The defendant, Antoine Taylor, is charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol as a misdemeanor, (VTL § 1192[3]); Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 120.20) and Reckless Driving (VTL § 1212).^[FN1]

These charges are based on defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. On January 30, 2025, the defendant collided with the Mr. Buitrago's vehicle that had stopped at red light. Two passengers were in Mr. Buitrago's vehicle. After exchanging vehicle insurance and registration information, the defendant started to drive away from the scene before the police arrived. In doing so, he nearly hit the complainant, Mr. [*2]Buitrago. The defendant then collided with a second vehicle a short distance away. The police arrived shortly thereafter and the defendant was arrested for driving while under the influence and related offenses. The defendant was eventually taken to the Highway District Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit for coordination tests and a breathalyzer test that he refused. This proceeding was video recorded.

In papers dated September 8, 2025, the defendant moves for an order invalidating the People's certificate of compliance filed on July 23, 2025, and the supplemental certificates of compliance respectively filed on August 27, 2025, and August 29, 2025, on the ground the People did not exercise due diligence and make reasonable inquires and engage in reasonable efforts before the initial COC was filed on July 23, 2025. Relatedly, the defendant moves for dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The items in dispute are the grand jury transcript, several photographs taken by police officers of the damaged vehicles, Axon device audit logs, names and contact information of civilian witnesses (passengers in Mr. Buitrago's vehicle), the ambulance call report, a motor vehicle collision report, tow paperwork, all property vouchers, DMV lookup-ups/DMV Compass Report, IDTU Metadata and the Notice of Hearing form (Krimstock hearing).

The People's response, dated October 6, 2025, oppose the defendant's motion, arguing that some of the material at issue was previously disclosed as unavailable at the time the certificate of compliance was filed, other material did not exist, other material was not discoverable. The People also maintain they acted with due diligence, made reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain the materials belatedly disclosed to the defendant in their supplemental COCs dated August 29, 2025, and October 6, 2025. However, the People did not directly respond to the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL § 30.30.

Article 245 was again amended on May 9, 2025, effective on August 7, 2025, and shall apply to all criminal proceedings initiated on or before such date. (See, L. 2025, ch 56, amended Article 245 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, signed May 9, 2025; effective August 7, 2025).^[FN2] Previously, the People were required to disclose "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case . . . in their possession, custody or control . . . or persons under [their] direction or control, including, but not limited to "the twenty-one categories of information provided in 245.20(1)(a) through (1)(u). The legislative amendments to Article 245 narrowed the scope of disclosure in four categories. The categories of information amended are statements made by a defendant or co-defendant, transcripts of grand jury testimony, photographs or drawings made by any law enforcement officer or a potential witness at trial and photographs or reproductions of property made by any law enforcement officer prior to its release. The amendments limited the scope of disclosure of information "that relates to the subject matter of the charges against the defendant in the instant case" (CPL § 245.20[1][a], [b], [h], [i].) The beginning language of CPL § 245.20(1) was also amended to limit the items that must be disclosed by the People to the twenty-one categories listed in this section, but added a [*3]catch-all provision, subsection (v), which requires the People to disclose "[a]ny other material and information relevant to the subject matter of the charges against the defendant in the instant case or a defense thereto that are not designated in paragraphs (a) through (u) of this subdivision." (See CPL § 245.20 [1] [v]). This added provision narrowed the scope of disclosure to "material and information relevant to the charges against the defendant" from the previous disclosure requirement of providing items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case.

Once the People have complied with the mandates of CPL § 245.20, the People are required to serve and file a certificate of compliance. Under the current and pre-August 2025 revisions to Article 245, the validity of the People's COC depends on whether the People can demonstrate good faith and due diligence in discharging their discovery obligations. (See People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211-212 [2023]; CPL § 245.50[5]) The People's COC must state that "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery," the People have "disclosed and made known all material and information it has obtained subject to discovery" (CPL § 245.50[1]). The recent amendment now permits the People to file a COC even if certain materials or information are not disclosed as long as they "identify the items" that they are required to disclose but could not be obtained "despite the exercise of due diligence" (CPL § 245. 50[1]).

The new amendments also impose time limits and prerequisites prior to challenging a COC. Absent an applicable exception, challenges to a COC must be brought within 35 days of the filing date of the COC. Before a defendant can bring a challenge, the defense must confer with and alert the People to missing discovery. (CPL § 245.50[4][b],[c]) Thereafter, the defense may file a written challenge by motion to any discovery still in dispute within the 35 days of the filing of the People's COC. Any challenges to the People's COC must contain an affirmation by the defense that "after the filing of the [People's COC]," the defense "timely conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the [People] regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge" and that "efforts to obtain the missing discovery" or otherwise to resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful and that no accommodation could be reached" (CPL § 245.50[4][c]).

The Legislature also adopted in CPL § 245.50 (5) the due diligence analysis set forth in Bay, 41 NY3d at 212, along with other non-exhaustive factors that courts must consider when assessing the People's due diligence. The Bay court established in dealing with discovery compliance, "there is no rule of strict liability" (Id.) The analysis is fundamentally case-specific and will turn on the circumstances presented. (Id.) In weighing due diligence, courts must consider the "totality" of the prosecution's efforts and not focus the People's efforts on an item by item basis. (CPL § 245.50[5]). In this regard, the People bear the burden of establishing that they did, if fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC" (Id. at 213)

In addition, the People must maintain "a flow of information" between them and the law enforcement agency involved, and they have a continuing duty to disclose automatic discovery (CPL §§ 245.50, 245.60) If the People obtain additional discoverable material or information, they must file a supplemental certificate disclosing such materials or information to the defendant (CPL § 245.50[1]). In the supplemental COC, the People must identify the additional material provided and detail the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine [*4]whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance. (CPL §§ 245.50 [1], [1-a]) However, the filing of a supplemental COC "shall not impact the validity of the original [COC] if filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence" (CPL § 245.50[1]).

Due diligence is assessed by weighing the factors listed in CPL § 245.50[5][a] along with any other factor relevant to the analysis of due diligence. When a defendant challenges the People's certificate, a reviewing court must examine the alleged discovery lapses individually to determine whether and to what extent the People failed to meet their discovery obligations. If the reviewing court finds any discovery violations, the reviewing court must then examine the violations in the context of "the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with the provisions of [Article 245]" to determine whether the People nevertheless "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith" in discharging their duties (CPL § 245.50[5].) In this regard, even where the People have not satisfied all of their discovery obligations, their certificate of compliance will not be invalidated where they have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material" (CPL § 245.50[6]; see also Bay at 211) In determining whether the People acted with due diligence, the court must consider:

[T]he efforts made by the People to comply with [their discovery obligations]; the volume of discovery material provided and the volume of discovery material outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.(CPL § 245.50[5][a]; see also Bay, 41 NY3d at 212).

The People filed their COC on July 23, 2025. The prosecutor noted on page 2 of the COC that the grand jury minutes had not been provided, but would be disclosed as soon as they became available. The same information was also noted in the attached Notice of Non-Disclosure under CPL §§ 245.10(1)(c) and (d) and that . . . "[the prosecutor] is in contact with the stenographer drafting them." (affirmation of prosecutor, exhibit 1, Notice of Non-Disclosure at 1)

On August 11, 2025, the defendant's attorney conferred by email with the assigned prosecutor. In her email, she identified 17 items of discovery that were potentially missing separate from missing police misconduct paperwork for four police officers. (see affirmation of defendant's attorney, exhibit A, affirmation of prosecutor, People's exhibit 2)^[FN3]

On August 11, 2025, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel and said he would contact Police Officer Eikenes, the arresting officer. On August 15, 2025, the prosecutor emailed the Police Officer Eikenes, the list of the potentially missing items of discovery. On August 19, 2025, the prosecutor emailed defense counsel that he contacted Police Officer Eikenes and was awaiting a response as to the disposition of the noted discovery items. On August 27, 2025, the prosecutor again emailed Police Officer Eikenes and asked if the requested items existed. (Affirmation of prosecutor at 7, exhibit 4) On August 29, 2025, Police Officer Eikenes responded to the prosecutor with two emails and provided updates as to the potentially missing items of discovery.

The People disclosed to the defense the grand jury minutes on August 27, 2025. In the supplemental COC, the People explained that the on July 23, 2025, when the People filed their COC, the grand jury minutes had not yet been transcribed by Brianna Kerr, the grand jury reporter who recorded the grand jury proceedings that concluded on July 7, 2025. The reporter created the minutes on August 21, 2025.

In the People's response papers, the prosecutor stated that on July 15, 2025, he requested the production of the minutes be expedited. (Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, at 47) The prosecutor also clarified that Ms. Kerr had actually created the grand jury minutes on July 22, 2025, . . . "but due to an unknown error, the assigned was not notified as to their completion at that time nor where the minutes available in the QDA discovery sharing platform at the time the People filed their COC on July 23, 2025." (Id., at 47) The prosecutor explained that he learned that the minutes had been created on July 22, 2025, although not made available him until August 21, 2025, when Shanise O'Neill, the chief of the Grand Jury Bureau included him in an email to Ms. Kerr, the grand jury reporter, in which O'Neill asked Kerr about the status of the minutes. (Id., at 47)

The prosecutor also discussed in his affirmation and Memorandum of Law the "substantial delays" the Queens District Attorney's office was experiencing in the production of grand jury transcripts and the causes of those delays. (see affirmation of prosecutor, at 9, ¶ 11, Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, at 48) Further, in an effort to demonstrate the nature of the delay, the assigned prosecutor submitted an affidavit from Randi Koch, of the Queens District Attorney's office in the capacity as the supervisor of the grand jury reporters. In the affidavit, dated May 5, 2025, Ms. Koch outlined the persistent shortage of qualified grand jury reporters and the substantial increase in grand jury presentations in the last two years as significant factors that causes delays in some cases in the production of grand jury transcripts. Ms. Koch also explained that new protocols had been implemented to help reporters prioritize cases and to timely notify prosecutors by email when their grand jury minutes are available. (Affirmation of prosecutor at 9, ¶ 11, exhibit 5).

The People disclosed to the defense the finalized activity logs for Police Officer Wilfredo Valentin, and Andrew Eikenes. The People also disclosed four photographs taken by police officers: a photograph of a license plate, a photograph of damage to a BMW, the defendant's vehicle, a photograph of the complainant's Tesla license plate, and a photograph of damage to the Tesla. Finally, the People disclosed Axon Device Audit Logs for Police Officers Wojcicki, Ortiz, Lin, Valentin, and Eikenes.

The prosecutor explained, with respect to the delayed production of the photographs, that prior to meeting with Police Officer Eikenes on July 7, 2025, he had instructed him to appear with his entire arrest packet. On July 7, 2025, Police Officer Eikenes assured the prosecutor that the arrest packet constituted all the police documentation that had been created in this case. Following the August 11th email conferral from defense counsel, the prosecutor learned from Police Officer Eikenes that he had taken 4 photographs of the damaged vehicles and license plates but he had forgotten to include in his arrest packet. (Affirmation of prosecutor, at 6-8; Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, at 24, 42)

The People disclosed the names and contact information for two civilian witnesses: Alfreado Castillo and Jonathan Morales. The People also disclosed the IDTU metadata related to the defendant's IDTU video interview.

The prosecutor explained that on July 7, 2025, when he met with Mr. Buitrago, he asked him for the Tesla video files of the collision and aftermath, and the names and contact information of his two passengers. Mr. Buitrago agreed he would provide the requested information. Sometime between July 7, 2025 and August 15, 2025, Mr. Buitrago provided the Tesla video files to the prosecutor but not the names and contact information for the two passengers. On August 15, 2025, the prosecutor again contacted Mr. Buitrago for the names and contact information of the two passengers. The prosecutor, not having heard from Mr. Buitrago, again emailed him on August 28, 2025, requesting the names and contact information for the two passengers. Although Mr. Buitrago responded on September 2, 2025, the prosecutor overlooked Mr. Buitrago's email until October 6, 2025. On October 6, 2025, the prosecutor, while reviewing the correspondence related to this case as he prepared his response to this motion, found Mr. Buitrago's September 2nd email that contained the names and contact information for his two passengers. The prosecutor then disclosed that information to the defense that day. (Affirmation of prosecutor, at 6-8; Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, 24, 43)

With respect to the IDTU video interview metadata, the prosecutor explained in the October 6, 2025 supplemental COC and in the Memorandum of Law appended to the People's response to this motion that on August 18, 2025, that once alerted by the defense as to the missing metadata, he contacted the QDA Discovery Liaison Unit and requested the missing metadata. On August 28, 2025, the prosecutor received the requested material, but upon inspection the following day found that only the IDTU video interview of the defendant had been provided, not the corresponding metadata. On September 2, 2025, personnel from the QDA Discovery Liaison Unit contacted the IDTU tech at Highway Unit #3 to obtain the IDTU video interview metadata for the defendant. The prosecutor explained further that sometime before October 6, 2025, he discovered that the defendant's IDTU video metadata file had been mistakenly shared with another Legal Aid attorney with an email of [email protected] on [*6]April 9, 2025. (October 6, 2025 Supplemental COC with appended Shared Discovery Document as of October 6, 2025, at 2; Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, at 43; Exhibit 3, October 6, 2025, Supplemental COC with appended Shared Discovery Document as of October 6, 2025)

Further, in the prosecutor's affirmation, the prosecutor stated the "IDTU Metadata which had been mislabeled by NYPD Highway # 3" as the reason why the ITDU Metadata was previously shared with the Legal Aid Society on April 9, 2025. (Affirmation of prosecutor, at 8)

The People also submitted exhibit 1 as part of their response a copy of the COC to which was appended the Shared Discovery Document as of July 23, 2025, that was filed with the court on July 23, 2025. The COC indicates that on page 1 that the IDTU video interview for the defendant and the corresponding docket number was disclosed. The page following shows that the IDTU video interview for Camila Reyna, a defendant unrelated to this case, was also disclosed to defense counsel. The same entries for the defendant and Camila Reyna appear again on page 9 of the COC. In the Shared Discovery Document, on page 10, appended to the COC, recorded that the IDTU video interviews of the defendant and Camila Reyna were disclosed on February 3, 2025, to an attorney with the Legal Aid Society with an email of [email protected].

The defendant alleges the People failed to disclose the ambulance call report and related contact information of the EMS personnel who responded. The defense also alleges that the People failed to exercise due diligence when alerted to the missing Axon device audit logs for the five police officers that the People belatedly disclosed with the August 29, 2025, supplemental COC.

The People assert that the ambulance call report and related contact information of the EMS personnel who responded is not discoverable because none of this material relate to or are relevant to the subject matter of the charges filed against the defendant. Moreover, the People maintain they have no obligation to get these records because those records require a subpoena, and the People are not required to disclose records that the defense could also subpoena. (Prosecutor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, at 30-35)

Under the revised 2025 discovery statute, the People are now required to disclose anything relevant to the charges. In making this demand for the ambulance call report, the defense relies on People v Rahman, 79 Misc 3d 129(A), (App Term 2d Dept 2023). In that case, a prosecution involving an assault charge, the court found the People failed to exercise due diligence when they failed to seek to FDNY/EMS medical records after EMS was summoned by the police. Unlike Rahman, where the injuries of an assault victim are critical evidence, the injuries to a civilian resulting from a car crash is irrelevant to whether the driver was under the influence of alcohol. The fact that the People elicited injury testimony in the grand jury does not make the ambulance call report discoverable for the underlying DWI and related charges since the witness's testimony about his injury does not relate to a specific element of the charges filed against the defendant. Thus, the People did not commit a discovery violation by not subpoenaing the ambulance call report because they do not relate to the criminal action or proceeding. (see People v Copeman, 8 Misc 3d 1250[A] [Crim Ct Kings County 2025]; People v Johnson, 85 Misc 3d 1238[A] [Sup Ct Kings County 2025]).

Although the People disclosed the device audit trails for body worn cameras for all [*7]officers once alerted by defense, the People maintain that none of these documents are related to the subject matter of the case. The court agrees with the People. In this case, the defendant has not shown that any of the audit trails for body worn cameras is related to the subject matter of the defendant's case or to the charges filed. (see People v Rodriguez, 84 Misc 3d 685 [Sup Ct Kings County 2024]; People v Larkin, 72 Misc 3d 663 [Sup Ct Kings County 2021].) In the absence of such a showing that any of the device audit trails is related to the subject matter of this case or to the charges, the defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC on this ground is denied.

The defense alerted the People that several discovery items were missing. Those items were all property invoices, DMV lookups/DMV Compass Report, motor vehicle collision report, Notice of Hearing form (Krimstock hearing), tow paperwork and civilian contact information.

With respect to these items, the assigned ADA, once alerted, contacted the arresting officer. The arresting officer informed the assigned ADA by email on August 29, 2025, that none of these items were created and do not exist. (affirmation of prosecutor at 9, exhibit 4, emails of August 15th, 18th and 29th)

The defendant contends he is entitled the following disciplinary records for the following law enforcement officers and relies primarily on People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122 (2d Dept 2025):

1. Police Officer Andrew Eikenes: CPI, IAB Logs 19-2983, 22-11685, 24-4057, and 24-36762 and related index sheets, closing reports, command discipline reports, and attachments for each IAB log; underlying documents for CCRB cases 202412650 and 202503848.

2. Police Officer Daniel Fink: CPI, MOS allegation history, IAB logs 18-14551 and 20-5675 and related index sheets, closing report and attachments.

3. Police Officer Miranda Ortiz: CPI, MOS allegation history, and underlying documents for CCRB case 202207151.

4. Police Officer Wilfredo Valentin: CPI, IAB logs 21-18818, 23-12601, 24-4057, 24-21923, and 24-36762 and related index sheets, closing reports, attachments and DAO reports for IAB log 24-336762. Underlying documents for CCRB case 202412650.

5. Police Officer Alexandra Wojcicki: CPI, MOS allegation history, IAB logs 21-10374, 23-2962, 24-1718, and 24-27832 and related index sheets closing reports and attachments, and DAO reports and Command Discipline records for IAB logs 23-2962 and 24-1718.

The People assert they shared summaries of these materials in LEOW letters with the defense. (See affirmation of prosecutor, at 76) Relying on the holdings in People v Johnson, 218, AD3d 1347 (4th Dept 2023), People v McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2023) and People v Jawad, 84 Misc 3d 31 (App. Term 2d, 11th, and 13th Jud. Dists. 2024), the People assert these materials are not within the scope of automatic discovery because they do not relate to the subject matter of the case. (Affirmation of prosecutor at 66-75) This court agrees. In Coley, two police officers responded to a call of men fighting. When they arrived at the location, the defendant and 4 others were in a vehicle. After one of the defendants got out of the car, Lt. Ruiz, [*8]one of the officers who responded, allegedly saw a loaded weapon on the floor directly below the driver seat. Coley and the other individuals were arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon based on the testimony of Lt. Ruiz. In a prior case. Lt. Ruiz (then Sgt. Ruiz) testified at a suppression hearing. Lt. Ruiz testified that he could read the numbers and the name on a credit card that was on the center console of a car while standing outside the car. He further stated that he could see that the fourth to last digit on the card was altered. On appeal, the court after exercising its power to conduct an independent factual review, found the testimony of Lt. Ruiz incredible. In Coley, the court found, under the circumstances of this case, that the underlying records in the case in which Lt. Ruiz' testimony was found to be incredible related to the to the subject matter of Coley's case for impeachment purposes because the material from the prior case went toward the weight of Lt. Ruiz's credibility. Coley at 138.

In this case, the defendant has not shown that any of the police misconduct disclosed as potential impeachment was related to the subject matter of the defendant's case or to the charges filed. In the absence of such a showing that any of the misconduct is related to the subject matter of this case or to the charges, the People complied with their statutory automatic discovery obligations by the submission of LEOW letters summarizing each police witness's existing disciplinary history and they need not obtain the underlying documentation.

Since Coley was decided, CPL § 245.20(1)(k) was amended on August 7, 2025. (See, L 2025, ch 56, part LL, § 8) The amendment clarified that the "relate to the subject matter" language applies directly to the impeachment category of discovery. The holding in Coley recognized that a prior finding that a testifying police officer lacked credibility and whose testimony is central to the prosecution of a case is always directly related to the subject matter of the case. Because the holdings in Johnson, McCarty, and Jawad did not involve an adverse judicial credibility finding, the holdings of those cases are not inconsistent with Coley.

Due diligence under CPL 245.50(1) is assessed by evaluating the reasonableness" of a prosecutor's efforts as a whole. While the law rejects "strict liability" and does not expect a "perfect prosecutor", it demands a prosecutor make reasonable inquiries into all mandatory disclosure categories of discovery before a COC is filed.

The cumulative weight of the following four evidence categories demonstrates a failure of due diligence that renders the July 23, 2025, COC invalid and the statement of readiness illusory.

The prosecutor emailed the grand jury reporter on July 15, 2025 to "expedite" the transcript. From July 15 to August 21, 2025, the prosecutor made zero follow-up attempts. First, these 37 days of inactivity were never explained by the prosecutor. Second, the prosecutor's arguments regarding the grand jury transcripts contain significant contradictions that undermine the validity of the COC.

In his August 27, 2025, supplemental COC the prosecutor explicitly stated the reporter had created the transcript on August 21, 2025. However, when later responding to the defense motion, the prosecutor admitted the transcript was actually created on July 22, 2025.

The prosecutor argued that for "some unknown reason" he was not notified of the transcripts availability on July 22, 2025. At the same time, he submitted an affidavit from Ms. [*9]Koch detailing that notification protocols were already in place to email prosecutors when transcripts are available.

Then the prosecutor blamed the delay on a "shortage of qualified grand jury reporters" and "an increased caseload". However, the factual record shows there was no production delay. The reporter completed the transcript on July 22nd, just 15 days after the presentation. This argument is belied by the facts of the case. Using a systemic excuse of a shortage of reporters and an increased caseload to explain a delay that was actually caused by internal management issues by failing to download an available file is simply an attempt to shift responsibility.

Waiting 37 days to check the status of an "expedited" request to produce the grand jury transcript, especially when the reporter completed the transcript on July 22, 2025, coupled with these shifting and contradictory narratives, undermine the prosecutor's claim he acted with due diligence.

In a DWI case involving a collision, photographs of car damage are foundational. Their absence, particularly when the footage of body worn cameras capture police officers taking photographs, should have been obvious to a prosecutor exercising due diligence.

If a prosecutor cannot provide certain information at the time of filing, they must state in the COC that despite "diligent, good faith efforts" specific items are still unavailable. The prosecutor must identify what is missing and explain the efforts made to get it. (CPL§ 245.50[1]) A prosecutor who files a COC aware he is missing required information is required to alert the defense by noting in the COC the specific items are still unavailable. In this case, the prosecutor requested on July 7, 2025 that Mr. Buitrago provide the names and contact information of his two passengers. When he filed his COC on July 23rd, he failed to identify that the names and contact information of two civilian witness were still missing and the efforts he made to that point to obtain the missing information. The failure to include in the COC this missing information is a violation that a COC must be accurate and complete to the best of the prosecutor's knowledge. The prosecutor's argument that he "overlooked" the email containing the names and contact information does not excuse his failure to monitor incoming correspondence for the response that he requested on August 28th. On September 2nd, the prosecutor had actual possession of the names and contact information for the two civilian witnesses. The prosecutor's good faith cannot cure a lack of due diligence and the failure to disclose it over a month after it was received.

Metadata is the means by which the defense can verify the integrity of the DWI video, including the actual time of recording and any potential requests. This evidence is an important means to determine the authenticity of the defendant IDTU video interview, an important piece of evidence against the defendant. The prosecutor argued that an honest "mislabeling" error occurred. An honest mislabeling error is not an acceptable excuse for the lack of a basic verification protocol, especially when the COC itself flagged that the wrong video had been sent [*10]and the IDTU metadata was missing. The prosecutor argued that an honest mislabeling error caused the IDTU metadata to be sent to the wrong attorney. However, the July 23rd COC explicitly disclosed that the IDTU video for a different defendant had been sent to the defense attorney. The prosecutor was on notice that his COC was flawed when he filed the COC. A prosecutor cannot claim due diligence while simultaneously documenting that they provided the wrong defendant's evidence

While the prosecutor made initial requests, he failed to make any additional inquires for the grand jury transcript for over one month. He accepted the police officer's "assurance" that he provided all discovery without reviewing the video footage from the body worn camera that revealed photographs of the damage to the vehicles involved in the collision. The prosecutor failed to check his emails for discovery that he requested for more than a month. He also failed to review his COC

The case involved the production of about 150 discovery files, largely consisting of routine police reports consistent with a DWI case, along with video footage of the cameras worn by police officers who responded to the scene. This case did not involve voluminous or complex production of discovery.

The DWI and reckless driving charges are routine and the missing materials were standard investigative and prosecutorial materials.

The prosecutor knew the grand jury transcript ( he requested their production be expedited on July 15th) was missing, he was aware of the missing names and contact information of the two passenger witnesses since he asked for them on July 7th.

His explanations —"unknown reasons" for notification failure, "overlooking" an email, and "officer forgot" are insufficient.

A prosecutor is expected to perform basic quality-control check to ensure that the electronic files, the IDTU metadata, match the defendant being prosecuted. Certifying a case as "ready" while the metadata is sitting in the wrong attorney's inbox and the video provided belongs to a stranger is a failure of verification.

The prosecutor did respond to defense counsel's conferral email, but several items took over 60 days (names and contact information and IDTU metadata were disclosed on October 6th after the August 11th inquiry).

Grand jury transcripts are essential to any case and photographs of vehicle damage and witness contact information are foundational to a case involving DWI and reckless charges.

While the omissions were eventually corrected, but over the speedy trial deadline.

The prosecutor did not self-report; he acted after the defense flagged the missing items.

A total failure of diligence on mandatory items like grand jury transcripts, the names and contact information for actual witnesses, the failure to verify the electronically created and stored information (ESI), here the defendant's IDTU metadata went to the incorrect attorney on April 9, 2025.

There is no "perfect prosecutor" standard; however, the cumulative nature of these errors — spanning major categories of discovery - demonstrates a systemic failure of due diligence. The People failed their affirmative duty to ensure a flow of information. The officer's "forgetfulness" regarding the photographs, the failure follow-up with the grand jury reporter for 37 days, the [*11]prosecutor's failure to check his inbox for contact information for more than a month, and the failure to verify that the discovery information in the COC is correct all demonstrate the failure of due diligence. The cumulative weight of the prosecutor's errors in this case fundamentally undermines the validity of the COC and statement of readiness.

This court finds the July 23, 2025, COC was invalid until discovery on the mandatory items of discovery was completed on October 6, 2025. Thus, the People's statement of readiness was illusory and the People are charged from July 23, 2025 to October 5, 2025.

The defendant moves to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(a), alleging the People have failed to declare their readiness for trial within the statutorily prescribed time. This criminal action commenced on February 1, 2025, with the filing of a felony complaint and the defendant's arraignment thereon. Although the sole felony count was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor by this court for legal insufficiency, the initial felony filing governs the maximum time allowed for the People to be ready for trial. For the reasons set forth below, this court finds that CPL § 30.30(1)(a) provides the controlling the six month period for the final calculation.

When an indictment count is reduced to a misdemeanor, as occurred in this case, the criminal action starts with the filing of the new accusatory instrument. In this case, the court reduced the E felony count of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol to an unclassified misdemeanor on December 11, 2025. While this court found the counts charging defendant with Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree and Reckless Driving sufficient, it also dismissed the misdemeanor count charging defendant with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol. Thus, the highest level offense charged in the new accusatory instrument is a class A misdemeanor and the applicable speedy trial time limitation for this offense is 90 days. (CPL § 30.30[7][e]). However, the statute explicitly mandates that when the aggregate of the time already elapsed, less any excludable time pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4), plus this new period of 90 days exceeds the original the original six month felony period, the original period from CPL 30.30(1)(a) "must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed,"

In determining the applicable speedy trial deadline following the reduction of the felony count, the court applies the aggregate calculation mandated by CPL § 30.30(7)(e). Under this provision, the People are typically afforded a 90 day period from the filing of the new accusatory instrument to declare readiness. However, this 90 day period must be added to the time already elapsed from the commencement of the action on February 1, 2025, excluding any periods of delay found to be excludable under CPL § 30.30(4). If the sum of this prior elapsed time and the new 90 day period exceeds the original six month period, in this case182 days, the original six month felony limit from CPL § 30.30(1)(a) remains the controlling period of limitation. In this case, from February 1, 2025 to December 11, 2025 when the new accusatory instrument was filed, a period of 337 days elapsed that reflects 65 days of excludable time from October 6, 2025 to December 11, 2025. Adding the 90 day misdemeanor period would result in an aggregate of 427 days. Because 427 days exceeds the six month period which would expire on August 2, 2025, the six month period from the original felony filing "must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed." (CPL § 30.30[7][e]).

On February 1, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on the felony complaint, the defendant was released under supervision. The case was adjourned to April 1, 2025 to AP 6 for grand jury [*12]action. The People are charged from February 2, 2025 to April 1, 2025, a period of 58 days.

On April 1, 2025, the People were not ready and the case was adjourned to June 10, 2025, for grand jury action. The People are charged from April 1, 2025 to June 10, 2025, a period of 70 days.

On June 10, 2025, the People were not ready and the case was adjourned to August 14, 2025, for grand jury action. On July 7, 2025, the People filed a notice of a voted indictment, the case was advanced from August 14, 2025, to AP6 on July 11, 2025. On July 11, 2025, the court adjourned the case to July 24, 2025, to Supreme Court, part K-12, for defendant to be arraigned on the indictment. On July 23, 2025, the People filed a certificate of compliance and statement of readiness. The People are charged from June 10, 2025 to July 23, 2025, a period of 42 days.

On July 24, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on the indictment, a motion schedule was set and the case was adjourned to November 3, 2025 for decision on the motion.

On December 3, 2025, the case was again adjourned for decision on defense motions.

On December 11, 2025, the court rendered a decision on defendant's omnibus motion, reducing the only felony count, Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol to a misdemeanor. The case was adjourned to December 22, 2025, on consent by the defense to consider a plea offer on a misdemeanor offense.

On December 22, 2025, the defendant declined the court's offer and the case was adjourned to January 26, 2025, for decision on defendant's motions to invalidate the People's certificate of compliance and dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL § 30.30.

On January 12, 2026, the court rendered a decision finding the People's certificate of compliance invalid and statement of readiness illusory from July 23, 2025 through October 6, 2025. The People are charged from July 23, 2025 to October 6, 2025, a period of 74 days.

In total, the People are charged with 244 days which exceeds the statutory period which in this case was calculated at 182 days. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on CPL § 30.30 speedy trial grounds is granted.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.