This action involves disputed real property claims between the plaintiffs and certain other owners in the Town of Stillwater. The original complaint contains 128 numbered paragraphs, 27 exhibits, and seven causes of action. Two of the defendants, Kinowski and Fusco, served an answer with 300 numbered paragraphs and 10 counterclaims and crossclaims (NYSCEF Document No. 63). Defendant Frontera followed with service of a similar answer, which contained 284 numbered paragraphs and eight counterclaims and crossclaims (NYSCEF Document No. 64). Defendants Christopher and Hickey then each followed with their own lengthy answers containing numerous counterclaims and crossclaims (NYSCEF Document Nos. 69 & 74). Defendants Matthew and Jennifer Liamero, as well as Defendants Lavelle and Tritschler, also served answers with counterclaims (NYSCEF Document Nos. 76, 84 & 112).

The plaintiffs have since filed an amended complaint, which contains 198 numbered paragraphs and fifteen causes of action (NYSCEF Document No. 123). In lieu of serving an answer to the amended complaint, the defendants who had previously served the above-referenced answers opted instead to file motions seeking to dismiss the amended complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7) (Motion Nos. 1-6). The motions present the following three main issues:

1. Whether documentary evidence conclusively establishes that Defendants Kinowski, Fusco, Lavelle, and Tritschler possess an ownership interest in certain real property, including a parcel known as Lot 8;

2. Whether documentary evidence conclusively establishes that certain defendants possess an express easement to install a dock on Lot 8 and congregate on Lot 8; and

3. Whether the thirteenth (accounting) and fourteenth (RPAPL 1201) causes of action satisfy the particularity requirement of CPLR 3013 and state a legally viable claim.

All the parties' properties at issue in this litigation (with the exception of 642 Route 9P) were formerly owned by Bessie M. Collins. A portion of these lands is located between a State Highway (Route 9P) and Saratoga Lake, as shown on a "Map of Property Belonging to Mrs. Bessie M. Collins" prepared in 1956 and filed in July 1957 (the "Map"). The Map depicts 10 numbered lots, an area surrounding a well and pump, and three Right of Ways ("ROW") (collectively, the "Westerly Lands").^[FN1]Another portion of these lands consist of four additional properties located to the east of the State Highway, which are known as 638 Route 9P; 640 Route 9P; 644 Route 9P; and 646 Route 9P (the "Easterly Lands").

The initial transfers and current owners of the lots depicted on the Map (excluding Lot 8), as well as these Easterly Lands, are set forth in the following chart:

The deeds for lots 2-7 and 9 & 10 of the Westerly Lands each purport to convey their respective lots, together with the buildings and improvements thereon (referred to as Parcel A), along with an "undivided one-ninth interest" in three parcels referred to as Parcels B, C & D. Parcel B is an area of land surrounding a well and pump ("Well/Pump Parcel"). Looking only at the Map, it is unclear whether this area is part of lot 1, part of lot 8, or its own unnumbered parcel/lot.

Parcel C is described in the deeds as "all that parcel of land . . . shown and designated [*3]on the [Map] as Lot No. 8."^[FN2] This lot (No. 8), as it appears on the Map, does not contain any buildings. Rather, it consists mostly of a rectangular looking area of land that seems somewhat comparable in size to the other lots. Based on the Map, this lot (No. 8) enjoys 32 feet of continuous lakefront access in between lot 7 and lot 9. This lot (No. 8), as shown on the Map, also appears to have several narrow extensions, consisting of a 3' ROW and two 12' ROWs.^[FN3]

The remaining parcel, Parcel D, appears (based on the Map) to be one of the 12' ROWs that is part of Lot 8. This parcel (D) is a roadway (now known as "Halyard Court") that runs along and/or through lots 3-7.

Parcel B: The Well/Pump Parcel

The language in the initial deeds for these specific lots (2-7, 9 and 10) conveying the Well/Pump Parcel reads, as follows:

"PARCEL B — An undivided one-ninth interest in all that parcel of land . . . surrounding the well and pump shown on [the Map], the ownership . . . to be in common with the owners of all the other lots shown on [the Map], as wells as the owners of land not shown on [the Map] presently owned by [Bessie Collins] and located east of the State Highway, the owner of each such lot and lands to own a one-ninth interest in said Parcel No. B."

These deeds also conveyed a related easement, "in common" with the owners of all other lots shown on the Map and of lands then owned by Collins east of the highway, "to take and use water from the well shown on the [Map] by means of the pump . . . and by means of the existing pipes which lead from [the] well and pump to the lots shown on [the Map] and such other lands, and to enter upon the lands . . . [where the] pipes run . . . ." Such easement is "for all purposes connected with the inspection, maintenance, repair, use, operation and reconstruction of [the] well, pump and/or pipes[.]"

The initial deeds for these lots (Nos. 2-7 and 9 & 10) further include covenants regarding the responsibility of the owners to maintain and repair the water pipes and to share equally in the cost of the expenses regarding the well and pump. These deeds specify that such expense shall be "divided into nine equal parts" with "the owner of each lot except Lot No. 1 and Lot No. 8 shown on [the Map] to bear one such part, and the owners of Lot No. 1 and the lands now owned by [Bessie Collins] east of [the] highway to bear the one remaining part."

Lot 8

The initial deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10 conveyed an ownership interest in Lot 8, as follows:

"PARCEL C - An undivided one-ninth interest in all that parcel of land . . . shown and designated on the [Map] as Lot No. 8, the ownership . . . to be in common with the [*4]owners of all the other lots shown on [the Map], as well as the owners of land not shown on [the Map] presently owned by [Bessie Collins] and located east of the State Highway, the owner of each such lots and lands to own a one-ninth interest in . . . Lot No. 8, subject to the agreement that . . . Lot No. 8 shall be forever maintained for the use and benefit of such owners in common, that no structure of any kind may be erected thereon and that the use shall be restricted to enable reasonable access to the lake for the benefit of the owners and occupants of said lots and lands, and that it shall not be used for parking purposes or any other purposes, which will interfere with the reasonable access to the lake."

These deeds further conveyed this parcel together with "an easement to use [Lot 8] for all purposes for which public roads are commonly used[.]"

Halyard Court

In addition, the initial deeds for these lots (Nos. 2-7, 9 & 10) also conveyed an ownership interest in Halyard Court, as follows:

"PARCEL D - An undivided one-ninth interest in all that parcel of land . . . shown on the [Map] as a strip of land extending from [the bottom of Lot 3 and running along lots 4, 5, and 6 and connecting into lots 7 and 8] . . . the ownership of . . . Parcel D to be in common with the owners of all the other lots shown on [the Map], as well as the owners of land not shown on said map presently owned by [Bessie Collins] and located east of the State Highway, the owner of each such lot and lands to own a one-ninth interest in . . . Parcel D, subject to the agreement that . . . Parcel D shall be forever maintained for the use and benefit of such owners, that no structure of any kind may be erected thereon and that the use shall be restricted to enable reasonable access to the lake for the benefit of the owners and occupants of said lot and lands, and that is shall not be used for parking purposes or any other purposes which will interfere with the reasonable access to the lake."

These deeds further conveyed this parcel together with "an easement in common with the owners of all other lots shown on [the Map] and such other lands to use Parcel No. D [Halyard Court] . . . for all purposes for which public highways are commonly used" (emphasis added).

The ROWs

The deeds for lots 2-7 and 9 & 10 also provide an "easement and right of way" for the 3' ROW that appears to be part of Lot 8 on the Map. This 3' ROW is "for utility purposes and particularly to enable maintenance in a manner similar to that presently existing of a water line together with pipes and connections as presently existing in and through [the] strip and for [the] benefit in common of the parties hereto, their heirs, representatives and assigns and owners of the other lots on [the Map] and the lands east of the highway . . . ." These deeds further conveyed an easement to use this 3' strip of land for all purposes for which footpaths are commonly used.

In addition, these deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10 also provide for a "a right of way" of approximately 12 feet (i.e., the 12' ROW that runs perpendicular to the 3' ROW), which runs [*5]along the boundaries of lots 1 and 10, "for the purposes of ingress to and egress from the lots shown on [the Map] and lands east of the highway from [the] highway to the shore of Saratoga Lake and also for the purposes of drainage, particularly from Parcel B . . . and the well and pump referred to herein."

In 1959, Lot 1 was conveyed by Collins to the grantees of Lot 10, the Pregents. This deed did not expressly convey any buildings (as it apparently did not have any) and expressly excludes the area surrounding the well/pump from the conveyance (perhaps because the Map arguably depicts this area as part of lot 1). In excepting out the well/pump area, however, the deed further includes the following language: "an undivided one-ninth interest in such parcel surrounding the well and pump having been heretofore conveyed to the parties of the second part [Pregents]."

Unlike the initial deeds for the other lots discussed above, the initial deed to lot 1 did not contain any language expressly conveying a 1/9th ownership interest in Parcels C & D (i.e., Lot 8 and Halyard Court) or expressly discussing any easements for such parcels. The initial deed to lot 1, however, expressly granted the same easements and rights as those contained in the deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10 for the 3' ROW; the intersecting 12' ROW; and the taking and use of water from the well; and it granted the same covenants regarding repairs and maintenance regarding the well/pump. The deed for lot 1 further specifies (as with all the other deeds discussed herein) that it was conveyed, "Together with the appurtenances and all the estate and rights of the party of the first part in and to said premises."

In 1980, the Pregents conveyed lots 1 and 10 in the same deed to Joseph Freije. The language in this deed first conveyed lot 10 and included a conveyance of the 1/9 interests in the three additional parcels (B, C & D), as well as the express easements for Lot 8 and Halyard Court. Following this language, this same deed conveying lot 10 and Parcels B, C & D to Freije then included language conveying lot 1 to Freije using the same language as the prior deed that conveyed lot 1 to the Pregents, which does not reference Parcels C & D or expressly grant any easement rights to use these parcels.

In 1986, Freije conveyed his interest in lot 10 to Joan Douglas. The language in the deeds includes the transfer of a 1/9 ownership interest in the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, and Halyard Court, as well as the same easements and rights set forth originally in the deed to lot 10 from Collins to the Pregents.

In 2005, Freije conveyed his interest in lot 1 to Robert Tate. In addition to Lot 1, this deed included "all those pieces or parcels of land" described as Parcels B, C & D in the deed for lot 10 from Collins to the Pregents. This 2005 deed for lot 1 also contains the same easements and covenants as those set forth in both the prior deeds from Collins to the Pregents for lots 1 and 10. In an affidavit dated April 15, 2005, Freije asserts that he owned the property from 1980 to 2005 and that during his period of ownership he "accessed and otherwise utilized the property [described] in Parcels B, C and D . . . pursuant to [his] 1/9 ownership interest in the same." He asserts that he believed that his 1/9 ownership interest entitled him to access across Lot 8 and that he utilized the same for purposes of accessing Saratoga Lake and making available dock space for boating purposes. He further asserts that he paid his share of expense to maintain, [*6]improve or otherwise repair the property, along with his share of taxes for the same. He further asserts that it was his belief that he owned the land, and that he exerted full control over the property and used the land for his use to the exclusion of the use of any other parties other than the other 1/9 interest owners.

In 2021, Freije's successor in title (Tate) conveyed his interest in lot 1 to Lavelle and Tritschler. The deed provided tracts the language used in the deed provided by Freije for lot 1. Among other things, it includes a conveyance of a 1/9 ownership interest in the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, and Halyard Court, as well as express easements regarding Lot 8 and Halyard Court.

In 1961, Bessie Collins transferred two parcels of the Easterly Lands (namely, 640 Route 9P and 644 Route 9P). These deeds contain an "easement and right of way" for the use of Halyard Court. The language in these deeds reads, as follows:

"TOGETHER with an easement and right of way as shown on a map of property belonging to Bessie M. Collins made by George I. Howard dated October 23, 1956 on a survey made by him on October 8-22, 1956 and filed in the office of the Clerk of the County of Saratoga. Such right of way extends from the above mentioned state highway to the northerly boundary of a lot on said map designated as Lot No. 8 and is bounded by part of the northerly boundary line of said Lot No. 8, by the westerly and northerly lines of lot No. 3, by part of the westerly line of the state highway, by the southerly lines of Lots Nos. 4 and 5 and by part of the southerly line of lot No. 6 and by parts of the easterly line of lot No. 7, all as shown on said map and is subject to all the conditions and restrictions in the deeds herein referred to including the agreement that such shall be forever maintained for the use and benefit of certain owners, that no structure of any kind may be erected thereon and the use shall be restricted to enable reasonable access to and over such lot No. 8 to Saratoga Lake, all particularly as reserved in certain deeds executed by Bessie M. Collins to Harrison J. Pregent and Catherine Pregent, his wife, and to Douglas Earl Fawthrop and Betty Jane Fawthrop, his wife, and to Nina E. Hickey, and to other owners of lots indicated on said map, as well as lands owned by Bessie M. Collina east of the said highway. Such easement is reserved to Bessie M. Collins in common with other owners to use the said right of way described in said deeds as Parcel No. D, for all purposes for which public roads are commonly used."

One of these two deeds from 1961 (specifically the one for Christopher's property at 644 Route 9P) also references a lease agreement. This provision reads as follows:

"Howard M. Gernon and Dorothy V. Gernon, the grantees herein, have occupied a portion of the above described premises by virtue of a certain lease from Bessie M. Collins, which lease is dated February 15, 1949 and recorded in the Saratoga County Clerk's office March 12, 1949 in Book 631 at page 117; the premises intended to be conveyed by this instrument are the same as described in the foregoing lease, as well as an additional ten (10) feet along the easterly extremity of the premises described in the aforementioned lease. It is also intended that the right of way mentioned in the above referred to lease is herein described by metes and bounds, and is subject to the conditions and restrictions herein set forth, and the rights therein of Howard M. Gernon and Dorothy [*7]V. Gernon are merged in the title herein conveyed."

In addition, Collins' executor (Harold J. Samuels) conveyed another parcel from the Easterly Lands in 1971. This deed also contains the same language cited above as the other two deeds for the Easterly Lands (640 Route 9P and 644 Route 9P) regarding the "easement and right of way" for Halyard Court. This 1971 deed also contains an "easement and right of way" for utility and maintenance regarding the pump on lot 1.

In addition, in 1992, Harold Samuels (as Collins' heir) conveyed another parcel to himself and his wife (including what is now known as 646 Route 9P). This conveyance purported to include two parcels on a map from 1935, excepting and reserving therefrom certain premises conveyed by Collings and/or her estate by various deeds. The exception set forth in the deed, however, did not include the prior deeds for lot 4 or lot 5. In addition, the 1992 deed from Samuels also did not expressly convey the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, or Halyard Court. This deed further provides that the parcel was being conveyed, "TOGETHER with and subject to the rights and easements contained in deeds from Bessie M. Collins to purchasers of lots on [the Map]," and "Together with the appurtenances and all the estate and rights of the party of the first part in and to said premises."

This parcel was later conveyed by Samuels' Executor (Anderson, Jr.) to Defendant Edward Kinowski in 2006. In addition to the language cited above, the deed also contains the following provision: "And also the estate therein, which the Party of the First Part has or had power to convey or dispose of, whether individually, or by virtue of said Will or otherwise."

In 2009, Kinowski conveyed this property to himself and Defendant Fusco. This deed contains the same language as the 2006 deed. Along with this parcel, Kinowski and Fusco also owned 640 Route 9P (which was previously owned by Collins), as well as 642 Route 9P (which was apparently not previously owned by Collins).

In 2019, Kinowski and Fusco conveyed a portion of the property that they owned to non-parties Matthew Harris and Katie Ogden. The property conveyed is more particularly described in Schedule A of the subject deed and is further referred to in the deed as being the "same premises" conveyed from Kinowski to himself and Fusco in 2009. This conveyance was further made, together "with the appurtenances and all the estate and rights of the [grantors] in and to [the] premises." Schedule A to the 2019 deed contains a limited metes and bounds description of the parcel conveyed. Schedule A, as well as the language in the deed, does not expressly reference any rights or easements from Collins' deeds. In addition, Schedule A refers to that the parcel conveyed as "ALSO being all of #646/Lot 2 as shown on a map entitled, 'Proposed Lot Line Adjustment, of Lands of Edward Kinowski & Kathleen Fusco, #640 & #646 N.Y.S. Route 9P — Stillwater, NY' . . . dated March 28, 2019, last revised 05-06-19 and filed . . . as Map #M2019095."

In 2021, Kinowski and Fusco executed and recorded a corrective deed for this conveyance. The corrective deed states that it was "being executed and recorded to correct the legal description contained in Schedule 'A' therein to include the right of way to and from Saratoga Lake that was inadvertently omitted from the previous deed." Scheule A to the 2021 deed adds the following language: "TOGETHER with and subject to the rights and easements in deeds from Bessie M. Collins to purchasers of lots on [the Map]."

In 2022, Harris and Ogden further conveyed this parcel to Defendants Ryan and Cassondra Dean. The 2022 deed similarly specified that the transfer was "TOGETHER with and [*8]subject to the rights and easements in deeds from Bessie M. Collins to purchasers of lots on [the Map]."

The amended complaint contains 15 causes of action. On the first six causes of action, the plaintiffs seek a judgment, pursuant to RPAPL Article 15, to quiet title and determine the parties' property rights, including, but not limited to, the ownership interests of certain defendants in Lot 8 and Halyard Court. The plaintiffs, for example, contend that the owners of lot 1 and the Easterly Lands (excepting the current owners of 646 Route 9P, the Deans) do not have any ownership interest in Lot 8 or Halyard Court, and that any easement rights possessed by such owners do not include the right to have a dock on Lot 8 or to congregate thereon. The plaintiffs also challenge Kinowski and Fusco's claimed ownership interest in the 3' ROW and the intersecting 12' ROW, the legal rights of Kinowski and Fusco as a result of a lot line adjustment, and Lavelle and Tritschler's rights in the Well/Pump Parcel. The seventh cause of action is based on RPAPL Article 6 and seeks to eject certain defendants and their docks from Lot 8. The eighth cause of action (trespass) further seeks monetary damages and to enjoin certain defendants from having any docks on Lot 8 and from congregating on Lot 8.

The ninth and tenth causes of action seek monetary damages against Lavelle and Tritschler based on their alleged disturbance of the markers placed by a licensed surveyor to identify the boundary of the Well/Pump Parcel. The eleventh and twelfth cause of action (breach of restrictive covenants) seek monetary damages and injunctive relief against the Liameros based on the installation of a drainage pipe which runs from their lot (Lot 2) through Lot 8.

The thirteenth cause of action seeks to obtain an accounting from certain defendants (namely, the Liameros, Lavelle, Tritschler, Frontera, Hickey, Kinowski, Fusco, and Christopher) for the sums received (and thereafter disposed of) by them from the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, and/or Halyard Court. The fourteenth cause of action (RPAPL 1201) seeks an award of monetary damages against these same defendants for the plaintiffs' just proportion of rents and proceeds collected by these defendants from the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, and/or Halyard Court. Lastly, in the fifteenth cause of action (private nuisance), the plaintiffs seek monetary damages and injunctive relief for certain "unreasonable and intentional" conduct of the defendants, including for behavior that was loud, disruptive, harassing, and profane.

The above-referenced defendants have filed motions seeking to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7).^[FN4] Kinowski and Fusco (Motion No. 1) and Lavelle and Tritschler (Motion No. 6) seek to dismiss those claims challenging their ownership interest in the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, and Halyard Court. They contend that the amended complaint erroneously alleges that they lack any ownership interest in these parcels and that [*9]these allegations are utterly refuted by the plain language in the deeds. Both sets of these defendants claim a 1/9th ownership interest in these parcels (Parcels B, C & D) based on deeds.

Kinowski and Fusco further claim based on their chain of title (at least on the motion) to be the sole owners of the 3' and 12' ROWs that intersect each other, whereas Lavelle and Tritschler claim to have an express easement to use the 3' and 12' ROWs. Alternatively, Lavelle and Tritschler rely on affidavits (including the affidavit from Freije from 2005) and contend that they acquired an ownership interest in these parcels (B, C & D) and a right to use the ROWs by way of their predecessor's adverse possession.

Further, Frontera (Motion No. 3), Hickey (Motion No. 4), and Christopher (Motion No. 5) seek to dismiss certain claims challenging their rights to use Lot 8. They contend that they have an express easement to install a dock on Lot 8 and congregate thereon, and that the deeds conclusively establish their rights.

In addition, Kinowski and Fusco (Motion No. 1), as well as the Liameros (Motion No. 2), Frontera (Motion 3), Hickey (Motion No. 4), Christopher (Motion No. 5), and Lavelle and Tritschler (Motion No. 6) seek to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the thirteenth (accounting) and fourteenth causes of action (RPAPL 1201). These defendants assert that the allegations fail to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 3013; and that they do not have to account for or share any rental income because they may allow their tenants to use the commonly owned parcels as incidental to the ownership of their individual lots.

In considering a motion to dismiss, "the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference" (Crepin v Fogarty, 59 AD3d 837, 838 [3d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also Hilgreen v Pollard Excavating, Inc., 210 AD3d 1344 [3d Dept 2022]). Where, however, a plaintiff's legal conclusions and factual allegations are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, they are not presumed to be true or accorded every favorable inference" (Matter of North Dock Tin Boat Assn., Inc. v New York State Off. of Gen. Servs., 96 AD3d 1186, 1189 [3d Dept 2012]).

Further, a motion based on CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be granted only where the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law (see Crepin, 59 AD3d at 839; see also CGreen, LLC v Quantum Impact Steel, LLC, 232 AD3d 974, 975 [3d Dept 2024]). Where such evidence fails to resolve all factual issues as a matter of law and fails to definitively dispose of the plaintiff's claim, the motion should be denied (Matter of North Dock Tin Boat Assn., Inc., 96 AD3d at 1188). Similarly, where a deed "contains a relevant ambiguity, [the deed] cannot justify the dismissal of a cause of action" (Slezak v Stewart's Shops Corp., 133 AD3d 1179, 1180 [3d Dept 2015]; see Witiuk v Mykytiw, 216 AD2d 779, 780-781 [3d Dept 1995] [denial of motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence affirmed where the deed was ambiguous and the parties' intentions could not be ascertained from the four corners of the document]).

"A deed must be construed according to the intent of the parties and a court is to give effect and meaning, to the degree possible, to each and every phrase or part of the deed" [*10](Cannon v Hampton, 198 AD3d 1230, 1231 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted]; see Real Property Law § 240 [3]). "If a deed describes property by reference to a filed map or plat, the filed map must be taken as part of the deed, and explanatory notes contained on the map become part of the description" (Cannon, 198 AD3d at 1233 [internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted]).

Where no ambiguities exist in the language used, such language by itself "may be considered in determining the true intent of the parties to the grant, to the exclusion of the circumstances surrounding the conveyance and the situation of the parties" (id.). "However, where the language used in a deed is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the courts will look beyond the written instrument to the surrounding circumstances" (Torpy's Pond & Outdoor Club, Inc. v DuSell, 198 AD3d 1218, 1219 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]).

As explained above, Kinowski and Fusco, as well as Lavelle and Tritschler, contend that the deeds conclusively establish their ownership interests and rights in the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, Halyard Court, and the ROWs. In contrast, the plaintiffs contend that the deeds are ambiguous and further dispute the ownership interests and easement rights asserted by these four defendants. The plaintiffs further contend that these two sets of defendants cannot both own this interest and that any interest acquired by Kinowski and Fusco in these parcels was subsequently conveyed by them to Harris and Ogden, who then conveyed it to the Deans.

Kinowski and Fusco

The prior deeds for Kinowski and Fusco's property do not expressly mention the parcels in dispute (Parcels B, C or D) or the ROWs. Rather, the deeds relied upon by Kinowski and Fusco conveyed two large parcels of property depicted on a 1935 map, excepting certain interests previously conveyed. These deeds further include a general grant for "the rights and easements" in the deeds for the lots on the Map, as well as "the appurtenances and all the estate and right of the party of the first part in and to said premises." Kinowski's grantor further conveyed to him "the estate therein, which the Party of the First Part has or had power to convey or dispose of, whether individually, or by virtue of said Will or otherwise."

A resolution of Kinowski and Fusco's rights on this issue therefore requires a rather fact intensive inquiry into the history of Collins' acquisitions and conveyances, the rights and easements in the deeds to the lots, and any other conveyances made by Collins' estate and her heirs. On top of this lengthy review process, Lavelle and Tritschler purport to claim the remaining 1/9th interest in Parcels B, C & D for themselves, and the plaintiffs contend that the Deans own it, making a CPLR 3211(a)(1) motion problematic for the resolution of this multi-party dispute.^[FN5] Considering the competing ownership claims of the other parties, as well as the [*11]complexity and number of the factual issues involved to resolve this dispute, the Court finds that it would be more appropriate to determine Kinowski and Fusco's ownership rights after the completion of discovery and the interjection of a summary judgment motion by these parties as against the plaintiffs and any other parties whose interests may be affected by its resolution. As such, this portion of the motion is denied, without prejudice.

Nevertheless, even if it were judicially prudent for the Court to decide this issue at this early stage of the proceedings in the context of a CPLR 3211(a)(1) motion, several evidentiary roadblocks exist. The deeds in Kinowski's chain of title contain a major error which calls their reliability into question, specifically, they completely fail to reference the deeds for the conveyances of two lots (namely, lots 4 and 5) when accounting for the property already conveyed. It is therefore possible that the deeds relied upon by Kinowski and Fusco also failed to reference other prior conveyances which disposed of additional property previously owned by Collins, including perhaps additional conveyances of an interest in Parcels B, C & D which could have completely disposed of any remaining interest that Collins or her estate previously had in these parcels. In addition, Kinowski and Fusco also seek to establish the boundaries of the grant in their chain of title by comparing a 1935 map with the metes and bounds description in the deeds. The 1935 map, however, does not expressly identify lots 1-10.

Even putting these issues to the side, the Court is not entirely persuaded that the deeds conclusively establish the numerous facts necessary for Kinowski and Fusco to prevail on their motion. For example, Kinowski and Fusco (on their motion) contend that they are the sole owners of the 3' ROW and 12' ROW. The deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10, however, can easily be read as including a grant of an ownership interest in these ROWs, as they are depicted on the Map as part of Lot 8 and the deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10 conveyed to the grantees a 1/9th interest "in all that parcel of land . . . shown and designated on the [Map] as Lot No. 8." The deeds relied upon by Kinowski and Fusco therefore do not conclusively establish that they are the sole owners of this land, as they contend on this motion.

Several factors also create uncertainty over whether Collins or her estate retained an ownership interest in Parcels B, C & D. The deeds in Kinowski and Fusco's chain of title, for example, do not expressly mention these parcels. The deeds for lots 2-7, 9, & 10 (including those issued after the conveyance of lot 1) can further be read as indicating that at least all the lots received or would be receiving an equal 1/9th interest in Parcels B, C & D, which would have disposed of at least nine, 1/9th interests in these parcels (i.e., 100%).

The initial deed to lot 1 further creates an ambiguity as to whether Collins conveyed the remaining 1/9th interest in the Well/Pump Parcel when she conveyed lot 1 in 1959. Specifically, this deed includes language referring to "an undivided one-ninth interest in such parcel surrounding the well and pump having been heretofore conveyed to the parties of the second part [Pregents]." This language makes it unclear whether Collins had transferred a 1/9th interest in the Well/Pump Parcel in connection with this transaction (either as appurtenant to lot 1 or by a conveyance in a separate document), or whether this language was simply referencing the conveyance made two years prior to the same grantees of lot 10. If any such conveyance was made in connection with the transfer of lot 1, it is also unclear whether Collins intended to include the other two parcels (C & D), as all three parcels were conveyed together in the other [*12]deeds and appear (based on at least one interpretation of the Map) to be part of the same lot (namely, Lot 8). At a minimum, the ambiguity created by the initial deed for lot 1 prevents Kinowski and Fusco from conclusively establishing that they hold a 1/9th ownership interest in the Well/Pump Parcel, as at least eight other lot owners (lots 2-7, 9 & 10) in addition to the owners of lot 1 contend that they received a 1/9th ownership interest in the Well/Pump Parcel, which (if true) would have amounted to a conveyance of 100% of this interest before the remaining lands of Collins were conveyed to Kinowski's predecessor in title.

Additional uncertainty was created by Kinowski and Fusco's subsequent conveyance of some of the property they acquired. The deed executed by Kinowski and Fusco as grantors for their conveyance to Harris and Ogden did not expressly exempt Parcels B, C or D from the conveyance. The property conveyed to Harris and Ogden is further referred to in the deed as being the "same premises" conveyed from Kinowski to himself and Fusco in 2009, and the conveyance to Harris and Ogden was made together "with the appurtenances and all the estate and rights of the [grantors] in and to the premises." The corrective deed for this property further purports to convey a "right of way to and from Saratoga Lake" and was made "TOGETHER with and subject to the rights and easements in deeds from Bessie M. Collins to purchasers of lots on [the Map]."

The Court finds that this language is ambiguous based on the limited record before it. Further, while Kinowski and Fusco focus on the language specifying that the corrective deed was executed to convey a right of way to and from Saratoga Lake, the deed does not specify that this was the only reason for the correction. Kinowski and Fusco have also failed to establish as a matter of law that they held this right of way to and from Saratoga Lake independent of their alleged 1/9th ownership interests in Lot 8. The reference to this right of way in this deed is therefore not entirely inconsistent with a transfer of their alleged 1/9th ownership interests in these parcels.

Lavelle and Tritschler

As it relates to Lavelle and Tritschler's reliance on their deed from 2021, the law is well settled that "[a] grantor cannot convey what does not belong to the grantor or constitute a part of or an appurtenance to the land conveyed; nor can the grantee acquire any greater rights than those possessed by the grantor, and a deed to property does not establish title in the grantee without proof of the grantor's chain of title and right to convey" (43A NY Jur Deeds § 239). Here, the initial conveyance of lot 1 to Lavelle and Tritschler's predecessors in title did not expressly convey or even reference Parcels C & D, which creates doubt as to whether Lavelle and Tritschler's predecessors in title ever acquired these parcels in the first place.

In addition, although the initial deed references a conveyance of a 1/9th ownership interest in the Well/Pump Parcel, the language in the deed is ambiguous and different from the language used in the other deeds to convey this parcel. As discussed above, this language may have been simply referencing the conveyance made two years prior when the same grantees acquired lot 10. At a minimum, all this uncertainty precludes Lavelle and Tritschler from relying on the initial deed from Collins as the basis for obtaining judgment at this stage of the litigation.

In addition, Lavelle and Tritschler's deed from 2021, as well as the 2005 deed from Freije, do not conclusively establish their adverse possession defense. While a party may [*13]adversely possess under a written instrument, RPAPL 511 and 512 nonetheless requires proof of additional factors beyond the four corners of the deed. As such, the deeds alone are not conclusive and do not resolve all factual issues. Further, the affidavits relied upon by Lavelle and Tritschler are also insufficient to dismiss the claims against them based on CPLR 3211(a)(1), as affidavits are not considered "documentary evidence" (see Crepin, 59 AD3d at 838; see also Phillips v Taco Bell Corp., 152 AD3d 806, 807 [2d Dept 2017]).

Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss the claims seeking to adjudicate the parties' ownership interests in Parcels B, C & D.

Turning to the second main issue raised on these motions, Frontera (Motion No. 3), Hickey (Motion No. 4), and Christopher (Motion No. 5) contend that the deeds conclusively establish that they have an express easement to install a dock on Lot 8 and congregate thereon. A review of the initial deeds conveying these parcels (Easterly Lands), however, do not support this contention. Those deeds do not provide any easement rights in Lot 8, except for that portion now known as Halyard Court (Parcel D), which is for the use of this right of way (Halyard Court) "for all purposes for which public roads are commonly used." As this right of way can be read as limited to Parcel D, which does not extend to the shoreline of Saratoga Lake, this easement does not include the right to install any docks on the lakeshore. Similarly, given that the easement is limited to purposes for which public roads are commonly used, the language of this easement also does not provide these owners with the right to congregate on this parcel (Lot 8).

These defendants also misplace reliance on the language in this easement making their easement rights "subject to" the "conditions and restrictions" in the deeds for the lots. Such language does not ordinarily expand or define the scope of an easement; rather, it restricts the easement holder's right to use the easement in a manner contrary to the conditions and restrictions. Moreover, even if this language could be read more broadly, it does not conclusively establish the right of these defendants (i.e., the owners of these parcels in the Easterly Lands) to install a dock or congregate on Lot 8.

In addition, Christopher misplaces reliance on the language in a prior deed regarding a lease. This deed does not expressly incorporate the terms of the lease on which he relies. In addition, the lease was expressly merged into the deed and, even if the right of way in the lease had survived the merger, this right of way was limited by time and would have already expired by now. Moreover, even if such language were reflective of the grantor's intent, it merely constitutes a surrounding circumstance and is not dispositive.

Further, the deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10 do not conclusively establish that all the owners of lot 1 and the Easterly Lands were granted easement rights to install a dock and congregate on Lot 8. Even assuming for the sake of argument that these deeds created an easement in favor of these other parcels (lot 1 and the Easterly Lands), the language of the express easement for Lot 8 in these deeds is "for all purposes for which public roads are commonly used." The language in this easement is insufficient to conclusively establish the right for these defendants to install a dock or congregate on Lot 8, as public roads are not commonly used for such purposes. Moreover, even if the Court could interpret the words "public roads" more broadly, it cannot do so in connection with this motion under CPLR 3211(a)(1).

The application of the language of this express easement for Lot 8 to all the other parcels formerly owned by Collins is also problematic on this motion given that the language in these deeds for lots 2-7, 9 & 10 fails to expressly specify that this easement for Lot 8 is "in common" with the owners of the Easterly Lands, whereas the easements for the pipes and Parcel D (Halyard Court) includes such language. In addition, the deeds for lots 2-7, 9, and 10 clearly indicate that any rights or easements created in Lot 8 are subject to various restrictions and conditions. There are therefore limitations that the Court must consider on these issues regarding the parties' rights, beyond the four corners of the deed, such as the size of the lakefront, the number of owners, the number of docks being installed, and the number of people seeking to congregate. All these factors require inquiry well beyond the face of the deeds, thereby making it inappropriate to dismiss these claims based solely on the deeds.

As for the thirteenth and fourteenth causes of action, the Court finds that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficiently particular to satisfy the limited pleading standard set forth in CPLR 3013. Nevertheless, even if any additional specificity were required about the defendants' rentals and disposition of funds, the Court will excuse such at this early stage of the litigation given that the information sought is in the knowledge of the defendants rather than the plaintiffs (see CPLR 3026; see also Fogan-Chew v Poughkeepsie Dep't of Pub. Works, 135 AD3d 702, 703 [2d Dept 2016]).

Further, these causes of action are legally viable. The substance of plaintiffs' thirteenth cause of action is that defendants collected rents and proceeds from the Well/Pump Parcel, Lot 8, and Halyard Court, and that plaintiffs have no knowledge of the rents and proceeds collected by defendants or the expenses associated therewith. Therefore, plaintiffs demand an accounting of such rents and proceeds. The substance of plaintiffs' fourteenth cause of action is that defendants collected rents and proceeds greater than their just proportion from these parcels. Therefore, plaintiffs demand their just proportion of the rents and proceeds.

Pursuant to RPAPL 1201, "A joint tenant or tenant in common . . . may maintain an action to recover his [or her] just proportion against his [or her] co-tenant who has received more than his [or her] own just proportion[.]" "The statutory purpose of RPAPL 1201 is the codification of the long-established principle that a [co-owner] be required to account to [his or her] cotenants for rents received from third parties" (Matter of Steinberg, 183 AD3d 1067, 1073 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "[A]ny item of rent received by a cotenant, in excess of his share of the income of the property, is an equitable charge against his interest" (Goergen v Maar, 2 AD2d 276, 278 [3d Dept 1956]). Further, "tenants in common . . . have a quasi-trust or fiduciary relation with regard to the property they commonly hold, supporting [a] cause of action for an accounting" (Pichler v Jackson, 157 AD3d 450, 450 [1st Dept 2018]). "[S]uch an accounting is essential for the purpose of enabling [a cotenant] to determine the amount owed to them by [another cotenant]" (Matter of Steinberg, 183 AD3d 1067, 1074-75 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]).

Given that the plaintiffs allegedly hold an ownership interest in these parcels (B, C & D) in common with other owners, they are entitled to assert a claim to have their co-owners account for their renting of these commonly owned parcels. In addition, the statute provides the plaintiffs with the right to maintain a claim to recover his or her "just proportion against [a] co-tenant" (PRAPL 1201). These are legally viable claims and should not be dismissed at this early [*14]stage of the litigation.^[FN6]

Moreover, Lot 8 is a separately created lot of comparable size to the other lots on the Map. This Court cannot determine as a matter of law based on the limited record before it that the use of Lot 8 (particularly its lakeshore area) is merely incidental to the use of the other lots. In any event, the Court disagrees (based on the limited record before it) that the co-owners of Lot 8 are entitled as a matter of law to freely allow their tenants to access the entirety of Lot 8 without accounting for such or sharing the proceeds with the co-owners in the manner required by law. At a minimum, consideration of this issue involves a fact specific inquiry and is not suitable for resolution on these motions to dismiss.

The Court has considered the parties' remaining contentions and finds them to be either without merit or academic in light of this decision.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that motions seeking to dismiss (Moton Nos. 1-6) are all DENIED, without prejudice to renew as part of a CPLR 3212 motion after discovery is completed; except that portion of Motion No. 5 seeking to dismiss the thirteenth and fourteenth causes of action as against Defendant Christoper is DENIED as moot; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the moving defendants are directed to serve and file an answer to the amended complaint by February 9, 2026; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the parties are directed to complete paper discovery and schedule party depositions, if any, by March 20, 2026; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the parties shall have until May 21, 2026 to conduct depositions of the named parties in this action; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the parties are directed to appear in-person at the courthouse for a compliance conference on May 28, 2026 at 2:00 p.m.

This shall constitute the Decision & Order of the Court. No costs are awarded to any party. The Court is hereby uploading the original into the NYSCEF system for filing and entry by the County Clerk. The Court further directs the parties to serve notice of entry in accordance with the Local Protocols for Electronic Filing for Saratoga County.