplace harassment claims.

When considering a motion to dismiss a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the Court must "accept the facts alleged as true and determine simply whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Rovello v. Orofino Realty, 40 NY2d 633)" (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980] [case citation omitted]). In performing this analysis, "the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see, CPLR 3026)" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), and the Court is required to "accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference" (id.) no matter what "an ultimate trial may disclose as to the truth of [those] allegations" (Sanders v Winship, 57 NY2d 391, 394 [1982]) and "without expressing any opinion as to the plaintiff's ability ultimately to establish the truth of these averments before the trier of the facts" (219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander's, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 509 [1979]). "[T]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail (see Foley v D'Agostino, 21 AD2d 60, 64-65; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3211:24, p 31; 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3211.36)" (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Plaintiff, who is 65 years of age and female, is a real estate broker and owns a real estate sales company with multiple locations. She alleges that in November of 2024, defendant Sartin expressed "harsh criticism" of a Malta Town board decision to rescind funding to law enforcement and that as part of her committee chair position, she was tasked with formulating a united response from elected Republican town officials on controversial matters. She alleges, without specification of any facts, that as a result of her efforts to attempt to unify the Republicans behind a single narrative on those topics, she was met with a pervasive and ongoing pattern of hostility and verbal abuse from fellow elected Republican officials including the individual and committee defendants. Plaintiff further claims that at the end of that year, she sought the assistance of defendant Suhrada, who offered no help, but coaxed her to remain as town committee chair, despite the stress caused by this role to her mental and physical health.

During the month of January 2025, plaintiff "became the target of increased dissension and wrath when she refused to support the endorsement of Mark Hammond for supervisor." Plaintiff was "subjected to fits of anger from . . . Surhada and Sartin" who demanded that plaintiff endorse their pick for supervisor. When plaintiff objected, "Sartin's behavior became increasingly threatening towards plaintiff and the other members of the slate of Republican Town of Malta candidates."

During a town chairpersons' meeting on February 3, 2025, plaintiff "was immediately met by a demand for money for the county committee from candidates." Plaintiff tried to explain that judicial candidates were exempt, but Surhada told her "she was to comply." Surhada was [*3]"demeaning, denigrating and hostile towards plaintiff" and, according to plaintiff, his behavior during this meeting was "alarming." At this same meeting, Sartin "lashed out" at plaintiff with "an unprecedented level of anger[,] demanding that [plaintiff's] failure to endorse their Supervisor candidate" would result in defendants "making the interviews of Malta candidates incredibly difficult and having 'the interviews of their lives.'"

Plaintiff alleges that the foregoing circumstances caused her to suffer from anxiety and depression requiring medication and that, in February of 2025, continued threats, lashing out, and denigration from Suhrada and Sartin lead to her resignation from the position. Plaintiff also alleges that her "performance as a realtor has suffered, . . . she is unable to handle the daily job requirements of a broker as a result of severe emotional distress" caused by "the harassment, intimidation and threats" by defendants. Plaintiff asserts that "Republican members of the Malta Town Board were willing to cooperate on issues with the male members of Republican Party leadership, but did not attempt to hide their animosity towards a woman in a leadership position."

The Court turns to the first cause of action. It is well established that New York does not recognize a stand-alone common-law cause of action alleging harassment (Wells v Town of Lenox, 110 AD3d 1192 [3d Dept 2013]; Carroll v Roundout Yacht Basin, Inc., 162 AD2d 1150 [3d Dept 2018]; Edelstein v. Farber, 27 AD3d 202 [1st Dept 2006]; Goldstein v. Tabb, 177 AD2d 470 [2d Dept 1991]). A close reading of the plaintiff's complaint reveals bald, conclusory allegations of objectionable actions on the part of Suhrada and Sartin, as well as unnamed committee members, but no specific factual averments detailing the underlying words used or intimidating physical conduct by the individual defendants. Moreover, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions are not entitled to consideration (Tenney v. Hodgson Russ, LLP, 97 AD3d 1089, 1090 [3d Dept 2012], citing Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, 485 [1985]). Regardless of plaintiff's allegations, there is no legal basis for such a claim for damages.

Although the affirmation of counsel opposing defendant's motion asserts a statutory claim for workplace harassment under Executive Law article 15, § 290 et seq. (New York State Human Rights Law, or NYSHRL), alleging for the first time that she occupied a subordinate position to defendant Suhrada in a "workplace" environment, such affirmation by counsel is of no consequence here. Under Executive Law § 292 (5), "employer" includes "all employers within the state" but does not set forth any formal definition. For purposes of the NYSHRL, factors indicative of an employer-employee relationship include right of control, hiring of the individual, payment of salary and power to dismiss the individual (see Klymn v Supreme Ct., Monroe County, 240 AD3d 1320, 1321-1322 [4th Dept 2025]; State Div. of Human Rights v GTE Corp., 109 AD2d 1082, 1083 [4th Dept 1985]).

It is true that an affidavit in opposition to a motion to dismiss may supplement a verified complaint (Lewis v DiDonna, 294 AD2d 799, 800 [3d Dept 2002]) or "remedy any defects in the complaint" wherein any facts alleged in the affidavit are likewise assumed to be true (Tcharnyi v Mendez, 221 AD3d 930, 931 [2d Dept 2023]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527 [2009]). However, "an affidavit from one who has no personal knowledge of the operative facts is without probative value and consequently is insufficient to defeat the motion (see [S.J.] Capelin Assoc. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 NY2d 338, 342; Sturtevant v. Home Town Bakery, 192 AD2d 904, 905)" (Bronson v Algonquin Lodge Assn., 295 AD2d 681, 682 [3d Dept 2002]). This includes an "affirmation by counsel, without personal knowledge of the facts" (Wisnieski v Kraft, 242 AD2d 290, 291 [2d Dept 1997]). "The mere averment of facts as upon personal [*4]knowledge . . . in a verified complaint or in an affidavit is not sufficient unless circumstances are stated from which the inference can be drawn that the affiant has personal knowledge of the facts which he avers (Hoormann v. Climax Cycle Co., 9 App. Div. 579, cited with approval in Matter of Farley v. Wurz, 217 NY 105, 108, and in Zenith Bathing Pavilion v. Fair Oaks S.S. Corp., 240 NY 307, 312; Einstein v. Climax Cycle Co., 13 App. Div. 624)" (Reitmeister v Reitmeister, 273 App Div 652, 654 [1st Dept 1948]).

Here, the attorney affirmations provide the Court with no basis upon which to infer that counsel has personal knowledge of the alleged facts, and do not cure defects in the complaint or substitute for a proper pleading. Moreover, neither the complaint (which was verified not by plaintiff, but by counsel) nor the attorney affirmation sufficiently allege any facts from which, assuming their truth, could support a conclusion that defendants collectively or otherwise were plaintiff's "employer" for purposes of the NYSHRL.

Plaintiff also argues in the attorney affirmation in opposition that the alleged facts in the complaint satisfy the elements for prima facie tort.^[FN2] Such cause of action "requires a showing of an intentional infliction of harm, without excuse or justification, by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be lawful," that caused special damages (Lerwick v Kelsey, 24 AD3d 931, 931-932 [3d Dept 2005]). A plaintiff must also show that "malevolence was the sole motivating factor" (id. at 932). Even considering plaintiff's complaint, it is nonetheless devoid of any particular facts that meet these elements, and the attorney affirmation is lacking in probative value. Plaintiff's pleading similarly fails to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which requires factual allegations of conduct that was "so outrageous in character" and "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency" (Doin v Dame, 82 AD3d 1338, 1340 [3d Dept 2011], quoting Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Again, counsel's affirmation is insufficient to fill in pleading gaps. Plaintiff's harassment claim as contained in the complaint must accordingly be dismissed.

Turning to the second cause of action, a claim to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress generally requires a plaintiff to show "a breach of duty owed to her which unreasonably endangered her physical safety, or caused her fear for her own safety" (Graber v Bachman, 27 AD3d 986, 987 [3d Dept 2006]; A.M.P. v Benjamin, 201 AD3d 50 [3d Dept 2021); Dolgas v Wales, 215 AD3d 51 [2023]). Here, neither the complaint—which is not verified by plaintiff herself—nor any sworn affidavit of a witness submitted in response to the motion provides a basis upon which the Court could reasonably infer that defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff as the result of their relationship in political organizations. There are no factual allegations from the plaintiff or any other witness having personal knowledge of endangerment or fear of endangerment to her physical safety caused by the defendants, other than a conclusory statement contained in her attorney's affirmation indicating that defendants breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff which caused her significant physical and emotional distress. Defense counsel's affirmation fails to provide the Court with any information upon which it could reasonably conclude that he was a fact witness to such claims. In addition, despite plaintiff's [*5]contentions to the contrary, a court may not take judicial notice of alleged sociopolitical conditions or perceived societal harm offered to establish missing factual allegations or to create a duty of care in the absence of controlling statutory or judicial authority, as such matters are neither adjudicative facts nor a substitute for well-pleaded claims. For these reasons, the Court grants the motion of to dismiss the second cause of action.

Finally, the Court notes that the complaint names two political committees as defendants but alleges no theory of liability connecting an official act of either committee to colorable conduct under the law. Additionally, the pleadings and motion papers lack any proof in admissible form showing that the political committees in question owed the plaintiff a duty of care. Generalized allegations as to unspecified acts of unidentified committee members, without more, fails to state a claim and requires dismissal pursuant CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Turning to the defendants' claims for recovery of costs and counsel fees under CPLR 3211 (g) and Civil Rights Law § 70-a, such relief is recoverable for defendants in actions involving "public petition and participation" as defined in Civil Rights Law § 76-a. These provisions authorize early dismissal and counsel fee provisions in certain lawsuits commonly referred to as "SLAPP suits"—litigation aimed at silencing speech, petition or association rights.^[FN3] As the anti-SLAPP movants, defendants bear the burden of showing that the statute applies. Such claims must be based upon a communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest or any other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest, or in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition (Civil Rights Law § 76-a). The term "[p]ublic interest" is defined to include "any subject other than a purely private matter" (id. § 76—a [1] [d]; Nelson v Ardrey, 231 AD3d 179, 183 [2d Dept 2024]).

Just as plaintiff's complaint is devoid of minimally required allegations of fact to support her causes of action, so too the defendants' motions lack sufficient allegations of fact to sustain the required burden of proof here. The Court cannot determine from the pleadings or the motion papers that this action involves communication within the meaning of Civil Rights Law § 76-a. The complaint does not allege the content of the alleged speech, the forum within which it occurred, or its connection to an issue of public interest and this Court cannot speculate about protected speech merely because political organizations and their officers have been named as defendants. Conclusory descriptions, without factual detail as to what was actually said or the circumstances under which the statements were made, are insufficient to establish that the challenged conduct falls within the scope of protected activity contemplated by Civil Rights Law § 76-a or whether they relate to a purely private matter. Because the pleadings fail to demonstrate that this action implicates protected speech, the heightened standard of CPLR 3211 (g) does not apply, and defendant's request for costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a is denied.

The above constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. The signing of this Decision [*6]and Order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provision of that section with respect to filing, entry and notice of entry.

Decision and order signed on January 12, 2026, at Lake George, New York.